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32 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1964–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Chavezgreen2 sentences2015In State v. Steele, we held that where a driver refused to provide a blood sample under the Implied Consent Act, a law enforcement officer could not obtain the sample using a search warrant because the Implied Consent Act afforded the defendant greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. 1979-NMCA-113 , ¶¶ 7-9, 93 N.M. 470 , 601 P.2d 440 ; see also State v. Chavez, 1981-NMCA-060 , ¶ 4, 96 N.M. 313 , 629 P.2d 1242 (explaining that in Steele, “[t]his Court held that the Legislature gave the defendant ' more protection than was afforded by the Constitution and that, after his refusal, the resul 2015In State v. Steele, we held that where a driver refused to provide a blood sample under the Implied Consent Act, a law enforcement officer could not obtain the sample using a search warrant because the Implied Consent Act afforded the defendant greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. 1979-NMCA-113 , ¶¶ 7-9, 93 N.M. 470 , 601 P.2d 440 ; see also State v. Chavez, 1981-NMCA-060 , ¶ 4, 96 N.M. 313 , 629 P.2d 1242 (explaining that in Steele, “[t]his Court held that the Legislature gave the defendant ' more protection than was afforded by the Constitution and that, after his refusal, the resul | 2 | 2 |
Pruitt v. State, Department of Public Safety, Division of Motor Vehiclesgreen2 sentences1993See Pruitt 825 P.2d at 894 . 1993See Pruitt 825 P.2d at 894 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Caudillogreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., State v. Notah-Hunter, 2005-NMCA-074, ¶ 24 , 137 N.M. 597 , 15 113 P.3d 867 (holding that the evidence was sufficient to uphold a conviction for DWI 16 where the defendant smelled of alcohol, had slurred speech, admitted to drinking 17 alcohol, failed field sobriety tests and was driving erratically); State v. Caudillo, 2003- 18 NMCA-042, ¶ 8, 133 N.M. 468 , 64 P.3d 495 (stating that the evidence was sufficient 2 1 to establish impairment where the defendant was involved in an accident, smelled of 2 alcohol, admitted to having consumed beer, and refused to take a blood alcohol test) 2017See, e.g., State v. Notah-Hunter, 2005-NMCA-074, ¶ 24 , 137 N.M. 597 , 15 113 P.3d 867 (holding that the evidence was sufficient to uphold a conviction for DWI 16 where the defendant smelled of alcohol, had slurred speech, admitted to drinking 17 alcohol, failed field sobriety tests and was driving erratically); State v. Caudillo, 2003- 18 NMCA-042, ¶ 8, 133 N.M. 468 , 64 P.3d 495 (stating that the evidence was sufficient 2 1 to establish impairment where the defendant was involved in an accident, smelled of 2 alcohol, admitted to having consumed beer, and refused to take a blood alcohol test) | 1 | 2 |
State v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2007In summary, Defendant argues that in most cases, the courts have required much more evidence than exists here to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. {33} Defendant relies on the following cases: Caudillo, 2003-NMCA-042, ¶ 8 (stating that the evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion that the defendant was impaired when the defendant was involved in an accident, admitted to having drunk a few beers, and refused to take a blood alcohol test and when the officers noticed slurred speech and a strong odor of alcohol); State v. Sanchez, 2001-NMCA-109, ¶¶ 15-16 , 131 N.M. 355 , 36 P.3 2007In summary, Defendant argues that in most cases, the courts have required much more evidence than exists here to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. {33} Defendant relies on the following cases: Caudillo, 2003-NMCA-042, ¶ 8 (stating that the evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion that the defendant was impaired when the defendant was involved in an accident, admitted to having drunk a few beers, and refused to take a blood alcohol test and when the officers noticed slurred speech and a strong odor of alcohol); State v. Sanchez, 2001-NMCA-109, ¶¶ 15-16 , 131 N.M. 355 , 36 P.3 | 1 | 2 |
