inflexible rule in Texas

2003See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38 , 83 S.Ct. 1623, 1632 , 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t has been recognized from the early common law that ... breaking is permissible in executing an arrest under certain circumstances”)!)] Id. at 934, 115 S.Ct. at 1918 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 982 . (footnote omitted).

2003See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38 , 83 S.Ct. 1623, 1632 , 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t has been recognized from the early common law that ... breaking is permissible in executing an arrest under certain circumstances”)!)] Id. at 934, 115 S.Ct. at 1918 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 982 . (footnote omitted).

2012We also looked to Zipes and discussed the U.S. Supreme Court’s distinction between “ ‘rule governing subject matter jurisdiction and an inflexible claim-processing rule.’ ” Id. at 85 (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 , 124 S.Ct. 906 , 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004)).

2012We also looked to Zipes and discussed the U.S. Supreme Court’s distinction between “ ‘rule governing subject matter jurisdiction and an inflexible claim-processing rule.’ ” Id. at 85 (quoting Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 456 , 124 S.Ct. 906 , 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004)).

2024Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 (1978)).

2020Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 575 (1978)).

2024After McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that the prima facie case is “not intended to be an inflexible rule.” See Young v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 228 (2015) (quoting Furnco Constr.

2020After McDonnell Douglas, the Supreme Court has repeatedly indicated that the prima facie case “is not intended to be an inflexible rule.” See Young v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 575 U.S. 206, 228 (2015) (quoting Furnco Constr.

2003See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38 , 83 S.Ct. 1623, 1632 , 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t has been recognized from the early common law that ... breaking is permissible in executing an arrest under certain circumstances”)!)] Id. at 934, 115 S.Ct. at 1918 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 982 . (footnote omitted).

2003See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 38 , 83 S.Ct. 1623, 1632 , 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963) (plurality opinion) (“[I]t has been recognized from the early common law that ... breaking is permissible in executing an arrest under certain circumstances”)!)] Id. at 934, 115 S.Ct. at 1918 , 131 L.Ed.2d at 982 . (footnote omitted).

2025See generally Goodwin, 457 U.S. at 382 (“There is good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pre-trial setting.”).

2015The Court noted “good reason to be cautious before adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.” Id.

2008In Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., the Supreme Court held that the numerosity requirement of fifteen or more employees in a Title VII action was not jurisdictional, but rather an element of the cause of action that could not be asserted defensively after the verdict. 546 U.S. 500, 516 , 126 S.Ct. 1235 , 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006).

2008In Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., the Supreme Court held that the numerosity requirement of fifteen or more employees in a Title VII action was not jurisdictional, but rather an element of the cause of action that could not be asserted defensively after the verdict. 546 U.S. 500, 516 , 126 S.Ct. 1235 , 163 L.Ed.2d 1097 (2006).

2025Assuming expressio unius can be applied to the Texas Constitution,1 it “is not an inflexible rule but is merely an aid in construction.” Ex Parte Campbell, 267 S.W.3d 916, 923 (Tex. Crim.

2022In refusing to grant mandamus relief, the supreme court rejected “an inflexible rule that would deny the trial court all discretion and . . . require severance in every case, regardless of the likelihood of prejudice.” Id. at 630 ; see In re Allstate Tex. Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 895, 899 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2006, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]) (denying mandamus relief regarding the severance of contractual and extracontractual claims based on the Akin standard).

2010See id.; see also Porras, 675 S.W.2d at 506 (case remanded in interest of justice when no evidence that reduction in market value from permanent injury to land but evidence that might have allowed landowner to recover under different theory); Windfohr v. Johnson’s Estate, 57 S.W.2d 215, 216 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1932, no writ) (measure of damages for injury to land is not “an inflexible rule” and “may be whatever comes nearest to affording actual compensation for the injury”).

