inflexible rule in Arkansas

2007The possibility of prejudice does not justify “an inflexible rule that would presume prejudice in all cases.” Id.

1995In Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 (1987), the Supreme Court acknowledged there is a possibility that prejudice will result when partners represent co-defendants, and the risk is increased when the two lawyers cooperate with one another in the planning and conduct of trial strategy, although this does not justify an inflexible rule that presumes prejudice in all cases.

2023Wood v. Lathrop, 249 Ark. 376, 379 , 459 S.W.2d 808 , 809–10 (1970); Deltic Timber Corp. v. Newland, 2010 Ark.

2023Wood v. Lathrop, 249 Ark. 376, 379 , 459 S.W.2d 808 , 809–10 (1970); Deltic Timber Corp. v. Newland, 2010 Ark.

2023Wood v. Lathrop, 249 Ark. 376, 379 , 459 S.W.2d 808 , 809–10 (1970); Deltic Timber Corp. v. Newland, 2010 Ark.

2023Wood v. Lathrop, 249 Ark. 376, 379 , 459 S.W.2d 808 , 809–10 (1970); Deltic Timber Corp. v. Newland, 2010 Ark.

1901In Trimble v. James, 40 Ark. 393 , this court said: “It is an inflexible rule that all profits made by a trustee must enure to the benefit of the cestui que trust; and if an administrator or his attorney buy up claims against the estate at a discount, the profit enures to the heir, although the purchase be made by borrowing money at ruinous rates of interest and the sale of his own property, and the estate be thereby saved from insolvency.” ' Such is the strictness of the rule.

1900Trimble v. James, 40 Ark. 393 ; Wolf v. Banks, 41 ib. 104; 2 Woerner, Adm. (2 Ed.) 1157; 11 Am. & Eng.

2023In Barker, supra, the Supreme Court recognized that the right to a speedy trial is “generically different” from any of the other rights enshrined in the Constitution for the protection of the accused.

1995In Wilheim, Justice George Rose Smith wrote: “Many situations may be conceived in which needless hardship would result from an inflexible rule nullifying every notice of appeal filed before the entry of the judgment.” 228 Ark. at 584 , 309 S.W.2d at 204 .

1995In Wilheim, Justice George Rose Smith wrote: “Many situations may be conceived in which needless hardship would result from an inflexible rule nullifying every notice of appeal filed before the entry of the judgment.” 228 Ark. at 584 , 309 S.W.2d at 204 .

1992Rather, the Court stated, prejudice is presumed “only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel ‘actively represented conflicting interest’ and that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’ ” Burger, 483 U.S. at 650 ; Ingle v. State, 294 Ark. 353 , 742 S.W.2d 939 (1988).

1992Rather, the Court stated, prejudice is presumed “only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel ‘actively represented conflicting interest’ and that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’ ” Burger, 483 U.S. at 650 ; Ingle v. State, 294 Ark. 353 , 742 S.W.2d 939 (1988).

1986We have followed the Day decision in several later cases: Young v. Young, 288 Ark. 33 , 701 S.W.2d 369 (1986); Gentry v. Gentry, 282 Ark. 413 , 668 S.W.2d 947 (1984); Marshall v. Marshall, 285 Ark. 426 , 688 S.W.2d 279 (1985), as has the Court of Appeals, Womacks v. Womack, 16 Ark.App. 139 (1985).

1986We have followed the Day decision in several later cases: Young v. Young, 288 Ark. 33 , 701 S.W.2d 369 (1986); Gentry v. Gentry, 282 Ark. 413 , 668 S.W.2d 947 (1984); Marshall v. Marshall, 285 Ark. 426 , 688 S.W.2d 279 (1985), as has the Court of Appeals, Womacks v. Womack, 16 Ark.App. 139 (1985).

1986We have followed the Day decision in several later cases: Young v. Young, 288 Ark. 33 , 701 S.W.2d 369 (1986); Gentry v. Gentry, 282 Ark. 413 , 668 S.W.2d 947 (1984), Marshall v. Marshall, 285 Ark. 426 , 688 S.W.2d 279 (1985), as has the Court of Appeals, Womack v. Womack, 16 Ark.App. 139 , 698 S.W.2d 306 (1985).

