17 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1902–2016 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Twitty v. Maassgreen2 sentences2016Id. at 101 ; see Twitty v. Maass, 96 Or App 631, 633-34 , 773 P2d 1336 (1989) (petitioner could not reasonably have asserted on direct appeal his claim of ineffective counsel based on a constitutional principle first articulated after the filing deadline for his appeal); cf. Lerch v. Cupp, 9 Or App 508, 515 , 497 P2d 379 (1972) (phrase “could not reasonably have been asserted” “should not be construed as an inflexible standard meant to be used as a procedural bludgeon to preclude the curing of defects of such magnitude as to render the conviction and imprisonment thereon unconstitutional” (int 2016Id. at 101 ; see Twitty v. Maass, 96 Or App 631, 633-34 , 773 P2d 1336 (1989) (petitioner could not reasonably have asserted on direct appeal his claim of ineffective counsel based on a constitutional principle first articulated after the filing deadline for his appeal); cf. Lerch v. Cupp, 9 Or App 508, 515 , 497 P2d 379 (1972) (phrase “could not reasonably have been asserted” “should not be construed as an inflexible standard meant to be used as a procedural bludgeon to preclude the curing of defects of such magnitude as to render the conviction and imprisonment thereon unconstitutional” (int | 1 | 1 |
Megdal v. Oregon State Board of Dental Examinersgreen1 sentence2008See Larsen v. Adult & Family Services Division, 34 Or App 615, 619-21 , 579 P2d 866 (1978) (agencies are not subject to “an inflexible requirement that every refinement of an articulated policy be promulgated through” prior rulemaking); see also Trebesch, 300 Or at 270 (Megdal does not require that all policymaking functions be exercised only after rulemaking); Megdal, 288 Or at 314 (rules need not “catalogue all the types” of conduct that are subject to enforcement action in order to serve the purposes of “giving notice of censurable conduct” and confining the agency’s discretion to the annou | 1 | 1 |
Larsen v. Adult & Family Services Divisiongreen2 sentences2008See Larsen v. Adult & Family Services Division, 34 Or App 615, 619-21 , 579 P2d 866 (1978) (agencies are not subject to “an inflexible requirement that every refinement of an articulated policy be promulgated through” prior rulemaking); see also Trebesch, 300 Or at 270 (Megdal does not require that all policymaking functions be exercised only after rulemaking); Megdal, 288 Or at 314 (rules need not “catalogue all the types” of conduct that are subject to enforcement action in order to serve the purposes of “giving notice of censurable conduct” and confining the agency’s discretion to the annou 2008See Larsen v. Adult & Family Services Division, 34 Or App 615, 619-21 , 579 P2d 866 (1978) (agencies are not subject to “an inflexible requirement that every refinement of an articulated policy be promulgated through” prior rulemaking); see also Trebesch, 300 Or at 270 (Megdal does not require that all policymaking functions be exercised only after rulemaking); Megdal, 288 Or at 314 (rules need not “catalogue all the types” of conduct that are subject to enforcement action in order to serve the purposes of “giving notice of censurable conduct” and confining the agency’s discretion to the annou | 1 | 1 |
Trebesch v. Employment Divisiongreen1 sentence2008See Larsen v. Adult & Family Services Division, 34 Or App 615, 619-21 , 579 P2d 866 (1978) (agencies are not subject to “an inflexible requirement that every refinement of an articulated policy be promulgated through” prior rulemaking); see also Trebesch, 300 Or at 270 (Megdal does not require that all policymaking functions be exercised only after rulemaking); Megdal, 288 Or at 314 (rules need not “catalogue all the types” of conduct that are subject to enforcement action in order to serve the purposes of “giving notice of censurable conduct” and confining the agency’s discretion to the annou | 1 | 1 |