2010See id.; see also Porras, 675 S.W.2d at 506 (case remanded in interest of justice when no evidence that reduction in market value from permanent injury to land but evidence that might have allowed landowner to recover under different theory); Windfohr v. Johnson's Estate, 57 S.W.2d 215, 216 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1932, no writ) (measure of damages for injury to land is not "an inflexible rule" and "may be whatever comes nearest to affording actual compensation for the injury").

2010See id.; see also Porras, 675 S.W.2d at 506 (case remanded in interest of justice when no evidence that reduction in market value from permanent injury to land but evidence that might have allowed landowner to recover under different theory); Windfohr v. Johnson’s Estate, 57 S.W.2d 215, 216 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1932, no writ) (measure of damages for injury to land is not “an inflexible rule” and “may be whatever comes nearest to affording actual compensation for the injury”).

2010See id.; see also Porras, 675 S.W.2d at 506 (case remanded in interest of justice when no evidence that reduction in market value from permanent injury to land but evidence that might have allowed landowner to recover under different theory); Windfohr v. Johnson's Estate, 57 S.W.2d 215, 216 (Tex.Civ.App.-Fort Worth 1932, no writ) (measure of damages for injury to land is not "an inflexible rule" and "may be whatever comes nearest to affording actual compensation for the injury").

2005See Roberts v. Roberts, 560 S.W.2d 488, 439-40 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1977, writ refd n.r.e.) (holding FEGLIA does not preempt state court’s power to impose a constructive trust on the proceeds of a decedent’s insurance policy after proceeds have been paid to the designated beneficiary); see also Eonda v. Affinito, 427 Pa.Super. 317 , 629 A.2d 119, 123 (1993) (concluding that a state court-imposed constructive trust does not contravene any of the federal interests underlying FEGLIA and thus is not preempted by FEGLIA); Kidd v. Pritzel, 821 S.W.2d 566, 575 (Mo.Ct.App.1991) (“We hold that the [e

2005See Roberts v. Roberts, 560 S.W.2d 488, 439-40 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1977, writ refd n.r.e.) (holding FEGLIA does not preempt state court’s power to impose a constructive trust on the proceeds of a decedent’s insurance policy after proceeds have been paid to the designated beneficiary); see also Eonda v. Affinito, 427 Pa.Super. 317 , 629 A.2d 119, 123 (1993) (concluding that a state court-imposed constructive trust does not contravene any of the federal interests underlying FEGLIA and thus is not preempted by FEGLIA); Kidd v. Pritzel, 821 S.W.2d 566, 575 (Mo.Ct.App.1991) (“We hold that the [e

2005Co. v. Christ, 979 F.2d 575, 580 (7th Cir.1992) (“FEGLIA preempts the divorce decree and constructive trust remedy.”); Dean v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 948, 949 (10th Cir.1989) (“The state domestic relations court order ostensibly restricts the federal insured’s right to designate a beneficiary and thus cannot be valid under FEG-LIA.”); O’Neal v. Gonzalez, 839 F.2d 1437, 1440 (11th Cir.1988) (“Congress intended to establish ... an inflexible rule that the beneficiary designated in accordance with the statute would receive the policy proceeds, regardless of other documents or the equities in a particu

2005Co. v. Christ, 979 F.2d 575, 580 (7th Cir.1992) (“FEGLIA preempts the divorce decree and constructive trust remedy.”); Dean v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 948, 949 (10th Cir.1989) (“The state domestic relations court order ostensibly restricts the federal insured’s right to designate a beneficiary and thus cannot be valid under FEG-LIA.”); O’Neal v. Gonzalez, 839 F.2d 1437, 1440 (11th Cir.1988) (“Congress intended to establish ... an inflexible rule that the beneficiary designated in accordance with the statute would receive the policy proceeds, regardless of other documents or the equities in a particu

2005Co. v. Christ, 979 F.2d 575, 580 (7th Cir.1992) (“FEGLIA preempts the divorce decree and constructive trust remedy.”); Dean v. Johnson, 881 F.2d 948, 949 (10th Cir.1989) (“The state domestic relations court order ostensibly restricts the federal insured’s right to designate a beneficiary and thus cannot be valid under FEG-LIA.”); O’Neal v. Gonzalez, 839 F.2d 1437, 1440 (11th Cir.1988) (“Congress intended to establish ... an inflexible rule that the beneficiary designated in accordance with the statute would receive the policy proceeds, regardless of other documents or the equities in a particu

