18 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1971–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Lopezgreen2 sentences2023Commonwealth v. Lopez, 3 S.W.3d 351, 353 (Ky. 1999), abrogated on procedural grounds by Commonwealth v. Carman, 455 S.W.3d 916 (Ky. 2015) (emphasis added) (“Combs is limited to those situations where a search warrant was necessary to obtain blood evidence in order to -10- prosecute a DUI case not involving injury or death . . . . [The Combs holding] does not control a situation where a defendant expressly consents to a blood alcohol test in compliance with KRS 189A.103.”). 2006The court further noted that its language in the Combs case “does not control a situation where a defendant expressly consents to a blood alcohol test in compliance with KRS 189A.103.” Id. 5 In Commonwealth v. Morriss, 70 S.W.3d 419 (Ky.2002), the court was again confronted with the application of KRS 189A.105(2)(b). | 1 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Hagergreen2 sentences2021Id. at 432 (citing South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983)). 2013While the fact of Appellant’s refusal is fully admissible at trial, see Commonwealth v. Hager, 702 S.W.2d 431, 432 (Ky.1986) (“[T]he admission into evidence of a defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test does not offend his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination....”) (citing South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 , 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983)), the Commonwealth sought, and the trial court allowed, the introduction of Appellant’s entire statement. | 1 | 2 |
Parson v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2009Thus, when the Court stated, “[w]e believe that evidence that a person charged with vehicular homicide had intoxicating drugs in his system when the homicide occurred is relevant to the issue of wanton ness even without additional evidence of the degree of impairment caused by its presence,” Id. at 781 (emphasis added), it recognized the temporal link under the evidence at hand (cocaine disappears from urine within 24 hours) of such conduct as a quantifier of the degree of wanton conduct at issue. 4 Notably, extreme impairment during the criminal event (which would have taken time to achieve) 2009Thus, when the Court stated, "[w]e believe that evidence that a person charged with vehicular homicide had intoxicating drugs in his system when the homicide occurred is relevant to the issue of wantonness *135 even without additional evidence of the degree of impairment caused by its presence," Id. at 781 (emphasis added), it recognized the temporal link under the evidence at hand (cocaine disappears from urine within 24 hours) of such conduct as a quantifier of the degree of wanton conduct at issue. [4] Notably, extreme impairment during the criminal event (which would have taken time to ach | 1 | 1 |
Beach v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1998See Beach v. Commonwealth, Ky., 927 S.W.2d 826 (1996) and Schmerber, supra. The ordinarily legitimate action of obtaining a search warrant when a suspect refuses cannot be used to avoid the standard set by the General Assembly which established the requirement of death or physical injury for a blood alcohol test. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
South Dakota v. Neville
green
2 sentences2025As the United States Supreme Court explained, albeit with reference to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, while the choice to submit to or refuse a blood-alcohol test “will not be an easy or pleasant one for a suspect to make,” the criminal process “often requires suspects and defendants to make difficult choices.” South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 , 103 S. Ct. 916, 923 , 74 L. 2025As the United States Supreme Court explained, albeit with reference to the Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution, while the choice to submit to or refuse a blood-alcohol test “will not be an easy or pleasant one for a suspect to make,” the criminal process “often requires suspects and defendants to make difficult choices.” South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 , 103 S. Ct. 916, 923 , 74 L. | 6 | 2010–2025 |
Commonwealth v. Wirth
green
2 sentences2005We held in Commonwealth v. Wirth, 936 S.W.2d 78 (Ky.1996), that the Commonwealth does not have to produce an expert witness to extrapolate the blood alcohol level back from the time of the blood alcohol test to the time the accused ceased operation of the motor vehicle. 2005Id. at 83-84 . | 2 | 2000–2005 |
Combs v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence2024Combs, 965 S.W.2d at 165 . (“The ordinarily legitimate action of obtaining a search warrant when a suspect refuses cannot be used to avoid the standard set by the General Assembly which established the requirement of death or physical injury for a blood alcohol test.”). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Commonwealth v. Carman
green
1 sentence2023Commonwealth v. Lopez, 3 S.W.3d 351, 353 (Ky. 1999), abrogated on procedural grounds by Commonwealth v. Carman, 455 S.W.3d 916 (Ky. 2015) (emphasis added) (“Combs is limited to those situations where a search warrant was necessary to obtain blood evidence in order to -10- prosecute a DUI case not involving injury or death . . . . [The Combs holding] does not control a situation where a defendant expressly consents to a blood alcohol test in compliance with KRS 189A.103.”). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Collins v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2010Id. at 114-15 . 2010Id. at 114-15 . | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Commonwealth v. Morriss
green
1 sentence2006The court further noted that its language in the Combs case “does not control a situation where a defendant expressly consents to a blood alcohol test in compliance with KRS 189A.103.” Id. 5 In Commonwealth v. Morriss, 70 S.W.3d 419 (Ky.2002), the court was again confronted with the application of KRS 189A.105(2)(b). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Kuntz v. State Highway Commissioner
green
2 sentences2004It was held in Kuntz v. State Highway Comm'r, 405 N.W.2d 285 (N.D.1987), that if an arrestee is denied the statutory right to counsel prior to submitting to a blood alcohol test, failure to take the test is not viewed as a refusal for purposes of revoking that person's driver's license. 2004It was held in Kuntz v. State Highway Comm’r, 405 N.W.2d 285 (N.D.1987), that if an arrestee is denied the statutory right to counsel prior to submitting to a blood alcohol test, failure to take the test is not viewed as a refusal for purposes of revoking that person’s driver’s license. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2000Additionally, Barker, analogizes the statutory “right” to refuse the blood alcohol test with the “rights” provided by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). 2000Additionally, Barker, analogizes the statutory “right” to refuse the blood alcohol test with the “rights” provided by Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 , 86 S.Ct. 1602 , 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Division of Driver Licensing, Department of Vehicle Regulation, Transportation Cabinet v. Bergmann
green
1 sentence1998Id. | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Jenkins
green
1 sentence1985Although no Kentucky case is on point, a similar result was reached in State v. Jenkins, 80 Wis. 426 , 259 N.W.2d 109 (1977), where the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the results of a defendant’s blood alcohol test were admissible at trial where the test was conducted at the request of a physician for diagnostic purposes and where the defendant was not under arrest at the time. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Commonwealth, Department of Public Safety v. Powers
green
1 sentence1971In Com., Dept. of Public Safety v. Powers, Ky., 453 S.W.2d 260 (1970), and Timberlake v. Com., Dept. of Public Safety, Ky., 464 S.W.2d 283 (1971), we held that the requests did not comply with KRS 186.565(3). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Timberlake v. Commonwealth, Department of Public Safety
neutral
1 sentence1971In Com., Dept. of Public Safety v. Powers, Ky., 453 S.W.2d 260 (1970), and Timberlake v. Com., Dept. of Public Safety, Ky., 464 S.W.2d 283 (1971), we held that the requests did not comply with KRS 186.565(3). | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences1971In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the Supreme Court of the United States had this question before it, viz., the rights of one required to take a blood-alcohol test as measured by the fourth and fifth amendments to the United States Constitution. 1971In Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), the Supreme Court of the United States had this question before it, viz., the rights of one required to take a blood-alcohol test as measured by the fourth and fifth amendments to the United States Constitution. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.