inflexible rule in Pennsylvania

1987The standard by which to measure references to photographic identifications in determining whether they create an inference of past criminality is set forth in Commonwealth v. Allen, 448 Pa. 177, 181 , 292 A.2d 373, 375 (1972) as follows: The suggestion that any reference to a defendant’s photograph is so prejudicial that an inflexible rule of reversal must apply is explicitly rejected.

1987The standard by which to measure references to photographic identifications in determining whether they create an inference of past criminality is set forth in Commonwealth v. Allen, 448 Pa. 177, 181 , 292 A.2d 373, 375 (1972) as follows: The suggestion that any reference to a defendant’s photograph is so prejudicial that an inflexible rule of reversal must apply is explicitly rejected.

1993See Giffin v. Chronister, 151 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 286, 616 A.2d 1070 (1992); Pennsylvania Association of Rehabilitation Facilities v. Foster, 147 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 487, 608 A.2d 613 (1992).

1993See Giffin v. Chronister, 151 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 286, 616 A.2d 1070 (1992); Pennsylvania Association of Rehabilitation Facilities v. Foster, 147 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 487, 608 A.2d 613 (1992).

1991See Consumers Education and Protective Association v. Nolan, 470 Pa. 372 , 368 A.2d 675 (1977), in which the court observed ‘that merely to hold automatically that the legislature’s intent does not encompass something not specifically included in a statute that contains specific provisions can sometimes thwart that intent.’ Significantly, the legislature did not mention negative implication as an interpretive principle in the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991.

1991See Consumers Education and Protective Association v. Nolan, 470 Pa. 372 , 368 A.2d 675 (1977), in which the court observed ‘that merely to hold automatically that the legislature’s intent does not encompass something not specifically included in a statute that contains specific provisions can sometimes thwart that intent.’ Significantly, the legislature did not mention negative implication as an interpretive principle in the Statutory Construction Act of 1972, 1 Pa.C.S. §§ 1501-1991.

1959He was in no wise relieved of his duty to look: see Brungo v. Pittsburgh Railways Company, 132 Pa. Superior Ct. 414, 419 , 200 A. 893 . ‘It is an inflexible rule that travelers must look at the edge of the street car track for approaching cars thereon .. . [and] as a companion to the rule above stated, is the additional rule that at the moment of such look the traveler must have his vehicle under control so he can stop before getting in the path of an approaching electric car:’ Smith v. Lehigh Valley Transit Co., 296 Pa. 212, 214-215 , 145 A. 818 .

1959He was in no wise relieved of his duty to look: see Brungo v. Pittsburgh Railways Company, 132 Pa. Superior Ct. 414, 419 , 200 A. 893 . ‘It is an inflexible rule that travelers must look at the edge of the street car track for approaching cars thereon .. . [and] as a companion to the rule above stated, is the additional rule that at the moment of such look the traveler must have his vehicle under control so he can stop before getting in the path of an approaching electric car:’ Smith v. Lehigh Valley Transit Co., 296 Pa. 212, 214-215 , 145 A. 818 .

2015It is the Commonwealth’s position that the inflexible rule reflected in the Superior Court’s decisions “degrade[s] the otherwise serious act of pleading guilty[.]” Id. at 18, 22 (quoting United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 677 , 117 S.Ct. 1630, 1634 , 137 L.Ed.2d 935 (1997)).

2015It is the Commonwealth’s position that the inflexible rule reflected in the Superior Court’s decisions “degrade[s] the otherwise serious act of pleading guilty[.]” Id. at 18, 22 (quoting United States v. Hyde, 520 U.S. 670, 677 , 117 S.Ct. 1630, 1634 , 137 L.Ed.2d 935 (1997)).

2015See Brief for Appellant at 12 (“The Superior Court’s inflexible rule treats a plea of guilty as a meaningless formality, revocable at the defendant’s whim upon utterance of magic words, and employable by him to manipulate or frustrate the justice system.”); accord United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 221 (D.C.Cir.1975) (“Were mere assertion of legal innocence always a sufficient condition for withdrawal, withdrawal would effectively become an automatic right.”); State v. Smullen, 118 N.J. 408 , 571 A.2d 1305, 1309 (1990) (“Liberality in exercising discretion does not mean an abdication of al

2015See Brief for Appellant at 12 (“The Superior Court’s inflexible rule treats a plea of guilty as a meaningless formality, revocable at the defendant’s whim upon utterance of magic words, and employable by him to manipulate or frustrate the justice system.”); accord United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 221 (D.C.Cir.1975) (“Were mere assertion of legal innocence always a sufficient condition for withdrawal, withdrawal would effectively become an automatic right.”); State v. Smullen, 118 N.J. 408 , 571 A.2d 1305, 1309 (1990) (“Liberality in exercising discretion does not mean an abdication of al

2015See Brief for Appellant at 12 (“The Superior Court’s inflexible rule treats a plea of guilty as a meaningless formality, revocable at the defendant’s whim upon utterance of magic words, and employable by him to manipulate or frustrate the justice system.”); accord United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 221 (D.C.

