inflexible rule in Delaware

2026Such an inflexible rule would be at odds with the very nature of equitable defenses, our precedent addressing “unusual conditions or extraordinary circumstances” 103 that might justify setting aside the analogous statute of limitations in a laches analysis, 100 Hudak v. Procek, 806 A.2d 140, 154 (Del. 2002). 101 2 Wolfe & Pittinger § 15.07[d] (quoting Reid, 970 A.2d at 183 ). 102 Id. (quoting Kraft, 145 A.3d at 979 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). 103 Levey, 76 A.3d at 771 (quoting IAC/InterActiveCorp. v. O’Brien, 26 A.3d 174, 178 (Del. 2011)). 41 and our precedent addressing the various

2026Such an inflexible rule would be at odds with the very nature of equitable defenses, our precedent addressing “unusual conditions or extraordinary circumstances” 103 that might justify setting aside the analogous statute of limitations in a laches analysis, 100 Hudak v. Procek, 806 A.2d 140, 154 (Del. 2002). 101 2 Wolfe & Pittinger § 15.07[d] (quoting Reid, 970 A.2d at 183 ). 102 Id. (quoting Kraft, 145 A.3d at 979 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). 103 Levey, 76 A.3d at 771 (quoting IAC/InterActiveCorp. v. O’Brien, 26 A.3d 174, 178 (Del. 2011)). 41 and our precedent addressing the various

2026Such an inflexible rule would be at odds with the very nature of equitable defenses, our precedent addressing “unusual conditions or extraordinary circumstances” 103 that might justify setting aside the analogous statute of limitations in a laches analysis, 100 Hudak v. Procek, 806 A.2d 140, 154 (Del. 2002). 101 2 Wolfe & Pittinger § 15.07[d] (quoting Reid, 970 A.2d at 183 ). 102 Id. (quoting Kraft, 145 A.3d at 979 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). 103 Levey, 76 A.3d at 771 (quoting IAC/InterActiveCorp. v. O’Brien, 26 A.3d 174, 178 (Del. 2011)). 41 and our precedent addressing the various

2026Such an inflexible rule would be at odds with the very nature of equitable defenses, our precedent addressing “unusual conditions or extraordinary circumstances” 103 that might justify setting aside the analogous statute of limitations in a laches analysis, 100 Hudak v. Procek, 806 A.2d 140, 154 (Del. 2002). 101 2 Wolfe & Pittinger § 15.07[d] (quoting Reid, 970 A.2d at 183 ). 102 Id. (quoting Kraft, 145 A.3d at 979 ) (internal quotation marks omitted). 103 Levey, 76 A.3d at 771 (quoting IAC/InterActiveCorp. v. O’Brien, 26 A.3d 174, 178 (Del. 2011)). 41 and our precedent addressing the various

2026GP, LLC, 336 A.3d 542 , 574 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 2025) (recognizing that the modern approach to awarding pre- and post-judgment interest is to award compound and floating interest). 193 540 A.2d 403, 410 (Del. 1988). 194 Id. at 409 . 195 Id. 196 Id. (citing Missouri-Kansas Pipeline Co. v. Warrick, 22 A.2d 865, 868 (Del. 1941)).

2024The Court observed that the landowner was, in effect, seeking “simple interest on unpaid interest”—that is, compound interest—which is “traditionally not favored in the law.”37 But the Court’s opinion 33 Costs and Interests Opinion at *7-9 (citing Summa Corp. v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 540 A.2d 403 (Del. 1988); Stone & Co., Inc. v. Silverstein, No. 298, 1998 (Del. Apr. 1, 1999) (ORDER); Rehoboth Marketplace Assocs. v. State, 625 A.2d 279 , 1993 WL 191465 (Del. Apr. 26, 1993) (TABLE)). 34 Summa Corp., 540 A.2d at 410 . 35 Id. 36 Francis I. duPont & Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 343 A

2020See Gannett Co. v. Kanaga, 750 A.2d 1174, 1182 (Del. 2000) (noting exceptions to law of the case doctrine “for clearly erroneous decisions, unjust results or significantly changed circumstances); Weedon v. State, 750 A.2d 521 , 527-28 (Del. 2000) (noting exceptions to the law of the case doctrine when the “previous ruling was clearly in error or there was an important change in circumstances” or an “equitable concern of preventing injustice”). 132 Def.’s Opening Br. 50-51. 133 Id. at 51-53. 49 outside the four corners of the agreement; it begins with the text of the agreement itself.

1952Eq. 293, 98 A. 848 ; Foster v. Foster, 93 N. J.

1945Ch. 315 , 147 A. 305 , he speaks of the statute as “defining the jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery.” At first glance there it may seem to be of little conse quence whether the adequacy of a remedy at law defeats the jurisdiction of the court of equity in a given- case, because, on the one hand, of an inflexible rule of the Court of Chancery that in such cases it will not assume jurisdiction, or, on the other whether such equitable jurisdiction is denied by the express terms- of a statute giving such jurisdiction to a court of law.