State v. Sotogreen1 sentence2025See Soto, 2007-NMCA-077, ¶ 34 . {8} Based on the evidence discussed above, we conclude the State presented sufficient evidence to demonstrate that Defendant was impaired to the slightest degree, and therefore affirm Defendant’s conviction for aggravated DWI. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Martinezgreen1 sentence2020See Martinez, 2007-NMSC-025, ¶ 11 (reiterating Dedman’s holding that “to meet foundational requirements, the [s]tate does not need to show compliance with all regulations, but only with those that are ‘accuracy-ensuring’ ”). {28} By way of illustration, in Dedman, our Supreme Court considered whether the defendant’s blood test results lacked the proper foundation, where the state failed to prove that the defendant’s blood-alcohol test had been administered via venipuncture, as required by 7.33.2.15(A)(1) NMAC. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dedmangreen1 sentence2020See Dedman, 2004-NMSC-037, ¶¶ 4-6 . 2 Examining various methods for drawing blood (including venipuncture, arterial puncture, and skin puncture), our Supreme Court concluded that “the reason for collection through veni[]puncture is not a higher probability of accuracy. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Notah-Huntergreen2 sentences2017See, e.g., State v. Notah-Hunter, 2005-NMCA-074, ¶ 24 , 137 N.M. 597 , 15 113 P.3d 867 (holding that the evidence was sufficient to uphold a conviction for DWI 16 where the defendant smelled of alcohol, had slurred speech, admitted to drinking 17 alcohol, failed field sobriety tests and was driving erratically); State v. Caudillo, 2003- 18 NMCA-042, ¶ 8, 133 N.M. 468 , 64 P.3d 495 (stating that the evidence was sufficient 2 1 to establish impairment where the defendant was involved in an accident, smelled of 2 alcohol, admitted to having consumed beer, and refused to take a blood alcohol test) 2017See, e.g., State v. Notah-Hunter, 2005-NMCA-074, ¶ 24 , 137 N.M. 597 , 15 113 P.3d 867 (holding that the evidence was sufficient to uphold a conviction for DWI 16 where the defendant smelled of alcohol, had slurred speech, admitted to drinking 17 alcohol, failed field sobriety tests and was driving erratically); State v. Caudillo, 2003- 18 NMCA-042, ¶ 8, 133 N.M. 468 , 64 P.3d 495 (stating that the evidence was sufficient 2 1 to establish impairment where the defendant was involved in an accident, smelled of 2 alcohol, admitted to having consumed beer, and refused to take a blood alcohol test) | 1 | 1 |
State v. Rowellgreen1 sentence2016Our Supreme Court has stated that “[a]ny warrantless search 6 analysis must start with the bedrock principle of both federal and state constitutional 7 jurisprudence that searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior 8 approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable, subject only to well- 9 delineated exceptions.” Rowell, 2008-NMSC-041, ¶ 10 (internal quotation marks and 10 citation omitted). 11 {19} A blood alcohol test is considered “a search of ‘persons’ [,]” and therefore falls 12 within the ambit of the Fourth Amendment. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Purkgreen1 sentence2012See State v. Purk, 84 N.M. 6 668, 669, 506 P.2d 1215, 1216 (Ct. App. 1973). 7 “[I]t is error to admit expert testimony involving scientific knowledge unless 8 the party offering such testimony first establishes the evidentiary reliability of the 9 scientific knowledge.” State v. Torres, 1999-NMSC-010, ¶ 24 , 127 N.M. 20 , 976 P.2d 10 20. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Torresgreen2 sentences2012See State v. Purk, 84 N.M. 6 668, 669, 506 P.2d 1215, 1216 (Ct. App. 1973). 7 “[I]t is error to admit expert testimony involving scientific knowledge unless 8 the party offering such testimony first establishes the evidentiary reliability of the 9 scientific knowledge.” State v. Torres, 1999-NMSC-010, ¶ 24 , 127 N.M. 20 , 976 P.2d 10 20. 2012See State v. Purk, 84 N.M. 6 668, 669, 506 P.2d 1215, 1216 (Ct. App. 1973). 7 “[I]t is error to admit expert testimony involving scientific knowledge unless 8 the party offering such testimony first establishes the evidentiary reliability of the 9 scientific knowledge.” State v. Torres, 1999-NMSC-010, ¶ 24 , 127 N.M. 20 , 976 P.2d 10 20. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gonzalesred2 sentences2008See State v. Gonzales, 113 N.M. 221, 229 , 824 P.2d 1023, 1031 (1992); Foster, 1998-NMCA-163 , ¶¶ 13-14. 2008See State v. Gonzales, 113 N.M. 221, 229 , 824 P.2d 1023, 1031 (1992); Foster, 1998-NMCA-163 , ¶¶ 13-14. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hernandezgreen2 sentences2007In summary, Defendant argues that in most cases, the courts have required much more evidence than exists here to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. {33} Defendant relies on the following cases: Caudillo, 2003-NMCA-042, ¶ 8 (stating that the evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion that the defendant was impaired when the defendant was involved in an accident, admitted to having drunk a few beers, and refused to take a blood alcohol test and when the officers noticed slurred speech and a strong odor of alcohol); State v. Sanchez, 2001-NMCA-109, ¶¶ 15-16 , 131 N.M. 355 , 36 P.3 2007In summary, Defendant argues that in most cases, the courts have required much more evidence than exists here