sense doctrine in Washington

1943This was the doctrine announced by this court in Week v. Fremont Mill Co., 3 Wash. 629 ( 29 Pac. 215 ), and Jennings v. Tacoma Ry. & Motor Co., 7 Wash. 275 ( 34 Pac. 937 ), and is the doctrine of common justice and right between employer and employee, and the doctrine of common sense.” Accord: French v. First Ave.

1943This was the doctrine announced by this court in Week v. Fremont Mill Co., 3 Wash. 629 ( 29 Pac. 215 ), and Jennings v. Tacoma Ry. & Motor Co., 7 Wash. 275 ( 34 Pac. 937 ), and is the doctrine of common justice and right between employer and employee, and the doctrine of common sense.” Accord: French v. First Ave.

1943This was the doctrine announced by this court in Week v. Fremont Mill Co., 3 Wash. 629 ( 29 Pac. 215 ), and Jennings v. Tacoma Ry. & Motor Co., 7 Wash. 275 ( 34 Pac. 937 ), and is the doctrine of common justice and right between employer and employee, and the doctrine of common sense.” Accord: French v. First Ave.

1943This was the doctrine announced by this court in Week v. Fremont Mill Co., 3 Wash. 629 ( 29 Pac. 215 ), and Jennings v. Tacoma Ry. & Motor Co., 7 Wash. 275 ( 34 Pac. 937 ), and is the doctrine of common justice and right between employer and employee, and the doctrine of common sense.” Accord: French v. First Ave.

1998To sustain a vagueness challenge, Holland must prove that the ordinance is vague "not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all." Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688 , 29 *296 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971).

1998To sustain a vagueness challenge, Holland must prove that the ordinance is vague "not in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all." Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 91 S.Ct. 1686, 1688 , 29 *296 L.Ed.2d 214 (1971).

1996The majority in essence defeats the common sense of this rule of intent by holding an easement is not created unless the magic words "right of way" are contained in the "granting clause." See Sherman v. Petroleum Exploration, 280 Ky. 105 , 132 S.W.2d 768 , 132 A.L.R. 137 (1939); 189 Kan. 536 , 370 P.2d 419 , 6 A.L.R.3d 962 -1039 (1962).

1996The majority in essence defeats the common sense of this rule of intent by holding an easement is not created unless the magic words "right of way" are contained in the "granting clause." See Sherman v. Petroleum Exploration, 280 Ky. 105 , 132 S.W.2d 768 , 132 A.L.R. 137 (1939); 189 Kan. 536 , 370 P.2d 419 , 6 A.L.R.3d 962 -1039 (1962).

1996The majority in essence defeats the common sense of this rule of intent by holding an easement is not created unless the magic words "right of way" are contained in the "granting clause." See Sherman v. Petroleum Exploration, 280 Ky. 105 , 132 S.W.2d 768 , 132 A.L.R. 137 (1939); 189 Kan. 536 , 370 P.2d 419 , 6 A.L.R.3d 962 -1039 (1962).

1996The majority in essence defeats the common sense of this rule of intent by holding an easement is not created unless the magic words "right of way" are contained in the "granting clause." See Sherman v. Petroleum Exploration, 280 Ky. 105 , 132 S.W.2d 768 , 132 A.L.R. 137 (1939); 189 Kan. 536 , 370 P.2d 419 , 6 A.L.R.3d 962 -1039 (1962).

1967Thus, as we said in Davies v. Krueger, 36 Wn.2d 649, 653 , 219 P.2d 969 (1950): It is the rule in this state that the statutory requirement of giving official notice, even of a special election such as this, is in a measure directory in the sense that the requirement need only be substantially complied with where there is a large measure of general unofficial information concerning a coming election reaching the public through the newspapers, other printed circulated matter, and discussions at public gatherings.

1967Thus, as we said in Davies v. Krueger, 36 Wn.2d 649, 653 , 219 P.2d 969 (1950): It is the rule in this state that the statutory requirement of giving official notice, even of a special election such as this, is in a measure directory in the sense that the requirement need only be substantially complied with where there is a large measure of general unofficial information concerning a coming election reaching the public through the newspapers, other printed circulated matter, and discussions at public gatherings.

2023App. 851, 854 , 110 P.3d 788 (2005) (quoting Shaughnessy v. Northland S.S.

2023“Thus, no employer or employee may ‘exempt himself [or herself] from the burdens which [the Act] imposes, nor by contract waive the benefits thereof in the sense that he can bar himself from the right to claim its benefits.’” Mandery v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 126 Wn.

1984As a result, "men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning." Connally v. General Construction Co., 269 U. S. 385, 391 . *867 Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 , 29 L.

1979A due process challenge asserting that a criminal statute contains no standards does not involve unconstitutional vagueness '"in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all."' (Italics mine.) Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755 , 41 L.

