inflexible rule in New York

1957(Cf. Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 370 ; Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 92-93 ; United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175,186 ; State of Indiana v. Woram, 6 Hill 33 , 38.) ” The court stated: “ We need not, however, here determine the exact nature or force of the canon in question, since the import of the statute in the present case falls, not on the state, but on an individual officer or agent thereof, and there is no showing that the proposed application of the statute will seriously prejudice the state. ‘ ‘ It has thus been observed that ‘ the rule of exclusion of

1955(Cf. Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 370 ; Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 92-93 ; United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175, 186 ; State of Indiana v. Woram, 6 Hill 33 , 38.) We need not, however, here determine the exact nature or force of the canon in question, since the impact of the statute in the present case falls, not on the state, but on an individual officer or agent thereof, and there is no showing that the proposed application of the statute will seriously prejudice the state.” (See, also, United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258 .) Distinction has been

1957(Cf. Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 370 ; Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 92-93 ; United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175,186 ; State of Indiana v. Woram, 6 Hill 33 , 38.) ” The court stated: “ We need not, however, here determine the exact nature or force of the canon in question, since the import of the statute in the present case falls, not on the state, but on an individual officer or agent thereof, and there is no showing that the proposed application of the statute will seriously prejudice the state. ‘ ‘ It has thus been observed that ‘ the rule of exclusion of

1955(Cf. Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 370 ; Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 92-93 ; United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175, 186 ; State of Indiana v. Woram, 6 Hill 33 , 38.) We need not, however, here determine the exact nature or force of the canon in question, since the impact of the statute in the present case falls, not on the state, but on an individual officer or agent thereof, and there is no showing that the proposed application of the statute will seriously prejudice the state.” (See, also, United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258 .) Distinction has been

1957(Cf. Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 370 ; Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 92-93 ; United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175,186 ; State of Indiana v. Woram, 6 Hill 33 , 38.) ” The court stated: “ We need not, however, here determine the exact nature or force of the canon in question, since the import of the statute in the present case falls, not on the state, but on an individual officer or agent thereof, and there is no showing that the proposed application of the statute will seriously prejudice the state. ‘ ‘ It has thus been observed that ‘ the rule of exclusion of

1955(Cf. Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U. S. 360, 370 ; Helvering v. Stockholms Enskilda Bank, 293 U. S. 84, 92-93 ; United States v. California, 297 U. S. 175, 186 ; State of Indiana v. Woram, 6 Hill 33 , 38.) We need not, however, here determine the exact nature or force of the canon in question, since the impact of the statute in the present case falls, not on the state, but on an individual officer or agent thereof, and there is no showing that the proposed application of the statute will seriously prejudice the state.” (See, also, United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258 .) Distinction has been

1957United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315 ; Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Roberts, 195 N. Y. 303, 323 ; see, also, General Construction Law, § 37.) The canon of construction thus invoked is usually phrased in terms of a presumption that ‘ statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be. applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect.’ (See United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 272-273 ; United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. [U. S.] 251, 263; People v. Herkimer, 4 Cow. 345, 348 .) ” The court stated further, and significantly: “There are, on the o

1955In City of Buffalo v. Hanna Furnace Corp. ( 305 N. Y. 369, 374-375 ), the court stated: “ The canon of construction thus invoked is usually phrased in terms of a presumption that ‘ statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect.’ (See United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 272-273 ; United States v. Herron, 20 Wall [U. S.] 251, 263; People v. Herkimer, 4 Cow. 345, 348 .) There are, on the other hand, indications that that canon serves, not as an inflexible rule of construction, but rather

2009Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the general policy of the respondent New York State Office of Mental Health (hereinafter OMH) mandating separate housing and therapy services for minor and adult patients was not an inflexible rule removing that agency’s discretion, and so OMH was not obligated to follow the rule-making procedure set forth in the State Administrative Procedure Act before requiring the petitioners to comply with the policy (see Matter of Alca Indus. v Delaney, 92 NY2d 775 [1999]; Matter of Schwartfigure v Hartnett, 83 NY2d 296 [1994]; Matter of Senior Care Servs., Inc. v

2007While the methodology used has been affirmed in other cases, this does not establish that DHCR has created an inflexible rule removing that agency’s discretion, and so DHCR was not obliged to follow the rule-making procedures set forth in the State Administrative Procedure Act (see Matter of Alca Indus. v Delaney, 92 NY2d 775 [1999]; Matter of DeJesus v Roberts, 296 AD2d 307, 310 [2002]).