Albino v. Albinogreen2 sentences1979While it is true that "a beneficiary may be barred by his laches from holding the trustee liable for breach of trust," Lulay v. Lulay, 247 Or. 497, 501 , 429 P.2d 802, 804 (1967), it is also true that the one asserting the bar has the burden of proving the elements of laches: "`In order to constitute laches there must have been full knowledge of all the facts, concurring with a delay for an unreasonable length of time, and laches does not start to run until such knowledge is shown to exist. * * * In addition, the delay must result in substantial prejudice to the defendant to the extent that it 1979While it is true that "a beneficiary may be barred by his laches from holding the trustee liable for breach of trust," Lulay v. Lulay, 247 Or. 497, 501 , 429 P.2d 802, 804 (1967), it is also true that the one asserting the bar has the burden of proving the elements of laches: "`In order to constitute laches there must have been full knowledge of all the facts, concurring with a delay for an unreasonable length of time, and laches does not start to run until such knowledge is shown to exist. * * * In addition, the delay must result in substantial prejudice to the defendant to the extent that it | 1 | 1 |
Lulay v. Lulaygreen2 sentences1979While it is true that "a beneficiary may be barred by his laches from holding the trustee liable for breach of trust," Lulay v. Lulay, 247 Or. 497, 501 , 429 P.2d 802, 804 (1967), it is also true that the one asserting the bar has the burden of proving the elements of laches: "`In order to constitute laches there must have been full knowledge of all the facts, concurring with a delay for an unreasonable length of time, and laches does not start to run until such knowledge is shown to exist. * * * In addition, the delay must result in substantial prejudice to the defendant to the extent that it 1979While it is true that "a beneficiary may be barred by his laches from holding the trustee liable for breach of trust," Lulay v. Lulay, 247 Or. 497, 501 , 429 P.2d 802, 804 (1967), it is also true that the one asserting the bar has the burden of proving the elements of laches: "`In order to constitute laches there must have been full knowledge of all the facts, concurring with a delay for an unreasonable length of time, and laches does not start to run until such knowledge is shown to exist. * * * In addition, the delay must result in substantial prejudice to the defendant to the extent that it | 1 | 1 |
Willis v. Stagergreen2 sentences1974See also Willis v. Stager, 257 Or 608, 618-19 , 481 P2d 78 (1971). 1974See also Willis v. Stager, 257 Or 608, 618-19 , 481 P2d 78 (1971). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Howellgreen2 sentences1966See the comment on Stale v. Wilson in State v. Howell, 237 Or 382, 388 , 388 P2d 282 . 1966See the comment on Stale v. Wilson in State v. Howell, 237 Or 382, 388 , 388 P2d 282 . | 1 | 1 |
Pugh v. Goodgreen2 sentences1916It is an inflexible rule that the right even of an officer to demand expenses incurred by him in the performance of official duty must be found in the Constitution of the statute conferring it, either directly or by necessary implication; and a private citizen could not have any greater right in this respect: Jackson v. Siglin, 10 Or. 93 ; Pugh v. Good, 19 Or. 85, 92 ( 23 Pac. 827 ); Houser v. Umatilla County, 30 Or. 486, 489 ( 49 Pac. 867 ); Baker County v. Benson, 40 Or. 207, 212 ( 66 Pac. 815 ). 9. 1916It is an inflexible rule that the right even of an officer to demand expenses incurred by him in the performance of official duty must be found in the Constitution of the statute conferring it, either directly or by necessary implication; and a private citizen could not have any greater right in this respect: Jackson v. Siglin, 10 Or. 93 ; Pugh v. Good, 19 Or. 85, 92 ( 23 Pac. 827 ); Houser v. Umatilla County, 30 Or. 486, 489 ( 49 Pac. 867 ); Baker County v. Benson, 40 Or. 207, 212 ( 66 Pac. 815 ). 9. | 1 | 1 |
Houser v. Umatilla Countygreen2 sentences1916It is an inflexible rule that the right even of an officer to demand expenses incurred by him in the performance of official duty must be found in the Constitution of the statute conferring it, either directly or by necessary implication; and a private citizen could not have any greater right in this respect: Jackson v. Siglin, 10 Or. 93 ; Pugh v. Good, 19 Or. 85, 92 ( 23 Pac. 827 ); Houser v. Umatilla County, 30 Or. 486, 489 ( 49 Pac. 867 ); Baker County v. Benson, 40 Or. 207, 212 ( 66 Pac. 815 ). 9. 1916It is an inflexible rule that the right even of an officer to demand expenses incurred by him in the performance of official duty must be found in the Constitution of the statute conferring it, either directly or by necessary implication; and a private citizen could not have any greater right in this respect: Jackson v. Siglin, 10 Or. 93 ; Pugh v. Good, 19 Or. 85, 92 ( 23 Pac. 827 ); Houser v. Umatilla County, 30 Or. 486, 489 ( 49 Pac. 867 ); Baker County v. Benson, 40 Or. 207, 212 ( 66 Pac. 815 ). 9. | 1 | 1 |
