blood alcohol test in Georgia

2017Our ‘Implied Consent Statute’ thus grants a suspect an opportunity, not afforded him by our constitution, to refuse to take a blood-alcohol test.” 254 Ga. at 434 (1) (a) (citations omitted).

2017In Allen, we held that, “[i]n Georgia, the state may constitutionally take a blood sample from a defendant without his consent. 7 Our ‘Implied Consent Statute’ thus grants a suspect an opportunity, not afforded him by our constitution, to refuse to take a blood-alcohol test.” 254 Ga. at 434 (1) (a) (citations omitted).

2025Notably, in Olevik, our Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s due process arguments both as facially applied to the statute and as applied to the appellant.6 302 Ga. at 247-252 (3) (a)-(b); see also So. 6 Additionally, in Olevik, our Supreme Court explained, Because the notice refers to a right to refuse, advises suspects of the 7 Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 565 (III) (103 SCt. 916, 74 LE2d 748) (1983) (noting that the right to refuse a blood alcohol test “is simply a matter of grace bestowed by the [state] legislature.”).

2020South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 564 (II) ( 103 SCt 916 , 74 LE2d 748) (1983) (“We hold, therefore, that a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test, after a police officer has lawfully requested it, is not an act coerced by the officer, and thus is not protected by the 5 Indeed, Birchfield acknowledged that many jurisdictions permit introduction of evidence of refusal of a blood test into evidence at trial, and did not note any problem with such practice. 136 SCt at 2179 (V) (C) (1). 14 privilege against self-incrimination.”).

2025See State v. 7 Robertson, 369 Ga. App. 707 , 713-714 (1) ( 894 SE2d 431 ) (2023) (admission of blood alcohol results harmless in DUI less safe trial when there was evidence of the defendant’s alcohol consumption, including her own admission that she was drinking); Stocia v. State, 339 Ga. App. 486, 489 (3) ( 793 SE2d 651 ) (2016) (holding that admission of the blood test results was harmless as to the DUI less safe countwhere before the jurors heard evidence regarding blood test results, they heard about the defendant’s erratic and concerning driving, the odor of alcohol emanating from his per

2025See State v. 7 Robertson, 369 Ga. App. 707 , 713-714 (1) ( 894 SE2d 431 ) (2023) (admission of blood alcohol results harmless in DUI less safe trial when there was evidence of the defendant’s alcohol consumption, including her own admission that she was drinking); Stocia v. State, 339 Ga. App. 486, 489 (3) ( 793 SE2d 651 ) (2016) (holding that admission of the blood test results was harmless as to the DUI less safe countwhere before the jurors heard evidence regarding blood test results, they heard about the defendant’s erratic and concerning driving, the odor of alcohol emanating from his per

1997J., and Pope, P. J, concur. 1 The blood alcohol test administered to Matheson was excluded from evidence under State v. Causey, 215 Ga. App. 85, 86 ( 449 SE2d 639 ) (1994). 2 Duggan and Matheson cite only one decision, Daniels v. State, 264 Ga. 460 ( 448 SE2d 185 ) (1994).

1997J., and Pope, P. J, concur. 1 The blood alcohol test administered to Matheson was excluded from evidence under State v. Causey, 215 Ga. App. 85, 86 ( 449 SE2d 639 ) (1994). 2 Duggan and Matheson cite only one decision, Daniels v. State, 264 Ga. 460 ( 448 SE2d 185 ) (1994).

2025See State v. 7 Robertson, 369 Ga. App. 707 , 713-714 (1) ( 894 SE2d 431 ) (2023) (admission of blood alcohol results harmless in DUI less safe trial when there was evidence of the defendant’s alcohol consumption, including her own admission that she was drinking); Stocia v. State, 339 Ga. App. 486, 489 (3) ( 793 SE2d 651 ) (2016) (holding that admission of the blood test results was harmless as to the DUI less safe countwhere before the jurors heard evidence regarding blood test results, they heard about the defendant’s erratic and concerning driving, the odor of alcohol emanating from his per

2025See State v. 7 Robertson, 369 Ga. App. 707 , 713-714 (1) ( 894 SE2d 431 ) (2023) (admission of blood alcohol results harmless in DUI less safe trial when there was evidence of the defendant’s alcohol consumption, including her own admission that she was drinking); Stocia v. State, 339 Ga. App. 486, 489 (3) ( 793 SE2d 651 ) (2016) (holding that admission of the blood test results was harmless as to the DUI less safe countwhere before the jurors heard evidence regarding blood test results, they heard about the defendant’s erratic and concerning driving, the odor of alcohol emanating from his per

