inflexible rule in Washington

17 Washington opinions name it 2 courts 1896–2018 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

Case	Followed	Cited
Joao Demedeiros v. Koehring Co. v. Parker Brothers Co., Third-Party Joao Demedeiros v. Koehring Co. v. Parker Brothers Co., Third-Partygreen ca1 · 1983 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998 2 sentences 1998For example, in DeMedeiros v. Koehring Co . the First Circuit allowed evidence of collateral benefits to show worker's motivation not to return to work and limited the applicability of Eichel , explaining: "[T]his circuit has refused to extend the holding in Eichel beyond its federal statutory context." DeMedeiros v. Koehring Co., 709 F.2d 734, 741 (1st Cir.1983). 1998For example, in DeMedeiros v. Koehring Co. the First Circuit allowed evidence of collateral benefits to show worker’s motivation not to return to work and limited the applicability of Eichel , explaining: “[T]his circuit has refused to extend the holding in Eichel beyond its federal statutory context.” DeMedeiros v. Koehring Co., 709 F.2d 734, 741 (1st Cir. 1983).	2	2
State v. Lewisgreen wash · 1990 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006The reasoning in both cases led to a similar conclusion in this case. ś 76 Goodwin's refusal to extend a vindictiveness presumption to the pretrial setting reflects recognition that pretrial charging allows exercise of broad discretion by a prosecutor. 457 U.S. at 381 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 ("There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.") See also this court's decision in State v. Lewis, 115 Wash.2d 294, 299 , 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (discussing the "long-recognized principle that prosecutors are vested with wide di 2006The reasoning in both cases led to a similar conclusion in this case. ś 76 Goodwin's refusal to extend a vindictiveness presumption to the pretrial setting reflects recognition that pretrial charging allows exercise of broad discretion by a prosecutor. 457 U.S. at 381 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 ("There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.") See also this court's decision in State v. Lewis, 115 Wash.2d 294, 299 , 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (discussing the "long-recognized principle that prosecutors are vested with wide di	1	2
Bordenkircher v. Hayesgreen scotus · 1978 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006The reasoning in both cases led to a similar conclusion in this case. ś 76 Goodwin's refusal to extend a vindictiveness presumption to the pretrial setting reflects recognition that pretrial charging allows exercise of broad discretion by a prosecutor. 457 U.S. at 381 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 ("There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.") See also this court's decision in State v. Lewis, 115 Wash.2d 294, 299 , 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (discussing the "long-recognized principle that prosecutors are vested with wide di 2006The reasoning in both cases led to a similar conclusion in this case. ś 76 Goodwin's refusal to extend a vindictiveness presumption to the pretrial setting reflects recognition that pretrial charging allows exercise of broad discretion by a prosecutor. 457 U.S. at 381 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 ("There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.") See also this court's decision in State v. Lewis, 115 Wash.2d 294, 299 , 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (discussing the "long-recognized principle that prosecutors are vested with wide di	1	2
