56 Washington opinions name it 3 courts 1975–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Washington courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Purchase v. Meyergreen2 sentences2019Therefore, this argument is not persuasive. ¶26 Gerlach also argues that Dr. Vincenzi's testimony was properly excluded based on Purchase v. Meyer , 108 Wash.2d 220 , 737 P.2d 661 (1987), because evidence of how alcohol affected a person's behavior cannot be based on a blood alcohol test alone. 2019Therefore, this argument is not persuasive. ¶26 Gerlach also argues that Dr. Vincenzi's testimony was properly excluded based on Purchase v. Meyer , 108 Wash.2d 220 , 737 P.2d 661 (1987), because evidence of how alcohol affected a person's behavior cannot be based on a blood alcohol test alone. | 2 | 7 |
South Dakota v. Nevillegreen2 sentences2014See also Neville, 459 U.S. at 566 (holding that due process is not violated when the government commented on the defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test, because the government did not mislead the defendant into believing his refusal could not be used against him in a later trial). 2014The trial court does not err in giving the instruction when requested. 6 See also Neville. 459 U.S. at 566 (holding that due process is not violated when the government commented on the defendant's refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test, because the government did not mislead the defendant into believing his refusal could not be used against him in a later trial). 13 No. 69613-1-1/14 jd at 299. | 2 | 7 |
City of Seattle v. Stalsbrotengreen2 sentences2016Ed. 2d 748 (1983); Stalsbroten, 138 Wn.2d at 235-37 (using evidence of refusal to take a blood alcohol test permissible because “there is no constitutional right not to take the .. . test”)- Because we hold that Mecham did not have a constitutional right to refuse the FSTs, we also hold that the State did not violate his constitutional rights when it presented evidence against him at trial of his refusal to consent. 2016Ed. 2d 748 (1983); Stalsbroten, 138 Wn.2d at 235-37 (using evidence of refusal to take a blood alcohol test permissible because "there is no constitutional right not to take the test"). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Robert James Snydergreen2 sentences2015The State cites United States v. Snyder, 852 F.2d 471, 473 (9th Cir. 1988), where the Ninth Circuit observed that "[t]he flaw in Snyder's argument is his attempt to divide his arrest, and the subsequent extraction and testing of his blood, into too many separate incidents, each to be given independent significance for fourth amendment purposes." It concluded that so long as the initial extraction of the blood was lawful (there, pursuant to a search incident to a valid arrest) "the subsequent performance of a blood-alcohol test has no independent significance for fourth amendment purposes. . . 2014For this proposition, the State relies on United States v. Snyder, 852 F.2d 471, 474 (9th Cir. 1988). | 2 | 2 |
Christen v. Leegreen2 sentences2008See Purchase, 108 Wn.2d at 226 (results of observations of behavior and BAC taken hours after service of alcohol did not establish overservice when nothing in the record suggested defendant appeared intoxicated at the bar); Christen, 113 Wn.2d at 488-89 (“neither the results of a blood alcohol test nor the appearance of a person a substantial time after the intoxicating liquor was served constitutes sufficient evidence of obvious intoxication”). 2008See, Purchase, 108 Wash.2d at 226 , 737 P.2d 661 (results of observations of behavior and BAC taken hours after service of alcohol did not establish overservice when nothing in the record suggested defendant appeared intoxicated at the bar); Christen, 113 Wash.2d at 488-89 , 780 P.2d 1307 ("neither the results of a blood alcohol test nor the appearance of a person a substantial time after the intoxicating liquor was served constitutes sufficient evidence of obvious intoxication.") Absent observational evidence that the drinker appeared under the influence of alcohol when served, a plaintiff ca | 1 | 4 |
State v. Zwickergreen2 sentences2024Ed. 2d 748 (1983) (“In the context of an arrest for driving while intoxicated, a police inquiry of whether the suspect will take a blood-alcohol test is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.”); State v. Zwicker, 105 Wn.2d 228, 243 , 713 P.2d 1101 (1986) (“[T]here is no coercion in obtaining refusal evidence where the accused is fully informed of the consequences of exercising the statutory right of refusal.”). 4 While we decline to review this claim, we note that Troutman does not assign error to the court’s failure to include a conclusion of law regarding CrR 3.1. 