2018See Massa v. State , 287 Ga. App. 494 , 495 (1), 651 S.E.2d 806 (2007) ("A defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and together with other evidence would support an inference that he was an impaired driver."); Alewine v. State , 273 Ga. App. 629 , 630 (1), 616 S.E.2d 472 (2005) (defendant's erratic driving and physical manifestations supported DUI conviction); Stephens v. State , 271 Ga. App. 634 , 635, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005) ("[T]he refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal th

2018See Massa v. State , 287 Ga. App. 494 , 495 (1), 651 S.E.2d 806 (2007) ("A defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and together with other evidence would support an inference that he was an impaired driver."); Alewine v. State , 273 Ga. App. 629 , 630 (1), 616 S.E.2d 472 (2005) (defendant's erratic driving and physical manifestations supported DUI conviction); Stephens v. State , 271 Ga. App. 634 , 635, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005) ("[T]he refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal th

2017And in Green , we held that urine testing did not violate the right against self-incrimination because it was merely “the use of a substance naturally excreted by the human body” 260 Ga. at 627 (2).

2017And in Green, we held that urine testing did not violate the right against self-incrimination because it was merely “the use of a substance naturally excreted by the human body.” 260 Ga. at 627 (2).

2013See Kitchens, supra at 413, 415 (1); Peirce, supra at 626 (1); State v. Terry, 236 Ga. App. 248,250 ( 511 SE2d 608 ) (1999) (affirming exclusion of evidence of defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test following arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol; although police officer read defendant the implied consent notice, officer subsequently attempted to respond to questions about defendant’s rights and gave defendant extraneous and misleading information); cf. McHugh, supra at 131-132, 134 (prior to reading implied consent notice, police officer stated to driver with out-of

2013See Kitchens, supra at 413, 415 (1); Peirce, supra at 626 (1); State v. Terry, 236 Ga. App. 248,250 ( 511 SE2d 608 ) (1999) (affirming exclusion of evidence of defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test following arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol; although police officer read defendant the implied consent notice, officer subsequently attempted to respond to questions about defendant’s rights and gave defendant extraneous and misleading information); cf. McHugh, supra at 131-132, 134 (prior to reading implied consent notice, police officer stated to driver with out-of

2013That notice pertinently provided that a suspect’s Georgia driver’s license would be suspended if s/he refused to submit to testing.10 The officer testified that he did not recall having any conversations with Barnard after he arrested her, other than reading his implied consent card to her.11 9 Kitchens v. State, 258 Ga. App. 411, 412-415 (1) ( 574 SE2d 451 ) (2002); State v. Peirce, 257 Ga. App. 623, 625-627 (1) ( 571 SE2d 826 ) (2002); Deckard, supra, at 422-423 . 10 See OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2); McHugh, supra at 134 . 11 See Kitchens, supra at 413, 415 (1); Peirce, supra at 626 (1); State v

2013See Kitchens, supra at 413, 415 (1); Peirce, supra at 626 (1); State v. Terry, 236 Ga. App. 248,250 ( 511 SE2d 608 ) (1999) (affirming exclusion of evidence of defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test following arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol; although police officer read defendant the implied consent notice, officer subsequently attempted to respond to questions about defendant’s rights and gave defendant extraneous and misleading information); cf. McHugh, supra at 131-132, 134 (prior to reading implied consent notice, police officer stated to driver with out-of

2013That notice pertinently provided that a suspect’s Georgia driver’s license would be suspended if s/he refused to submit to testing.10 The officer testified that he did not recall having any conversations with Barnard after he arrested her, other than reading his implied consent card to her.11 9 Kitchens v. State, 258 Ga. App. 411, 412-415 (1) ( 574 SE2d 451 ) (2002); State v. Peirce, 257 Ga. App. 623, 625-627 (1) ( 571 SE2d 826 ) (2002); Deckard, supra, at 422-423 . 10 See OCGA § 40-5-67.1 (b) (2); McHugh, supra at 134 . 11 See Kitchens, supra at 413, 415 (1); Peirce, supra at 626 (1); State v

2013See Kitchens, supra at 413, 415 (1); Peirce, supra at 626 (1); State v. Terry, 236 Ga. App. 248,250 ( 511 SE2d 608 ) (1999) (affirming exclusion of evidence of defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test following arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol; although police officer read defendant the implied consent notice, officer subsequently attempted to respond to questions about defendant’s rights and gave defendant extraneous and misleading information); cf. McHugh, supra at 131-132, 134 (prior to reading implied consent notice, police officer stated to driver with out-of