United States v. Goodwingreen scotus · 1982 · cited in 2 Washington opinions naming this issue, 2006–2006 2 sentences 2006The reasoning in both cases led to a similar conclusion in this case. ś 76 Goodwin's refusal to extend a vindictiveness presumption to the pretrial setting reflects recognition that pretrial charging allows exercise of broad discretion by a prosecutor. 457 U.S. at 381 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 ("There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.") See also this court's decision in State v. Lewis, 115 Wash.2d 294, 299 , 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (discussing the "long-recognized principle that prosecutors are vested with wide di 2006The reasoning in both cases led to a similar conclusion in this case. ¶83 Goodwin’s refusal to extend a vindictiveness presumption to the pretrial setting reflects recognition that pretrial charging allows exercise of broad discretion by a prosecutor. 457 U.S. at 381 (“There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.”).	1	2
Marnon v. Vaughan Motor Co., Inc.green or · 1947 · cited in 1 Washington opinions naming this issue, 1970–1970 2 sentences 1970Willis v. Van Woy, 155 Fla. 465 , 20 So. 2d 690 (1945); Shulkin v. Shulkin, 301 Mass. 184 , 16 N.E.2d 644 , 118 A.L.R. 629 (1938); Marnon v. Vaughan Motor Co., 184 Ore. 103 , 194 P.2d 992, 1020 (1948). 3 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 469 (1958) does not stand for a contrary proposition. 1970Willis v. Van Woy, 155 Fla. 465 , 20 So. 2d 690 (1945); Shulkin v. Shulkin, 301 Mass. 184 , 16 N.E.2d 644 , 118 A.L.R. 629 (1938); Marnon v. Vaughan Motor Co., 184 Ore. 103 , 194 P.2d 992, 1020 (1948). 3 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 469 (1958) does not stand for a contrary proposition.	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (25)

Case	Cited	Years
In re the Detention of Williams green wash · 2002 2 sentences 2009In accord with the views expressed by the New Mexico and Ohio courts, in Audett we considered whether the rule at issue should be applied in Audett or instead should be applied prospectively, even though the rule had been applied in the case in which it was announced (Williams, 147 Wn.2d 476 ). ¶53 Unlike the inflexible analysis of Robinson , which was, as noted, founded on changes to federal retroactivity law, our decision in Audett respects the importance of treating similarly situated litigants alike while retaining the court’s discretion to apply a state rule prospectively if the injustice 2009In accord with the views expressed by the New Mexico and Ohio courts, in Audett we considered whether the rule at issue should be applied in Audett or instead should be applied prospectively, even though the rule had been applied in the case in which it was announced ( Williams, 147 Wash.2d 476 , 55 P.3d 597 ). ¶ 53 Unlike the inflexible analysis of Robinson , which was, as noted, founded on changes to federal retroactivity law, our decision in Audett respects the importance of treating similarly situated litigants alike while retaining the court's discretion to apply a state rule prospectivel	2	2009–2009
State v. Penn green washctapp · 1982 2 sentences 2006The reasoning in both cases led to a similar conclusion in this case. ś 76 Goodwin's refusal to extend a vindictiveness presumption to the pretrial setting reflects recognition that pretrial charging allows exercise of broad discretion by a prosecutor. 457 U.S. at 381 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 ("There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.") See also this court's decision in State v. Lewis, 115 Wash.2d 294, 299 , 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (discussing the "long-recognized principle that prosecutors are vested with wide di 2006The reasoning in both cases led to a similar conclusion in this case. ś 76 Goodwin's refusal to extend a vindictiveness presumption to the pretrial setting reflects recognition that pretrial charging allows exercise of broad discretion by a prosecutor. 457 U.S. at 381 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 ("There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.") See also this court's decision in State v. Lewis, 115 Wash.2d 294, 299 , 797 P.2d 1141 (1990) (discussing the "long-recognized principle that prosecutors are vested with wide di	2	2006–2006
