sense standard in Colorado

2016The statute must be “vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.” Nerud , ¶17 (quoting People v. Hickman , 988 P.2d 628, 643 (Colo. 1999)).

2016The statute must be “vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.” Nerud, ¶ 17 (quoting People v. Hickman, 988 P.2d 628, 643 (Colo.1999)).

2025See People v. Cooper, 2021 CO 69, ¶ 48 (The relevance of expert testimony depends on “a common sense inquiry: whether an untrained lay person would be qualified to determine a particular issue ‘intelligently and to the best possible degree without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.’” (quoting Lanari v. People, 827 P.2d 495, 502 (Colo. 1992))); accord CRE 702.

2021The test calls for "a common sense inquiry: whether an untrained lay person would be qualified to determine a particular issue ‘intelligently and to the best possible degree without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.’ " Lanari , 827 P.2d at 502 ( quoting Fed.

2016Rather, it is unconstitutional only if it "is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all." Wilder, 960 P.2d at 703 (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971)); see also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 (holding that an impermissibly vague enactment is one that is so indeterminate that persons "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning").

2016Rather, it is unconstitutional only if it “is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.” Wilder, 960 P.2d at 703 (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)); see also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607 (holding that an impermissibly vague enactment is one that is so indeterminate that persons “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning”).

2016Rather, it is unconstitutional only if it "is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all." Wilder, 960 P.2d at 703 (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971)); see also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 (holding that an impermissibly vague enactment is one that is so indeterminate that persons "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning").

2016Rather, it is unconstitutional only if it “is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.” Wilder, 960 P.2d at 703 (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)); see also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607 (holding that an impermissibly vague enactment is one that is so indeterminate that persons “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning”).

2016Rather, it is unconstitutional only if it "is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all." Wilder, 960 P.2d at 703 (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686 , 29 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971)); see also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607 , 93 S.Ct. 2908 (holding that an impermissibly vague enactment is one that is so indeterminate that persons "of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning").

2016Rather, it is unconstitutional only if it “is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.” Wilder, 960 P.2d at 703 (quoting Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971)); see also Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 607 (holding that an impermissibly vague enactment is one that is so indeterminate that persons “of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning”).

2016To pass constitutional muster, the language must convey "sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices." Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 , 77 S.Ct. 1304 , 1 L.Ed.2d 1498 (1957) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2016To pass constitutional muster, the language must convey “sufficiently definite warning as to the proscribed conduct when measured by common understanding and practices.” Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 491 (1957) (internal quotation marks omitted).

2025See People v. Cooper, 2021 CO 69, ¶ 48 (The relevance of expert testimony depends on “a common sense inquiry: whether an untrained lay person would be qualified to determine a particular issue ‘intelligently and to the best possible degree without enlightenment from those having a specialized understanding of the subject involved in the dispute.’” (quoting Lanari v. People, 827 P.2d 495, 502 (Colo. 1992))); accord CRE 702.

2016The statute must be “vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all.” Nerud , ¶17 (quoting People v. Hickman , 988 P.2d 628, 643 (Colo. 1999)).

2015Provide a patient with written documentation, based upon the physician's contemporaneous assessment of the patient's medical history and current medical condition and a bona fide physician-patient relationship, stating that the patient has a debilitating medical condition and might benefit from the medical use of marijuana."); § 18-18-406.8(1)(b). 171 However, the court's determination that defendant did not meet any of the requirements for the exeeption to apply, including establishing a bong fide physician-patient relationship, did not (and could not) govern the issue the jury had to decide:

2014"So long as a statute permits persons of ordinary intelligence to distinguish between permissible and illegal conduct and provides workable standards for those responsible for the enforcement and application of the law, due process of law will be satisfied." People v. West, 724 P.2d 623, 626 (Colo.1986). 145 "[If a challenged statute is capable of several constructions, one of which is constitutional, the constitutional construction must be adopted." People v. Houser, 2013 COA 11, ¶41 , 337 P.3d 1238 (internal quotation marks omitted). 146 "[UJnder the Colorado Constitution's separation of pow

2012Because we must construe statutory terms in a manner that avoids constitutional infirmities, "if a statute is capable of alternative constructions, one of which is constitutional, then the constitutional interpretation must be adopted." People v. Zapotocky, 869 P.2d 1234, 1240 (Colo.1994). 123 The juvenile argues that subsection (II) is unconstitutionally vague because a person can only abandon something in which that person has a right or interest, but the subsection does not describe the acts necessary to establish such a right or interest.

2012Thus, a law is unconstitutional only if it is "vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all." Hickman, 988 P.2d at 648 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 122 To succeed in a facial challenge, the complaining party must show that the statute is " "impermissibly vague in all of its applications'" People v. Baer, 973 P.2d 1225, 1233 (Colo.1999) (quoting Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489,

2002Id.; see also Lanari 827 P.2d at 502-03 ; United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir.1985) (expert may be used if his testimony can offer something "beyond the understanding and experience of the average citizen"); United States v. Burchfield, 719 F.2d 356, 357 (11th Cir.1983) (expert testimony admissible where it is "the kind that enlightens and informs lay persons without expertise in a specialized field").

2002Id.; see also Lanari 827 P.2d at 502-03 ; United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir.1985) (expert may be used if his testimony can offer something “beyond the understanding and experience of the average citizen”); United States v. Burchfield, 719 F.2d 356, 357 (11th Cir.1983) (expert testimony admissible where it is “the kind that enlightens and informs lay persons without expertise in a specialized field”).

2002Id.; see also Lanari 827 P.2d at 502-03 ; United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir.1985) (expert may be used if his testimony can offer something "beyond the understanding and experience of the average citizen"); United States v. Burchfield, 719 F.2d 356, 357 (11th Cir.1983) (expert testimony admissible where it is "the kind that enlightens and informs lay persons without expertise in a specialized field").

2002Id.; see also Lanari 827 P.2d at 502-03 ; United States v. Rouco, 765 F.2d 983, 995 (11th Cir.1985) (expert may be used if his testimony can offer something “beyond the understanding and experience of the average citizen”); United States v. Burchfield, 719 F.2d 356, 357 (11th Cir.1983) (expert testimony admissible where it is “the kind that enlightens and informs lay persons without expertise in a specialized field”).

1984See Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344 , 517 P.2d 396 (1973).

1984See Pomeroy v. Waitkus, 183 Colo. 344 , 517 P.2d 396 (1973).