2024Ed. 2d 748 (1983) (“In the context of an arrest for driving while intoxicated, a police inquiry of whether the suspect will take a blood-alcohol test is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.”); State v. Zwicker, 105 Wn.2d 228, 243 , 713 P.2d 1101 (1986) (“[T]here is no coercion in obtaining refusal evidence where the accused is fully informed of the consequences of exercising the statutory right of refusal.”). 4 While we decline to review this claim, we note that Troutman does not assign error to the court’s failure to include a conclusion of law regarding CrR 3.1. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Bartelsgreen2 sentences2013Codified at RCW 46.20.308, the law “provides law enforcement officers with an effective means of obtaining physical evidence of intoxication since any person operating a motor vehicle on the roads of this state is deemed to have consented to the administration of a blood alcohol test.” State v. Bartels, 112 Wn.2d 882, 885 , 774 P.2d 1183 (1989). 2013Codified at RCW 46.20.308, the law “provides law enforcement officers with an effective means of obtaining physical evidence of intoxication since any person operating a motor vehicle on the roads of this state is deemed to have consented to the administration of a blood alcohol test.” State v. Bartels, 112 Wn.2d 882, 885 , 774 P.2d 1183 (1989). | 1 | 3 |
City of Seattle v. St. Johngreen2 sentences2020See City of Seattle, 166 Wn.2d at 946 (“[A]n officer may obtain a blood alcohol test pursuant to a warrant regardless of the implied consent statute.”). 2014John, 166 Wn.2d 941, 946 , 215 P.3d 194 (2009), in which the Washington Supreme Court held that the plain language of RCW 46.20.308(1) allows officers to “obtain a search warrant for blood alcohol tests regardless of the implied consent statute” (Emphasis added.) In St. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Ritzgreen1 sentence2016Id. at 99-101. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Moralesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gahagan v. Department of Licensinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| State Department of Motor Vehicles v. McElwaingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Washington. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences2015Similarly, in Schmerber v. California. 384 U.S. 757, 768 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 LEd.2d 908 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court viewed the seizure and separate search of blood as a single event, considering whether "the police were justified in requiring petitioner to submit to the blood test, and whether the means and procedures employed in taking his blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness." jd at 768. 2015Similarly, in Schmerber v. California. 384 U.S. 757, 768 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 LEd.2d 908 (1966), the U.S. Supreme Court viewed the seizure and separate search of blood as a single event, considering whether "the police were justified in requiring petitioner to submit to the blood test, and whether the means and procedures employed in taking his blood respected relevant Fourth Amendment standards of reasonableness." jd at 768. | 4 | 2001–2015 |
State v. Hultenschmidt
green
2 sentences2008State v. Hultenschmidt, 125 Wash.App. 259, 264 , 102 P.3d 192 (2004); Clark-Munoz, 152 Wash.2d at 44 , 93 P.3d 141 . 2008State v. Hultenschmidt, 125 Wn. | 4 | 2006–2008 |
Shelby v. Keck
green
2 sentences1984"The settled rule in this state as to actions based on the Halvorson line of cases is that a person's sobriety must be judged by the way she appeared to those around her, not by what a blood alcohol test may subsequently reveal." Wilson , at 439 (citing Barrie v. Hosts of Am., Inc., 94 Wn.2d 640 , 643 n.1, 618 P.2d 96 (1980); Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wn.2d 911, 915 , 541 P.2d 365 (1975)). 1984"The settled rule in this state as to actions based on the Halvorson line of cases is that a person's sobriety must be judged by the way she appeared to those around her, not by what a blood alcohol test may subsequently reveal." Wilson , at 439 (citing Barrie v. Hosts of Am., Inc., 94 Wn.2d 640 , 643 n.1, 618 P.2d 96 (1980); Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wn.2d 911, 915 , 541 P.2d 365 (1975)). | 3 | 1982–1987 |
Wilson v. Steinbach
green
2 sentences2015In Purchase v. Meyer, a restaurant was sued for serving alcohol to an "obviously intoxicated" person.76 For this cause of action, '"a person's sobriety must be judged by the way she appeared to those around her, not by what a blood alcohol test may subsequently reveal.'"77 Thus, a blood alcohol content test was not competent evidence that the patron was obviously intoxicated.78 But the present case does not involve that cause of action, or its requirement that the person appear "obviously intoxicated." In State v. Lewis, the defendant sought to introduce testimony that the murder victim had me 2015In Purchase v. Meyer, a restaurant was sued for serving alcohol to an "obviously intoxicated" person.76 For this cause of action, '"a person's sobriety must be judged by the way she appeared to those around her, not by what a blood alcohol test may subsequently reveal.'"77 Thus, a blood alcohol content test was not competent evidence that the patron was obviously intoxicated.78 But the present case does not involve that cause of action, or its requirement that the person appear "obviously intoxicated." In State v. Lewis, the defendant sought to introduce testimony that the murder victim had me | 2 | 1986–2015 |
