inflexible rule in Virginia

18 Virginia opinions name it 3 courts 1892–2023 2 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (14)

Case	Followed	Cited
Griffin v. Illinoisgreen scotus · 1956 · cited in 2 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2016–2016 2 sentences 2016See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (State need not purchase a stenographer’s transcript in every case where an indigent defendant cannot buy it; State “Supreme Court may find other means of affording adequate and effective appellate review to indigent defendants.”). 2016See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (1956) (State need not purchase a stenographer’s transcript in every case where an indigent defendant cannot buy it; State “Supreme Court may find other means of affording adequate and effective appellate review to indigent defendants.”).	2	2
Acree v. Acreegreen vactapp · 1986 · cited in 4 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 1995–2018 2 sentences 1995Relying upon Acree v. Acree, 2 Va.App. 151 , 342 S.E.2d 68 (1986), the trial judge ruled that “the purpose of applying an inflexible rule here is outweighed by the equities involved, and ... to award [the wife] continuing monies until the termination of the contract would unjustly enrich her and would ..., again, probably shock the conscience of the average man.” Thus, the trial judge found that the husband had discharged his support obligations. 1995Relying upon Acree v. Acree, 2 Va.App. 151 , 342 S.E.2d 68 (1986), the trial judge ruled that “the purpose of applying an inflexible rule here is outweighed by the equities involved, and ... to award [the wife] continuing monies until the termination of the contract would unjustly enrich her and would ..., again, probably shock the conscience of the average man.” Thus, the trial judge found that the husband had discharged his support obligations.	1	4
Commonwealth v. Sandersongreen va · 1938 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2023–2023 1 sentence 2023While not an inflexible rule, the principal value of the “in pari materia” canon is to recognize that “apparent inconsistencies” can be and “should be ironed out whenever that is possible.” Commonwealth v. Sanderson, 170 Va. 33, 38 (1938).	1	1
Robert Sylvester Davis, Jr. v. Commonwealth of VAgreen vactapp · 2001 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022 1 sentence 2022He does not contest, however, that if a rational fact finder concluded that he orchestrated the shooting, he is guilty under the theory of concert of action. “[C]oncert of action [is] a species of accomplice liability, carrying with it the principle that the punishment imposed on each accomplice may be the same.” Velez-Suarez v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 269, 279 (2015) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 291, 295-96 (2001)).	1	1
Freddy Velez-Suarez v. Commonwealth of Virginiagreen vactapp · 2015 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2022–2022 1 sentence 2022He does not contest, however, that if a rational fact finder concluded that he orchestrated the shooting, he is guilty under the theory of concert of action. “[C]oncert of action [is] a species of accomplice liability, carrying with it the principle that the punishment imposed on each accomplice may be the same.” Velez-Suarez v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 269, 279 (2015) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 36 Va. App. 291, 295-96 (2001)).	1	1
Sharon O'Neal v. Constance Gonzalezgreen ca11 · 1988 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012 1 sentence 2012Co. v. Christ, 979 F.2d 575, 578-79 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); O'Neal v. Gonzalez, 839 F.2d 1437, 1440 (11th Cir. 1988) ("Congress intended to establish . . . for the benefit of designated beneficiaries, an inflexible rule that the beneficiary . . . would receive the policy proceeds, regardless of other documents or the equities in a particular case.").	1	1
cluster 594743green ca7 · 1992 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012 1 sentence 2012Co. v. Christ, 979 F.2d 575, 578-79 (7th Cir. 1992) (same); O'Neal v. Gonzalez, 839 F.2d 1437, 1440 (11th Cir. 1988) ("Congress intended to establish . . . for the benefit of designated beneficiaries, an inflexible rule that the beneficiary . . . would receive the policy proceeds, regardless of other documents or the equities in a particular case.").	1	1
