inflexible standard in Ohio

2017Terry at 20, 21, 30, 31, 88 S.Ct. 1868 . {¶ 18} Instead of employing an inflexible standard to determine whether an officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, its determination involves a consideration of "the totality of the circumstances." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 417, 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).

2017Terry at 20, 21, 30, 31, 88 S.Ct. 1868 . {¶ 18} Instead of employing an inflexible standard to determine whether an officer has a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, its determination involves a consideration of "the totality of the circumstances." United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 , 417, 101 S.Ct. 690 , 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981).

2010The Supreme Court found that the prosecutor’s conduct, “which no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution, did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 365 . {¶ 33} As noted in United States v. Goodwin (1982), 457 U.S. 368, 381-382 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 , 73 L.Ed.2d 74 , “There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.

2010The Supreme Court found that the prosecutor’s conduct, “which no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution, did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 365 . {¶ 33} As noted in United States v. Goodwin (1982), 457 U.S. 368, 381-382 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 , 73 L.Ed.2d 74 , “There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.

2009Id. at 674 . {¶ 37} Furthermore, in Hampton-Jones , 2001-Ohio-4229 , the court stated: R.C. 3109.04 (G) does not create an inflexible rule requiring all shared parenting plans to be submitted thirty days before trial-a judge has discretion to grant leave to file an untimely plan, as long as due process rights are protected by allowing the opposing party adequate opportunity to address the issue and present relevant evidence at trial.

2005However, the statute "does not create an inflexible rule requiring all shared parenting plans to be submitted thirty days before trial — a judge has discretion to grant leave to file an untimely plan, as long as due process rights are protected by allowing the opposing party adequate opportunity to address the issue and present relevant evidence at trial." Hampton-Jones v. Jones (Aug. 9, 2001), Cuyahoga App. Nos. 77279 and 77412 (citing Harris v. Harris (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 671 , 674 , 664 N.E.2d 1304 ).

2006While that failure does not completely foreclose appellant's right to raise a constitutional challenge, the failure to assert his Sixth Amendment right is a factor to consider under the balancing test of Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . {¶ 15} Under Barker , a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim cannot be established by an inflexible rule.

2006While that failure does not completely foreclose appellant's right to raise a constitutional challenge, the failure to assert his Sixth Amendment right is a factor to consider under the balancing test of Barker v. Wingo (1972), 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 . {¶ 15} Under Barker , a Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim cannot be established by an inflexible rule.

1988These factors include whether appellant has substantially complied with the statutory appeal provisions and whether the purpose of the unsatisfied provision is sufficiently important to require compliance for jurisdictional purposes.” Id. at 20-21 , 15 OBR at 17, 471 N.E. 2d at 1386 .

1984Co. (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d 18 , this court held as follows: “* * * It is the belief of this court, however, that such an inflexible standard as was set forth in Rockwell and Cadle is not appropriate in all circumstances.

2010The Supreme Court found that the prosecutor’s conduct, “which no more than openly presented the defendant with the unpleasant alternatives of forgoing trial or facing charges on which he was plainly subject to prosecution, did not violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 365 . {¶ 33} As noted in United States v. Goodwin (1982), 457 U.S. 368, 381-382 , 102 S.Ct. 2485 , 73 L.Ed.2d 74 , “There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.

2008Langer 1 Cf. State v. Weitbrecht , 86 Ohio St.3d 368 , 374, 1999-Ohio-113 (holding that the felony involuntary manslaughter statute, "as applied to a minor misdemeanor traffic offense which results in a vehicular homicide, does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 9 , Article I of the Ohio Constitution"). 2 "There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.

2008Langer 1 Cf. State v. Weitbrecht , 86 Ohio St.3d 368 , 374, 1999-Ohio-113 (holding that the felony involuntary manslaughter statute, "as applied to a minor misdemeanor traffic offense which results in a vehicular homicide, does not violate the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution or Section 9 , Article I of the Ohio Constitution"). 2 "There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.

2002The totality of the circumstances involves both the context of the information possessed by police, and its degree of reliability, Alabama v. White (1990), 496 U.S. 325 , 110 Supreme Court 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 . {¶ 25} Contrasting with the Weisner case, here, although the caller identified herself to the dispatcher, and indicated the location, the only suspicious behavior she could articulate was that appellant was looking for a lost dog.

2002The totality of the circumstances involves both the context of the information possessed by police, and its degree of reliability, Alabama v. White (1990), 496 U.S. 325 , 110 Supreme Court 2412, 110 L.Ed.2d 301 . {¶ 25} Contrasting with the Weisner case, here, although the caller identified herself to the dispatcher, and indicated the location, the only suspicious behavior she could articulate was that appellant was looking for a lost dog.

2002Id. at 214 .

1990However, since the unique facts of a given case must dictate the decision of a trial court whether to grant a mistrial, Glover, supra, at 19 , we do not see the benefit in imposing an inflexible standard which could potentially punish the state for engaging in a course of conduct with the legitimate intent of vigorously pursuing a just conviction.

1986In Wells v. Chrysler Corp. (1984), 15 Ohio St. 3d 21 , this court stated at 23: “R.C. 4123.519 sets forth five requirements for the notice of appeal, the only act required to perfect the appeal and vest jurisdiction in the court: a ‘[n]otice of appeal shall state the names of the claimant and the employer, the number of the claim, the date of the decision appealed from, and the fact that appellant appeals therefrom.’ ” The court commented further that “ ‘such an inflexible standard * * * is not appropriate in all circumstances.

1983In Brown v. Maryland (1827), 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 , which still contains the preeminent judicial analysis of the Import-Export Clause of the federal Constitution, Chief Justice Marshall disdained the adoption of an inflexible rule for determining which forms of state taxation of imported goods the clause proscribes.

1973Comm. (1939), 135 Ohio St. 110 .

1907In Gordon v. Railway, 40 Barb., 546 , the principle is thus expressed: “Neither an entry into the cars upon a railroad, nor the payment of fare, is essential to create the relation of carrier and passenger.

1897And, speaking of the rule there announced, the same learned judge, in the case of Parker v. Farley, 10 Cush. 279 , said : “Were this a new and original question to be decided upon principle, it might be doubted whether it would be just and wise to establish this as an inflexible rule of practice, ” because, it is said, cases might arise where a nolle prosequi is entered without the consent of the accused, and against his remonstrance, thus depriving him of his right of showing the charge was groundless.

1883“It was,” said Swayne, J. in Hall v. United States, 92 U. S. 27, 30 , “ an inflexible rule of African slavery, wherever it existed, that the slave was incapable of entering into any contract, not excepting the contract of marriage.” Mr. Bishop thinks there is a stronger reason for the invalidity of such marriages than inability to contract.

1839They held that if the party executing the bill of sale, was permitted to remain in possession, whether the sale was absolute or conditional, it was fraudulent in law; but that decision was again entirely overruled, Bissell v. Hopkins, 3 Cow. 166 , where it was again held, that possession was Only prima facie evidence of fraud.