inflexible rule in California

2023“Generally, the lead agency should describe physical environmental conditions as they exist at the time the notice of preparation is published.” (Guidelines, § 15125, subd. (a)(1).) But this is not an inflexible rule and must be read in light of the teaching that “in reviewing an EIR’s discussion, we do not require technical perfection or scientific certainty: ‘ “ ‘[T]he courts have looked not for an exhaustive analysis but for adequacy, completeness and a good-faith effort at full disclosure.’ ” ’ ” (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 515 .) The draft EIR discloses that CARB estimates the st

2023“Generally, the lead agency should describe physical environmental conditions as they exist at the time the notice of preparation is published.” (Guidelines, § 15125, subd. (a)(1).) But this is not an inflexible rule and must be read in light of the teaching that “in reviewing an EIR’s discussion, we do not require technical perfection or scientific certainty: ‘ “ ‘[T]he courts have looked not for an exhaustive analysis but for adequacy, completeness and a good-faith effort at full disclosure.’ ” ’ ” (Sierra Club, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 515 .) The draft EIR discloses that CARB estimates the st

2019Consistent with Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors , supra , 197 Cal.App.3d 1167 , 243 Cal.Rptr. 339 , we do not propose "an inflexible rule that the availability of other sites always must be considered or that it never need be considered.

2019Consistent with Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors , supra , 197 Cal.App.3d 1167 , 243 Cal.Rptr. 339 , we do not propose "an inflexible rule that the availability of other sites always must be considered or that it never need be considered.

2017Nor would such an inflexible rule be justified by the plain language of section 1871.5." ( Tensfeldt, supra , 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 124 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 ; italics added.) Thus "[a]bsent a clear and express intention of the Legislature, we cannot interpret section 1871.5 to bar without qualification receipt of all classes of compensation benefits as a result of the fraudulent receipt of any one benefit unless there is substantial proof that those benefits in question were owed or received as a result of the fraud." ( Id . at p. 126, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 .) Accordingly, the court in Tensfeldt e

2017Nor would such an inflexible rule be justified by the plain language of section 1871.5." ( Tensfeldt, supra , 66 Cal.App.4th at p. 124 , 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 ; italics added.) Thus "[a]bsent a clear and express intention of the Legislature, we cannot interpret section 1871.5 to bar without qualification receipt of all classes of compensation benefits as a result of the fraudulent receipt of any one benefit unless there is substantial proof that those benefits in question were owed or received as a result of the fraud." ( Id . at p. 126, 77 Cal.Rptr.2d 691 .) Accordingly, the court in Tensfeldt e

2013To forbid this most rudimentary inquiry at the threshold is effectively to emasculate the right of cross-examination itself.” (Smith v. Illinois (1968) 390 U.S. 129, 131 , fn. omitted; see also Alford v. United States (1931) 282 U.S. 687, 692 [“Prejudice ensues from a denial of the opportunity to place the witness in his proper setting and put the weight of his testimony and his credibility to a test, without which the jury cannot fairly appraise them.”].) 79 “The right of confrontation is not absolute, however [citations], ‘and may, in appropriate cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate in

2000In observing that Alford, supra, 282 U.S. 687 , and Smith, supra, 390 U.S. 129 , do not establish an inflexible rule requiring disclosure of a witness’s identity and address in all circumstances, however, the overwhelming majority of the decisions cited by the People and the Court of Appeal—unlike the case presently before us—involved factual situations in which the only information withheld from the defense was the residential address of the witness or other identifying information deemed to be inconsequential to the defendant’s right to a fair trial under the facts presented.

2008In particular, it seems inaccurate to characterize the defendant as the ‘prevailing party’ if the plaintiff dismissed the action only after obtaining, by means of settlement or otherwise, all or most of the requested relief, or if the plaintiff dismissed for reasons, such as the defendant’s insolvency, that have nothing to do with the probability of success on the merits.” {Santisas, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 621 .) “But we do not agree that the only remaining alternative is an inflexible rule denying contractual attorney fees as costs in all voluntary pretrial dismissal cases.

2004(Santisas, supra, 17 Cal.4th at p. 621-622 .) We also here reject such an inflexible rule to determine attorney fees under section 405.38 when a lis pendens is withdrawn before a ruling on a motion to expunge.

2005Such an inflexible rule would be based on two unwarranted presumptions: (1) that the client in all cases will be unaware of its arbitration rights simply because the attorney failed to give the section 6201(a) notice; and (2) “that in every fee dispute, no matter who the parties are and no matter what the circumstances may be, the attorney will always have the upper hand.” (Richards, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1180 .) 16 2.

2005Such an inflexible rule would be based on two unwarranted presumptions: (1) that the client in all cases will be unaware of its arbitration rights simply because the attorney failed to give the section 6201(a) notice; and (2) "that in every fee dispute, no matter who the parties are and no matter what the circumstances may be, the attorney will always have the upper hand." ( Richards, supra, 39 Cal.App.4th 1176, 1180 , 46 Cal.Rptr.2d 169 .) [16] 2.

1996"The exercise of the court's discretion in the appointment of counsel should not have been restricted by an inflexible rule, but rather should have rested upon consideration of the particular facts and interests involved in the case before it...." ( People v. Chavez, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 346 .) Moreover, the court should not be swayed by extraneous factors which divert the court from its obligation to exercise proper judgment.

1996“The exercise of the court’s discretion in the appointment of counsel should not have been restricted by an inflexible rule, but rather should have rested upon consideration of the particular facts and interests involved in the case before it. . . . ” (People v. Chavez, supra, 26 Cal.3d at p. 346 .) Moreover, the court should not be swayed by extraneous factors which divert the court from its obligation to exercise proper judgment.