Stubblebine v. Stubblebinegreen vactapp · 1996 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008 2 sentences 2008In Virginia, when “a claim for support is made by a party who has been held blameless for the marital breach, the law imposes upon the other party a duty, within the limits of his or her financial ability, to maintain the blameless party according to the station in life to which that party was accustomed during the marriage.” Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va.App. 558, 573-74 , 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 (1992); see also Lapidus v. Lapidus, 226 Va. 575, 581 , 311 S.E.2d 786, 789 (1984); Butler v. Butler, 217 Va. 195, 197 , 227 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1976); Stubblebine v. Stubblebine, 22 Va.App. 703, 710 , 473 S.E.2d 2008In Virginia, when “a claim for support is made by a party who has been held blameless for the marital breach, the law imposes upon the other party a duty, within the limits of his or her financial ability, to maintain the blameless party according to the station in life to which that party was accustomed during the marriage.” Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va.App. 558, 573-74 , 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 (1992); see also Lapidus v. Lapidus, 226 Va. 575, 581 , 311 S.E.2d 786, 789 (1984); Butler v. Butler, 217 Va. 195, 197 , 227 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1976); Stubblebine v. Stubblebine, 22 Va.App. 703, 710 , 473 S.E.2d	1	1
Lapidus v. Lapidusgreen va · 1984 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008 2 sentences 2008In Virginia, when “a claim for support is made by a party who has been held blameless for the marital breach, the law imposes upon the other party a duty, within the limits of his or her financial ability, to maintain the blameless party according to the station in life to which that party was accustomed during the marriage.” Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va.App. 558, 573-74 , 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 (1992); see also Lapidus v. Lapidus, 226 Va. 575, 581 , 311 S.E.2d 786, 789 (1984); Butler v. Butler, 217 Va. 195, 197 , 227 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1976); Stubblebine v. Stubblebine, 22 Va.App. 703, 710 , 473 S.E.2d 2008In Virginia, when “a claim for support is made by a party who has been held blameless for the marital breach, the law imposes upon the other party a duty, within the limits of his or her financial ability, to maintain the blameless party according to the station in life to which that party was accustomed during the marriage.” Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va.App. 558, 573-74 , 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 (1992); see also Lapidus v. Lapidus, 226 Va. 575, 581 , 311 S.E.2d 786, 789 (1984); Butler v. Butler, 217 Va. 195, 197 , 227 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1976); Stubblebine v. Stubblebine, 22 Va.App. 703, 710 , 473 S.E.2d	1	1
Gamble v. Gamblegreen vactapp · 1992 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008 2 sentences 2008In Virginia, when “a claim for support is made by a party who has been held blameless for the marital breach, the law imposes upon the other party a duty, within the limits of his or her financial ability, to maintain the blameless party according to the station in life to which that party was accustomed during the marriage.” Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va.App. 558, 573-74 , 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 (1992); see also Lapidus v. Lapidus, 226 Va. 575, 581 , 311 S.E.2d 786, 789 (1984); Butler v. Butler, 217 Va. 195, 197 , 227 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1976); Stubblebine v. Stubblebine, 22 Va.App. 703, 710 , 473 S.E.2d 2008In Virginia, when “a claim for support is made by a party who has been held blameless for the marital breach, the law imposes upon the other party a duty, within the limits of his or her financial ability, to maintain the blameless party according to the station in life to which that party was accustomed during the marriage.” Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va.App. 558, 573-74 , 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 (1992); see also Lapidus v. Lapidus, 226 Va. 575, 581 , 311 S.E.2d 786, 789 (1984); Butler v. Butler, 217 Va. 195, 197 , 227 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1976); Stubblebine v. Stubblebine, 22 Va.App. 703, 710 , 473 S.E.2d	1	1