State v. Turpin
green
2 sentences2010Turpin, 94 Wn.2d at 827 . 1984State v. Turpin, 94 Wn.2d 820, 824 , 620 P.2d 990 (1980). | 2 | 1984–2010 |
State v. Neher
green
2 sentences2009State v. Neher, 112 Wn.2d 347, 351 , 771 P.2d 330 (1989). 2009State v. Neher, 112 Wn.2d 347, 351 , 771 P.2d 330 (1989). | 2 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Board of Yakima County Commissioners
green
2 sentences2009If a statute's language is ambiguous, we construe the statute "`in the manner that best fulfills the legislative purpose and intent.'" Id. at 459 , 869 P.2d 56 (quoting In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wash.2d 795, 804 , 854 P.2d 629 (1993)). ¶ 9 Under the implied consent statute, if a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a motor vehicle driver has been driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug (DUI), the driver may choose to undergo a blood alcohol test [1] or have his or her driver's license suspended for at least one year. 2009If a statute’s language is ambiguous, we construe the statute “ ‘in the manner that best fulfills the legislative purpose and intent.’ ” Id. at 459 (quoting In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795, 804 , 854 P.2d 629 (1993)). ¶6 Under the implied consent statute, if a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a motor vehicle driver has been driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug (DUI), the driver may choose to undergo a blood alcohol test 1 or have his or her driver’s license suspended for at least one year. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
In Re the Marriage of Kovacs
green
2 sentences2009If a statute’s language is ambiguous, we construe the statute “ ‘in the manner that best fulfills the legislative purpose and intent.’ ” Id. at 459 (quoting In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795, 804 , 854 P.2d 629 (1993)). ¶6 Under the implied consent statute, if a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a motor vehicle driver has been driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug (DUI), the driver may choose to undergo a blood alcohol test 1 or have his or her driver’s license suspended for at least one year. 2009If a statute’s language is ambiguous, we construe the statute “ ‘in the manner that best fulfills the legislative purpose and intent.’ ” Id. at 459 (quoting In re Marriage of Kovacs, 121 Wn.2d 795, 804 , 854 P.2d 629 (1993)). ¶6 Under the implied consent statute, if a law enforcement officer has reasonable grounds to believe that a motor vehicle driver has been driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug (DUI), the driver may choose to undergo a blood alcohol test 1 or have his or her driver’s license suspended for at least one year. | 2 | 2009–2009 |
City of Seattle v. Clark-Munoz
green
2 sentences2008State v. Hultenschmidt, 125 Wash.App. 259, 264 , 102 P.3d 192 (2004); Clark-Munoz, 152 Wash.2d at 44 , 93 P.3d 141 . 2006State v. Hultenschmidt, 125 Wash.App. 259, 264 , 102 P.3d 192 (2004); City of Seattle v. Clark-Munoz, 152 Wash.2d 39, 44 , 93 P.3d 141 (2004). | 2 | 2006–2008 |
City of Seattle v. Clark-Munoz
green
2 sentences2008State v. Hultenschmidt, 125 Wash.App. 259, 264 , 102 P.3d 192 (2004); Clark-Munoz, 152 Wash.2d at 44 , 93 P.3d 141 . 2006State v. Hultenschmidt, 125 Wash.App. 259, 264 , 102 P.3d 192 (2004); City of Seattle v. Clark-Munoz, 152 Wash.2d 39, 44 , 93 P.3d 141 (2004). | 2 | 2006–2008 |
State v. Hultenschmidt
green
2 sentences2008State v. Hultenschmidt, 125 Wash.App. 259, 264 , 102 P.3d 192 (2004); Clark-Munoz, 152 Wash.2d at 44 , 93 P.3d 141 . 2006State v. Hultenschmidt, 125 Wash.App. 259, 264 , 102 P.3d 192 (2004); City of Seattle v. Clark-Munoz, 152 Wash.2d 39, 44 , 93 P.3d 141 (2004). | 2 | 2006–2008 |
State v. Clark
green
2 sentences2006Clark, 62 Wash. App. at 267-69 , 814 P.2d 222 . [9] Although a blood alcohol test must strictly comply with the requirements of WAC 448-14, the WAC regulations only describe "the criteria any approved method must meet." Clark, 62 Wash.App. at 268 , 814 P.2d 222 . 2006App. at 267-69 . 9 Although a blood alcohol test must strictly comply with the requirements of chapter 448-14 WAC, the WAC regulations only describe “the criteria any approved method must meet.” Clark, 62 Wn. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
