inflexible rule in Connecticut

2015But the law of the case is not an inflexible principle and in a proper situation a judge may modify or depart from an interlocutory ruling of another coordinate magistrate, in whole or in part.’’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Rogers, 199 Conn. 453, 459 , 508 A.2d 11 (1986).

2015But the law of the case is not an inflexible principle and in a proper situation a judge may modify or depart from an interlocutory ruling of another coordinate magistrate, in whole or in part.’’ (Citations omitted.) State v. Rogers, 199 Conn. 453, 459 , 508 A.2d 11 (1986).

1981If this intent, when discovered, has been adequately expressed and is not contrary to some positive rule of law, it will be carried out.’ Swole v. Burnham, 111 Conn. 120, 121 , 149 A. 229 [1930]. ‘The most inflexible rule of testamentary construction and one universally recognized is that the intention of the testator should govern the construction, and this intention is to be sought in the language used by the testator in the light of the circumstances surrounding and known to him at the time the will was executed.’ Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Ackerman, 114 Conn. 152, 157-58 , 158 A. 224 [

1981If this intent, when discovered, has been adequately expressed and is not contrary to some positive rule of law, it will be carried out.’ Swole v. Burnham, 111 Conn. 120, 121 , 149 A. 229 [1930]. ‘The most inflexible rule of testamentary construction and one universally recognized is that the intention of the testator should govern the construction, and this intention is to be sought in the language used by the testator in the light of the circumstances surrounding and known to him at the time the will was executed.’ Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Ackerman, 114 Conn. 152, 157-58 , 158 A. 224 [

1981If this intent, when discovered, has been adequately expressed and is not contrary to some positive rule of law, it will be carried out.’ Swole v. Burnham, 111 Conn. 120, 121 , 149 A. 229 [1930]. ‘The most inflexible rule of testamentary construction and one universally recognized is that the intention of the testator should govern the construction, and this intention is to be sought in the language used by the testator in the light of the circumstances surrounding and known to him at the time the will was executed.’ Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Ackerman, 114 Conn. 152, 157-58 , 158 A. 224 [

1981If this intent, when discovered, has been adequately expressed and is not contrary to some positive rule of law, it will be carried out.’ Swole v. Burnham, 111 Conn. 120, 121 , 149 A. 229 [1930]. ‘The most inflexible rule of testamentary construction and one universally recognized is that the intention of the testator should govern the construction, and this intention is to be sought in the language used by the testator in the light of the circumstances surrounding and known to him at the time the will was executed.’ Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Ackerman, 114 Conn. 152, 157-58 , 158 A. 224 [

1961There remains the question whether the statute requires the state to prove criminal intent or guilty knowledge as a necessary element of a crime. “ ‘Although prima facie and as a general rule there must be a mind at fault before there can be a crime, it is not an inflexible rule and a statute may relate to such a subject-matter and may be so framed as to make an act criminal, whether there has been any intention to break the law or otherwise to do wrong or not.’ ” State v. Nussenholtz, 76 Conn. 92, 95 , and cases therein cited.

1961There remains the question whether the statute requires the state to prove criminal intent or guilty knowledge as a necessary element of a crime. "`Although prima facie and as a general rule there must be a mind at fault before there can be a crime, it is not an inflexible rule and a statute may relate to such a subject-matter and may be so framed as to make an act criminal, whether there has been any intention to break the law or otherwise to do wrong or not.'" State v. Nussenholtz, 76 Conn. 92 , 95 , and cases therein cited.

2021The question is not what [he] meant to say, but what is meant by what [he] did say.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Canaan National Bank v. Peters, 217 Conn. 330 , 335–36, 586 A.2d 562 (1991); see also Schwerin v. Ratcliffe, 335 Conn. 300 , 310, 238 A.3d 1 (2020) (‘‘The most inflexible rule of testamentary con- struction and one universally recognized is that the intention of the testator should govern the construction, and this intention is to be sought in the language used by the testator in the light of the circumstances sur- rounding and known to him at the time th

2021The question is not what [he] meant to say, but what is meant by what [he] did say.’’ (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Canaan National Bank v. Peters, 217 Conn. 330 , 335–36, 586 A.2d 562 (1991); see also Schwerin v. Ratcliffe, 335 Conn. 300 , 310, 238 A.3d 1 (2020) (‘‘The most inflexible rule of testamentary con- struction and one universally recognized is that the intention of the testator should govern the construction, and this intention is to be sought in the language used by the testator in the light of the circumstances sur- rounding and known to him at the time th

1992The Court is cognizant of the recently released Appellate Court decision in Evans v. Warden, 29 Conn. App. 274 (1992) declining to "adopt an inflexible requirement that expert testimony must be presented in every case raising a Strickland inquiry," instead ruling that a "case-by-case approach is appropriate in a situation involving ineffective assistance of counsel." Id., 280-81 .

