45 Michigan opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Michigan courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Keengreen2 sentences1981Defendant, relying on People v Keen, 396 Mich 573 ; 242 NW2d 405 (1976), argues that the blood alcohol test results were improperly admitted into evidence at the preliminary examination. 1981Defendant, relying on People v Keen, 396 Mich 573 ; 242 NW2d 405 (1976), argues that the blood alcohol test results were improperly admitted into evidence at the preliminary examination. | 5 | 9 |
People v. Wagergreen2 sentences2012As this Court has explained, “a court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself.” Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 63, 66 (2002) (declining to add a requirement to object to any deficiencies in a notice of intent before the complaint is filed in a medical malpractice action because “[i]n the absence of such a statutory requirement, we do not have the authority to create and impose an extrastatutory affirmative duty on the defendant”); see also People v Wager, 460 Mich 118, 12 2012As this Court has explained, “a court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself.” Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 63, 66 (2002) (declining to add a requirement to object to any deficiencies in a notice of intent before the complaint is filed in a medical malpractice action because “[i]n the absence of such a statutory requirement, we do not have the authority to create and impose an extrastatutory affirmative duty on 2 the defendant”); see also People v Wager, 460 Mich 118, | 2 | 6 |
People v. Perlosgreen2 sentences2017Id. at 326, 330 , 462 N.W.2d 310 . 2017Id. at 326, 330 , 462 N.W.2d 310 . | 2 | 2 |
Roberts v. Mecosta County General Hospitalgreen2 sentences2012As this Court has explained, “a court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself.” Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 63, 66 (2002) (declining to add a requirement to object to any deficiencies in a notice of intent before the complaint is filed in a medical malpractice action because “[i]n the absence of such a statutory requirement, we do not have the authority to create and impose an extrastatutory affirmative duty on the defendant”); see also People v Wager, 460 Mich 118, 12 2012As this Court has explained, “a court may read nothing into an unambiguous statute that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as derived from the words of the statute itself.” Roberts v Mecosta Co Gen Hosp, 466 Mich 57, 63, 66 (2002) (declining to add a requirement to object to any deficiencies in a notice of intent before the complaint is filed in a medical malpractice action because “[i]n the absence of such a statutory requirement, we do not have the authority to create and impose an extrastatutory affirmative duty on 2 the defendant”); see also People v Wager, 460 Mich 118, | 2 | 2 |
Breithaupt v. Abramgreen2 sentences1977See Breithaupt v Abram, 352 US 432 ; 77 S Ct 408 ; 1 L Ed 2d 448 (1957) (where the Supreme Court, though noting probable exclusion in Federal courts on Fourth Amendment grounds, upheld admission of a blood-alcohol test in a New Mexico state manslaughter prosecution). 1977See Breithaupt v Abram, 352 US 432 ; 77 S Ct 408 ; 1 L Ed 2d 448 (1957) (where the Supreme Court, though noting probable exclusion in Federal courts on Fourth Amendment grounds, upheld admission of a blood-alcohol test in a New Mexico state manslaughter prosecution). | 1 | 3 |
People v. Campbellgreen2 sentences2001We note that Kris makes no argument concerning foundational requirements, or the alleged lack thereof, or concerning the lapse of time between the accident and the blood alcohol test, perhaps eschewing those lines of argument in light of People v Wager, 460 Mich 118 ; 594 NW2d 487 (1999), and People v Campbell, 236 Mich App 490 ; 601 NW2d 114 (1999). 2001We note that Kris makes no argument concerning foundational requirements, or the alleged lack thereof, or concerning the lapse of time between the accident and the blood alcohol test, perhaps eschewing those lines of argument in light of People v Wager, 460 Mich 118 ; 594 NW2d 487 (1999), and People v Campbell, 236 Mich App 490 ; 601 NW2d 114 (1999). | 1 | 2 |
