inflexible rule in Illinois

1990The doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions. ( Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill.2d 11, 26 .) Anderson and Mega were wrongly decided.

1977The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held, “the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice.” (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 .) See Amann v. Faidy (1953), 415 Ill. 422 , 114 N.E.2d 412

1988An important aid in determining whether a provision is mandatory or directory is the form of the verb used in the statute. [Citation.] *** Generally, the use of the word ‘shall’ is regarded as indicative of a mandatory intent. [Citations.] We recognize, however, that this is not an inflexible rule; the statute may be interpreted as permissive, depending upon the context of the provision and the intent of the drafters. [Citation.]” (People v. Youngbey (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 556, 562 .) In Youngbey, this court found that the word “shall” coupled with the negative “not” renders the requirement of sec

1984Relying on another case, this court in Davis stated: “In Youngbey, in construing the import of the term ‘shall’ we observed: ‘Generally, the use of the word “shall” is regarded as indicative of a mandatory intent. [Citations.] We recognize, however, that this is not an inflexible rule; the statute may be interpreted as permissive, depending upon the context of the provision and the intent of the drafters.’ (People v. Youngbey (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 556, 562 .) In the instant case, to hold that the term ‘shall’ denominates a mandatory requirement imposed upon the judiciary at sentencing would be to

1977The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held, “the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice.” (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 .) See Amann v. Faidy (1953), 415 Ill. 422 , 114 N.E.2d 412

1977The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held, “the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice.” (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 .) See Amann v. Faidy (1953), 415 Ill. 422 , 114 N.E.2d 412

1977The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held, “the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice.” (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 .) See Amann v. Faidy (1953), 415 Ill. 422 , 114 N.E.2d 412

1977The Illinois Supreme Court has repeatedly held, “the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy and social needs require a departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice.” (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill. 2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 .) See Amann v. Faidy (1953), 415 Ill. 422 , 114 N.E.2d 412

1991The court cited its earlier Davis opinion that “an inflexible rule requiring formal proof of earlier court records only by authenticated or certified copies of proof of identity *** [is] incompatible with considerations of judicial economy and efficiency” (Davis, 95 Ill. 2d at 31 , citing People v. Davis (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 157, 164 ) and adopted the “general rule that identity of name gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of identity of person.” Davis, 95 Ill. 2d at 31 .

1991The court cited its earlier Davis opinion that “an inflexible rule requiring formal proof of earlier court records only by authenticated or certified copies of proof of identity *** [is] incompatible with considerations of judicial economy and efficiency” (Davis, 95 Ill. 2d at 31 , citing People v. Davis (1976), 65 Ill. 2d 157, 164 ) and adopted the “general rule that identity of name gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of identity of person.” Davis, 95 Ill. 2d at 31 .

1956The plain and sufficient reason is that the interests of the buyer and seller of the same property are necessarily antagonistic, and the only safe rule is one which absolutely forbids a trustee to occupy two positions inconsistent with each other.” ’ Citing Joliet Trust & Savings Bank v. Ingalls, 276 Ill.

1952The plain and sufficient reason is that the interests of the buyer and seller of the same property are necessarily antagonistic, and the only safe rule is one which absolutely forbids a trustee to occupy two positions inconsistent with each other. ’ ” Citing Joliet Trust & Savings Bank v. Ingalls, 276 Ill.

1998Based on that determination, the courts in People v. Lavariega, 175 Ill. 2d 153, 157-59 (1997), and People v. Dvorak, 276 Ill.

1997If this were the case, the State argues, every sanction would be punishment for double jeopardy purposes, and the State cites People v. Dvorak, 276 Ill.

1969In People v. Henson, 29 Ill2d 210, 193 NE2d 777 (1963), it is said (p 213): “We have repeatedly held that where a case is tried without a jury the determination of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given to their testimony is for the trial judge, and this court will not substitute its judgment on such matters for that of the trial judge, who saw and heard the witnesses.” We believe the pronouncements made in People v. Mack, 25 Ill2d 416, 420, 185 NE2d 154 (1962), apply here: “We do not, however, regard these cases as establishing an inflexible rule of law requiring in all c

1968In People v. Mack, 25 Ill2d 416, 185 NE2d 154 , the court discussed this requirement saying at page 420: “We do not, however, regard these cases as establishing an inflexible rule of law requiring in all cases that the testimony of the complaining witness in a rape case must be corroborated.

2009Such an inflexible rule would needlessly lengthen litigation and burden a class of litigants which is generally little able to afford the cost of such proceedings." Fotsch, 139 Ill.App.3d at 89 , 93 Ill.Dec. 640 , 487 N.E.2d 84 .

