inflexible rule in Massachusetts

2011However, “[w]hile that rule of construction may apply in many situations, it ‘must give way to the primary and inflexible rule that... contracts are to be construed so as to ascertain ... the true intention the parties.” DeLorenzo v. Tzokos, 2001 Mass. App. Div. 179, 180 , quoting Shea v. Bay State Gas Co., 383 Mass. 218, 225 (1981).

2003The remainder of the Agreement does not, for example, meaningfully clarify the over-all permeability or impermeability of the financial relationship between BRMC and the Center for the purpose of calculating “collected revenues for management fees.” The court has in certain circumstances, particularly contracts of adhesion, interpreted ambiguity against the drafter of the contract, albeit recognizing that this “rule of construction ‘must give way to the primary and inflexible rule that. . . contracts, are to be construed so as to ascertain... the true intention of the parties.’ ” Shea v. Bay S

2003The remainder of the Agreement does not, for example, meaningfully clarify the over-all permeability or impermeability of the financial relationship between BRMC and the Center for the purpose of calculating “collected revenues for management fees.” The court has in certain circumstances, particularly contracts of adhesion, interpreted ambiguity against the drafter of the contract, albeit recognizing that this “rule of construction ‘must give way to the primary and inflexible rule that. . . contracts, are to be construed so as to ascertain... the true intention of the parties.’ ” Shea v. Bay S

1981Moreover, that rule of construction “must give way to the primary and inflexible rule that . . . contracts, are to be construed so as to ascertain . . . the true intention of the parties.” Teeples v. Tolson, 207 F. Supp. 212, 215 (D.

2001See also Hubert v. Melrose-Wakefield Hospital Association, 40 Mass. App. Ct. 172, 177 (1996).

2000Wakefield Hosp., 40 Mass.App.Ct. 172, 177 (1996), quoting Shea v. Bay State Gas Co., 383 Mass. 218, 225 (1981).

2011At the same time, “an inflexible rule excluding all juror testimony offered to impeach verdicts achieves stability at the expense of doing justice between the parties — a result not consistent with the ideal of trial by an impartial jury.” Commonwealth v. Fidler, supra at 197 .

2002“Where a verdict [may be] the product of misconduct based on extraneous matter, an inflexible rule that bars the best evidence of that misconduct does not serve the interests of providing a fair and just trial for litigants.” Fidler, 377 Mass. at 197 (albeit speaking about evidence from jurors).

2016App. at 116 (court granted equitable relief by crediting the father for his overpayment of child support for nearly two years due to “grossly incorrect” order; court noted that there was “clear evidence that granting [the father] some sort of credit against his future child support payments will not work a hardship on the children in [the mother’s] custody”); Acree v. Acree, 2 Va. App. 151, 157 (1986) (“Where . . . the custodial parent has by his or her own volition entered into an agreement to relinquish custody on a permanent basis and has further agreed to the elimination of support payment

2015In fact, we have found that, in rare cases, a new trial may be warranted “[wjhere the Commonwealth’s case depends so heavily on the testimony of a witness” and where the newly discovered evidence “seriously undermines the credibility of that witness.” Commonwealth v. Liebman, 388 Mass. 483, 489 (1983).

2015For instance, it could be explored whether Debra had any sort of relationship with the defendant that might have created a motive for her to lie in order to support the defendant’s motion for a new trial. 7 In addition to concluding that Debra’s affidavit was not admissible as a dying declaration, the judge also determined that Debra’s statements “would not be sufficient to warrant a new trial” because it only “tend[s] to impeach the testimony of Jackson.” In Commonwealth v. Cowels, 470 Mass. 607, 621 (2015), however, which we decided after the judge denied the defendant’s first motion for a n

2015Id.

2002See Wright v. Abbott, 160 Mass. 395, 397-398 (1894), where a deputy sheriff who had charge of a jury was permitted to testify as to what he heard was said and done by the jury (they had decided the case by lot), the court stating, at 398: “If, on grounds of public policy, the affidavits or the testimony of jurors concerning what took place in the jury room is excluded, as well as evidence of their subsequent declarations on the subject, still we are of opinion that independent evidence should be admitted, and that the consequences to be apprehended from admitting such evidence are less harmful

1999Kerrigan v. Boston, 361 Mass. 24, 33 (1972); Shea v. Bay State Gas Co., 383 Mass. 218, 225 (1981); Hubert v. Melrose-Wakefield Hospital Assoc., 40 Mass.App.Ct. 172, 177 (1996).

1990Examining the affidavit, the defendant contends that it provided no information from which the magistrate could conclude that Frommer possessed “sufficient expertise to identify growing marijuana.” In Sullivan v. District Court of Hampshire, 384 Mass. 736, 743-744 (1981), the court refused to adopt “an inflexible rule” that a police officer must have previously seen marihuana to seize it lawfully.

1988See, e.g., id. at 839-840 (sufficient where trial judge asked counsel to object by number); Commonwealth v. Martin, 369 Mass. 640, 645-646 (1976) (objection by number sufficed where judge probably looked at the requests during objection).

1988See, e.g., id. at 839-840 (sufficient where trial judge asked counsel to object by number); Commonwealth v. Martin, 369 Mass. 640, 645-646 (1976) (objection by number sufficed where judge probably looked at the requests during objection).

1982Second, the plaintiffs note correctly that the Young case “does not establish an inflexible rule.” The court there states (at 729) that “[i]t appears likely that practices of reasonable accommodation to mutual convenience will evolve . . . and we leave a more precise statement as to timeliness to the particular case wherein it may be required . . . .” This court applied the flexible Young guidelines in Carroll v. Malden, 2 Mass. App. Ct. 735, 739-740 (1974).

1976It is for the Legislature to determine “that society can best be protected against the evil aimed at by a rigorous application of an inflexible rule.” Commonwealth v. Mixer, 207 Mass. 141, 146 (1910).

1976Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 21-26 (1967).

1948See Meader v. Meader, 252 Mass. 132 ; Goren v. Goren, 310 Mass. 284 .