sense inquiry in Michigan

2022In People v Smith, 425 Mich 98, 106 ; 387 NW2d 814 (1986) (citation omitted), our Supreme Court explained that in answering the question of whether an expert’s opinion is necessary in aiding the jury to decide the ultimate issue, it is helpful to use “the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from” experts.

2022In People v Smith, 425 Mich 98, 106 ; 387 NW2d 814 (1986) (citation omitted), our Supreme Court explained that in answering the question of whether an expert’s opinion is necessary in aiding the jury to decide the ultimate issue, it is helpful to use “the common sense inquiry whether the untrained layman would be qualified to determine intelligently and to the best possible degree the particular issue without enlightenment from” experts.

2018Singerman, 455 Mich at 145 .

2018Singerman, 455 Mich at 145 .

2018That is, the fact or datum must be specific to the case.” People v Yost, 278 Mich App 341, 390 ; 749 NW2d 753 (2008). “[W]hether expert testimony is beyond the ken of common knowledge is a common sense inquiry that focuses on whether the proposed expert testimony is on a matter that would be commonly understood by the average person.” People v Kowalski, 492 Mich 106, 123 ; 821 NW2d 14 (2012).

2018That is, the fact or datum must be specific to the case.” People v Yost, 278 Mich App 341, 390 ; 749 NW2d 753 (2008). “[W]hether expert testimony is beyond the ken of common knowledge is a common sense inquiry that focuses on whether the proposed expert testimony is on a matter that would be commonly understood by the average person.” People v Kowalski, 492 Mich 106, 123 ; 821 NW2d 14 (2012).

2018That is, the fact or datum must be specific to the case.” People v Yost, 278 Mich App 341, 390 ; 749 NW2d 753 (2008). “[W]hether expert testimony is beyond the ken of common knowledge is a common sense inquiry that focuses on whether the proposed expert testimony is on a matter that would be commonly understood by the average person.” People v Kowalski, 492 Mich 106, 123 ; 821 NW2d 14 (2012).

2018That is, the fact or datum must be specific to the case.” People v Yost, 278 Mich App 341, 390 ; 749 NW2d 753 (2008). “[W]hether expert testimony is beyond the ken of common knowledge is a common sense inquiry that focuses on whether the proposed expert testimony is on a matter that would be commonly understood by the average person.” People v Kowalski, 492 Mich 106, 123 ; 821 NW2d 14 (2012).

2016Although defendant argues that the present sense exception contains a requirement that additional evidence be presented that the event was actually occurring, see People v Hendrickson, 459 Mich 229, 238 ; 586 NW2d 906 (1998), the excited utterance exception requires no such showing, People v Barrett, 480 Mich 125, 134 ; 747 NW2d 797 (2008).

2016Although defendant argues that the present sense exception contains a requirement that additional evidence be presented that the event was actually occurring, see People v Hendrickson, 459 Mich 229, 238 ; 586 NW2d 906 (1998), the excited utterance exception requires no such showing, People v Barrett, 480 Mich 125, 134 ; 747 NW2d 797 (2008).

2016Although defendant argues that the present sense exception contains a requirement that additional evidence be presented that the event was actually occurring, see People v Hendrickson, 459 Mich 229, 238 ; 586 NW2d 906 (1998), the excited utterance exception requires no such showing, People v Barrett, 480 Mich 125, 134 ; 747 NW2d 797 (2008).

2016Although defendant argues that the present sense exception contains a requirement that additional evidence be presented that the event was actually occurring, see People v Hendrickson, 459 Mich 229, 238 ; 586 NW2d 906 (1998), the excited utterance exception requires no such showing, People v Barrett, 480 Mich 125, 134 ; 747 NW2d 797 (2008).

2003The bright-line rule in People v Barbara, supra, that testimony concerning the result of a polygraph examination is not admissible at trial remains intact.

