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18 New Hampshire opinions name it 1 courts 1984–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Hampshire courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
South Dakota v. Nevillegreen2 sentences2015Muniz is consistent with the Court’s earlier decision in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), in which it held that “‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted); 2 see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 , 564 n.15 (1983) (“In the context of an arrest for driving while intoxic 2005See Zyla v. Turner, Director, 134 N.H. 259, 262 (1991); see also Cormier, 127 N.H. at 255, 257 (1985) (“The privilege against self-incrimination does not require the State to obtain the defendant’s permission---- Neither does the guarantee of due process.”); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554 (1983) (“[A] State [can] force a defendant to submit to a blood-alcohol test without violating the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). | 4 | 6 |
State v. Cormiergreen2 sentences2005See Zyla v. Turner, Director, 134 N.H. 259, 262 (1991); see also Cormier, 127 N.H. at 255, 257 (1985) (“The privilege against self-incrimination does not require the State to obtain the defendant’s permission---- Neither does the guarantee of due process.”); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554 (1983) (“[A] State [can] force a defendant to submit to a blood-alcohol test without violating the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 1986In State v. Cormier, 127 N.H. 253 , 499 A.2d 986 (1985), a majority of this court held that a suspect’s refusal to take a blood alcohol test can be admitted as evidence against the suspect in a later DWI prosecution. | 3 | 4 |
State v. Hullgreen2 sentences2020See Kelley, 159 N.H. at 455 (finding the evidence sufficient where, among other things, the defendant admitted to consuming alcohol, failed field sobriety tests, and had difficulty producing her registration); Wiggin, 151 N.H. at 309 (holding that evidence of intoxication was sufficient where officer noticed an odor of alcohol when he approached the defendant, observed the defendant’s flushed face and bloodshot, glassy eyes, the defendant admitted to having consumed alcohol, the defendant failed five field sobriety tests, and refused to submit to a blood alcohol test); State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 2019See State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 706, 712 (2003) (finding that evidence that defendant smelled of alcohol, had slurred speech and blood shot eyes, swayed, performed poorly on field sobriety tests, and refused to take a blood alcohol test was sufficient to establish intoxication). | 2 | 2 |
Rhode Island v. Innisgreen2 sentences2015Muniz is consistent with the Court’s earlier decision in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), in which it held that “‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted); 2 see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 , 564 n.15 (1983) (“In the context of an arrest for driving while intoxic 2015Muniz is consistent with the Court’s earlier decision in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), in which it held that “‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted); 2 see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 , 564 n.15 (1983) (“In the context of an arrest for driving while intoxic | 2 | 2 |
State v. Jenkinsgreen2 sentences2005See id. at 674-75 (rejecting a due process challenge brought under Part I, Article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution alleging that a defendant’s decision to submit to a blood-alcohol test was not made “knowingly and intelligently”). 1987In State v. Jenkins, 128 N.H. 672 , 517 A.2d 1182 (1986), we rejected a claim that the police must warn DWI arrestees that they could be charged with a higher offense if the blood alcohol test revealed an alcohol level greater than 20/100 percent. | 1 | 3 |
State v. Kelleygreen2 sentences2020See Kelley, 159 N.H. at 455 (finding the evidence sufficient where, among other things, the defendant admitted to consuming alcohol, failed field sobriety tests, and had difficulty producing her registration); Wiggin, 151 N.H. at 309 (holding that evidence of intoxication was sufficient where officer noticed an odor of alcohol when he approached the defendant, observed the defendant’s flushed face and bloodshot, glassy eyes, the defendant admitted to having consumed alcohol, the defendant failed five field sobriety tests, and refused to submit to a blood alcohol test); State v. Hull, 149 N.H. 2018Contrary to the defendant’s argument, this case is factually distinguishable from State v. Lorton, 149 N.H. 732 (2003), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449 (2009). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Wiggingreen1 sentence2020See Kelley, 159 N.H. at 455 (finding the evidence sufficient where, among other things, the defendant admitted to consuming alcohol, failed field sobriety tests, and had difficulty producing her registration); Wiggin, 151 N.H. at 309 (holding that evidence of intoxication was sufficient where officer noticed an odor of alcohol when he approached the defendant, observed the defendant’s flushed face and bloodshot, glassy eyes, the defendant admitted to having consumed alcohol, the defendant failed five field sobriety tests, and refused to submit to a blood alcohol test); State v. Hull, 149 N.H. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Godinggreen2 sentences2015As we recognized in Goding, in the context of an arrest for driving under the influence, “a police inquiry of whether the suspect will take a blood-alcohol test is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda’.’ Id. at 274 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Geasley, 619 N.E.2d 1086, 1089-90 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (“Police instructions on a state’s implied consent law do not fall within [the] definition of ‘interrogation.’ ”); State v. Blouin, 716 A.2d 826, 829-30 (Vt. 1998). 