inflexible rule (South Carolina) · Go Syfert
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inflexible rule in South Carolina

8 South Carolina opinions name it 1 courts 1918–1966 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (0)

CaseFollowedCited
No positive-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina.

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (10)

CaseCitedYears
McLaughlin v. Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen green
sc · 1950
2 sentences

1960Trainmen, 216 S. C. 233, 57 S. E. (2d) 411, 414 , Mr. Justice Oxner, speaking for a unanimous court, said: “We have never undertaken to lay down an inflexible rule applicable to every situation.

1957In McLaughlin v. Brotherhood oj Railroad Trainmen, supra, we said: “The nature of the insurance involved, whether the insured is any longer an insurable risk, whether similar insurance in another reputable company is available, and various other factors must be considered. * * * The dominant idea in formulating a rule of damages in any case should be the reimbursement of the insured for the actual loss sustained by him, and the measure of recovery which adheres most closely to that idea is the one that should be adopted.” *468 The leading case on this question is Pack v. Metropolitan Life Insu

21957–1960
Hardee v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Philadelphia green
· 1949
2 sentences

1960On the contrary, we have emphasized ‘that the facts of each case are necessarily of potent influence in determining the measure of damages.’ Rogers v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 182 S. C. 51, 188 S. E. 432, 434 ; Hardee v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co., 215 S. C. 1, 53 S. E. (2d) 861 .

1950On the contrary, we have emphasized “that the facts of each case are necessarily of potent influence in determining the measure of damages.” Rogers v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 182 S. C. 51, 188 S. E. 432, 434 ; Hardee v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co., 215 S. C. 1, 53 S. E. (2d) 861 .

21950–1960
Rogers v. Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. neutral
· 1936
2 sentences

1960On the contrary, we have emphasized ‘that the facts of each case are necessarily of potent influence in determining the measure of damages.’ Rogers v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 182 S. C. 51, 188 S. E. 432, 434 ; Hardee v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co., 215 S. C. 1, 53 S. E. (2d) 861 .

1950On the contrary, we have emphasized “that the facts of each case are necessarily of potent influence in determining the measure of damages.” Rogers v. Jefferson Standard Life Insurance Co., 182 S. C. 51, 188 S. E. 432, 434 ; Hardee v. Penn Mutual Life Insurance Co., 215 S. C. 1, 53 S. E. (2d) 861 .

21950–1960
Nicholson v. Whitlock. green
sc · 1900
2 sentences

1939The only inflexible rule is that the trustee shall not make a profit out of the balance in his hands, and that he shall not be charged with loss except for neglect of duty.’ And in Nicholson v. Whitlock, 57 S. C., 36, 35 S. E., 412 , 414: The principle is well established that it is a matter of discretion with the Court, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, whether it will allow interest against the administrator.’ See also Dixon v. Hunter' s Distributees, 3 Hill, 204 ; Pettus v. Clawson, 4 Rich.

1938The only inflexible rule is that the trustee shall not make a profit out of the balance in his hands, and that he shall not be charged with loss except for neglect of duty.” And in Nicholson v. Whitlock, 57 S. C., 36, 35 S. E., 412 , 414: *406 “The principle is well established that it is a matter of discretion with the Court, in the exercise of its equitable jurisdiction, whether it will allow interest against the administrator.” See also Dixon v. Hunter’s Distributees, 3 Hill, 204 ; Pettus v. Clawson, 4 Rich.

21938–1939
Glenn v. Worthy green
· 1933
2 sentences

1939Eq, 92; Tompkins v. Tompkins, 18 S. C., 1; Glenn v. Worthy, 169 S. C, 263, 168 S. E., 705 .” Beacham v. Ross et al., 187 S. C., 398, 197 S. E., 369, 373 .

1938Eq., 92 ; Tompkins v. Tompkins, 18 S. C., 1; Glenn v. Worthy, 169 S. C., 263, 168 S. E., 705 .

21938–1939
Cole v. State Highway Department green
sc · 1939
1 sentence

1966We have in some cases supplied the lack of express findings by implication from the general findings, Cole v. State Highway Department, 190 S. C. 142, 2 S. E. (2d) 490 ; and have refused to consider the question in the absence of an objection seasonably made, Long Motor Lines.

11966–1966
Pack v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. green
sc · 1935
1 sentence

1957In McLaughlin v. Brotherhood oj Railroad Trainmen, supra, we said: “The nature of the insurance involved, whether the insured is any longer an insurable risk, whether similar insurance in another reputable company is available, and various other factors must be considered. * * * The dominant idea in formulating a rule of damages in any case should be the reimbursement of the insured for the actual loss sustained by him, and the measure of recovery which adheres most closely to that idea is the one that should be adopted.” *468 The leading case on this question is Pack v. Metropolitan Life Insu

11957–1957
Ainscow v. Alexander green
delorphct · 1944
1 sentence

1954Cf. Ainscow v. Alexander, 1944, 28 Del.

11954–1954
Beacham v. Ross neutral
sc · 1938
1 sentence

1939Eq, 92; Tompkins v. Tompkins, 18 S. C., 1; Glenn v. Worthy, 169 S. C, 263, 168 S. E., 705 .” Beacham v. Ross et al., 187 S. C., 398, 197 S. E., 369, 373 .

11939–1939
Tucker v. Richards neutral
· 1900
1 sentence

1918Tucker v. Richards, 58 S. C. 27, 36 S. E. 3 .

11918–1918

Where else courts name it

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Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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