State v. Spencer green washctapp · 2002 2 sentences 2003App. 401 , 45 P.3d 209 (2002), review denied, 148 Wn.2d 1009 (2003), may be inconsistent with Teaford in that it appears to hold that even where the jury receives the standard accomplice liability instruction, a defendant can be convicted as an accomplice only if the “to convict” instruction says so. 8 We have found no authority supporting the adoption of such an inflexible rule. 2003A more recent Division Two opinion, State v. Spencer, 111 Wash.App. 401 , 45 P.3d 209 (2002), review denied, 148 Wash.2d 1009 , 62 P.3d 889 (2003), may be inconsistent with Teaford in that it appears to hold that even where the jury receives the standard accomplice liability instruction, a defendant can be convicted as an accomplice only if the "to *409 convict" instruction says so. [8] We have found no authority supporting the adoption of such an inflexible rule.	2	2003–2003
Gurliacci v. Mayer green conn · 1991 2 sentences 1998For example, the Connecticut high court declined to follow the alleged inflexible rule in Eichel noting: "Eichel has been limited, however, to the federal statutory scheme of the Railroad Retirement Act." Gurliacci, 590 A.2d at 929 n. 23. [4] Even federal courts limit Eichel to the 808 peculiar statute there at issue. 1998*For example, the Connecticut high court declined to follow the alleged inflexible rule in Eichel noting: “Eichel has been limited, however, to the federal statutory scheme of the Railroad Retirement Act.” Gurliacci, 590 A.2d at 929 n.23. 8 Even federal courts limit Eichel to the peculiar statute there at issue.	2	1998–1998
In re the Marriage of: Ellen Doneen and James Doneen green washctapp · 2017 1 sentence 2018In affirming, the court noted that the trial court properly "declined to utilize an inflexible rule, but rather properly considered all of the circumstances of the -6- No. 76306-7-1/7 marriage and exercised its discretion to attain a result in accordance with RCW 26.09.080." Doneen, 197 Wn.	1	2018–2018
Cogan v. Kidder, Mathews & Segner, Inc. green wash · 1982 1 sentence 2013Jd. at 696 n.2, 698; Cogan. 97 Wn.2d at 667 .	1	2013–2013
In Re Detention of Williams green wash · 2002 1 sentence 2009In accord with the views expressed by the New Mexico and Ohio courts, in Audett we considered whether the rule at issue should be applied in Audett or instead should be applied prospectively, even though the rule had been applied in the case in which it was announced ( Williams, 147 Wash.2d 476 , 55 P.3d 597 ). ¶ 53 Unlike the inflexible analysis of Robinson , which was, as noted, founded on changes to federal retroactivity law, our decision in Audett respects the importance of treating similarly situated litigants alike while retaining the court's discretion to apply a state rule prospectivel	1	2009–2009
State v. Spencer green washctapp · 2002 1 sentence 2003A more recent Division Two opinion, State v. Spencer, 111 Wash.App. 401 , 45 P.3d 209 (2002), review denied, 148 Wash.2d 1009 , 62 P.3d 889 (2003), may be inconsistent with Teaford in that it appears to hold that even where the jury receives the standard accomplice liability instruction, a defendant can be convicted as an accomplice only if the "to *409 convict" instruction says so. [8] We have found no authority supporting the adoption of such an inflexible rule.	1	2003–2003
In Re Writ of Habeas Corpus of Jeffries green washctapp · 1976 1 sentence 1978As we recognized in In re Jeffries, 15 Wn.	1	1978–1978
Shulkin v. Shulkin green mass · 1938 2 sentences 1970Willis v. Van Woy, 155 Fla. 465 , 20 So. 2d 690 (1945); Shulkin v. Shulkin, 301 Mass. 184 , 16 N.E.2d 644 , 118 A.L.R. 629 (1938); Marnon v. Vaughan Motor Co., 184 Ore. 103 , 194 P.2d 992, 1020 (1948). 3 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 469 (1958) does not stand for a contrary proposition. 1970Willis v. Van Woy, 155 Fla. 465 , 20 So. 2d 690 (1945); Shulkin v. Shulkin, 301 Mass. 184 , 16 N.E.2d 644 , 118 A.L.R. 629 (1938); Marnon v. Vaughan Motor Co., 184 Ore. 103 , 194 P.2d 992, 1020 (1948). 3 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 469 (1958) does not stand for a contrary proposition.	1	1970–1970
