inflexible rule in Michigan

2026But “the preservation requirement is not an inflexible rule; it yields to the necessity of considering additional issues when necessary to a proper determination of a case.” Klooster v Charlevoix, 488 Mich 289, 310 ; 795 NW2d 578 (2011) (quotation marks, citation, and ellipsis omitted).

2026But “the preservation requirement is not an inflexible rule; it yields to the necessity of considering additional issues when necessary to a proper determination of a case.” Klooster v Charlevoix, 488 Mich 289, 310 ; 795 NW2d 578 (2011) (quotation marks, citation, and ellipsis omitted).

2007Bank should be rejected because it "establishes an inflexible rule precluding the application of equitable subrogation in mortgage refinancing" that is "contrary to the principles of equity the doctrine is intended to promote." Ameriquest, supra at 683, 726 N.W.2d 424 .

2006In this regard, the result in Washington Mut Bank is more properly reached on a consideration of the equities, and particularly the issue of notice, rather than on the basis of a rule that equitable subrogation is inapplicable. [Ameriquest, supra at 682 .] The Court concluded that the ruling in Washington Mut Bank should he rejected because it “establishes an inflexible rule precluding the application of equitable subrogation in mortgage refinancing” that is “contrary to the principles of equity the doctrine is intended to promote.” Ameriquest, supra at 683 .

2016We are not bound, however, by a party’s choice of label for a cause of action because such an inflexible rule would “exalt form over substance.” Norris v Lincoln Park Police Officers, 292 Mich App 574, 582 ; 808 NW2d 578 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2016We are not bound, however, by a party’s choice of label for a cause of action because such an inflexible rule would “exalt form over substance.” Norris v Lincoln Park Police Officers, 292 Mich App 574, 582 ; 808 NW2d 578 (2011) (citation and quotation marks omitted).

2011Noting a “critical difference between a rule governing subject- matter jurisdiction and an inflexible claim-processing rule,” the Court stressed that a claim-processing rule can be forfeited by the parties, whereas, “[c]haracteristically, a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be expanded to account for the parties’ litigation conduct; a claim-processing rule, on the other hand, even if unalterable on a party’s application, can nonetheless be forfeited if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point.” Id. at 456 . 26 IV.

2011Noting a “critical difference between a rule governing subject-matter jurisdiction and an inflexible claim-processing rule,” the Court stressed that a claim-processing rule can be forfeited by the parties, whereas, “[cjharacteristically, a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction cannot be expanded to account for the parties’ litigation conduct; a claim-processing rule, on the other hand, even if unalterable on a party’s application, can nonetheless be forfeited if the party asserting the rule waits too long to raise the point.” Id. at 456 .

2011In addition, the preservation requirement is not an inflexible rule; it yields to the necessity of considering additional issues when “ ‘necessary to a proper determination of a case ....’” Prudential Ins Co of America v Cusick, 369 Mich 269, 290 ; 120 NW2d 1 (1963), quoting Dation v Ford Motor Co, 314 Mich 152, 160-161 ; 22 NW2d 252 (1946).

2011In addition, the preservation requirement is not an inflexible rule; it yields to the necessity of considering additional issues when “ ‘necessary to a proper determination of a case ....’” Prudential Ins Co of America v Cusick, 369 Mich 269, 290 ; 120 NW2d 1 (1963), quoting Dation v Ford Motor Co, 314 Mich 152, 160-161 ; 22 NW2d 252 (1946).

2011Although this issue was not decided below, a party “should not be punished for the omission of the trial court.” Peterman v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 446 Mich 177, 183 ; 521 NW2d 499 (1994).

2011Although this issue was not decided below, a party “should not be punished for the omission of the trial court.” Peterman v Dep’t of Natural Resources, 446 Mich 177, 183 ; 521 NW2d 499 (1994).

2011In addition, the preservation requirement is not an inflexible rule; it yields to the necessity of considering additional issues when “ ‘necessary to a proper determination of a case ....’” Prudential Ins Co of America v Cusick, 369 Mich 269, 290 ; 120 NW2d 1 (1963), quoting Dation v Ford Motor Co, 314 Mich 152, 160-161 ; 22 NW2d 252 (1946).

2011In addition, the preservation requirement is not an inflexible rule; it yields to the necessity of considering additional issues when “ ‘necessary to a proper determination of a case ....’” Prudential Ins Co of America v Cusick, 369 Mich 269, 290 ; 120 NW2d 1 (1963), quoting Dation v Ford Motor Co, 314 Mich 152, 160-161 ; 22 NW2d 252 (1946).

2006Deutsche Bank, supra at 613; Advanta Nat’l Bank v McClarty, 257 Mich App 113, 125 ; 667 NW2d 880 (2003); see also MCL 600.3236. v Because the holding of Washington Mut Bank establishes an inflexible rule precluding the application of equitable subrogation in mortgage refinancing, we find it contrary to the principles of equity the doctrine is intended to promote.

2006Deutsche Bank, supra at 613; Advanta Nat’l Bank v McClarty, 257 Mich App 113, 125 ; 667 NW2d 880 (2003); see also MCL 600.3236. v Because the holding of Washington Mut Bank establishes an inflexible rule precluding the application of equitable subrogation in mortgage refinancing, we find it contrary to the principles of equity the doctrine is intended to promote.