to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. {33} Defendant relies on the following cases: Caudillo, 2003-NMCA-042, ¶ 8 (stating that the evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion that the defendant was impaired when the defendant was involved in an accident, admitted to having drunk a few beers, and refused to take a blood alcohol test and when the officers noticed slurred speech and a strong odor of alcohol); State v. Sanchez, 2001-NMCA-109, ¶¶ 15-16 , 131 N.M. 355 , 36 P.3 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ruizgreen2 sentences2007In summary, Defendant argues that in most cases, the courts have required much more evidence than exists here to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. {33} Defendant relies on the following cases: Caudillo, 2003-NMCA-042, ¶ 8 (stating that the evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion that the defendant was impaired when the defendant was involved in an accident, admitted to having drunk a few beers, and refused to take a blood alcohol test and when the officers noticed slurred speech and a strong odor of alcohol); State v. Sanchez, 2001-NMCA-109, ¶¶ 15-16 , 131 N.M. 355 , 36 P.3 2007In summary, Defendant argues that in most cases, the courts have required much more evidence than exists here to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. {33} Defendant relies on the following cases: Caudillo, 2003-NMCA-042, ¶ 8 (stating that the evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion that the defendant was impaired when the defendant was involved in an accident, admitted to having drunk a few beers, and refused to take a blood alcohol test and when the officers noticed slurred speech and a strong odor of alcohol); State v. Sanchez, 2001-NMCA-109, ¶¶ 15-16 , 131 N.M. 355 , 36 P.3 | 1 | 1 |
State v. Suazogreen1 sentence1999See In re Suazo, 117 N.M. at 786 , 877 P.2d at 1089 . | 1 | 1 |
| Matter of Suazogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Wrightgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Portales v. Shiplettgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Corradogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Taylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Desmond v. Superior Courtgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Purchase v. Meyergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Copelandgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Wetherellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Richerson
green
2 sentences2016State v. Richerson, 1975-NMCA-027 , 13 ¶ 23, 87 N.M. 437 , 535 P.2d 644 . 2016State v. Richerson, 1975-NMCA-027 , 13 ¶ 23, 87 N.M. 437 , 535 P.2d 644 . | 2 | 1988–2016 |
State v. Steele
green
2 sentences2015In State v. Steele, we held that where a driver refused to provide a blood sample under the Implied Consent Act, a law enforcement officer could not obtain the sample using a search warrant because the Implied Consent Act afforded the defendant greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. 1979-NMCA-113 , ¶¶ 7-9, 93 N.M. 470 , 601 P.2d 440 ; see also State v. Chavez, 1981-NMCA-060 , ¶ 4, 96 N.M. 313 , 629 P.2d 1242 (explaining that in Steele, “[t]his Court held that the Legislature gave the defendant ' more protection than was afforded by the Constitution and that, after his refusal, the resul 2015In State v. Steele, we held that where a driver refused to provide a blood sample under the Implied Consent Act, a law enforcement officer could not obtain the sample using a search warrant because the Implied Consent Act afforded the defendant greater protection than the Fourth Amendment. 1979-NMCA-113 , ¶¶ 7-9, 93 N.M. 470 , 601 P.2d 440 ; see also State v. Chavez, 1981-NMCA-060 , ¶ 4, 96 N.M. 313 , 629 P.2d 1242 (explaining that in Steele, “[t]his Court held that the Legislature gave the defendant ' more protection than was afforded by the Constitution and that, after his refusal, the resul | 2 | 2014–2015 |
Bullcoming v. New Mexico
green
2 sentences2012Thereafter, the United States Supreme Court in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S.Ct. 2705 (2011), implicitly rejected the distinction between chemical analyses and blood alcohol tests and held that the testimony of a substitute expert about a blood alcohol analysis report conducted by another analyst violated the defendant’s confrontation rights. 2011Cooper, Acting Chief Public Defender 19 Susan Roth, Assistant Appellate Defender 20 Santa Fe, NM 21 for Appellant 22 MEMORANDUM OPINION 23 SUTIN, Judge. 1 Defendant Joseph Marez appeals from the judgment and sentence, following 2 a jury trial, convicting him of driving while intoxicated (DWI) (.08 or above). [RP 3 106] Defendant contends that his confrontation rights were violated when the district 4 court allowed the supervisor of the person who actually conducted the blood test and 5 prepared the Scientific Laboratory Division (SLD) report to give his expert opinion 6 at trial as to the bloo | 2 | 2011–2012 |