Willis v. Van Woy neutral fla · 1945 2 sentences 1970Willis v. Van Woy, 155 Fla. 465 , 20 So. 2d 690 (1945); Shulkin v. Shulkin, 301 Mass. 184 , 16 N.E.2d 644 , 118 A.L.R. 629 (1938); Marnon v. Vaughan Motor Co., 184 Ore. 103 , 194 P.2d 992, 1020 (1948). 3 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 469 (1958) does not stand for a contrary proposition. 1970Willis v. Van Woy, 155 Fla. 465 , 20 So. 2d 690 (1945); Shulkin v. Shulkin, 301 Mass. 184 , 16 N.E.2d 644 , 118 A.L.R. 629 (1938); Marnon v. Vaughan Motor Co., 184 Ore. 103 , 194 P.2d 992, 1020 (1948). 3 Restatement (Second) of Agency § 469 (1958) does not stand for a contrary proposition.	1	1970–1970
Beecher v. Thompson neutral wash · 1922 2 sentences 1942Consequently, the courts will not compel a merger of estates where the party in whom the two interests are vested does not intend such a merger to take place, or where it would be inimical to the interest of the party in whom the several estates have united (see Beecher v. Thompson, 120 Wash. 520 , 207 Pac. 1056 , 29 A. L. 1942Consequently, the courts will not compel a merger of estates where the party in whom the two interests are vested does not intend such a merger to take place, or where it would be inimical to the interest of the party in whom the several estates have united (see Beecher v. Thompson, 120 Wash. 520 , 207 Pac. 1056 , 29 A. L.	1	1942–1942
Mobley v. Harkins green wash · 1942 1 sentence 1942In the recent case of Mobley v. Harkins, ante p. 276, 128 P. (2d) 289 , this court stated: “It was an inflexible rule at common law that a merger always took place when a greater and a lesser estate met in the ownership of the same person without any intermediate estate, but modernly the doctrine of merger is not favored either at law or in equity.	1	1942–1942
Sackman v. Campbell neutral wash · 1896 2 sentences 1926Black on Rescission and Cancellation, vol. 2, § 542; Sackman v. Campbell, 15 Wash. 57 , 45 Pac. 895 . 1926Black on Rescission and Cancellation, vol. 2, § 542; Sackman v. Campbell, 15 Wash. 57 , 45 Pac. 895 .	1	1926–1926
Martínez Pacheco v. Martínez green prsupreme · 1948 1 sentence 1911Bailey v. Mukilteo Lumber Co., 44 Wash. 581 , 87 Pac. 819 ; Christianson v. Pacific Bridge Co., 27 Wash. 582 , 68 Pac. 191 ; Johnson v. Collier, 54 Wash. 478 , 103 Pac. 818 ; Morgan v. Rainier Beach Lumber Co., 51 Wash. 335 , 98 Pac. 1120 , 22 L.	1	1911–1911
Fernández v. Royal Indemnity Co. green prsupreme · 1963 1 sentence 1911Bailey v. Mukilteo Lumber Co., 44 Wash. 581 , 87 Pac. 819 ; Christianson v. Pacific Bridge Co., 27 Wash. 582 , 68 Pac. 191 ; Johnson v. Collier, 54 Wash. 478 , 103 Pac. 818 ; Morgan v. Rainier Beach Lumber Co., 51 Wash. 335 , 98 Pac. 1120 , 22 L.	1	1911–1911
Christianson v. Pacific Bridge Co. neutral wash · 1902 1 sentence 1911Bailey v. Mukilteo Lumber Co., 44 Wash. 581 , 87 Pac. 819 ; Christianson v. Pacific Bridge Co., 27 Wash. 582 , 68 Pac. 191 ; Johnson v. Collier, 54 Wash. 478 , 103 Pac. 818 ; Morgan v. Rainier Beach Lumber Co., 51 Wash. 335 , 98 Pac. 1120 , 22 L.	1	1911–1911
Bailey v. Mukilteo Lumber Co. green wash · 1906 1 sentence 1911Bailey v. Mukilteo Lumber Co., 44 Wash. 581 , 87 Pac. 819 ; Christianson v. Pacific Bridge Co., 27 Wash. 582 , 68 Pac. 191 ; Johnson v. Collier, 54 Wash. 478 , 103 Pac. 818 ; Morgan v. Rainier Beach Lumber Co., 51 Wash. 335 , 98 Pac. 1120 , 22 L.	1	1911–1911
Morgan v. Rainier Beach Lumber Co. neutral wash · 1909 2 sentences 1911Bailey v. Mukilteo Lumber Co., 44 Wash. 581 , 87 Pac. 819 ; Christianson v. Pacific Bridge Co., 27 Wash. 582 , 68 Pac. 191 ; Johnson v. Collier, 54 Wash. 478 , 103 Pac. 818 ; Morgan v. Rainier Beach Lumber Co., 51 Wash. 335 , 98 Pac. 1120 , 22 L. 1911Bailey v. Mukilteo Lumber Co., 44 Wash. 581 , 87 Pac. 819 ; Christianson v. Pacific Bridge Co., 27 Wash. 582 , 68 Pac. 191 ; Johnson v. Collier, 54 Wash. 478 , 103 Pac. 818 ; Morgan v. Rainier Beach Lumber Co., 51 Wash. 335 , 98 Pac. 1120 , 22 L.	1	1911–1911