People v. Sloangreen2 sentences1999"To change the law in that regard would have been an easy and convenient task for the Legislature." Id. [6] Given that the blood alcohol test results were properly suppressed pursuant to the statute, it was unnecessary for "the trial court to make findings of fact regarding the constitutional validity of defendant's consent." Op. at 10. 1999In addition, we agree with the Supreme Court’s statement in People v Sloan, 450 Mich 160, 197, n 11 ; 538 NW2d 380 (1995): “Because a person’s blood-alcohol level dissipates over time, the danger to the rights of the defendant that are being protected by such a rule is not readily apparent.” In the overwhelming majority of cases, delay on the part of the police will only inure to the defendant’s benefit. *502 Although there are exceptions to this, 3 we believe that it would be more sensible to allow defendants to set forth evidence at trial showing the unreliability of the blood alcohol test t | 1 | 2 |
People v. Greengreen2 sentences2015See People v Green, 260 Mich App 392, 408-410 ; 677 NW2d 363 (2004), rev’d on other grounds People v Antsey, 476 Mich 436 (2006) (holding that, because the defendant was in an accident and his blood was drawn for purposes of medical treatment, evidence of the defendant’s blood alcohol test results was admissible under MCL 257.625a(6)(e)); People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 118-119 ; 631 NW2d 67 (2001), (holding that the defendants’ blood alcohol test results were admissible under MCL 257.625a(6)(e) because the withdrawal of blood was done for medical reasons); People v Kulpinski, 243 Mich App 2015See People v Green, 260 Mich App 392, 408-410 ; 677 NW2d 363 (2004), rev’d on other grounds People v Antsey, 476 Mich 436 (2006) (holding that, because the defendant was in an accident and his blood was drawn for purposes of medical treatment, evidence of the defendant’s blood alcohol test results was admissible under MCL 257.625a(6)(e)); People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 118-119 ; 631 NW2d 67 (2001), (holding that the defendants’ blood alcohol test results were admissible under MCL 257.625a(6)(e) because the withdrawal of blood was done for medical reasons); People v Kulpinski, 243 Mich App | 1 | 1 |
Bullcoming v. New Mexicogreen2 sentences2011Curie and the veracity of Mother Teresa.” Id. at ; 131 S Ct at 2715 (majority opinion) (quotation marks and citation omitted.) In our judgment, Dr. Shahid’s psychiatric opinions, which are necessarily grounded in subjective interpretations of the vagaries of the human mind, are at least as deserving of the constitution’s guaranteed protections of confrontation and cross-examination as the analyst’s certification of a blood alcohol analysis in Bullcoming . 2011Curie and the veracity of Mother Teresa.” Id. at ; 131 S Ct at 2715 (majority opinion) (quotation marks and citation omitted.) In our judgment, Dr. Shahid’s psychiatric opinions, which are necessarily grounded in subjective interpretations of the vagaries of the human mind, are at least as deserving of the constitution’s guaranteed protections of confrontation and cross-examination as the analyst’s certification of a blood alcohol analysis in Bullcoming . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Livesaygreen2 sentences2006This evidence, if favorable to the Defendant, could easily have secured his acquittal.” State v Livesay, 941 SW2d 63, 66 (Tenn Crim App, 1996). 2006This evidence, if favorable to the Defendant, could easily have secured his acquittal." State v. Livesay, 941 S.W.2d 63, 66 (Tenn.Crim.App., 1996). | 1 | 1 |
People v. Justicegreen2 sentences1998See also McVeigh v Smith, 872 F2d 725, 728 (CA 6, 1989) (declaring that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel, or Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment due process right to counsel, when deciding whether to submit to a blood alcohol test). 2 This Court has also stated generally that “art 1, § 20 of the Michigan Constitution affords no greater rights than those guaranteed by the federal constitution.” People v Justice, 216 Mich App 633, 636, n 2 ; 550 NW2d 562 (1996). 1998See also McVeigh v Smith, 872 F2d 725, 728 (CA 6, 1989) (declaring that there is no Sixth Amendment right to counsel, or Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment due process right to counsel, when deciding whether to submit to a blood alcohol test). 2 This Court has also stated generally that “art 1, § 20 of the Michigan Constitution affords no greater rights than those guaranteed by the federal constitution.” People v Justice, 216 Mich App 633, 636, n 2 ; 550 NW2d 562 (1996). | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Willisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hartmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wolf v. Coloradored | 1 | 1 |
| Lessenhop v. Nortongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Michigan. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
McNitt v. Citco Drilling Co.