1979A due process challenge asserting that a criminal statute contains no standards does not involve unconstitutional vagueness '"in the sense that it requires a person to conform his conduct to an imprecise but comprehensible normative standard, but rather in the sense that no standard of conduct is specified at all."' (Italics mine.) Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755 , 41 L.

1974Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 , 29 L.

1974Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 , 29 L.

1948It is plainly to the substantial disadvantage of petitioners to be deprived of all opportunity to receive a sentence which would give them freedom from custody and control prior to the expiration of the 15-year term.” In In re Grieve v. Smith, 26 Wn. (2d) 156, 173 P. (2d) 168 , we held that the right to a discharge from confinement of a prisoner serving a maximum sentence, is not *57 a matter of right but is a matter of discretion with the board of prison terms and paroles.

1915This was the doctrine announced in Week v. Fremont Mill Co., 3 Wash. 629 ( 29 Pac. 215 ), and Jennings v. Tacoma R. & Motor Co., 7 Wash. 275 ( 34 Pac. 937 ), and is the doctrine of common justice and right between employer and employee, and the doctrine of common sense.” In Brown v. Tabor Mill Co., 22 Wash. 317 , 60 Pac. 1126 , we said: “The rule that an employee, on entering upon the duties of his employment, assumes all of the risks incident to such employment which are apparent and obvious, and which he could by the exercise of common prudence avoid, is well settled in this state.” In Jobe

1915This was the doctrine announced in Week v. Fremont Mill Co., 3 Wash. 629 ( 29 Pac. 215 ), and Jennings v. Tacoma R. & Motor Co., 7 Wash. 275 ( 34 Pac. 937 ), and is the doctrine of common justice and right between employer and employee, and the doctrine of common sense.” In Brown v. Tabor Mill Co., 22 Wash. 317 , 60 Pac. 1126 , we said: “The rule that an employee, on entering upon the duties of his employment, assumes all of the risks incident to such employment which are apparent and obvious, and which he could by the exercise of common prudence avoid, is well settled in this state.” In Jobe

1915This was the doctrine announced in Week v. Fremont Mill Co., 3 Wash. 629 ( 29 Pac. 215 ), and Jennings v. Tacoma R. & Motor Co., 7 Wash. 275 ( 34 Pac. 937 ), and is the doctrine of common justice and right between employer and employee, and the doctrine of common sense.” In Brown v. Tabor Mill Co., 22 Wash. 317 , 60 Pac. 1126 , we said: “The rule that an employee, on entering upon the duties of his employment, assumes all of the risks incident to such employment which are apparent and obvious, and which he could by the exercise of common prudence avoid, is well settled in this state.” In Jobe

1915This was the doctrine announced in Week v. Fremont Mill Co., 3 Wash. 629 ( 29 Pac. 215 ), and Jennings v. Tacoma R. & Motor Co., 7 Wash. 275 ( 34 Pac. 937 ), and is the doctrine of common justice and right between employer and employee, and the doctrine of common sense.” In Brown v. Tabor Mill Co., 22 Wash. 317 , 60 Pac. 1126 , we said: “The rule that an employee, on entering upon the duties of his employment, assumes all of the risks incident to such employment which are apparent and obvious, and which he could by the exercise of common prudence avoid, is well settled in this state.” In Jobe

1905This was the doctrine announced by this court in Week v. Fremont Mill Co., 3 Wash. 629 , 29 Pac. 215 , and Jennings v. Tacoma Ry. and Motor Co., 7 Wash. 275 , 34 Pac. 937 , and is the doctrine of common justice and right between employer and employee, and the doctrine of common sense.” To the same effect, see Hoffman v. American Foundry Co., 18 Wash. 287 , 51 Pac. 385 ; French v. First Avenue R.

1905Co., 24 Wash. 83 , 63 Pac. 1108 ; Bier v. Hosford, 35 Wash. 544 , 77 Pac. 867 .

1905Co., 24 Wash. 83 , 63 Pac. 1108 ; Bier v. Hosford, 35 Wash. 544 , 77 Pac. 867 .

1905This was the doctrine announced by this court in Week v. Fremont Mill Co., 3 Wash. 629 , 29 Pac. 215 , and Jennings v. Tacoma Ry. and Motor Co., 7 Wash. 275 , 34 Pac. 937 , and is the doctrine of common justice and right between employer and employee, and the doctrine of common sense.” To the same effect, see Hoffman v. American Foundry Co., 18 Wash. 287 , 51 Pac. 385 ; French v. First Avenue R.

1905Co., 24 Wash. 83 , 63 Pac. 1108 ; Bier v. Hosford, 35 Wash. 544 , 77 Pac. 867 .

1905Co., 24 Wash. 83 , 63 Pac. 1108 ; Bier v. Hosford, 35 Wash. 544 , 77 Pac. 867 .