2008See State v. Melde, 725 NW2d 99, 104 (Minn. 2006) (the lack of a more specific warning in the implied consent notice as to the consequences of a refusal to submit to chemical testing, when the driver has been told it is a crime to refuse, did not violate federal due process); State v. Taylor, 648 So2d 701, 704 (Fla. 1995) (since driver was told of possible adverse consequences of refusal to submit to testing, the failure to expressly tell him that refusal could be used against him in court did not violate the Due Process Clause); People v. Wegielnik, 152 Ill.2d 418, 428 ( 605 NE2d 487 ) (1992)

2008See State v. Melde, 725 NW2d 99, 104 (Minn. 2006) (the lack of a more specific warning in the implied consent notice as to the consequences of a refusal to submit to chemical testing, when the driver has been told it is a crime to refuse, did not violate federal due process); State v. Taylor, 648 So2d 701, 704 (Fla. 1995) (since driver was told of possible adverse consequences of refusal to submit to testing, the failure to expressly tell him that refusal could be used against him in court did not violate the Due Process Clause); People v. Wegielnik, 152 Ill.2d 418, 428 ( 605 NE2d 487 ) (1992)

1992“A refusal to take a blood alcohol test which was requested by a police officer is not an act coerced by the officer, and the refusal is not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.” Patton v. State, 170 Ga. App. 807 (2) ( 318 SE2d 231 ) (1984), citing Wessels v. State, 169 Ga. App. 246 ( 312 SE2d 361 ) (1983).

1992“A refusal to take a blood alcohol test which was requested by a police officer is not an act coerced by the officer, and the refusal is not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination.” Patton v. State, 170 Ga. App. 807 (2) ( 318 SE2d 231 ) (1984), citing Wessels v. State, 169 Ga. App. 246 ( 312 SE2d 361 ) (1983).

1992In State v. Highsmith, 190 Ga. App. 838 ( 380 SE2d 272 ) (1989), this court rejected the argument that once a suspect indicates to an officer that he refuses to submit to a blood-alcohol test, the matter is closed.

1992In State v. Highsmith, 190 Ga. App. 838 ( 380 SE2d 272 ) (1989), this court rejected the argument that once a suspect indicates to an officer that he refuses to submit to a blood-alcohol test, the matter is closed.

2023See Stoica v. State, 339 Ga. App. 486, 486-487, 489 (3) ( 793 SE2d 651 ) (2016) (upholding the denial of defendant’s motion for new trial on his conviction for DUI less safe, which was based on his contention that his blood test results were illegally admitted, by finding that “before the jurors heard any evidence regarding 13 [defendant’s] blood test results,” they heard testimony regarding defendant’s indicia of inebriation which was overwhelming and rendered the admission of the blood test results harmless error); see also King v. State, 272 Ga. App. 8, 9-10 (2) ( 611 SE2d 692 ) (2005) (“Th

2016See King v. State, 272 Ga. App. 8, 9-10 (2) ( 611 SE2d 692 ) (2005) (“The blood alcohol test result was merely cumulative of other evidence of [the defendant’s] less-safe-to-drive condition, and error, if any, was harmless.”); Parker v. State, 259 Ga. App. 236 ( 576 SE2d 610 ) (2003); Camp v. State, 259 Ga. App. 228, 230 (2) ( 576 SE2d 610 ) (2003); Walsh v. State, 220 Ga. App. 514 (2) ( 469 SE2d 526 ) (1996).

2018See Massa v. State , 287 Ga. App. 494 , 495 (1), 651 S.E.2d 806 (2007) ("A defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and together with other evidence would support an inference that he was an impaired driver."); Alewine v. State , 273 Ga. App. 629 , 630 (1), 616 S.E.2d 472 (2005) (defendant's erratic driving and physical manifestations supported DUI conviction); Stephens v. State , 271 Ga. App. 634 , 635, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005) ("[T]he refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal th

2018See Massa v. State , 287 Ga. App. 494 , 495 (1), 651 S.E.2d 806 (2007) ("A defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and together with other evidence would support an inference that he was an impaired driver."); Alewine v. State , 273 Ga. App. 629 , 630 (1), 616 S.E.2d 472 (2005) (defendant's erratic driving and physical manifestations supported DUI conviction); Stephens v. State , 271 Ga. App. 634 , 635, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005) ("[T]he refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal th