green
2 sentences1982In McNitt v Citco Drilling Co, 397 Mich 384 ; 245 NW2d 18 (1976), the Supreme Court held that the results of a blood alcohol test administered pursuant to the implied consent law cannot be used in civil litigation. 1982In McNitt v Citco Drilling Co, 397 Mich 384 ; 245 NW2d 18 (1976), the Supreme Court held that the results of a blood alcohol test administered pursuant to the implied consent law cannot be used in civil litigation. | 5 | 1977–1999 |
People v. Aldrich
green
2 sentences2017The time lapse between the traffic stop and the blood alcohol test makes little difference because there is no requirement that a blood alcohol test be given within a certain amount of time to be sufficient.1 See People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101 ; 631 NW2d 67 (2001) (finding that the defendant’s blood alcohol test was sufficient evidence for the jury to consider, even though the test was administered three and a half hours after the accident). 2017The time lapse between the traffic stop and the blood alcohol test makes little difference because there is no requirement that a blood alcohol test be given within a certain amount of time to be sufficient.1 See People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101 ; 631 NW2d 67 (2001) (finding that the defendant’s blood alcohol test was sufficient evidence for the jury to consider, even though the test was administered three and a half hours after the accident). | 4 | 2004–2017 |
People v. Weaver
green
2 sentences1999Relying on the analysis in McNitt, the Court of Appeals panel stated: As the Supreme Court in McNitt held that a blood alcohol test is obtained pursuant to the statutory authority absent express disclaimer to the hospital personnel asked to administer that test, so do we hold that consent to a blood alcohol test obtained from a conscious driver will be considered to have been obtained under color of the statutory authority absent express disclaimer to the driver of reliance on the statute and upon statutory penalties, and advice that the statutory limits on the use to which such test results m 1999Relying on the analysis in McNitt, the Court of Appeals panel stated: As the Supreme Court in McNitt held that a blood alcohol test is obtained pursuant to the statutory authority absent express disclaimer to the hospital personnel asked to administer that test, so do we hold that consent to a blood alcohol test obtained from a conscious driver will be considered to have been obtained under color of the statutory authority absent express disclaimer to the driver of reliance on the statute and upon statutory penalties, and advice that the statutory limits on the use to which such test results m | 3 | 1979–1999 |
State v. VanLaarhoven
green
2 sentences2021While these cases have often been decided in the context of blood seized pursuant to a warrant, they stand for the proposition that the testing of blood evidence “is an essential part of the seizure,” State v VanLaarhoven, 248 Wis 2d 881, 891 ; 2001 WI App 275 ; 637 NW2d 411 (2001), and that “the right to seize the blood . . . encompass[es] the right to conduct a blood-alcohol test at some later time,” Snyder, 852 F2d at 474. 2021While these cases have often been decided in the context of blood seized pursuant to a warrant, they stand for the proposition that the testing of blood evidence “is an essential part of the seizure,” State v VanLaarhoven, 248 Wis 2d 881, 891 ; 2001 WI App 275 ; 637 NW2d 411 (2001), and that “the right to seize the blood . . . encompass[es] the right to conduct a blood-alcohol test at some later time,” Snyder, 852 F2d at 474. | 2 | 2017–2021 |
People v. Bennett
green
2 sentences2017People v Bennett, 290 Mich App 465, 472 ; 802 NW2d 627 (2010). 2017People v Bennett, 290 Mich App 465, 472 ; 802 NW2d 627 (2010). | 2 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Kulpinski
green
2 sentences2015See People v Green, 260 Mich App 392, 408-410 ; 677 NW2d 363 (2004), rev’d on other grounds People v Antsey, 476 Mich 436 (2006) (holding that, because the defendant was in an accident and his blood was drawn for purposes of medical treatment, evidence of the defendant’s blood alcohol test results was admissible under MCL 257.625a(6)(e)); People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 118-119 ; 631 NW2d 67 (2001), (holding that the defendants’ blood alcohol test results were admissible under MCL 257.625a(6)(e) because the withdrawal of blood was done for medical reasons); People v Kulpinski, 243 Mich App 2015See People v Green, 260 Mich App 392, 408-410 ; 677 NW2d 363 (2004), rev’d on other grounds People v Antsey, 476 Mich 436 (2006) (holding that, because the defendant was in an accident and his blood was drawn for purposes of medical treatment, evidence of the defendant’s blood alcohol test results was admissible under MCL 257.625a(6)(e)); People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 118-119 ; 631 NW2d 67 (2001), (holding that the defendants’ blood alcohol test results were admissible under MCL 257.625a(6)(e) because the withdrawal of blood was done for medical reasons); People v Kulpinski, 243 Mich App | 2 | 2004–2015 |