Bierner v. State, Taxation & Revenue Department
green
2 sentences1993We added, "[T]he legislature could properly decide that it did not want hearings prolonged by the testimony of experts and other witnesses that may be necessary to connect the blood alcohol test result with the licensee's BAC at the time he or she was driving." Id. 1993We added, “[T]he legislature could properly decide that it did not want hearings prolonged by the testimony of experts and other witnesses that may be necessary to connect the blood alcohol test result with the licensee’s BAC at the time he or she was driving.” Id. | 2 | 1993–1993 |
State v. Gardner
green
2 sentences2023In Gardner, we held that the numerical breath test results were improperly admitted into evidence and concluded that “when the only scientific evidence presented at trial was admitted in error, the court cannot say that the effect is harmless.” 1998-NMCA-160, ¶¶ 20-21 . {14} Unlike in Franklin, in which the district court announced the blood alcohol test results during its verdict and expressed concern, the metropolitan court in the present case did not rely on—or even mention—the breath card when delivering the verdict. 2 While, like in Gardner, the breath tests results were the “only scienti 2023In Gardner, we held that the numerical breath test results were improperly admitted into evidence and concluded that “when the only scientific evidence presented at trial was admitted in error, the court cannot say that the effect is harmless.” 1998-NMCA-160, ¶¶ 20-21 . {14} Unlike in Franklin, in which the district court announced the blood alcohol test results during its verdict and expressed concern, the metropolitan court in the present case did not rely on—or even mention—the breath card when delivering the verdict. 2 While, like in Gardner, the breath tests results were the “only scienti | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Franklin
green
2 sentences2021Officer Cobb is not, and he can’t testify as to the credentials of those people who took the blood.” The district court overruled the objection. {27} Assuming without deciding that Defendant preserved the issue he now raises on appeal and the district court erred in admitting the results of the blood draw, but see State v. Franklin, 2020-NMCA-016, ¶ 24 , 460 P.3d 69 (stating that the individual who performed the blood draw is not required to testify and the necessary foundation may be established by an officer who witnessed the blood draw), we review Defendant’s claim for harmless error. 2021Officer Cobb is not, and he can’t testify as to the credentials of those people who took the blood.” The district court overruled the objection. {27} Assuming without deciding that Defendant preserved the issue he now raises on appeal and the district court erred in admitting the results of the blood draw, but see State v. Franklin, 2020-NMCA-016, ¶ 24 , 460 P.3d 69 (stating that the individual who performed the blood draw is not required to testify and the necessary foundation may be established by an officer who witnessed the blood draw), we review Defendant’s claim for harmless error. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
State v. Estrada
green
2 sentences2017See, e.g., State v. Notah-Hunter, 2005-NMCA-074, ¶ 24 , 137 N.M. 597 , 15 113 P.3d 867 (holding that the evidence was sufficient to uphold a conviction for DWI 16 where the defendant smelled of alcohol, had slurred speech, admitted to drinking 17 alcohol, failed field sobriety tests and was driving erratically); State v. Caudillo, 2003- 18 NMCA-042, ¶ 8, 133 N.M. 468 , 64 P.3d 495 (stating that the evidence was sufficient 2 1 to establish impairment where the defendant was involved in an accident, smelled of 2 alcohol, admitted to having consumed beer, and refused to take a blood alcohol test) 2017See, e.g., State v. Notah-Hunter, 2005-NMCA-074, ¶ 24 , 137 N.M. 597 , 15 113 P.3d 867 (holding that the evidence was sufficient to uphold a conviction for DWI 16 where the defendant smelled of alcohol, had slurred speech, admitted to drinking 17 alcohol, failed field sobriety tests and was driving erratically); State v. Caudillo, 2003- 18 NMCA-042, ¶ 8, 133 N.M. 468 , 64 P.3d 495 (stating that the evidence was sufficient 2 1 to establish impairment where the defendant was involved in an accident, smelled of 2 alcohol, admitted to having consumed beer, and refused to take a blood alcohol test) | 1 | 2017–2017 |
State v. Baldwin
green