Baker County v. Bensongreen2 sentences1916It is an inflexible rule that the right even of an officer to demand expenses incurred by him in the performance of official duty must be found in the Constitution of the statute conferring it, either directly or by necessary implication; and a private citizen could not have any greater right in this respect: Jackson v. Siglin, 10 Or. 93 ; Pugh v. Good, 19 Or. 85, 92 ( 23 Pac. 827 ); Houser v. Umatilla County, 30 Or. 486, 489 ( 49 Pac. 867 ); Baker County v. Benson, 40 Or. 207, 212 ( 66 Pac. 815 ). 9. 1916It is an inflexible rule that the right even of an officer to demand expenses incurred by him in the performance of official duty must be found in the Constitution of the statute conferring it, either directly or by necessary implication; and a private citizen could not have any greater right in this respect: Jackson v. Siglin, 10 Or. 93 ; Pugh v. Good, 19 Or. 85, 92 ( 23 Pac. 827 ); Houser v. Umatilla County, 30 Or. 486, 489 ( 49 Pac. 867 ); Baker County v. Benson, 40 Or. 207, 212 ( 66 Pac. 815 ). 9. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McIver v. Norman
green
2 sentences1974Thus, the doctrine of laches is not an inflexible rule, but its application depends upon..the particular: circumstances of each case McIver v. Norman, 187 Or 516, 544 , 205 P2d 137 , 213 P2d 144 (1949). 1974Thus, the doctrine of laches is not an inflexible rule, but its application depends upon..the particular: circumstances of each case McIver v. Norman, 187 Or 516, 544 , 205 P2d 137 , 213 P2d 144 (1949). | 3 | 1971–1974 |
Lerch v. Cupp
green
2 sentences2016Id. at 101 ; see Twitty v. Maass, 96 Or App 631, 633-34 , 773 P2d 1336 (1989) (petitioner could not reasonably have asserted on direct appeal his claim of ineffective counsel based on a constitutional principle first articulated after the filing deadline for his appeal); cf. Lerch v. Cupp, 9 Or App 508, 515 , 497 P2d 379 (1972) (phrase “could not reasonably have been asserted” “should not be construed as an inflexible standard meant to be used as a procedural bludgeon to preclude the curing of defects of such magnitude as to render the conviction and imprisonment thereon unconstitutional” (int 2016Id. at 101 ; see Twitty v. Maass, 96 Or App 631, 633-34 , 773 P2d 1336 (1989) (petitioner could not reasonably have asserted on direct appeal his claim of ineffective counsel based on a constitutional principle first articulated after the filing deadline for his appeal); cf. Lerch v. Cupp, 9 Or App 508, 515 , 497 P2d 379 (1972) (phrase “could not reasonably have been asserted” “should not be construed as an inflexible standard meant to be used as a procedural bludgeon to preclude the curing of defects of such magnitude as to render the conviction and imprisonment thereon unconstitutional” (int | 2 | 1979–2016 |
Long v. Armenakis
green
1 sentence2016Id. at 101 ; see Twitty v. Maass, 96 Or App 631, 633-34 , 773 P2d 1336 (1989) (petitioner could not reasonably have asserted on direct appeal his claim of ineffective counsel based on a constitutional principle first articulated after the filing deadline for his appeal); cf. Lerch v. Cupp, 9 Or App 508, 515 , 497 P2d 379 (1972) (phrase “could not reasonably have been asserted” “should not be construed as an inflexible standard meant to be used as a procedural bludgeon to preclude the curing of defects of such magnitude as to render the conviction and imprisonment thereon unconstitutional” (int | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill
red
1 sentence2009Although Gibbs did not state an inflexible rule, it did identify the appropriate balance in the usual case “in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial.” Carnegie-Mellon Univ., 484 US at 350 n 7. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. Goodwin
green
1 sentence2000The Court then went on to explain its reasons for not “adopting an inflexible presumption of prosecutorial vindictiveness in a pretrial setting.” Id. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Stephan v. Equitable Savings and Loan Association
green
2 sentences1993We agree. “[T]he doctrine of laches is not an inflexible rule, but its application depends upon the particular circumstance of each case.” Stephan v. Equitable S & L Ass’n., 268 Or 544, 569 , 522 P2d 478 (1974). 1993We agree. “[T]he doctrine of laches is not an inflexible rule, but its application depends upon the particular circumstance of each case.” Stephan v. Equitable S & L Ass’n., 268 Or 544, 569 , 522 P2d 478 (1974). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Mattson v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc.