People v. Stoney
neutral
2 sentences1990Second, in an attempt to combat the tremendous cost in lives and property damage to our society, the Legislature has chosen "to ease the prosecution of drunk drivers [who have been involved in an accident] by making the results of blood alcohol tests performed by hospitals available to prosecutors, without the use of otherwise cumbersome procedures.” People v Stoney, 157 Mich App 721, 726 ; 403 NW2d 212 (1987). [ 176 Mich App 347 -348.] The Court then cited O’Donnell v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 404 Mich 524, 542 ; 273 NW2d 829 (1979), where this Court stated: "If it be said, the law 1990Second, in an attempt to combat the tremendous cost in lives and property damage to our society, the Legislature has chosen "to ease the prosecution of drunk drivers [who have been involved in an accident] by making the results of blood alcohol tests performed by hospitals available to prosecutors, without the use of otherwise cumbersome procedures.” People v Stoney, 157 Mich App 721, 726 ; 403 NW2d 212 (1987). [ 176 Mich App 347 -348.] The Court then cited O’Donnell v State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins Co, 404 Mich 524, 542 ; 273 NW2d 829 (1979), where this Court stated: "If it be said, the law | 2 | 1989–1990 |
Gard v. Michigan Produce Haulers
green
2 sentences1986The conditions precedent to the admission of a blood sample analysis into evidence were stated in Gard v Michigan Produce Haulers, 20 Mich App 402, 407 ; 174 NW2d 73 (1969), lv den 383 Mich 777 (1970). 1986The conditions precedent to the admission of a blood sample analysis into evidence were stated in Gard v Michigan Produce Haulers, 20 Mich App 402, 407 ; 174 NW2d 73 (1969), lv den 383 Mich 777 (1970). | 2 | 1975–1986 |
Lebel v. Swincicki
green
2 sentences1976We hold that where a blood alcohol test is administered pursuant to the statute the test result is not admissible in a criminal prosecution other than for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUIL) or for driving while ability to operate a vehicle was impaired due to the consumption of intoxicating liquor (DI). 2 I In Lebel v Swincicki, 354 Mich 427 ; 93 NW2d 281 (1958), this Court ruled that the result of a blood alcohol tqst, based on a blood sample taken from an unconscious driver, was inadmissible in a civil action as the Michigan constitutional provision securing pers 1976We hold that where a blood alcohol test is administered pursuant to the statute the test result is not admissible in a criminal prosecution other than for driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor (DUIL) or for driving while ability to operate a vehicle was impaired due to the consumption of intoxicating liquor (DI). 2 I In Lebel v Swincicki, 354 Mich 427 ; 93 NW2d 281 (1958), this Court ruled that the result of a blood alcohol tqst, based on a blood sample taken from an unconscious driver, was inadmissible in a civil action as the Michigan constitutional provision securing pers | 2 | 1976–1976 |
People v. Grayer
green
2 sentences2025The jury had sufficient evidence to convict defendant based on the theory that defendant “was ‘under the influence of’ alcohol” when he was driving, see id. so we need not consider the viability of the prosecution’s separate theory “that the defendant’s BAC reached or exceeded 0.08.” Id. -3- convicted of certain prior violations of the law as listed in MCL 750.479a(3)(c)[.] [People v Grayer, 235 Mich App 737, 741 ; 599 NW2d 527 (1999).] Defendant only disputes the second element: whether he was the operator of the motor vehicle just before he was arrested. 2025The jury had sufficient evidence to convict defendant based on the theory that defendant “was ‘under the influence of’ alcohol” when he was driving, see id. so we need not consider the viability of the prosecution’s separate theory “that the defendant’s BAC reached or exceeded 0.08.” Id. -3- convicted of certain prior violations of the law as listed in MCL 750.479a(3)(c)[.] [People v Grayer, 235 Mich App 737, 741 ; 599 NW2d 527 (1999).] Defendant only disputes the second element: whether he was the operator of the motor vehicle just before he was arrested. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Dodd v. Jones