2009Such an inflexible rule would needlessly lengthen litigation and burden a class of litigants which is generally little able to afford the cost of such proceedings." Fotsch, 139 Ill.App.3d at 89 , 93 Ill.Dec. 640 , 487 N.E.2d 84 .

2003Under Oliveira, a plaintiff must allege, not that he read the ads, but only “that he was, in some manner, deceived.” (Emphasis added.) Oliveira, 201 Ill. 2d at 155 , 776 N.E.2d at 164 .

2003Under Oliveira, a plaintiff must allege, not that he read the ads, but only “that he was, in some manner, deceived.” (Emphasis added.) Oliveira, 201 Ill. 2d at 155 , 776 N.E.2d at 164 .

2003However, in Zekman, 182 Ill.2d at 376 , 231 Ill.Dec. 80 , 695 N.E.2d at 862 , the supreme court found the plaintiff had not demonstrated proximate cause because the plaintiff was not deceived where he had not read the deceptive material.

2003However, in Zekman, 182 Ill.2d at 376 , 231 Ill.Dec. 80 , 695 N.E.2d at 862 , the supreme court found the plaintiff had not demonstrated proximate cause because the plaintiff was not deceived where he had not read the deceptive material.

1999Just as we reject respondent’s contention the date of discovery of the condition and its relation to the employment necessarily fixes the date of the accident, we reject any interpretation of this opinion which would permit the employee to always establish the date of the accident in a repetitive-trauma case by reference to the last date of work.” Oscar Mayer, 176 Ill.

1992Just as we reject respondent’s contention the date of discovery of the condition and its relation to the employment necessarily fixes the date of accident, we reject any interpretation of this opinion which would permit the employee to always establish the date of accident in a repetitive-trauma case by reference to the last date of work.” 176 Ill.

1995The court stated: "No court has stated that each element must be proved to establish a prima facie case. 'This, of course, was not intended to be an inflexible rule *** "[t]he facts necessarily will vary *** and the specifications *** of the prima facie proof required *** is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.” ’ Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters (1978), 438 U.S. 567, 575-76 , 57 L.

1995The court stated: "No court has stated that each element must be proved to establish a prima facie case. 'This, of course, was not intended to be an inflexible rule *** "[t]he facts necessarily will vary *** and the specifications *** of the prima facie proof required *** is not necessarily applicable in every respect to differing factual situations.” ’ Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters (1978), 438 U.S. 567, 575-76 , 57 L.

1995Ed. 2d 957, 966 , 98 S. Ct. 2943, 2949 , quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792 , 802 n.13, 36 L.

1995Ed. 2d 957, 966 , 98 S. Ct. 2943, 2949 , quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (1973), 411 U.S. 792 , 802 n.13, 36 L.

1960Because it turns what is supposedly a practical test, "one designed to assist the court in determining whether or not the confession was voluntary," ( People v. Jennings, 11 Ill.2d 610 ), into an inflexible rule, and because it virtually nullifies the exception which excuses the presence of witnesses when *535 it is not possible or feasible for them to testify, I cannot join that opinion.

1960Because it turns what is supposedly a practical test, “one designed to assist the court in determining whether or not the confession was voluntary,” (People v. Jennings, 11 Ill.2d 610 ), into an inflexible rule, and because it virtually nullifies the exception which excuses the presence of witnesses when it is not possible or feasible for them to testify, I cannot join that opinion.

1992App. 3d 839 , 551 N.E.2d 737 ), this is not an inflexible rule and the trial court has the discretion to exclude such income.

1992While non-recurring income may properly be included in calculating net income for purposes of child support ( In re Marriage of Hart (1990), 194 Ill.App.3d 839 , 141 Ill.Dec. 550 , 551 N.E.2d 737 ), this is not an inflexible rule and the trial court has the discretion to exclude such income.

1984Village of Park Forest v. Fagan (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 264, 268 .” (People v. Youngbey (1980), 82 Ill. 2d 556, 562 .) The appellate court acknowledged the general rule concerning the word “shall” but nonetheless concluded that the context of this provision required “shall” to be interpreted as directory rather than mandatory.

1980Village of Park Forest v. Fagan (1976), 64 Ill. 2d 264, 268 .

1984(Andrews v. Foxworthy (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 13, 21 ; see 1A A. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction sec. 25.04, at 301 (1972).) We recognize, however, that this is not an inflexible rule; the statute may be interpreted as permissive, depending upon the context of the provision and the intent of the drafters.

1980(Andrews v. Foxworthy (1978), 71 Ill. 2d 13, 21 ; See 1A A. Sutherland, Statutes and Statutory Construction sec. 25.04, at 301 (1972).) We recognize, however, that this is not an inflexible rule; the statute may be interpreted as permissive, depending upon the context of the provision and the intent of the drafters.