1984On this point in United States v. Goodwin, supra, 457 U.S. 368 , the United States Supreme Court reasoned: “There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.

1984On this point, in United States v. Goodwin (1982) 457 U.S. 368 [ 73 L.Ed.2d 74 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 ], the United States Supreme Court reasoned: “There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.

1968(P. 578.) Subsequent eases (Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 730 , 87 S.Ct. 788 ]; People v. Webb, 66 Cal.2d 107 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 902 , 424 P.2d 342 ]) have distinguished Preston and Burke and qualified language therein which suggested an inflexible requirement of a warrant unless a search of the vehicle was incident to a lawful arrest.

1968(P. 578.) Subsequent eases (Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 730 , 87 S.Ct. 788 ]; People v. Webb, 66 Cal.2d 107 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 902 , 424 P.2d 342 ]) have distinguished Preston and Burke and qualified language therein which suggested an inflexible requirement of a warrant unless a search of the vehicle was incident to a lawful arrest.

1968(P. 578.) Subsequent eases (Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 730 , 87 S.Ct. 788 ]; People v. Webb, 66 Cal.2d 107 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 902 , 424 P.2d 342 ]) have distinguished Preston and Burke and qualified language therein which suggested an inflexible requirement of a warrant unless a search of the vehicle was incident to a lawful arrest.

1968(P. 578.) Subsequent eases (Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 [ 17 L.Ed.2d 730 , 87 S.Ct. 788 ]; People v. Webb, 66 Cal.2d 107 [ 56 Cal.Rptr. 902 , 424 P.2d 342 ]) have distinguished Preston and Burke and qualified language therein which suggested an inflexible requirement of a warrant unless a search of the vehicle was incident to a lawful arrest.

1886(Colburn v. Richards, 13 Mass. 420 ; S. C., 7 Am.

1886(Colburn v. Richards, 13 Mass. 420 ; S. C., 7 Am.

2021Croson Co. (1989) 488 U.S. 469, 509 .) The cases Caltrans cites, however, do not hold that statistical evidence is required to obtain an injunction compelling Caltrans to develop an anti-retaliation policy and train its employees regarding that policy—and we see no good reason to impose such an inflexible requirement.

2021In Pitts, the defendant argued that the court did not exercise discretion in excluding a witness’s prior conviction “but, instead, excluded it on the basis of an inflexible rule of the trial court’s own making that any crime more than 10 years old cannot be used for impeachment.” (Id. at p. 1554.) The Pitts court stated: “As we noted in People v. Burns (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 734, 738 , ‘[t]here is no consensus among courts as to how remote a conviction must be before it is too remote. [Citation]’ In our view establishing 10 years as the presumptive cut-off date for 45 prior convictions is an ex

2021(See, e.g., People v. Thompson (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 974, 978 .) However, this is not an inflexible rule.

2021For one thing, both the city and the county of Los Angeles are “expressly exempted . . . from PERB’s jurisdiction.” (City of Los Angeles v. City of Los Angeles Employee Relations Board (2016) 7 Cal.App.5th 150, 161 .) More to the point, Berkeley Council’s conclusion that the state policy codified in the wage garnishment law (and in Labor Code sections 221 to 224) “establishes an inflexible standard and immutable provisions” (Berkeley Council, supra, at p. 9) seems contraindicated by state law allowing the 21 state to recoup overpayments (Gov.

2020Even if the minimal requirements for its application are satisfied, the doctrine should not be applied if considerations of policy or fairness outweigh the doctrine’s purposes as applied in a particular case.” (Bostick v. Flex Equipment Co., Inc. (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 80, 97 .) For collateral estoppel to apply here, the key question is whether the identical issue was presented and decided between Textron and Travelers in the Rhode Island action.8 Collateral estoppel applies only to issues that were truly litigated and decided between the parties in the former action.

2018True: Courts often presume that a word used in more than one provision of a statute has precisely the same meaning throughout -- a logical inference rooted not only in how people ordinarily use language, but also in how one generally might expect legislative bodies to draft statutory provisions. ( People v. Hernandez (1981) 30 Cal.3d 462 , 468, 179 Cal.Rptr. 239 , 637 P.2d 706 .) Yet this is merely a presumption, not an inflexible rule. ( People v. Jones (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585 , 595, 250 Cal.Rptr. 635 , 758 P.2d 1165 .) Just as people sometimes use the same word to convey different meanings even

2018True: Courts often presume that a word used in more than one provision of a statute has precisely the same meaning throughout -- a logical inference rooted not only in how people ordinarily use language, but also in how one generally might expect legislative bodies to draft statutory provisions. ( People v. Hernandez (1981) 30 Cal.3d 462 , 468, 179 Cal.Rptr. 239 , 637 P.2d 706 .) Yet this is merely a presumption, not an inflexible rule. ( People v. Jones (1988) 46 Cal.3d 585 , 595, 250 Cal.Rptr. 635 , 758 P.2d 1165 .) Just as people sometimes use the same word to convey different meanings even

2016Circumstances can be conceived where an occupier of land could create automobile snarl-ups on his premises or unleash forces onto public streets the nature of which would require a court to say that injury to third persons was foreseeable and that a duty of care existed and was breached.’ (Id at. p. 562.)” (Annocki, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at p. 38 .) “‘[A]lthough the obviousness of a danger may obviate the duty to warn of its existence, if it is foreseeable that the danger may cause injury despite the fact that it is obvious (e.g., when necessity requires persons to encounter it), there may be