2018See Massa v. State , 287 Ga. App. 494 , 495 (1), 651 S.E.2d 806 (2007) ("A defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and together with other evidence would support an inference that he was an impaired driver."); Alewine v. State , 273 Ga. App. 629 , 630 (1), 616 S.E.2d 472 (2005) (defendant's erratic driving and physical manifestations supported DUI conviction); Stephens v. State , 271 Ga. App. 634 , 635, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005) ("[T]he refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal th

2018See Massa v. State , 287 Ga. App. 494 , 495 (1), 651 S.E.2d 806 (2007) ("A defendant's refusal to submit to field sobriety tests is admissible as circumstantial evidence of intoxication and together with other evidence would support an inference that he was an impaired driver."); Alewine v. State , 273 Ga. App. 629 , 630 (1), 616 S.E.2d 472 (2005) (defendant's erratic driving and physical manifestations supported DUI conviction); Stephens v. State , 271 Ga. App. 634 , 635, 610 S.E.2d 613 (2005) ("[T]he refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test created an inference that the test would reveal th

1992See State v. Buffington, 189 Ga. App. 800, 801 ( 377 SE2d 548 ).

1992See State v. Buffington, 189 Ga. App. 800, 801 ( 377 SE2d 548 ).

1989See OCGA § 40-6-393 (c); Wyatt v. State, 179 Ga. App. 327, 328 ( 346 SE2d 387 ) (1986).

1989See OCGA § 40-6-393 (c); Wyatt v. State, 179 Ga. App. 327, 328 ( 346 SE2d 387 ) (1986).

1986This contention has been decided adversely to appellant in State v. Dull, 176 Ga. App. 152, 154 ( 335 SE2d 605 ) (1985), and a defendant’s refusal to take a blood alcohol test is relevant and admissible.

1986This contention has been decided adversely to appellant in State v. Dull, 176 Ga. App. 152, 154 ( 335 SE2d 605 ) (1985), and a defendant’s refusal to take a blood alcohol test is relevant and admissible.

2025Rather, in its analysis, the Court synthesizes the draw and the subsequent chemical analysis as a singular “blood test.” See, e.g., id. at 625 (III)(B) (“[T]he intrusion occasioned 5 clarify that, under ordinary circumstances involving a valid warrant for chemical blood analysis, law enforcement is not required to obtain two warrants, i.e., one for the draw and one for the subsequent testing.

2025See State v. 7 Robertson, 369 Ga. App. 707 , 713-714 (1) ( 894 SE2d 431 ) (2023) (admission of blood alcohol results harmless in DUI less safe trial when there was evidence of the defendant’s alcohol consumption, including her own admission that she was drinking); Stocia v. State, 339 Ga. App. 486, 489 (3) ( 793 SE2d 651 ) (2016) (holding that admission of the blood test results was harmless as to the DUI less safe countwhere before the jurors heard evidence regarding blood test results, they heard about the defendant’s erratic and concerning driving, the odor of alcohol emanating from his per

2025Notably, in Olevik, our Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s due process arguments both as facially applied to the statute and as applied to the appellant.6 302 Ga. at 247-252 (3) (a)-(b); see also So. 6 Additionally, in Olevik, our Supreme Court explained, Because the notice refers to a right to refuse, advises suspects of the 7 Dakota v. Neville, 459 U. S. 553, 565 (III) (103 SCt. 916, 74 LE2d 748) (1983) (noting that the right to refuse a blood alcohol test “is simply a matter of grace bestowed by the [state] legislature.”).

2025See State v. 7 Robertson, 369 Ga. App. 707 , 713-714 (1) ( 894 SE2d 431 ) (2023) (admission of blood alcohol results harmless in DUI less safe trial when there was evidence of the defendant’s alcohol consumption, including her own admission that she was drinking); Stocia v. State, 339 Ga. App. 486, 489 (3) ( 793 SE2d 651 ) (2016) (holding that admission of the blood test results was harmless as to the DUI less safe countwhere before the jurors heard evidence regarding blood test results, they heard about the defendant’s erratic and concerning driving, the odor of alcohol emanating from his per

2023Having viewed the evidence as we expect reasonable jurors would have done, Renfro, 313 Ga. at 613 (2); Ensslin, 308 Ga. at 471 (2) (d), we find that the trial court erred in granting Robertson a new trial on Counts 1 and 2. 2.

2023Having viewed the evidence as we expect reasonable jurors would have done, Renfro, 313 Ga. at 613 (2); Ensslin, 308 Ga. at 471 (2) (d), we find that the trial court erred in granting Robertson a new trial on Counts 1 and 2. 2.