1984“What constitutes effective assistance is not and cannot be fixed with yardstick precision, but varies according to the unique circumstances of each representation (see People v Droz, 39 NY2d 457 )” (People v Baldi, 54 NY2d 137,146 ). 11 Although an inflexible standard has not been articulated, two different standards for reviewing an attorney’s effectiveness have evolved (see People v Aiken, 45 NY2d 394 ).

1981Indeed, in Droz , this court concluded only that the defendant’s representation, under all the circumstances presented, could not be considered “adequate or effective in any meaningful sense of the words” ( 39 NY2d, at p 463 ).

1979(Martin v City of Cohoes, 37 NY2d 162, 165 ; Burgundy Basin Inn v Watkins Glen Grand Prix Corp., 51 AD2d 140, 143 ; Puro v Puro, 89 Misc 2d 856, 859 .) The reversal of the judgment left the parties in the same position as though there had been no trial.

1978Co. v Sonotone Corp., 230 F2d 131, 134-135 [Learned Hand, J.], reh den 231 F2d 867, cert dsmd 352 US 883 ; cf. Martin v City of Cohoes, 37 NY2d 162, 165 ).

1957United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315 ; Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Roberts, 195 N. Y. 303, 323 ; see, also, General Construction Law, § 37.) The canon of construction thus invoked is usually phrased in terms of a presumption that ‘ statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be. applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect.’ (See United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 272-273 ; United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. [U. S.] 251, 263; People v. Herkimer, 4 Cow. 345, 348 .) ” The court stated further, and significantly: “There are, on the o

1953United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315 ; Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Roberts, 195 N. Y. 303, 323 ; see, also, General Construction Law, § 37.) The canon of construction thus invoked is usually phrased in terms of a presumption that ‘4 statutes which in general terms divest preexisting rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect.” (See United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 272-273 ; United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. [U. S.] 251, 263; People v. Herkimer, 4 Cow. 345, 348 .) There are, on the other hand, indications that that canon serves, no

1957United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315 ; Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Roberts, 195 N. Y. 303, 323 ; see, also, General Construction Law, § 37.) The canon of construction thus invoked is usually phrased in terms of a presumption that ‘ statutes which in general terms divest pre-existing rights or privileges will not be. applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect.’ (See United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 272-273 ; United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. [U. S.] 251, 263; People v. Herkimer, 4 Cow. 345, 348 .) ” The court stated further, and significantly: “There are, on the o

1953United States v. Fox, 94 U. S. 315 ; Saranac Land & Timber Co. v. Roberts, 195 N. Y. 303, 323 ; see, also, General Construction Law, § 37.) The canon of construction thus invoked is usually phrased in terms of a presumption that ‘4 statutes which in general terms divest preexisting rights or privileges will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect.” (See United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 272-273 ; United States v. Herron, 20 Wall. [U. S.] 251, 263; People v. Herkimer, 4 Cow. 345, 348 .) There are, on the other hand, indications that that canon serves, no

1956(Matter of Laudy, 161 N. Y. 429, 433-434 .) Upon all the evidence the court determines that the propounded instrument was executed in compliance with the provisions of section 21 of the Decedent Estate Law.

1926In Matter of Carll ( 38 Misc. 471 , 474) the court says: “ Upon all the evidence, I am satisfied that the signature could have been seen, and if the witnesses could see, then, legally, they did see," citing Matter of Laudy ( 161 N. Y. 429, 433 ) and Matter of Stockwell ( 17 Misc. 108 ).

1898Saratoga Co. Bk. v. King, 44 N. Y. 87 ; Brinkman v. Eisler, 40 N. Y.