2 sentences2015While Jones does not inform us on what basis 18 these statements were made, it is well settled that such questions are matters of 19 scientific expertise, and constitute adjudicative facts not subject to judicial notice. 18 1 See State v. Day, 2008-NMSC-007, ¶ 31 , 143 N.M. 359 , 176 P.3d 1091 (discussing 2 the necessity of use of scientific retrograde extrapolation evidence to determine BAC 3 at an earlier time); State v. Baldwin, 2001-NMCA-063, ¶ 17 , 130 N.M. 705 , 30 P.3d 4 394 (“But a BAC reading from a laboratory test is just a sterile number; by itself it 5 tells us nothing about a driv 2015While Jones does not inform us on what basis 18 these statements were made, it is well settled that such questions are matters of 19 scientific expertise, and constitute adjudicative facts not subject to judicial notice. 18 1 See State v. Day, 2008-NMSC-007, ¶ 31 , 143 N.M. 359 , 176 P.3d 1091 (discussing 2 the necessity of use of scientific retrograde extrapolation evidence to determine BAC 3 at an earlier time); State v. Baldwin, 2001-NMCA-063, ¶ 17 , 130 N.M. 705 , 30 P.3d 4 394 (“But a BAC reading from a laboratory test is just a sterile number; by itself it 5 tells us nothing about a driv | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Day
green
2 sentences2015While Jones does not inform us on what basis 18 these statements were made, it is well settled that such questions are matters of 19 scientific expertise, and constitute adjudicative facts not subject to judicial notice. 18 1 See State v. Day, 2008-NMSC-007, ¶ 31 , 143 N.M. 359 , 176 P.3d 1091 (discussing 2 the necessity of use of scientific retrograde extrapolation evidence to determine BAC 3 at an earlier time); State v. Baldwin, 2001-NMCA-063, ¶ 17 , 130 N.M. 705 , 30 P.3d 4 394 (“But a BAC reading from a laboratory test is just a sterile number; by itself it 5 tells us nothing about a driv 2015While Jones does not inform us on what basis 18 these statements were made, it is well settled that such questions are matters of 19 scientific expertise, and constitute adjudicative facts not subject to judicial notice. 18 1 See State v. Day, 2008-NMSC-007, ¶ 31 , 143 N.M. 359 , 176 P.3d 1091 (discussing 2 the necessity of use of scientific retrograde extrapolation evidence to determine BAC 3 at an earlier time); State v. Baldwin, 2001-NMCA-063, ¶ 17 , 130 N.M. 705 , 30 P.3d 4 394 (“But a BAC reading from a laboratory test is just a sterile number; by itself it 5 tells us nothing about a driv | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
green
1 sentence2011Cooper, Acting Chief Public Defender 19 Susan Roth, Assistant Appellate Defender 20 Santa Fe, NM 21 for Appellant 22 MEMORANDUM OPINION 23 SUTIN, Judge. 1 Defendant Joseph Marez appeals from the judgment and sentence, following 2 a jury trial, convicting him of driving while intoxicated (DWI) (.08 or above). [RP 3 106] Defendant contends that his confrontation rights were violated when the district 4 court allowed the supervisor of the person who actually conducted the blood test and 5 prepared the Scientific Laboratory Division (SLD) report to give his expert opinion 6 at trial as to the bloo | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Bullcoming
green
2 sentences2011Cooper, Acting Chief Public Defender 19 Susan Roth, Assistant Appellate Defender 20 Santa Fe, NM 21 for Appellant 22 MEMORANDUM OPINION 23 SUTIN, Judge. 1 Defendant Joseph Marez appeals from the judgment and sentence, following 2 a jury trial, convicting him of driving while intoxicated (DWI) (.08 or above). [RP 3 106] Defendant contends that his confrontation rights were violated when the district 4 court allowed the supervisor of the person who actually conducted the blood test and 5 prepared the Scientific Laboratory Division (SLD) report to give his expert opinion 6 at trial as to the bloo 2011Cooper, Acting Chief Public Defender 19 Susan Roth, Assistant Appellate Defender 20 Santa Fe, NM 21 for Appellant 22 MEMORANDUM OPINION 23 SUTIN, Judge. 1 Defendant Joseph Marez appeals from the judgment and sentence, following 2 a jury trial, convicting him of driving while intoxicated (DWI) (.08 or above). [RP 3 106] Defendant contends that his confrontation rights were violated when the district 4 court allowed the supervisor of the person who actually conducted the blood test and 5 prepared the Scientific Laboratory Division (SLD) report to give his expert opinion 6 at trial as to the bloo | 1 | 2011–2011 |
State v. Foster
green
1 sentence2008See State v. Gonzales, 113 N.M. 221, 229 , 824 P.2d 1023, 1031 (1992); Foster, 1998-NMCA-163 , ¶¶ 13-14. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Sanchez
green