1986We have followed the Day decision in several later cases: Young v. Young, 288 Ark. 33 , 701 S.W.2d 369 (1986); Gentry v. Gentry, 282 Ark. 413 , 668 S.W.2d 947 (1984); Marshall v. Marshall, 285 Ark. 426 , 688 S.W.2d 279 (1985), as has the Court of Appeals, Womacks v. Womack, 16 Ark.App. 139 (1985).

1986We have followed the Day decision in several later cases: Young v. Young, 288 Ark. 33 , 701 S.W.2d 369 (1986); Gentry v. Gentry, 282 Ark. 413 , 668 S.W.2d 947 (1984); Marshall v. Marshall, 285 Ark. 426 , 688 S.W.2d 279 (1985), as has the Court of Appeals, Womacks v. Womack, 16 Ark.App. 139 (1985).

1986We have followed the Day decision in several later cases: Young v. Young, 288 Ark. 33 , 701 S.W.2d 369 (1986); Gentry v. Gentry, 282 Ark. 413 , 668 S.W.2d 947 (1984); Marshall v. Marshall, 285 Ark. 426 , 688 S.W.2d 279 (1985), as has the Court of Appeals, Womacks v. Womack, 16 Ark.App. 139 (1985).

1986We have followed the Day decision in several later cases: Young v. Young, 288 Ark. 33 , 701 S.W.2d 369 (1986); Gentry v. Gentry, 282 Ark. 413 , 668 S.W.2d 947 (1984); Marshall v. Marshall, 285 Ark. 426 , 688 S.W.2d 279 (1985), as has the Court of Appeals, Womacks v. Womack, 16 Ark.App. 139 (1985).

1986We have followed the Day decision in several later cases: Young v. Young, 288 Ark. 33 , 701 S.W.2d 369 (1986); Gentry v. Gentry, 282 Ark. 413 , 668 S.W.2d 947 (1984); Marshall v. Marshall, 285 Ark. 426 , 688 S.W.2d 279 (1985), as has the Court of Appeals, Womacks v. Womack, 16 Ark.App. 139 (1985).

1985Matthews v. Matthews, 245 Ark. 1 , 430 S.W.2d 834 (1968).

1985Matthews v. Matthews, 245 Ark. 1 , 430 S.W.2d 864 (1968).

1984Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261 , 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984); Williford v. Williford, 280 Ark. 71 , 655 S.W.2d 398 (1983).

1984Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261 , 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984); Williford v. Williford, 280 Ark. 71 , 655 S.W.2d 398 (1983).

1984Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261 , 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984); Williford v. Williford, 280 Ark. 71 , 655 S.W.2d 398 (1983).

1984Day v. Day, 281 Ark. 261 , 663 S.W.2d 719 (1984); Williford v. Williford, 280 Ark. 71 , 655 S.W.2d 398 (1983).

1982Ferguson v. Green, 266 Ark. 557 , 587 S.W.2d 18 (1979).

1968In Jerry v. Jerry, 235 Ark. 589 , 361 S.W. 2d 92 (1962), we pointed out that an earlier opinion had said that “ordinarily” there is no legal obligation on the part of a parent to support his children after they become of age.

1968In Jerry v. Jerry, 235 Ark. 589 , 361 S.W. 2d 92 (1962), we pointed out that an earlier opinion had said that “ordinarily” there is no legal obligation on the part of a parent to support his children after they become of age.

1961Weatherly v. Purcell, 217 Ark. 908 , 234 S. W. 2d 32 .

1961Weatherly v. Purcell, 217 Ark. 908 , 234 S. W. 2d 32 .

1926Digest, which provides that “ when a person shall die, having title to any real estate of inheritance, * * * and shall be intestate as to such estate, it shall descend. * * * Second: If there be no children, then to the father, then to the mother; if no mother, then to the brothers and sisters, or their descendants, in equal parts.” The contention of counsel is contrary to the construction given our statute of descent and distribution ■in the celebrated case of Kelly’s Heirs v. McGuire, supra, where we said: “If the estate comes to the intestate by the father, or, as it may be differently and