1994Thus, the ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. [Coates, supra, p 614 .] A legislature, thus, may not enact a standard for criminal liability that depends on the varied and constantly changing sensibilities of the public. 23 In Commonwealth v Balthazar, supra, the court reconsidered its earlier decision in Jaquith v Commonwealth, 331 Mass 439, 442; 120 NE2d 189 (1954), in which it had defined the term "unnatural and lasc

1994Thus, the ordinance is vague, not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all. [Coates, supra, p 614 .] A legislature, thus, may not enact a standard for criminal liability that depends on the varied and constantly changing sensibilities of the public. 23 In Commonwealth v Balthazar, supra, the court reconsidered its earlier decision in Jaquith v Commonwealth, 331 Mass 439, 442; 120 NE2d 189 (1954), in which it had defined the term "unnatural and lasc

1991In Cirner , this Court, citing O’Dowd v Linehan, 385 Mich 491, 510 ; 189 NW2d 333 (1971), set forth the requirements for the admission of expert testimony: (1) the witness must be an expert; (2) there must be facts in evidence which require or are subject to examination and analysis by a competent expert; and (3). there must be knowledge in a particular area that "belongs more to an expert than to the common man.” [Id., pp 168-169.] The Court also stated: The "critical inquiry” with regard to expert testimony is "whether such testimony will aid the factfinder in making the ultimate decision in

1991In Cirner , this Court, citing O’Dowd v Linehan, 385 Mich 491, 510 ; 189 NW2d 333 (1971), set forth the requirements for the admission of expert testimony: (1) the witness must be an expert; (2) there must be facts in evidence which require or are subject to examination and analysis by a competent expert; and (3). there must be knowledge in a particular area that "belongs more to an expert than to the common man.” [Id., pp 168-169.] The Court also stated: The "critical inquiry” with regard to expert testimony is "whether such testimony will aid the factfinder in making the ultimate decision in

1988In doing so, it rejected the concurring opinion’s reliance on Hewitt v Grand Trunk W R Co, 123 Mich App 309 ; 333 NW2d 264 (1983), for the interpretation that the phrase "immediately thereafter” in MRE 803(1) required that the statement be made "instantly” after the event.

1988In doing so, it rejected the concurring opinion’s reliance on Hewitt v Grand Trunk W R Co, 123 Mich App 309 ; 333 NW2d 264 (1983), for the interpretation that the phrase "immediately thereafter” in MRE 803(1) required that the statement be made "instantly” after the event.

1931It was there said: “A person about to cross a railroad track is bound to recognize the danger, and to make use of the sense of hearing as well as of sight, * * * to ascertain, before attempting to cross, whether a train is in dangerous proximity; and if he neglects to do this, but ventures blindly upon the track, without any effort to ascertain whether a train is approaching, it must be at his own risk.” In Guntermann v. Railroad Co., 168 Mich. 37 , it was stated: “There is no testimony that upon approaching the track plaintiff’s decedent stopped, looked, and listened for the approaching train

1926Trask v. Wadsworth , 78 Me. 336 ( 5 A. 182 ).

1926Trask v. Wadsworth , 78 Me. 336 ( 5 A. 182 ).

1892Such conduct is of itself negligence.” This same doctrine is laid down by this Court in Haas v. Railroad Co., 47 Mich. 401 ; Matta v. Railway Co., 69 Id. 109; Freeman v. Railway Co., 74 Id. 86; Gebhard v. Railway Co., 79 Id. 586; Brady v. Railroad Co., 81 Id. 616; Guta v. Railway Co., Id. 291; Underhill v. Railway Co., Id. 43; Apsey v. Railroad Co., 83 Id. 432.

1892It was held in Potter v. Railroad Co., 62 Mich. 22 , that— “ It is the duty of all highway travelers [approaching a railroad crossing] to keep a due lookout; and, if they do not choose to heed what they ought to heed, they must bear the consequences,” In Mynning v. Railroad Co., 64 Mich. 93 , it was held by this Court that— “A railroad track is a warning of danger to those who go upon it, and persons about to cross are bound to recognize the danger, and make use of the sense of hearing as well as of sight, and, if either cannot be rendered available, the obligation to use the other is the stro

1892It was held in Potter v. Railroad Co., 62 Mich. 22 , that— “ It is the duty of all highway travelers [approaching a railroad crossing] to keep a due lookout; and, if they do not choose to heed what they ought to heed, they must bear the consequences,” In Mynning v. Railroad Co., 64 Mich. 93 , it was held by this Court that— “A railroad track is a warning of danger to those who go upon it, and persons about to cross are bound to recognize the danger, and make use of the sense of hearing as well as of sight, and, if either cannot be rendered available, the obligation to use the other is the stro

1890In Ford v. Railroad Co., 110 Mass. 240 , it was said: “ The agents who are charged with the duty of supplying safe machinery are not, in a true sense of the rule relied on, to be regarded as fellow-servants of those who are engaged in operating it.