1992The Court is cognizant of the recently released Appellate Court decision in Evans v. Warden, 29 Conn. App. 274 (1992) declining to "adopt an inflexible requirement that expert testimony must be presented in every case raising a Strickland inquiry," instead ruling that a "case-by-case approach is appropriate in a situation involving ineffective assistance of counsel." Id., 280-81 .

1989Breen v. Phelps, supra, 98-100 .”Id.; Barnes v. Schlein, 192 Conn. 732, 734 , 473 A.2d 1221 (1984).

1989Breen v. Phelps, supra, 98-100 .”Id.; Barnes v. Schlein, 192 Conn. 732, 734 , 473 A.2d 1221 (1984).

1989Breen v. Phelps, 186 Conn. 86 , 439 A.2d 1066 (1982); Santore v. Kleinberger, 115 Conn. 631, 638 , 163 A. 107 (1932).” State v. Rogers, 199 Conn. 453, 459 , 508 A.2d 11 (1986). “[T]he law of the case is not an inflexible principle and in a proper situation a judge may modify or depart from an interlocutory ruling of another coordinate magistrate, in whole or in part.

1989Breen v. Phelps, 186 Conn. 86 , 439 A.2d 1066 (1982); Santore v. Kleinberger, 115 Conn. 631, 638 , 163 A. 107 (1932).” State v. Rogers, 199 Conn. 453, 459 , 508 A.2d 11 (1986). “[T]he law of the case is not an inflexible principle and in a proper situation a judge may modify or depart from an interlocutory ruling of another coordinate magistrate, in whole or in part.

1989Breen v. Phelps, 186 Conn. 86 , 439 A.2d 1066 (1982); Santore v. Kleinberger, 115 Conn. 631, 638 , 163 A. 107 (1932).” State v. Rogers, 199 Conn. 453, 459 , 508 A.2d 11 (1986). “[T]he law of the case is not an inflexible principle and in a proper situation a judge may modify or depart from an interlocutory ruling of another coordinate magistrate, in whole or in part.

1989Breen v. Phelps, 186 Conn. 86 , 439 A.2d 1066 (1982); Santore v. Kleinberger, 115 Conn. 631, 638 , 163 A. 107 (1932).” State v. Rogers, 199 Conn. 453, 459 , 508 A.2d 11 (1986). “[T]he law of the case is not an inflexible principle and in a proper situation a judge may modify or depart from an interlocutory ruling of another coordinate magistrate, in whole or in part.

1981If this intent, when discovered, has been adequately expressed and is not contrary to some positive rule of law, it will be carried out.’ Swole v. Burnham, 111 Conn. 120, 121 , 149 A. 229 [1930]. ‘The most inflexible rule of testamentary construction and one universally recognized is that the intention of the testator should govern the construction, and this intention is to be sought in the language used by the testator in the light of the circumstances surrounding and known to him at the time the will was executed.’ Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Ackerman, 114 Conn. 152, 157-58 , 158 A. 224 [

1981If this intent, when discovered, has been adequately expressed and is not contrary to some positive rule of law, it will be carried out.’ Swole v. Burnham, 111 Conn. 120, 121 , 149 A. 229 [1930]. ‘The most inflexible rule of testamentary construction and one universally recognized is that the intention of the testator should govern the construction, and this intention is to be sought in the language used by the testator in the light of the circumstances surrounding and known to him at the time the will was executed.’ Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Ackerman, 114 Conn. 152, 157-58 , 158 A. 224 [

1981If this intent, when discovered, has been adequately expressed and is not contrary to some positive rule of law, it will be carried out.’ Swole v. Burnham, 111 Conn. 120, 121 , 149 A. 229 [1930]. ‘The most inflexible rule of testamentary construction and one universally recognized is that the intention of the testator should govern the construction, and this intention is to be sought in the language used by the testator in the light of the circumstances surrounding and known to him at the time the will was executed.’ Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Ackerman, 114 Conn. 152, 157-58 , 158 A. 224 [

1981If this intent, when discovered, has been adequately expressed and is not contrary to some positive rule of law, it will be carried out.’ Swole v. Burnham, 111 Conn. 120, 121 , 149 A. 229 [1930]. ‘The most inflexible rule of testamentary construction and one universally recognized is that the intention of the testator should govern the construction, and this intention is to be sought in the language used by the testator in the light of the circumstances surrounding and known to him at the time the will was executed.’ Union & New Haven Trust Co. v. Ackerman, 114 Conn. 152, 157-58 , 158 A. 224 [

1948“Not only must all parts of the will be considered, but each and all its provisions should, so far as possible, be harmonized and given effect.” Cumming v. Pendleton, 112 Conn. 569, 574 , 153 A. 175 .

1948“Not only must all parts of the will be considered, but each and all its provisions should, so far as possible, be harmonized and given effect.” Cumming v. Pendleton, 112 Conn. 569, 574 , 153 A. 175 .