Butler v. Butlergreen va · 1976 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008 2 sentences 2008In Virginia, when “a claim for support is made by a party who has been held blameless for the marital breach, the law imposes upon the other party a duty, within the limits of his or her financial ability, to maintain the blameless party according to the station in life to which that party was accustomed during the marriage.” Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va.App. 558, 573-74 , 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 (1992); see also Lapidus v. Lapidus, 226 Va. 575, 581 , 311 S.E.2d 786, 789 (1984); Butler v. Butler, 217 Va. 195, 197 , 227 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1976); Stubblebine v. Stubblebine, 22 Va.App. 703, 710 , 473 S.E.2d 2008In Virginia, when “a claim for support is made by a party who has been held blameless for the marital breach, the law imposes upon the other party a duty, within the limits of his or her financial ability, to maintain the blameless party according to the station in life to which that party was accustomed during the marriage.” Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va.App. 558, 573-74 , 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 (1992); see also Lapidus v. Lapidus, 226 Va. 575, 581 , 311 S.E.2d 786, 789 (1984); Butler v. Butler, 217 Va. 195, 197 , 227 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1976); Stubblebine v. Stubblebine, 22 Va.App. 703, 710 , 473 S.E.2d	1	1
Furr v. Furrgreen vactapp · 1992 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2008–2008 2 sentences 2008In Virginia, when “a claim for support is made by a party who has been held blameless for the marital breach, the law imposes upon the other party a duty, within the limits of his or her financial ability, to maintain the blameless party according to the station in life to which that party was accustomed during the marriage.” Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va.App. 558, 573-74 , 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 (1992); see also Lapidus v. Lapidus, 226 Va. 575, 581 , 311 S.E.2d 786, 789 (1984); Butler v. Butler, 217 Va. 195, 197 , 227 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1976); Stubblebine v. Stubblebine, 22 Va.App. 703, 710 , 473 S.E.2d 2008In Virginia, when “a claim for support is made by a party who has been held blameless for the marital breach, the law imposes upon the other party a duty, within the limits of his or her financial ability, to maintain the blameless party according to the station in life to which that party was accustomed during the marriage.” Gamble v. Gamble, 14 Va.App. 558, 573-74 , 421 S.E.2d 635, 644 (1992); see also Lapidus v. Lapidus, 226 Va. 575, 581 , 311 S.E.2d 786, 789 (1984); Butler v. Butler, 217 Va. 195, 197 , 227 S.E.2d 688, 690 (1976); Stubblebine v. Stubblebine, 22 Va.App. 703, 710 , 473 S.E.2d	1	1
United States v. Michel Joseph Napoligreen ca5 · 1976 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 2000–2000 1 sentence 2000When dealing with search warrants, “there is no place for technical requirements of elaborate specificity once exacted under common law pleadings.” United States v. Napoli, 530 F.2d 1198, 1200 (5th Cir. 1976) (quotation marks and citation omitted).	1	1
Whitley v. Cunninghamgreen va · 1964 · cited in 1 Virginia opinions naming this issue, 1971–1971 2 sentences 1971See Whitley v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 251 , 135 S. E. 2d 823 (1964); Peyton v. Fields, 207 Va. 40 , 147 S. E. 2d 762 (1966); Blowe v. Peyton, 208 Va. 68, 155 S. E. 2d 351 (1967); Ford v. Peyton, 209 Va. 203 , 163 S. E. 2d 314 (1968). 1971See Whitley v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 251 , 135 S. E. 2d 823 (1964); Peyton v. Fields, 207 Va. 40 , 147 S. E. 2d 762 (1966); Blowe v. Peyton, 208 Va. 68, 155 S. E. 2d 351 (1967); Ford v. Peyton, 209 Va. 203 , 163 S. E. 2d 314 (1968).	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (12)

Case	Cited	Years