1898Bank v. King, 44 N. Y. 87 ; Brinkman v. Eisler (City Ct. N. Y.) 16 N. Y.

2013(Kassis, 93 NY2d at 616-617 ; Solow, 83 NY2d at 309 .) The law teaches that an inflexible rule in this area would unfairly disqualify members of the firm who themselves have no knowledge of the client’s confidences or secrets.

2013As “disqualification of a law firm during litigation may have significant adverse consequences to the client and others, ‘it is particularly important that the Code of Professional Responsibility not be mechanically applied when disqualification is raised in litigation.’ ” (Kassis, 93 NY2d at 617-618 , quoting S & S Hotel Ventures Ltd.

2013(Kassis, 93 NY2d at 616-617 ; Solow, 83 NY2d at 309 .) The law teaches that an inflexible rule in this area would unfairly disqualify members of the firm who themselves have no knowledge of the client’s confidences or secrets.

2009Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the general policy of the respondent New York State Office of Mental Health (hereinafter OMH) mandating separate housing and therapy services for minor and adult patients was not an inflexible rule removing that agency’s discretion, and so OMH was not obligated to follow the rule-making procedure set forth in the State Administrative Procedure Act before requiring the petitioners to comply with the policy (see Matter of Alca Indus. v Delaney, 92 NY2d 775 [1999]; Matter of Schwartfigure v Hartnett, 83 NY2d 296 [1994]; Matter of Senior Care Servs., Inc. v

2009Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the general policy of the respondent New York State Office of Mental Health (hereinafter OMH) mandating separate housing and therapy services for minor and adult patients was not an inflexible rule removing that agency’s discretion, and so OMH was not obligated to follow the rule-making procedure set forth in the State Administrative Procedure Act before requiring the petitioners to comply with the policy (see Matter of Alca Indus. v Delaney, 92 NY2d 775 [1999]; Matter of Schwartfigure v Hartnett, 83 NY2d 296 [1994]; Matter of Senior Care Servs., Inc. v

2009Contrary to the petitioners’ contention, the general policy of the respondent New York State Office of Mental Health (hereinafter OMH) mandating separate housing and therapy services for minor and adult patients was not an inflexible rule removing that agency’s discretion, and so OMH was not obligated to follow the rule-making procedure set forth in the State Administrative Procedure Act before requiring the petitioners to comply with the policy (see Matter of Alca Indus. v Delaney, 92 NY2d 775 [1999]; Matter of Schwartfigure v Hartnett, 83 NY2d 296 [1994]; Matter of Senior Care Servs., Inc. v

2007Weighing into the court’s decision was Madeline’s failure to consult or even notify the estranged brother of the arrangements, despite her argument that she didn’t know how to reach him (see also Hassard v Lehane, 143 App Div 424 [1911] [mother with whom decedent resided had duty of burial]; compare Stiles v Stiles, 113 Misc 576 [1920] [primary right/duty to bury with spouse over children, but in some circumstances, such an inflexible rule might result in great harshness]; Buchanan v Buchanan, 28 Misc 261 [1899] [where widow, although the one bearing the duty of burial under the law, did not h

2007Weighing into the court’s decision was Madeline’s failure to consult or even notify the estranged brother of the arrangements, despite her argument that she didn’t know how to reach him (see also Hassard v Lehane, 143 App Div 424 [1911] [mother with whom decedent resided had duty of burial]; compare Stiles v Stiles, 113 Misc 576 [1920] [primary right/duty to bury with spouse over children, but in some circumstances, such an inflexible rule might result in great harshness]; Buchanan v Buchanan, 28 Misc 261 [1899] [where widow, although the one bearing the duty of burial under the law, did not h

2006Rather, we have held that when the State imposes “an incidental burden on the right to free exercise of religion” we must consider the interest advanced by the legislation that imposes the burden, and that “[t]he respective interests must be balanced to determine whether the incidental burdening is justified” (La Rocca v Lane, 37 NY2d 575, 583 [1975], citing People v Woodruff, 26 AD2d 236, 238 [1966], affd 21 NY2d 848 [1968]).