2015See Brief for Appellant at 12 (“The Superior Court’s inflexible rule treats a plea of guilty as a meaningless formality, revocable at the defendant’s whim upon utterance of magic words, and employable by him to manipulate or frustrate the justice system.”); accord United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 221 (D.C.Cir.1975) (“Were mere assertion of legal innocence always a sufficient condition for withdrawal, withdrawal would effectively become an automatic right.”); State v. Smullen, 118 N.J. 408 , 571 A.2d 1305, 1309 (1990) (“Liberality in exercising discretion does not mean an abdication of al

2015See Brief for Appellant at 12 (“The Superior Court’s inflexible rule treats a plea of guilty as a meaningless formality, revocable at the defendant’s whim upon utterance of magic words, and employable by him to manipulate or frustrate the justice system.”); accord United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 221 (D.C.Cir.1975) (“Were mere assertion of legal innocence always a sufficient condition for withdrawal, withdrawal would effectively become an automatic right.”); State v. Smullen, 118 N.J. 408 , 571 A.2d 1305, 1309 (1990) (“Liberality in exercising discretion does not mean an abdication of al

2015See Brief for Appellant at 12 (“The Superior Court’s inflexible rule treats a plea of guilty as a meaningless formality, revocable at the defendant’s whim upon utterance of magic words, and employable by him to manipulate or frustrate the justice system.”); accord United States v. Barker, 514 F.2d 208, 221 (D.C.Cir.1975) (“Were mere assertion of legal innocence always a sufficient condition for withdrawal, withdrawal would effectively become an automatic right.”); State v. Smullen, 118 N.J. 408 , 571 A.2d 1305, 1309 (1990) (“Liberality in exercising discretion does not mean an abdication of al

2006See Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831, 855 (2003); Buehl, 508 A.2d at 1174 .

2006See Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831, 855 (2003); Buehl, 508 A.2d at 1174 .

2005We note 1 hat Dunaway, 442 U.S. 200 , 99 S.Ct. 2248 , 60 L.Ed.2d 824 , which appellant cites in support of the inflexible rule he would have this Court adopt, does not support the notion that merely transporting a suspect necessarily transforms a Terry stop into a full-blown arrest.

2005We note 1 hat Dunaway, 442 U.S. 200 , 99 S.Ct. 2248 , 60 L.Ed.2d 824 , which appellant cites in support of the inflexible rule he would have this Court adopt, does not support the notion that merely transporting a suspect necessarily transforms a Terry stop into a full-blown arrest.

2005See Commonwealth v. Glass, 754 A.2d at 660 (Pa.2000) ("[W]here the weight of authority falls so heavily on one side of the equation, a proper respect for the experience and opinion of others who have grappled with the issue counsels that we view somewhat skeptically an argument, such as that proposed by appellant here, that demands the contrary result[.]"). [16] We note that Dunaway, 442 U.S. 200 , 99 S.Ct. 2248 , 60 L.Ed.2d 824 , which appellant cites in support of the inflexible rule he would have this Court adopt, does not support the notion that merely transporting a suspect necessarily tr

1996As our review of the case law illustrates, there is no authority for the inflexible requirement proposed by Father, namely, that "since [Mother] has a significant work history, she should have an earning capacity." To the contrary, while "[a] trial court in determining [a parent's] ability to pay support must primarily focus on earning capacity rather than actual earnings, . . . a trial court is free to consider making an exception to this rule whenever a parent chooses to stay at home with a minor child[,]" Singleton v. Waties, 420 Pa.Super. 184, 190 , 616 A.2d 644, 647 (1992) (citation omitt

1996As our review of the case law illustrates, there is no authority for the inflexible requirement proposed by Father, namely, that "since [Mother] has a significant work history, she should have an earning capacity." To the contrary, while "[a] trial court in determining [a parent's] ability to pay support must primarily focus on earning capacity rather than actual earnings, . . . a trial court is free to consider making an exception to this rule whenever a parent chooses to stay at home with a minor child[,]" Singleton v. Waties, 420 Pa.Super. 184, 190 , 616 A.2d 644, 647 (1992) (citation omitt

1992See Pennsylvania Ass’n of State Mental Hospital Physicians v. State Employees’ Retirement Board, 31 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 151, 375 A.2d 863 (1977), aff’d, 484 Pa. 313 , 399 A.2d 93 (1979) (law of the case doctrine not applied where preliminary objections in original action overruled but this Court never addressed the issue raised on appeal); Commonwealth v. Reidenbaugh, 266 Pa.Superior Ct. 315, 404 A.2d 697 (1978) (the doctrine held inapplicable as it is not an inflexible rule and does not have the finality of the doctrine of res judicata and where a prior decision is palpably erroneous, a court

1992See Pennsylvania Ass’n of State Mental Hospital Physicians v. State Employees’ Retirement Board, 31 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 151, 375 A.2d 863 (1977), aff’d, 484 Pa. 313 , 399 A.2d 93 (1979) (law of the case doctrine not applied where preliminary objections in original action overruled but this Court never addressed the issue raised on appeal); Commonwealth v. Reidenbaugh, 266 Pa.Superior Ct. 315, 404 A.2d 697 (1978) (the doctrine held inapplicable as it is not an inflexible rule and does not have the finality of the doctrine of res judicata and where a prior decision is palpably erroneous, a court

1992See Pennsylvania Ass’n of State Mental Hospital Physicians v. State Employees’ Retirement Board, 31 Pa.Commonwealth Ct. 151, 375 A.2d 863 (1977), aff’d, 484 Pa. 313 , 399 A.2d 93 (1979) (law of the case doctrine not applied where preliminary objections in original action overruled but this Court never addressed the issue raised on appeal); Commonwealth v. Reidenbaugh, 266 Pa.Superior Ct. 315, 404 A.2d 697 (1978) (the doctrine held inapplicable as it is not an inflexible rule and does not have the finality of the doctrine of res judicata and where a prior decision is palpably erroneous, a court