Illinois v. Gates green scotus · 1983 2 sentences 2003“Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such diversity. ‘One simple rule will not cover every situation.’ ” Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 , 103 S.Ct. at 2329 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 , 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)). 2003“Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such diversity. ‘One simple rule will not cover every situation.’ ” Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 , 103 S.Ct. at 2329 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 , 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)).	2	2003–2003
Adams v. Williams green scotus · 1972 2 sentences 2003“Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such diversity. ‘One simple rule will not cover every situation.’ ” Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 , 103 S.Ct. at 2329 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 , 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)). 2003“Rigid legal rules are ill-suited to an area of such diversity. ‘One simple rule will not cover every situation.’ ” Gates, 462 U.S. at 232 , 103 S.Ct. at 2329 (quoting Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 , 92 S.Ct. 1921, 1924 , 32 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972)).	2	2003–2003
Beckner v. Commonwealth green vactapp · 1993 2 sentences 2003We made a similar point in response to an appellant who argued that White established an inflexible rule that "information supplied to the government by an unidentified informant may not establish reasonable suspicion to effect an investigative stop, unless the information predicts the future actions of the individual stopped.” Beckner, 15 Va.App. at 535 , 425 S.E.2d at 531 . 2003We made a similar point in response to an appellant who argued that White established an inflexible rule that "information supplied to the government by an unidentified informant may not establish reasonable suspicion to effect an investigative stop, unless the information predicts the future actions of the individual stopped.” Beckner, 15 Va.App. at 535 , 425 S.E.2d at 531 .	2	2003–2003
Brandau v. Brandau green vactapp · 2008 2 sentences 2020In Brandau, 52 Va. App. at 637 , a husband essentially argued that “every stay-at-home spouse seeking spousal support must start work outside the home immediately upon the entry of the divorce decree if he or she has any provable income earning capacity.” We rejected his argument because there was “no basis for such an inflexible principle in our statutes or caselaw.” Id. 2020In Brandau, 52 Va. App. at 637 , a husband essentially argued that “every stay-at-home spouse seeking spousal support must start work outside the home immediately upon the entry of the divorce decree if he or she has any provable income earning capacity.” We rejected his argument because there was “no basis for such an inflexible principle in our statutes or caselaw.” Id.	1	2020–2020
Dyke v. Commonwealth green va · 1941 2 sentences 1985"The cupidity of lenders, and the willingness of borrowers to concede whatever may be demanded or to promise whatever may be exacted in order to obtain temporary relief from financial embarrassment, as would naturally be expected, have resulted in a great variety of devices to evade the usury laws; and to frustrate such evasions the courts have been compelled to look beyond the form of a transaction to its substance, and they have laid it down as an inflexible rule that the mere form is immaterial, but that it is the substance which must be considered. " Id. at 423-24 , 17 S.E.2d at 369 (quoti 1985"The cupidity of lenders, and the willingness of borrowers to concede whatever may be demanded or to promise whatever may be exacted in order to obtain temporary relief from financial embarrassment, as would naturally be expected, have resulted in a great variety of devices to evade the usury laws; and to frustrate such evasions the courts have been compelled to look beyond the form of a transaction to its substance, and they have laid it down as an inflexible rule that the mere form is immaterial, but that it is the substance which must be considered. " Id. at 423-24 , 17 S.E.2d at 369 (quoti	1	1985–1985