2005Indeed, Justice Weaver’s Kirsehner opinion was careful to avoid making sweeping generalizations or extending Ruddock v Detroit Life Ins Co, 209 Mich 638 ; 177 NW 242 (1920), beyond its intended bounds.

2005Indeed, Justice Weaver’s Kirsehner opinion was careful to avoid making sweeping generalizations or extending Ruddock v Detroit Life Ins Co, 209 Mich 638 ; 177 NW 242 (1920), beyond its intended bounds.

2002P. 32(a), the United States Supreme Court first noted that "[i]f Rule 32(a) constitutes an inflexible requirement that the trial judge specifically address the defendant, e.g., `Do you, the defendant, Theodore Green, have anything to say before I pass sentence?' then what transpired in the present case falls short of the requirement." Id. at 303 , 81 S.Ct. 653 .

2002Faced with the claim that these trial court proceedings were not in compliance with FR Crim P 32(a), the United States Supreme Court first noted that “[i]f Rule 32(a) constitutes an inflexible requirement that the trial judge specifically address the defendant, e.g., ‘Do you, the defendant, Theodore Green, have anything to say before I pass sentence?’ then what transpired in the present case falls short of the requirement.” Id. at 303 .

1999As even petitioner concedes, the common-law principle of announcement was never stated as an inflexible rule requiring announcement under all circumstances. [ Wilson, supra at 514 US 934 (citations omitted).] As will be discussed further below, among the amici curiae referred to by the Court in Wilson was the very same appellate prosecutor who now appears before us in this action.

1999As even petitioner concedes, the common-law principle of announcement was never stated as an inflexible rule requiring announcement under all circumstances. [ Wilson, 514 U.S. at 934 , 115 S.Ct. 1914 (citations omitted).] [17] As will be discussed further below, among the amici curiae referred to by the Court in Wilson was the very same appellate prosecutor who now appears before us in this action. [18] As evidenced in a federal statute, 18 U.S.C. § 3109 , a statute comparable to our own knock and announce statute. [19] While the appellant prosecutor takes great effort to note that the only ti

1989Kent, supra, p 791 .

1958In fact, *497 the only inflexible rule as to the measure of actual damages is the rule of compensation. * * * “Testimony was admissible to show the value of the trees as they stood before they were injured, and the extent of their injury, and that the sum of money necessary to compensate the plaintiff for being deprived of them for the uses intended will come nearer affording actual compensation for the injuries sustained than the opinion of witnesses as to the difference in the value of the land upon which they stood immediately before and immediately after the injury.” See, also, City of New

1958In fact, *497 the only inflexible rule as to the measure of actual damages is the rule of compensation. * * * “Testimony was admissible to show the value of the trees as they stood before they were injured, and the extent of their injury, and that the sum of money necessary to compensate the plaintiff for being deprived of them for the uses intended will come nearer affording actual compensation for the injuries sustained than the opinion of witnesses as to the difference in the value of the land upon which they stood immediately before and immediately after the injury.” See, also, City of New

1958Admittedly, the value of a growing tree to a particular piece of residential property is not susceptible of precise measurement, but as we said in Ruediger v. Klink, 346 Mich 357, 373, 374 , quoting Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich 542, 555 , 556: “The law does not require impossibilities; and can not, therefore, require a higher degree of certainty than the nature of the case admits.

1958In fact, *497 the only inflexible rule as to the measure of actual damages is the rule of compensation. * * * “Testimony was admissible to show the value of the trees as they stood before they were injured, and the extent of their injury, and that the sum of money necessary to compensate the plaintiff for being deprived of them for the uses intended will come nearer affording actual compensation for the injuries sustained than the opinion of witnesses as to the difference in the value of the land upon which they stood immediately before and immediately after the injury.” See, also, City of New

1958In fact, *497 the only inflexible rule as to the measure of actual damages is the rule of compensation. * * * “Testimony was admissible to show the value of the trees as they stood before they were injured, and the extent of their injury, and that the sum of money necessary to compensate the plaintiff for being deprived of them for the uses intended will come nearer affording actual compensation for the injuries sustained than the opinion of witnesses as to the difference in the value of the land upon which they stood immediately before and immediately after the injury.” See, also, City of New

1921In the early case of Wilbur v. Flood, 16 Mich. 40 , the court said, speaking through Justice Campbell: “It is an inflexible rule that a party complaining of fraud must be guilty of no unreasonable delay in repudiating and getting rid of his contract.

1900It is said that the rule laid down in Village of Norwood v. Baker, 172 U. S. 269 (19 Sup. Ct. 187), should be followed by this court.

1894It was there said (after quoting from the opinion of Mr. Justice Campbell in Beaubien v. Cicotte, 12 Mich. 459 ): “This opinion, if read in the light of the writer’s opinion in the case of White v. Bailey, 10 Mich. 161 , leaves no room for doubting that it is the settled law of Michigan that an opinion that a testator was incompetent can only be given when the witness has testified to circumstances upon which it is predicated, and which to some extent justify it. * * * The extent to which such proof must go cannot be limited by an inflexible rule.