green
1 sentence2017However, there is persuasive authority holding that, once a blood sample has been lawfully obtained for purposes of analysis, the subsequent testing of that sample has " 'no independent significance for fourth amendment purposes.' " Dodd v. Jones , 623 F.3d 563 , 569 (C.A.8 2010), quoting United States v. Snyder , 852 F.2d 471 , 474 (C.A.9 1988). *306 While these cases have often been decided in the context of blood seized via a warrant, they stand for the proposition that the testing of blood evidence "is an essential part of the seizure," *388 State v. VanLaarhoven , 248 Wis. 2d 881 , 891, 2 | 1 | 2017–2017 |
United States v. Robert James Snyder
green
2 sentences2017However, there is persuasive authority holding that, once a blood sample has been lawfully obtained for purposes of analysis, the subsequent testing of that sample has " 'no independent significance for fourth amendment purposes.' " Dodd v. Jones , 623 F.3d 563 , 569 (C.A.8 2010), quoting United States v. Snyder , 852 F.2d 471 , 474 (C.A.9 1988). *306 While these cases have often been decided in the context of blood seized via a warrant, they stand for the proposition that the testing of blood evidence "is an essential part of the seizure," *388 State v. VanLaarhoven , 248 Wis. 2d 881 , 891, 2 2017However, there is persuasive authority holding that, once a blood sample has been lawfully obtained for purposes of analysis, the subsequent testing of that sample has " 'no independent significance for fourth amendment purposes.' " Dodd v. Jones , 623 F.3d 563 , 569 (C.A.8 2010), quoting United States v. Snyder , 852 F.2d 471 , 474 (C.A.9 1988). *306 While these cases have often been decided in the context of blood seized via a warrant, they stand for the proposition that the testing of blood evidence "is an essential part of the seizure," *388 State v. VanLaarhoven , 248 Wis. 2d 881 , 891, 2 | 1 | 2017–2017 |
People v. Wolverton
green
2 sentences2016Wolverton, 227 Mich App at 77 . -20- Lee cites Wolverton, 227 Mich App at 75-78 , where this Court vacated the defendant’s conviction for operating a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor (requiring a blood alcohol level of .10 or higher) based on the prosecutor’s reference in the opening statement to the incriminating results of a blood alcohol test (showing a BAC of .19 and .20), which were ultimately held inadmissible. 2016Wolverton, 227 Mich App at 77 . -20- Lee cites Wolverton, 227 Mich App at 75-78 , where this Court vacated the defendant’s conviction for operating a vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor (requiring a blood alcohol level of .10 or higher) based on the prosecutor’s reference in the opening statement to the incriminating results of a blood alcohol test (showing a BAC of .19 and .20), which were ultimately held inadmissible. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
People v. Anstey
green
1 sentence2015See People v Green, 260 Mich App 392, 408-410 ; 677 NW2d 363 (2004), rev’d on other grounds People v Antsey, 476 Mich 436 (2006) (holding that, because the defendant was in an accident and his blood was drawn for purposes of medical treatment, evidence of the defendant’s blood alcohol test results was admissible under MCL 257.625a(6)(e)); People v Aldrich, 246 Mich App 101, 118-119 ; 631 NW2d 67 (2001), (holding that the defendants’ blood alcohol test results were admissible under MCL 257.625a(6)(e) because the withdrawal of blood was done for medical reasons); People v Kulpinski, 243 Mich App | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Lambert
green
2 sentences2015Bueche sought and secured a search warrant and defendant’s blood was then drawn by Katie Kacafirek, a nurse 1 Defendant was charged under MCL 257.625(1)(a) (operating while under the influence), but after being instructed on the lesser included offense of OWVI, see People v Lambert, 395 Mich 296 ; 235 NW2d 338 (1975), the jury returned a guilty verdict for OWVI. -1- employed by the jail who worked under the supervision of a physician. 2015Bueche sought and secured a search warrant and defendant’s blood was then drawn by Katie Kacafirek, a nurse 1 Defendant was charged under MCL 257.625(1)(a) (operating while under the influence), but after being instructed on the lesser included offense of OWVI, see People v Lambert, 395 Mich 296 ; 235 NW2d 338 (1975), the jury returned a guilty verdict for OWVI. -1- employed by the jail who worked under the supervision of a physician. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Krulikowski