2 sentences2007In summary, Defendant argues that in most cases, the courts have required much more evidence than exists here to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. {33} Defendant relies on the following cases: Caudillo, 2003-NMCA-042, ¶ 8 (stating that the evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion that the defendant was impaired when the defendant was involved in an accident, admitted to having drunk a few beers, and refused to take a blood alcohol test and when the officers noticed slurred speech and a strong odor of alcohol); State v. Sanchez, 2001-NMCA-109, ¶¶ 15-16 , 131 N.M. 355 , 36 P.3 2007In summary, Defendant argues that in most cases, the courts have required much more evidence than exists here to prove each element beyond a reasonable doubt. {33} Defendant relies on the following cases: Caudillo, 2003-NMCA-042, ¶ 8 (stating that the evidence was sufficient to support a conclusion that the defendant was impaired when the defendant was involved in an accident, admitted to having drunk a few beers, and refused to take a blood alcohol test and when the officers noticed slurred speech and a strong odor of alcohol); State v. Sanchez, 2001-NMCA-109, ¶¶ 15-16 , 131 N.M. 355 , 36 P.3 | 1 | 2007–2007 |
State v. Christian
green
2 sentences2004She further testified that the blood kit’s seals were intact, she signed her name as the receiving employee, and she performed the blood alcohol test on Defendant’s blood. {42} Reliability “is said variously to be supplied by systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon them, or by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job or occupation.” Christian, 119 N.M. at 779 , 895 P.2d at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 803 advisory committee’s note). 2004She further testified that the blood kit’s seals were intact, she signed her name as the receiving employee, and she performed the blood alcohol test on Defendant’s blood. {42} Reliability “is said variously to be supplied by systematic checking, by regularity and continuity which produce habits of precision, by actual experience of business in relying upon them, or by a duty to make an accurate record as part of a continuing job or occupation.” Christian, 119 N.M. at 779 , 895 P.2d at 679 (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 803 advisory committee’s note). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State Ex Rel. Schwartz v. Kennedy
green
2 sentences2002(Kennedy, 120 N.M. at 631 , 904 P.2d at 1056 ) (“[W]hether a sanction constitutes punishment is not determined from the defendant’s perspective, as even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment.”) (quoted authority and quotation marks omitted). {12} In Kennedy, this Court determined that suspending the driver’s license of an individual who exceeded the statutory limits of a blood-alcohol test or refused to take the test “serves the legitimate nonpunitive purpose of protecting the public from the dangers presented by drank drivers and helps enforce regulatory compliance with the laws go 2002(Kennedy, 120 N.M. at 631 , 904 P.2d at 1056 ) (“[W]hether a sanction constitutes punishment is not determined from the defendant’s perspective, as even remedial sanctions carry the sting of punishment.”) (quoted authority and quotation marks omitted). {12} In Kennedy, this Court determined that suspending the driver’s license of an individual who exceeded the statutory limits of a blood-alcohol test or refused to take the test “serves the legitimate nonpunitive purpose of protecting the public from the dangers presented by drank drivers and helps enforce regulatory compliance with the laws go | 1 | 2002–2002 |
| State v. Bearly green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| South Dakota v. Neville green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Geisler green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Larson green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Kubik green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Dumont green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Ladwig green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Haas v. State green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Ledsome v. U-Brand Corp. green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Ransford v. District of Columbia green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Wyrostek green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| Cave v. Cooley green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Breithaupt v. Abram green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| State v. Stoesser green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Breithaupt v. Abram green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| People v. Conterno green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Machado v. New York green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Commonwealth v. Tanchyn green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.