Already have an account? Sign in instead.
You stay signed in for 30 days on this browser.
Continue with Google Continue with MicrosoftNo account yet? Create a free one.
We sent a six-digit code.
It expires in ten minutes, works once, and only in this browser. Five wrong tries void it. Send another code.
Your account is live and the Cloudflare checks are off for this browser.
12 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1875–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Professional Rental, Inc. v. Shelby Insurancegreen2 sentences1997“The junction where environmental law meets insurance law is an inappropriate place to erect an inflexible rule requiring the initiation of a *292 traditional lawsuit as a condition precedent to the insurer’s obligation to defend.” Id., 599 N.E.2d at 428 . 1997“The junction where environmental law meets insurance law is an inappropriate place to erect an inflexible rule requiring the initiation of a *292 traditional lawsuit as a condition precedent to the insurer’s obligation to defend.” Id., 599 N.E.2d at 428 . | 1 | 2 |
Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Dana Corp.green2 sentences2009The trial court relied on this court's decision in Dana Corp. to find that SFC's voluntary participation in remediating the Indiana site constituted a "suit." 690 N.E.2d at 290, 298 ; Appellants 'App. at 76. ' "The junction where environmental law meets insurance law is an inappropriate place to erect an inflexible rule requiring the initiation of a traditional lawsuit as a condition precedent to the insurer's obligation to defend.'" Dana Corp., 690 N.E.2d at 291 -92 (quoting Professional Rental, Inc. v. Shelby Ins. 2009The trial court relied on this court's decision in Dana Corp. to find that SFC's voluntary participation in remediating the Indiana site constituted a "suit." 690 N.E.2d at 290, 298 ; Appellants 'App. at 76. ' "The junction where environmental law meets insurance law is an inappropriate place to erect an inflexible rule requiring the initiation of a traditional lawsuit as a condition precedent to the insurer's obligation to defend.'" Dana Corp., 690 N.E.2d at 291 -92 (quoting Professional Rental, Inc. v. Shelby Ins. | 1 | 1 |
Cox v. Coxgreen1 sentence1992See Cox v. Cox (1991), Ind.App., 580 N.E.2d 344 , trans. denied (not abuse of discretion to order non-custodial parent to pay all medical expenses where self-employed parents did not have ready access to health insurance). | 1 | 1 |
Cuyler v. Sullivangreen2 sentences1988See Cuyler v. Sullivan 446 U.S. 335, 348 , 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). 1988See Cuyler v. Sullivan 446 U.S. 335, 348 , 100 S.Ct. 1708, 1718 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Marriage of McManamagreen1 sentence1980See IC 31-1-11.5-11 (pertaining to disposition of property) 5 and see, e. g., In re Marriage of McManama, (1980) Ind., 399 N.E.2d 371 ; and see generally Eppley v. Eppley, (1976) 168 Ind.App. 59, 67 , 341 N.E.2d 212, 218 , where the Court concluded marital property need not be valued at the time of a final hearing, rather than as of the date of separation, since “such an inflexible rule might have drawbacks in that it could encourage parties to secrete, conceal or otherwise divest themselves of certain properties during the period between separation and divorce so as to distort the true nature | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Garrod v. Garrod
green
1 sentence1993Id. | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Burger v. Kemp
green
2 sentences1989Burger v. Kemp (1987), 483 U.S. 776 , —, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3120 , 97 L.Ed. 2d 638, 650 . 1989Burger v. Kemp (1987), 483 U.S. 776 , —, 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3120 , 97 L.Ed. 2d 638, 650 . | 1 | 1989–1989 |
Franklin v. Franklin
green
1 sentence1981Opposed to the above cases is Franklin v. Franklin, (1976) 169 Ind.App. *669 537, 349 N.E.2d 210 , wherein the court approved a ruling crediting the obligated parent for payments for the few weeks the children were with him. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Eppley v. Eppley
green
2 sentences1980See IC 31-1-11.5-11 (pertaining to disposition of property) 5 and see, e. g., In re Marriage of McManama, (1980) Ind., 399 N.E.2d 371 ; and see generally Eppley v. Eppley, (1976) 168 Ind.App. 59, 67 , 341 N.E.2d 212, 218 , where the Court concluded marital property need not be valued at the time of a final hearing, rather than as of the date of separation, since “such an inflexible rule might have drawbacks in that it could encourage parties to secrete, conceal or otherwise divest themselves of certain properties during the period between separation and divorce so as to distort the true nature 1980See IC 31-1-11.5-11 (pertaining to disposition of property) 5 and see, e. g., In re Marriage of McManama, (1980) Ind., 399 N.E.2d 371 ; and see generally Eppley v. Eppley, (1976) 168 Ind.App. 59, 67 , 341 N.E.2d 212, 218 , where the Court concluded marital property need not be valued at the time of a final hearing, rather than as of the date of separation, since “such an inflexible rule might have drawbacks in that it could encourage parties to secrete, conceal or otherwise divest themselves of certain properties during the period between separation and divorce so as to distort the true nature | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Daugherty v. Rogers
green
1 sentence1914Where there is nothing in the context of a will, from which it is apparent that a testator has used the words in which he has expressed himself in any other than in their strict and primary sense, but his words, so interpreted, are insensible with reference to extrinsic circumstances, a court of law may look into the extrinsic circumstances of the case, to see whether the meaning of the words be sensible in any popular or secondary sense, of which, with reference to these circumstances, they are capable.” Wigram, Wills (2d Am. ed.) 55, 56; Daugherty v. Rogers (1889), 119 Ind. 254 , 20 N. E. 4. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Shirk v. Whitten
neutral
1 sentence1911Shirk v. Whitten, supra. The assignment of the note and mortgage to Cockburn would be evidence tending to show his intention, which is an important fact in determining the question of merger1, but if he was the primary debtor, there is no equity which would keep the charge alive whatever might be his intention or the form of their transfer. | 1 | 1911–1911 |
Cox v. Cox
green
1 sentence1892In the case last named the court, in speaking of a statutory provision similar to ours, said: “ On the other hand, because alimony may, under special circumstances, be decreed to the wife, where the divorce has been granted to the husband for her misconduct, it does not follow that such an order would be warranted where the conduct of the wife, as in the present case, has been grossly improper.” It was also said: “It was manifestly not the intention of the Legislature, in adopting the provisions of the statute above cited, to abrogate the general principles or policy of the law relating to the | 1 | 1892–1892 |
Hedrick v. Hedrick
neutral
1 sentence1892In the case last named the court, in speaking of a statutory provision similar to ours, said: “ On the other hand, because alimony may, under special circumstances, be decreed to the wife, where the divorce has been granted to the husband for her misconduct, it does not follow that such an order would be warranted where the conduct of the wife, as in the present case, has been grossly improper.” It was also said: “It was manifestly not the intention of the Legislature, in adopting the provisions of the statute above cited, to abrogate the general principles or policy of the law relating to the | 1 | 1892–1892 |
Knight v. Inhabitants of Freeport
green
1 sentence1875In Knight v. The Inhabitants of Freeport, 13 Mass. 218 , the court says, what we fully approve, that “we cannot be too strict in guarding trials by jury from improper influence. | 1 | 1875–1875 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.