2015This is so because instructing a suspect about *615 the state’s implied consent law involves a process that is “highly regulated by State law, and is presented in virtually the same words to all suspects.” Goding, 128 N.H. at 274 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Blouingreen1 sentence2015As we recognized in Goding, in the context of an arrest for driving under the influence, “a police inquiry of whether the suspect will take a blood-alcohol test is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda’.’ Id. at 274 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Geasley, 619 N.E.2d 1086, 1089-90 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (“Police instructions on a state’s implied consent law do not fall within [the] definition of ‘interrogation.’ ”); State v. Blouin, 716 A.2d 826, 829-30 (Vt. 1998). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jermaine Woodsgreen1 sentence2015Muniz is consistent with the Court’s earlier decision in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980), in which it held that “‘interrogation’ under Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the suspect.” Innis, 446 U.S. at 301 (emphasis added; footnotes omitted); 2 see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 , 564 n.15 (1983) (“In the context of an arrest for driving while intoxic | 1 | 1 |
State v. Geasleygreen1 sentence2015As we recognized in Goding, in the context of an arrest for driving under the influence, “a police inquiry of whether the suspect will take a blood-alcohol test is not an interrogation within the meaning of Miranda’.’ Id. at 274 (quotation omitted); see also State v. Geasley, 619 N.E.2d 1086, 1089-90 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993) (“Police instructions on a state’s implied consent law do not fall within [the] definition of ‘interrogation.’ ”); State v. Blouin, 716 A.2d 826, 829-30 (Vt. 1998). | 1 | 1 |
Zyla v. Turnergreen2 sentences2005See Zyla v. Turner, Director, 134 N.H. 259, 262 (1991); see also Cormier, 127 N.H. at 255, 257 (1985) (“The privilege against self-incrimination does not require the State to obtain the defendant’s permission---- Neither does the guarantee of due process.”); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554 (1983) (“[A] State [can] force a defendant to submit to a blood-alcohol test without violating the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 2005See Zyla v. Turner, Director, 134 N.H. 259, 262 (1991); see also Cormier, 127 N.H. at 255, 257 (1985) (“The privilege against self-incrimination does not require the State to obtain the defendant’s permission---- Neither does the guarantee of due process.”); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554 (1983) (“[A] State [can] force a defendant to submit to a blood-alcohol test without violating the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Barongreen1 sentence2005Chalmers v. Harris Motors, 104 N.H. 111, 112-13 (1962); State v. Baron, 98 N.H. 298, 299-300 (1953). | 1 | 1 |
Chalmers v. Harris Motors Inc.green1 sentence2005Chalmers v. Harris Motors, 104 N.H. 111, 112-13 (1962); State v. Baron, 98 N.H. 298, 299-300 (1953). | 1 | 1 |
Wiebenga v. Iowa Department of Transportation, Motor Vehicle Divisiongreen1 sentence2000See Wiebenga v. Dept. of Transp., 530 N.W.2d 732 (Iowa 1995). | 1 | 1 |
In re Sanborngreen2 sentences1997Conduct that improperly shifts the burden of proof to a defendant in a criminal trial, however, implicates the defendant’s due process rights under part I, article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution, cf. In re Sanborn, 130 N.H. 430, 441-42 , 545 A.2d 726, 733-34 (1988), and the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975). 1997Conduct that improperly shifts the burden of proof to a defendant in a criminal trial, however, implicates the defendant’s due process rights under part I, article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution, cf. In re Sanborn, 130 N.H. 430, 441-42 , 545 A.2d 726, 733-34 (1988), and the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Mullaney v. Wilburgreen1 sentence1997Conduct that improperly shifts the burden of proof to a defendant in a criminal trial, however, implicates the defendant’s due process rights under part I, article 15 of the New Hampshire Constitution, cf. In re Sanborn, 130 N.H. 430, 441-42 , 545 A.2d 726, 733-34 (1988), and the fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitution, see Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 704 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hoenscheidgreen1 sentence1987As the South Dakota Supreme Court noted in State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425, 430 (S.D. 1984), overruled on other grounds, State v. Hoenscheid, 374 N.W.2d 128, 129-30 (S.D. 1985), upon remand from the United States Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 , “the requirement that an arresting officer must fully inform a defendant driver of the consequences of a refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test” is inherent in due process protection. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nevillegreen1 sentence1987As the South Dakota Supreme Court noted in State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425, 430 (S.D. 1984), overruled on other grounds, State v. Hoenscheid, 374 N.W.2d 128, 129-30 (S.D. 1985), upon remand from the United States Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 , “the requirement that an arresting officer must fully inform a defendant driver of the consequences of a refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test” is inherent in due process protection. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Larochellegreen2 sentences1985State v. Larochelle, 112 N.H. 392, 397-98 , 297 A.2d 223, 227 (1972); accord State v. Amato supra (official report is conclusive evidence of conduct and result of test even though the person who tested the breathalyzer machine was not produced at trial). 1985State v. Larochelle, 112 N.H. 392, 397-98 , 297 A.2d 223, 227 (1972); accord State v. Amato supra (official report is conclusive evidence of conduct and result of test even though the person who tested the breathalyzer machine was not produced at trial). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Berrygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Hampshire. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences2005See Zyla v. Turner, Director, 134 N.H. 259, 262 (1991); see also Cormier, 127 N.H. at 255, 257 (1985) (“The privilege against self-incrimination does not require the State to obtain the defendant’s permission---- Neither does the guarantee of due process.”); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554 (1983) (“[A] State [can] force a defendant to submit to a blood-alcohol test without violating the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). 2005See Zyla v. Turner, Director, 134 N.H. 259, 262 (1991); see also Cormier, 127 N.H. at 255, 257 (1985) (“The privilege against self-incrimination does not require the State to obtain the defendant’s permission---- Neither does the guarantee of due process.”); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554 (1983) (“[A] State [can] force a defendant to submit to a blood-alcohol test without violating the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.”); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). | 2 | 1987–2005 |
State v. Barkus
green
2 sentences2019Cf., e.g. , State v. Ducharme , 167 N.H. 606 , 614, 116 A.3d 1281 (2015) (noting that "implied consent law questioning is not 'interrogation' " and therefore need not be preceded by Miranda warnings); State v. Barkus , 152 N.H. 701 , 708, 888 A.2d 398 (2005) (recognizing that "it is settled law that a driver arrested for driving while under the influence has no constitutional right to refuse to provide a sample for a blood alcohol test"). 2 Because we adopt the reasonable officer approach, which is focused on the objective conduct of the officer in administering the testing rather than the sub 2019Cf., e.g. , State v. Ducharme , 167 N.H. 606 , 614, 116 A.3d 1281 (2015) (noting that "implied consent law questioning is not 'interrogation' " and therefore need not be preceded by Miranda warnings); State v. Barkus , 152 N.H. 701 , 708, 888 A.2d 398 (2005) (recognizing that "it is settled law that a driver arrested for driving while under the influence has no constitutional right to refuse to provide a sample for a blood alcohol test"). 2 Because we adopt the reasonable officer approach, which is focused on the objective conduct of the officer in administering the testing rather than the sub | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State of New Hampshire v. Alex Ducharme
green
1 sentence2019Cf., e.g. , State v. Ducharme , 167 N.H. 606 , 614, 116 A.3d 1281 (2015) (noting that "implied consent law questioning is not 'interrogation' " and therefore need not be preceded by Miranda warnings); State v. Barkus , 152 N.H. 701 , 708, 888 A.2d 398 (2005) (recognizing that "it is settled law that a driver arrested for driving while under the influence has no constitutional right to refuse to provide a sample for a blood alcohol test"). 2 Because we adopt the reasonable officer approach, which is focused on the objective conduct of the officer in administering the testing rather than the sub | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Winslow
green
2 sentences2018Accordingly, "due process requires that a [DUI] defendant be afforded a meaningful opportunity to request an additional blood-alcohol test." Winslow , 140 N.H. at 322 , 666 A.2d 946 . 2018Accordingly, "due process requires that a [DUI] defendant be afforded a meaningful opportunity to request an additional blood-alcohol test." Winslow , 140 N.H. at 322 , 666 A.2d 946 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
State v. Lorton
green
1 sentence2018Contrary to the defendant’s argument, this case is factually distinguishable from State v. Lorton, 149 N.H. 732 (2003), overruled on other grounds by State v. Kelley, 159 N.H. 449 (2009). | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Illinois v. Perkins
green
1 sentence2015In Illinois v. Perkins, 496 U.S. 292 (1990), the Court held that Miranda did not apply to a situation in which an undercover government agent was placed in the cellblock of a suspect who had been incarcerated for two days* * 3 while awaiting trial, and engaged him in conversation designed to elicit the suspect’s involvement in an unrelated murder. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Vandebogart
green
1 sentence1997Cf. id. (during closing argument, prosecutor may draw reasonable inferences from evidence presented). | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Greene
green
2 sentences1993We reaffirmed Petkus in State v. Greene, where we based our decision on the State Constitution, and held that “the assistance of counsel in making the decision to take or not to take a blood alcohol test under the implied consent law was not necessary in this DWI case to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Greene, 128 N.H. at 320 , 512 A.2d at 432 . 1993We reaffirmed Petkus in State v. Greene, where we based our decision on the State Constitution, and held that “the assistance of counsel in making the decision to take or not to take a blood alcohol test under the implied consent law was not necessary in this DWI case to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial.” Greene, 128 N.H. at 320 , 512 A.2d at 432 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
1 sentence1987The Court held that the right protected by Miranda warnings, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), was of constitutional dimension and thus could not be unduly burdened, whereas the right to refuse the blood alcohol test, in contrast, was “simply a matter of grace bestowed by the South Dakota Legislature,” Neville, 459 U.S. at 565 , since compelled blood tests under normal circumstances do not deprive a defendant of his protection against self-incrimination. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Gallant
green
1 sentence1984Moreover, as this court observed in State v. Gallant, in general the delay in recording a blood alcohol analysis “works in favor of the accused, although there may be extraordinary circumstances where the alcoholic content in the defendant’s blood would be lower at the time of the arrest than when the blood sample was taken.” Id. | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.