Johnson v. Collier neutral wash · 1909 2 sentences 1911Bailey v. Mukilteo Lumber Co., 44 Wash. 581 , 87 Pac. 819 ; Christianson v. Pacific Bridge Co., 27 Wash. 582 , 68 Pac. 191 ; Johnson v. Collier, 54 Wash. 478 , 103 Pac. 818 ; Morgan v. Rainier Beach Lumber Co., 51 Wash. 335 , 98 Pac. 1120 , 22 L. 1911Bailey v. Mukilteo Lumber Co., 44 Wash. 581 , 87 Pac. 819 ; Christianson v. Pacific Bridge Co., 27 Wash. 582 , 68 Pac. 191 ; Johnson v. Collier, 54 Wash. 478 , 103 Pac. 818 ; Morgan v. Rainier Beach Lumber Co., 51 Wash. 335 , 98 Pac. 1120 , 22 L.	1	1911–1911
Rogers v. Dougherty neutral ga · 1856 1 sentence 1896And it is held to be error for the court to entertain the application, and to appoint a receiver without notice to the adverse party.” These propositions are abundantly supported by the authorities: French v. Gifford, 30 Iowa, 148 ; Bisson v. Curry, 35 Iowa, 72; Railway Co. v. Jewett, 37 Ohio St. 649 ; Rogers v. Dougherty, 20 Ga. 271 ; Arnold v. Bright, 41 Mich. 207 ( 2 N. W. 16 ); Salling v. Johnson, 25 Mich. 489 .	1	1896–1896
Arnold v. Bright green mich · 1879 2 sentences 1896And it is held to be error for the court to entertain the application, and to appoint a receiver without notice to the adverse party.” These propositions are abundantly supported by the authorities: French v. Gifford, 30 Iowa, 148 ; Bisson v. Curry, 35 Iowa, 72; Railway Co. v. Jewett, 37 Ohio St. 649 ; Rogers v. Dougherty, 20 Ga. 271 ; Arnold v. Bright, 41 Mich. 207 ( 2 N. W. 16 ); Salling v. Johnson, 25 Mich. 489 . 1896And it is held to be error for the court to entertain the application, and to appoint a receiver without notice to the adverse party.” These propositions are abundantly supported by the authorities: French v. Gifford, 30 Iowa, 148 ; Bisson v. Curry, 35 Iowa, 72; Railway Co. v. Jewett, 37 Ohio St. 649 ; Rogers v. Dougherty, 20 Ga. 271 ; Arnold v. Bright, 41 Mich. 207 ( 2 N. W. 16 ); Salling v. Johnson, 25 Mich. 489 .	1	1896–1896
Salling v. Johnson green mich · 1872 1 sentence 1896And it is held to be error for the court to entertain the application, and to appoint a receiver without notice to the adverse party.” These propositions are abundantly supported by the authorities: French v. Gifford, 30 Iowa, 148 ; Bisson v. Curry, 35 Iowa, 72; Railway Co. v. Jewett, 37 Ohio St. 649 ; Rogers v. Dougherty, 20 Ga. 271 ; Arnold v. Bright, 41 Mich. 207 ( 2 N. W. 16 ); Salling v. Johnson, 25 Mich. 489 .	1	1896–1896
French v. Gifford green · 1870 1 sentence 1896And it is held to be error for the court to entertain the application, and to appoint a receiver without notice to the adverse party.” These propositions are abundantly supported by the authorities: French v. Gifford, 30 Iowa, 148 ; Bisson v. Curry, 35 Iowa, 72; Railway Co. v. Jewett, 37 Ohio St. 649 ; Rogers v. Dougherty, 20 Ga. 271 ; Arnold v. Bright, 41 Mich. 207 ( 2 N. W. 16 ); Salling v. Johnson, 25 Mich. 489 .	1	1896–1896
Bisson v. Curry green iowa · 1872 1 sentence 1896And it is held to be error for the court to entertain the application, and to appoint a receiver without notice to the adverse party.” These propositions are abundantly supported by the authorities: French v. Gifford, 30 Iowa, 148 ; Bisson v. Curry, 35 Iowa, 72; Railway Co. v. Jewett, 37 Ohio St. 649 ; Rogers v. Dougherty, 20 Ga. 271 ; Arnold v. Bright, 41 Mich. 207 ( 2 N. W. 16 ); Salling v. Johnson, 25 Mich. 489 .	1	1896–1896

Where else courts name it

IL 112 (1869–2025) CA 79 (1864–2025) NY 65 (1872–2023) PA 53 (1841–2015) TX 45 (1904–2025) NC 38 (1886–2021) GA 35 (1909–2018) NJ 34 (1924–2024) MD 33 (1960–2025) MO 31 (1900–2020) MN 29 (1892–2025) FL 26 (1886–2025) OH 25 (1883–2017) MA 24 (1852–2016) LA 22 (1928–2016) MI 20 (1894–2026) AR 20 (1900–2023) CO 18 (1912–2019) TN 18 (1898–2020) VA 18 (1892–2023) WA 17 (1896–2018) OR 17 (1902–2016) AL 17 (1859–2011) MT 17 (1934–2012) VT 17 (1923–2026) KY 14 (1897–2023) WI 13 (1963–2025) DC 12 (1976–2023) IN 12 (1875–2009) MS 11 (1868–2022) WV 11 (1919–2024) IA 11 (1912–2014) SD 11 (1958–2025) DE 10 (1945–2026) NM 10 (1954–2021) ME 10 (1900–2024) KS 9 (1899–2020) CT 9 (1948–2021) SC 8 (1918–1966) HI 8 (1999–2025) ID 8 (1893–2013) AZ 6 (1977–2008) ND 6 (1807–2005) NE 6 (1897–1996) RI 5 (1979–2002) UT 5 (1946–2006) AK 3 (1970–1994) NH 3 (1980–1999) WY 2 (1931–1984) OK 2 (1915–1973)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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