5 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1946–2006 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Gregory Lewisgreen1 sentence2006See also Lewis, 954 F.2d at 1393 (‘“No attempt is made in the exception to spell out the ... contemporaneity and accuracy of the record, leaving them to be dealt with as the circumstances of the particular case might indicate.’”) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 803(5) advisory committee note). 7 ¶ 18 We agree that, in the usual case, the federal approach to the question of freshness is sound and that we should not impose an arbitrary cut-off point at which a memorandum or record could not have been “fresh” in a witness’s memory when it was made or adopted. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Nick Senak
green
1 sentence2006Federal courts have reasoned that the better view is that the discretion of the trial judge should not be rigidly bound by an inflexible rule but rather that it should be exercised on a case-by-case basis giving consideration to all pertinent aspects including the lapse of time which reasonably and properly bear upon the likelihood of the statement being an accurate recordation of the event to which the memory " related. 6 *888 Senak, 527 F.2d at 141 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. David S. King, United States of America v. Stanley E. Deal, M. D.
green
2 sentences2005Id. at 961 . ¶ 30 Recognizing the hazards that accompany the adoption of an inflexible rule, we embrace the Ninth Circuit’s approach in King . 2005Accordingly, to establish the requisite foundation for admissibility of a tape recording, we hold that the proponent of the recording must produce evidence sufficient to persuade the district court “that the recording is accurate, authentic, and generally trustworthy.” Id. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Pashaian v. Eccelston Properties, Ltd.
green
1 sentence2003See, eg., Statement of Recusal Policy, United States Supreme Court press release, November 1, 1993 (signed by seven justices) (opining that a bright-line rule would multiply opportunities for "selecting law firms with an eye to producing the recusal of particular Justices"); Pashaian v. Eccelston Props., 88 F.3d 77 , 84-85 (2d Cir.1996) (noting the "potential for mischief in ... an inflexible rule" that would allow "a party to recuse a judge by hiring a particular lawyer"). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Olympia Equipment Leasing Company, Alfco Telecommunications Company, and Abraham Feldman v. Western Union Telegraph Company
green
2 sentences2002Consideration for the plight of other creditors compels the Seventh Circuit’s reading of the federal rules as allowing other forms of security to substitute for a supersedeas bond under appropriate circumstances: “an inflexible requirement of a bond would be inappropriate ... in an age of titanic damage judgments ... where the requirement would put the defendant’s other creditors in undue jeopardy.” Olympia Equip., 786 F.2d at 795 . 2002Consideration for the plight of other creditors compels the Seventh Circuit's reading of the federal rules as allowing other forms of security to substitute for a supersedeas bond under appropriate circumstances: "an inflexible requirement of a bond would be inappropriate ... in an age of titanic damage judgments . . . where the requirement would put the defendant's other creditors in undue jeopardy." Olympia Equip., 786 F.2d at 795 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Ewalt v. Mortgage Securities, Inc.
green
2 sentences1946“The American Law Institute, Eestatement, Contracts, Vol. 2, Sec. 529, states the general principle: ‘Where the intent of a party to a bargain is to make a loan of money or an extension of the maturity of a pecuniary debt for a greater profit than is allowed by law, the agreement is illegal though the transaction is put in whole or in part in the form of a sale, a contract to sell or other contracts.” In Ewalt v. Mortgage Securities Inc., of Santa Barbara, 129 Cal. App. 559 , 19 P. 2d 60, at 62 , the court said: “The terms of the entire contract may be considered in determining whether it was 1946“The American Law Institute, Eestatement, Contracts, Vol. 2, Sec. 529, states the general principle: ‘Where the intent of a party to a bargain is to make a loan of money or an extension of the maturity of a pecuniary debt for a greater profit than is allowed by law, the agreement is illegal though the transaction is put in whole or in part in the form of a sale, a contract to sell or other contracts.” In Ewalt v. Mortgage Securities Inc., of Santa Barbara, 129 Cal. App. 559 , 19 P. 2d 60, at 62 , the court said: “The terms of the entire contract may be considered in determining whether it was | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.