green
2 sentences1999In People v Krulikowski, 60 Mich App 28, 33 ; 230 NW2d 290 (1975), this Court stated that a failure to adduce evidence of the foundational requirements “precludes the admission of the test results into evidence, and does not go merely to the weight which the trier of fact may accord the test results” (emphasis in original). 1999In People v Krulikowski, 60 Mich App 28, 33 ; 230 NW2d 290 (1975), this Court stated that a failure to adduce evidence of the foundational requirements “precludes the admission of the test results into evidence, and does not go merely to the weight which the trier of fact may accord the test results” (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Wager
neutral
2 sentences1999In this regard, we agree fully with the trial court’s statement quoted in Judge Smolensk’s dissenting opinion in People v Wager, 233 Mich App 1, 12 ; 592 NW2d 389 (1998), rev’d 460 Mich 118 ; 594 NW2d 487 (1999), in which the majority of a panel of this Court held that the prosecution must extrapolate a blood alcohol test back to the time of the offense in order to adrr.it the test results: “To accept the premise being postured here would mean that every time there’s a driving incident or an accident there would have to be portable medical teams, portable labs on the site, investigation, and t 1999In this regard, we agree fully with the trial court’s statement quoted in Judge Smolensk’s dissenting opinion in People v Wager, 233 Mich App 1, 12 ; 592 NW2d 389 (1998), rev’d 460 Mich 118 ; 594 NW2d 487 (1999), in which the majority of a panel of this Court held that the prosecution must extrapolate a blood alcohol test back to the time of the offense in order to adrr.it the test results: “To accept the premise being postured here would mean that every time there’s a driving incident or an accident there would have to be portable medical teams, portable labs on the site, investigation, and t | 1 | 1999–1999 |
People v. Jacobsen
green
2 sentences1999This Court in Jacobsen, supra, 205 Mich.App. at 306-307 , 517 N.W.2d 323 , explained that the requirement that the blood alcohol test be performed within a reasonable amount of time after the arrest is to ensure that the test results accurately reflect the defendant's blood alcohol content at the time he was arrested. 1999This Court in Jacobsen, supra, 205 Mich.App. at 306-307 , 517 N.W.2d 323 , explained that the requirement that the blood alcohol test be performed within a reasonable amount of time after the arrest is to ensure that the test results accurately reflect the defendant's blood alcohol content at the time he was arrested. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| People v. Hellis green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
People v. Richert
green
1 sentence1998In another 1996 case, this Court held that “ ‘ “[u]nless there is a compelling reason to afford greater protection under the Michigan Constitution, the Michigan and federal [right to counsel] provisions will be treated as affording the same protections.” ’ ” People v Richert (After Remand), 216 *680 Mich App 186, 193; 548 NW2d 924 (1996), quoting People v Hellis, 211 Mich App 634, 648 ; 536 NW2d 587 (1995) , quoting People v Perlos, 436 Mich 305, 313, n 7 ; 462 NW2d 310 (1990). | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| South Dakota v. Neville green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Schmerber v. California green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Brisboy v. Fibreboard Corp. green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Manko v. Root green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| O'Donnell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Murray v. United States green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| People v. Perlos green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Harbison v. Secretary of State green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Hempstead green | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Castle neutral | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| People v. Cords green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| People v. Reeder green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People v. Hayes green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| People v. Blondia green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| McNitt v. Citco Drilling Co. neutral | 1 | 1976–1976 |
| Gilbert v. Leach green | 1 | 1976–1976 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.