2005See Roberts v. Roberts, 560 S.W.2d 488, 439-40 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1977, writ refd n.r.e.) (holding FEGLIA does not preempt state court’s power to impose a constructive trust on the proceeds of a decedent’s insurance policy after proceeds have been paid to the designated beneficiary); see also Eonda v. Affinito, 427 Pa.Super. 317 , 629 A.2d 119, 123 (1993) (concluding that a state court-imposed constructive trust does not contravene any of the federal interests underlying FEGLIA and thus is not preempted by FEGLIA); Kidd v. Pritzel, 821 S.W.2d 566, 575 (Mo.Ct.App.1991) (“We hold that the [e

2005See Roberts v. Roberts, 560 S.W.2d 488, 439-40 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1977, writ refd n.r.e.) (holding FEGLIA does not preempt state court’s power to impose a constructive trust on the proceeds of a decedent’s insurance policy after proceeds have been paid to the designated beneficiary); see also Eonda v. Affinito, 427 Pa.Super. 317 , 629 A.2d 119, 123 (1993) (concluding that a state court-imposed constructive trust does not contravene any of the federal interests underlying FEGLIA and thus is not preempted by FEGLIA); Kidd v. Pritzel, 821 S.W.2d 566, 575 (Mo.Ct.App.1991) (“We hold that the [e

2005See Roberts v. Roberts, 560 S.W.2d 488, 439-40 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1977, writ refd n.r.e.) (holding FEGLIA does not preempt state court’s power to impose a constructive trust on the proceeds of a decedent’s insurance policy after proceeds have been paid to the designated beneficiary); see also Eonda v. Affinito, 427 Pa.Super. 317 , 629 A.2d 119, 123 (1993) (concluding that a state court-imposed constructive trust does not contravene any of the federal interests underlying FEGLIA and thus is not preempted by FEGLIA); Kidd v. Pritzel, 821 S.W.2d 566, 575 (Mo.Ct.App.1991) (“We hold that the [e

2005See Roberts v. Roberts, 560 S.W.2d 488, 439-40 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1977, writ refd n.r.e.) (holding FEGLIA does not preempt state court’s power to impose a constructive trust on the proceeds of a decedent’s insurance policy after proceeds have been paid to the designated beneficiary); see also Eonda v. Affinito, 427 Pa.Super. 317 , 629 A.2d 119, 123 (1993) (concluding that a state court-imposed constructive trust does not contravene any of the federal interests underlying FEGLIA and thus is not preempted by FEGLIA); Kidd v. Pritzel, 821 S.W.2d 566, 575 (Mo.Ct.App.1991) (“We hold that the [e

2005See Roberts v. Roberts, 560 S.W.2d 488, 439-40 (Tex.Civ.App.-Beaumont 1977, writ refd n.r.e.) (holding FEGLIA does not preempt state court’s power to impose a constructive trust on the proceeds of a decedent’s insurance policy after proceeds have been paid to the designated beneficiary); see also Eonda v. Affinito, 427 Pa.Super. 317 , 629 A.2d 119, 123 (1993) (concluding that a state court-imposed constructive trust does not contravene any of the federal interests underlying FEGLIA and thus is not preempted by FEGLIA); Kidd v. Pritzel, 821 S.W.2d 566, 575 (Mo.Ct.App.1991) (“We hold that the [e

1998Rivera v. State, 948 S.W.2d 365, 370 (TexApp.-Beaumont 1997, no pet.) (applying the reasoning set out in an analogous situation in Johnson v. State, 650 S.W.2d 414 (Tex.Crim.App.1983)).

1992Co. v. Manning, 568 F.2d 922, 926 (2nd Cir.1977).

1992Co. v. Manning, 568 F.2d at 925-26 .