green
2 sentences1993To prevail on a laches defense, a defendant must establish that “(1) plaintiffs delayed asserting their claim for an unreasonable length of time, (2) with full knowledge of all relevant facts (and laches does not start to run until such knowledge is shown to exist), (3) resulting in such substantial prejudice to defendant that it would be inequitable for the court to grant relief.” Mattson v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 301 Or 407, 419 , 723 P2d 996 (1986). 1993To prevail on a laches defense, a defendant must establish that “(1) plaintiffs delayed asserting their claim for an unreasonable length of time, (2) with full knowledge of all relevant facts (and laches does not start to run until such knowledge is shown to exist), (3) resulting in such substantial prejudice to defendant that it would be inequitable for the court to grant relief.” Mattson v. Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 301 Or 407, 419 , 723 P2d 996 (1986). | 1 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Welch
green
1 sentence1975However, in the present case, it is clear that the act of publishing the two checks was a single transaction.” 264 Or at 394-95 . | 1 | 1975–1975 |
State v. Wilson
green
2 sentences1966What was said with reference to a similar question in State v. Wilson, 221 Or 602, 604 , 351 P2d 944 , was not intended to lay down an inflexible rule depriving the trial judge of all discretion in passing upon a motion for continuance. 1966What was said with reference to a similar question in State v. Wilson, 221 Or 602, 604 , 351 P2d 944 , was not intended to lay down an inflexible rule depriving the trial judge of all discretion in passing upon a motion for continuance. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
State Ex Rel. Southern Pacific Co. v. Duncan
neutral
2 sentences1963When it appears that the demand would be unavailing, demand is unnecessary.” State ex rel S. P. Co. v. Duncan, 1962, 230 Or 179, 181 , 368 P2d 733, 734 . 1963When it appears that the demand would be unavailing, demand is unnecessary.” State ex rel S. P. Co. v. Duncan, 1962, 230 Or 179, 181 , 368 P2d 733, 734 . | 1 | 1963–1963 |
State v. Dennis
green
2 sentences1956The case at bar depends upon its own peculiar facts and so long as the corpus delicti is proved by clear, unequivocal, cogent and convincing evidence, the law is satisfied.” (Italics added) And again in State v. Dennis, 177 Or 73, 77 , 159 P2d 838 , 161 P2d 670 : “ * * * The fact that a crime has been committed (the corpus delicti), and that it was done *411 by tbe defendant, may be lawfully established by circumstantial evidence alone. 1956The case at bar depends upon its own peculiar facts and so long as the corpus delicti is proved by clear, unequivocal, cogent and convincing evidence, the law is satisfied.” (Italics added) And again in State v. Dennis, 177 Or 73, 77 , 159 P2d 838 , 161 P2d 670 : “ * * * The fact that a crime has been committed (the corpus delicti), and that it was done *411 by tbe defendant, may be lawfully established by circumstantial evidence alone. | 1 | 1956–1956 |
Dulles v. De Forest
neutral
1 sentence1934As the court well said in Dulles v. DeForest, 19 Conn. 190 : “It is obvious, that all the transactions between individuals may be, and often are, entered together in the form of one general account, for the purpose of more readily showing the state of all the affairs between them, or for some other purpose of mere per *285 sonal convenience; and it would be unreasonable, indeed, if an inflexible rule of inference should be adopted, which would preclude them from showing, in such a case, what was their real object and intention. ’ ’ Again, as the court said in Upham v. Lafavour, 11 Metc. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Jackson v. Siglin
neutral
1 sentence1916It is an inflexible rule that the right even of an officer to demand expenses incurred by him in the performance of official duty must be found in the Constitution of the statute conferring it, either directly or by necessary implication; and a private citizen could not have any greater right in this respect: Jackson v. Siglin, 10 Or. 93 ; Pugh v. Good, 19 Or. 85, 92 ( 23 Pac. 827 ); Houser v. Umatilla County, 30 Or. 486, 489 ( 49 Pac. 867 ); Baker County v. Benson, 40 Or. 207, 212 ( 66 Pac. 815 ). 9. | 1 | 1916–1916 |
Successors of Sanders v. Rivera
neutral
1 sentence1902Thus, if it appear from the face of the conveyance, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, that the corners and distances as given correctly describe the land intended to be conveyed, they will prevail: Hale v. Cottle, 21 Or. 580 ( 28 Pac. 901 ). | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Hale v. Cottle
green
1 sentence1902Thus, if it appear from the face of the conveyance, in the light of the surrounding circumstances, that the corners and distances as given correctly describe the land intended to be conveyed, they will prevail: Hale v. Cottle, 21 Or. 580 ( 28 Pac. 901 ). | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.