Peyton v. Fields green va · 1966 2 sentences 1971See Whitley v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 251 , 135 S. E. 2d 823 (1964); Peyton v. Fields, 207 Va. 40 , 147 S. E. 2d 762 (1966); Blowe v. Peyton, 208 Va. 68, 155 S. E. 2d 351 (1967); Ford v. Peyton, 209 Va. 203 , 163 S. E. 2d 314 (1968). 1971See Whitley v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 251 , 135 S. E. 2d 823 (1964); Peyton v. Fields, 207 Va. 40 , 147 S. E. 2d 762 (1966); Blowe v. Peyton, 208 Va. 68, 155 S. E. 2d 351 (1967); Ford v. Peyton, 209 Va. 203 , 163 S. E. 2d 314 (1968).	1	1971–1971
Blowe v. Peyton green va · 1967 2 sentences 1971See Whitley v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 251 , 135 S. E. 2d 823 (1964); Peyton v. Fields, 207 Va. 40 , 147 S. E. 2d 762 (1966); Blowe v. Peyton, 208 Va. 68, 155 S. E. 2d 351 (1967); Ford v. Peyton, 209 Va. 203 , 163 S. E. 2d 314 (1968). 1971See Whitley v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 251 , 135 S. E. 2d 823 (1964); Peyton v. Fields, 207 Va. 40 , 147 S. E. 2d 762 (1966); Blowe v. Peyton, 208 Va. 68, 155 S. E. 2d 351 (1967); Ford v. Peyton, 209 Va. 203 , 163 S. E. 2d 314 (1968).	1	1971–1971
Ford v. Peyton green va · 1968 2 sentences 1971See Whitley v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 251 , 135 S. E. 2d 823 (1964); Peyton v. Fields, 207 Va. 40 , 147 S. E. 2d 762 (1966); Blowe v. Peyton, 208 Va. 68, 155 S. E. 2d 351 (1967); Ford v. Peyton, 209 Va. 203 , 163 S. E. 2d 314 (1968). 1971See Whitley v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 251 , 135 S. E. 2d 823 (1964); Peyton v. Fields, 207 Va. 40 , 147 S. E. 2d 762 (1966); Blowe v. Peyton, 208 Va. 68, 155 S. E. 2d 351 (1967); Ford v. Peyton, 209 Va. 203 , 163 S. E. 2d 314 (1968).	1	1971–1971
Longshore v. Longshore neutral ill · 1902 2 sentences 1926Richmond v. Harris, supra; Longshore v. Longshore, 200 Ill. 470 , 65 N. E. 1081 ; Lavery v. Hutcheson, 249 Ill. 86 , 94 N. E. 6 , Am. 1926Richmond v. Harris, supra; Longshore v. Longshore, 200 Ill. 470 , 65 N. E. 1081 ; Lavery v. Hutcheson, 249 Ill. 86 , 94 N. E. 6 , Am.	1	1926–1926
Lavery v. Hutchinson green · 1911 2 sentences 1926Richmond v. Harris, supra; Longshore v. Longshore, 200 Ill. 470 , 65 N. E. 1081 ; Lavery v. Hutcheson, 249 Ill. 86 , 94 N. E. 6 , Am. 1926Richmond v. Harris, supra; Longshore v. Longshore, 200 Ill. 470 , 65 N. E. 1081 ; Lavery v. Hutcheson, 249 Ill. 86 , 94 N. E. 6 , Am.	1	1926–1926
Hall v. United States green scotus · 1876 1 sentence 1892In Hall v. U. S., 92 U. S., 27, 30 , it is said: “ It was an inflexible rule of the law of African slavery, wherever it existed, that the slave was incapable of entering into any contract, not excepting the contract of marriage.” And in Malinda v. Gardner, 24 Ala. 719 , it is said: “ The father and mother were slaves, and such persons are incapable of contracting marriage, because that relation brings with it certain duties and rights, with reference to*which it is supposed to be entered into.	1	1892–1892
Malinda v. Gardner neutral · 1854 1 sentence 1892In Hall v. U. S., 92 U. S., 27, 30 , it is said: “ It was an inflexible rule of the law of African slavery, wherever it existed, that the slave was incapable of entering into any contract, not excepting the contract of marriage.” And in Malinda v. Gardner, 24 Ala. 719 , it is said: “ The father and mother were slaves, and such persons are incapable of contracting marriage, because that relation brings with it certain duties and rights, with reference to*which it is supposed to be entered into.	1	1892–1892

Where else courts name it

IL 112 (1869–2025) CA 79 (1864–2025) NY 65 (1872–2023) PA 53 (1841–2015) TX 45 (1904–2025) NC 38 (1886–2021) GA 35 (1909–2018) NJ 34 (1924–2024) MD 33 (1960–2025) MO 31 (1900–2020) MN 29 (1892–2025) FL 26 (1886–2025) OH 25 (1883–2017) MA 24 (1852–2016) LA 22 (1928–2016) MI 20 (1894–2026) AR 20 (1900–2023) CO 18 (1912–2019) TN 18 (1898–2020) VA 18 (1892–2023) WA 17 (1896–2018) OR 17 (1902–2016) AL 17 (1859–2011) MT 17 (1934–2012) VT 17 (1923–2026) KY 14 (1897–2023) WI 13 (1963–2025) DC 12 (1976–2023) IN 12 (1875–2009) MS 11 (1868–2022) WV 11 (1919–2024) IA 11 (1912–2014) SD 11 (1958–2025) DE 10 (1945–2026) NM 10 (1954–2021) ME 10 (1900–2024) KS 9 (1899–2020) CT 9 (1948–2021) SC 8 (1918–1966) HI 8 (1999–2025) ID 8 (1893–2013) AZ 6 (1977–2008) ND 6 (1807–2005) NE 6 (1897–1996) RI 5 (1979–2002) UT 5 (1946–2006) AK 3 (1970–1994) NH 3 (1980–1999) WY 2 (1931–1984) OK 2 (1915–1973)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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