1979(People v. Madison (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 476, 488 ; People v. McCrimmon (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 40, 45 .) To the extent that these and similar holdings may be thought to create an inflexible rule requiring formal proof of earlier court records only by authenticated or certified copies of those records and proof of identity, they are incompatible with considerations of judicial economy and efficiency essential to the disposition of present-day caseloads.

1976(People v. Madison (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 476, 488 ; People v. McCrimmon (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 40, 45 .) To the extent that these and similar holdings may be thought to create an inflexible rule requiring formal proof of earlier court records only by authenticated or certified copies of those records and proof of identity, they are incompatible with considerations of judicial economy and efficiency essential to the disposition of present-day caseloads.

1979(People v. Madison (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 476, 488 ; People v. McCrimmon (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 40, 45 .) To the extent that these and similar holdings may be thought to create an inflexible rule requiring formal proof of earlier court records only by authenticated or certified copies of those records and proof of identity, they are incompatible with considerations of judicial economy and efficiency essential to the disposition of present-day caseloads.

1976(People v. Madison (1974), 56 Ill. 2d 476, 488 ; People v. McCrimmon (1967), 37 Ill. 2d 40, 45 .) To the extent that these and similar holdings may be thought to create an inflexible rule requiring formal proof of earlier court records only by authenticated or certified copies of those records and proof of identity, they are incompatible with considerations of judicial economy and efficiency essential to the disposition of present-day caseloads.

1977No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill.2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 , may appropriately be said again: `We have repeatedly held that the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy and social needs require a *788 departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice. ( Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill.2d 106, 111 ; Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill.2d 608, 615 ; Amann v.

1977No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill.2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89, 96 , may appropriately be said again: `We have repeatedly held that the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to prior decisions, and that when it appears that public policy and social needs require a *788 departure from prior decisions, it is our duty as a court of last resort to overrule those decisions and establish a rule consonant with our present day concepts of right and justice. ( Bradley v. Fox, 7 Ill.2d 106, 111 ; Nudd v. Matsoukas, 7 Ill.2d 608, 615 ; Amann v.

1973Although we are mindful “that the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to policy decisions” (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill.2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89 ; see also Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill.2d 608, 615 , 131 N.E.2d 525 ; and Doggett v. North American Life Insurance Co. (1947), 396 Ill. 354, 360-61 , 71 N.E.2d 686 ), we feel compelled to follow the rule adhered to by the courts of this State for over 75 years.

1973Although we are mindful “that the doctrine of stare decisis is not an inflexible rule requiring this court to blindly follow precedents and adhere to policy decisions” (Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District No. 302 (1959), 18 Ill.2d 11, 26 , 163 N.E.2d 89 ; see also Nudd v. Matsoukas (1956), 7 Ill.2d 608, 615 , 131 N.E.2d 525 ; and Doggett v. North American Life Insurance Co. (1947), 396 Ill. 354, 360-61 , 71 N.E.2d 686 ), we feel compelled to follow the rule adhered to by the courts of this State for over 75 years.

1970(Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill 408, 414, 105 NE2d 300 ), but as the court observed in Wolfrum v. Wolfrum, 5 Ill App2d 471, 475, 126 NE2d 34 , “This is not an inflexible rule, however, since the welfare of the child is the prime consideration.” There is no evidence in this record involving moral turpitude on the part of the defendant, but there was evidence which amounted to a positive showing that the interests of the children would be best served by the award of the custody to the plaintiff and this showing is sufficient to support the award.

1970Nye v. Nye, supra; Eggemeyer v. Eggemeyer, supra; Hirth v. Hirth, supra. While not an inflexible rule, it is generally considered that the mother is the most beneficent custodian of a child of tender years, if she is a fit person.

1970(Nye v. Nye, 411 Ill 408, 414, 105 NE2d 300 ), but as the court observed in Wolfrum v. Wolfrum, 5 Ill App2d 471, 475, 126 NE2d 34 , “This is not an inflexible rule, however, since the welfare of the child is the prime consideration.” There is no evidence in this record involving moral turpitude on the part of the defendant, but there was evidence which amounted to a positive showing that the interests of the children would be best served by the award of the custody to the plaintiff and this showing is sufficient to support the award.

1967While we realize that it is usual to place small children in the care of their mother, as we have pointed out in Wolfram v. Wolfram, 5 Ill App2d 471, 475, 126 NE2d 34 : “This is not an inflexible rule, however, since the welfare of the child is the prime consideration.” In the case at bar, the trial court specifically found: “If however we consider the many times this mother left the children, on many occasions overnight and at times for extensive periods, and if we consider the fact that the evidence indicates that she resorts to intoxicants when real or imagined problems arise, and sometimes