State v. O'Neill
green
2 sentences2006State v. O'Neill, 148 Wash.2d 564, 571 , 62 P.3d 489 (2003). ¶ 18 We conclude that Officer Huber had the statutory authority to obtain a blood sample without Kim's consent, and the trial court properly denied Kim's motion to suppress the results of the WSTL's blood alcohol test. 2. 2006State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 571 , 62 P.3d 489 (2003). ¶18 We conclude that Officer Huber had the statutory authority to obtain a blood sample without Kim’s consent and the trial court properly denied Kim’s motion to suppress the results of the WSTL’s blood alcohol test. 2. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
State v. O'NEILL
green
2 sentences2006State v. O'Neill, 148 Wash.2d 564, 571 , 62 P.3d 489 (2003). ¶ 18 We conclude that Officer Huber had the statutory authority to obtain a blood sample without Kim's consent, and the trial court properly denied Kim's motion to suppress the results of the WSTL's blood alcohol test. 2. 2006State v. O’Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 571 , 62 P.3d 489 (2003). ¶18 We conclude that Officer Huber had the statutory authority to obtain a blood sample without Kim’s consent and the trial court properly denied Kim’s motion to suppress the results of the WSTL’s blood alcohol test. 2. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Reier
green
2 sentences2006State v. Reier, 127 Wn. 2006Reier, 127 Wn. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
State v. Bostrom
green
2 sentences2001State v. Bostrom, 127 Wn.2d 580, 590 , 902 P.2d 157 (1995) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S. Ct. 1826 , 16 L. 2001State v. Bostrom, 127 Wn.2d 580, 590 , 902 P.2d 157 (1995) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S. Ct. 1826 , 16 L. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Barrie v. Hosts of America, Inc.
green
2 sentences1984"The settled rule in this state as to actions based on the Halvorson line of cases is that a person's sobriety must be judged by the way she appeared to those around her, not by what a blood alcohol test may subsequently reveal." Wilson , at 439 (citing Barrie v. Hosts of Am., Inc., 94 Wn.2d 640 , 643 n.1, 618 P.2d 96 (1980); Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wn.2d 911, 915 , 541 P.2d 365 (1975)). 1984"The settled rule in this state as to actions based on the Halvorson line of cases is that a person's sobriety must be judged by the way she appeared to those around her, not by what a blood alcohol test may subsequently reveal." Wilson , at 439 (citing Barrie v. Hosts of Am., Inc., 94 Wn.2d 640 , 643 n.1, 618 P.2d 96 (1980); Shelby v. Keck, 85 Wn.2d 911, 915 , 541 P.2d 365 (1975)). | 2 | 1984–1987 |
State v. Wetherell
green
2 sentences1982State v. Turpin, supra. 2 The State argues that because defendant consented to the blood alcohol test, it was not required to apprise him of his statutory right, relying on State v. Wetherell, 82 Wn.2d 865 , 514 P.2d 1069 (1973). 1982State v. Turpin, supra. 2 The State argues that because defendant consented to the blood alcohol test, it was not required to apprise him of his statutory right, relying on State v. Wetherell, 82 Wn.2d 865 , 514 P.2d 1069 (1973). | 2 | 1980–1982 |
State v. Brown
green
1 sentence2024State v. Brown, 145 Wn. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Mullen
green
1 sentence2018Mullen, 186 Wn. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Judge
green
1 sentence2016Id. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Bohnsack v. Kirkham green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Lewis neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Wilbur-Bobb neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Wilbur-Bobb neutral | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Lewis green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Dempsey green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Brown green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| City of Seattle v. St. John green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Kennedy green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Ladson green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Ladson green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Carney green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| State v. Holcomb green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Anderson neutral | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Schultz neutral | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Schultz green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| City of Spokane v. Whitehead green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Scales green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Reier green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.