51 Tennessee opinions name it 3 courts 1975–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Greenwoodgreen2 sentences2025This court has recognized that the results of “a proper blood alcohol test administered at a reasonable time after the defendant has been driving” is circumstantial evidence upon which the jury may rely in convicting the defendant of DUI, see State v. Greenwood, 115 S.W.3d 527, 532-33 (Tenn. Crim. 2024We have recognized that a blood alcohol test that is “administered at a ‘reasonable time’ after the defendant was driving” and that reflects a blood alcohol concentration greater than the statutory minimum, “constitutes circumstantial evidence upon which the 6 trier of fact may, but is not required to, convict the defendant of DUI.” State v. Greenwood, 115 S.W.3d 527, 532-33 (Tenn. Crim. | 6 | 8 |
State v. Jerry Huskinsgreen2 sentences2014App. May 12, 1999) (quoting State v. Huskins, 989 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Tenn. Crim. 2013See State v. Huskins, 989 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Tenn. Crim. | 3 | 4 |
State v. Morgangreen2 sentences2013See State v. Morgan, 692 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tenn. Crim. 2012See State v. Morgan, 692 S.W.2d 428, 430 (Tenn. Crim. | 3 | 3 |
State v. Gilbertgreen2 sentences2016State v. Gilbert, 751 S.W.2d 454, 460 (Tenn. Crim. 2005App. 1998) (statute’s purpose not to carve out a rule of exclusion when the provisions of subsection (a)(2) have not been followed; officer’s non-compliance with license suspension warning requirement does not warrant suppression of the defendant’s blood alcohol test results); State v. Gilbert, 751 S.W.2d 454, 460 (Tenn. Crim. | 2 | 3 |
West v. Stategreen2 sentences2012In Tennessee, the definition of “arrest” is well-established; it is “‘the taking, seizing, or detaining of the person of another, either by touching or putting hands on him, or by any act which indicates an intention to take him into custody and subjects the person arrested to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest.’” State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d 295, 301 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting West v. State, 425 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tenn. 1968)). 2011In Tennessee, the definition of “arrest” is well-established; it is “ ‘the taking, seizing, or detaining of the person of another, either by touching or putting hands on him, or by any act which indicates an intention to take him into custody and subjects the person arrested to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest.’ ” Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d at 301 (quoting West v. State, 221 Tenn. 178 , 425 S.W.2d 602, 605 (1968)). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Livesaygreen2 sentences2009State v. Livesay, 941 S.W.2d 63, 66 (Tenn.Crim.App.1996). 2001See State v. Livesay, 941 S.W.2d 63, 66 (Tenn. Crim. | 2 | 2 |
South Dakota v. Nevillegreen2 sentences2015Id. at 564 . -7- that they do so.”). 1986South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 , 103 S.Ct. 916, 923, fn. 15 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Sensinggreen2 sentences2014The Defendant filed a motion to suppress the results of the blood alcohol test based upon a violation of State v. Sensing, 843 S.W.2d 412 (Tenn. 1992). 2001Specifically, the Defendant argues that the State did not meet the requirements for admissibility set out in State v. Sensing, 843 S.W.2d 412, 416 (Tenn. 1992). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Crutchergreen2 sentences2012In Tennessee, the definition of “arrest” is well-established; it is “‘the taking, seizing, or detaining of the person of another, either by touching or putting hands on him, or by any act which indicates an intention to take him into custody and subjects the person arrested to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest.’” State v. Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d 295, 301 (Tenn. 1999) (quoting West v. State, 425 S.W.2d 602, 605 (Tenn. 1968)). 2011In Tennessee, the definition of “arrest” is well-established; it is “ ‘the taking, seizing, or detaining of the person of another, either by touching or putting hands on him, or by any act which indicates an intention to take him into custody and subjects the person arrested to the actual control and will of the person making the arrest.’ ” Crutcher, 989 S.W.2d at 301 (quoting West v. State, 221 Tenn. 178 , 425 S.W.2d 602, 605 (1968)). | 1 | 2 |
King v. Stategreen2 sentences1999In addition , we reco gnized the prior ho lding by this Court tha t “admonitions prior to submitting to a blood alcohol test are not req uired to susta in a valid conse nt.” Id. (citing King v. State , 598 S.W.2d 834, 835 (Tenn. Crim. 1997King v. State, 598 S.W.2d 834 (Tenn.Crim.App.1980). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Frasiergreen2 sentences1998As we have previously observed, an officer’s request that a driver submit to a blood alcohol test “is not governed by the Miranda rule.” State v. Snapp, 696 S.W.2d 370, 371 (Tenn.Crim.App.1985); see also State v. Frasier, 914 S.W.2d 467 , 471 n. 4 (Tenn.1996) (Miranda warnings not required in conjunction with request that driver take a blood alcohol test because test is not considered to be an interrogation) (Reid, J., dissenting); State v. Blackwood, 713 S.W.2d 677, 680 (Tenn.Crim.App.1986). 1996State v. Frasier, 914 S.W.2d 467 (Tenn.1996). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Ralphgreen1 sentence2025App. 2003), and “has repeatedly refused to set a bright line rule as to what constitutes ‘a reasonable time after the defendant - 37 - has been driving,’” see State v. Ralph, 347 S.W.3d 710, 716 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
State v. McKimgreen1 sentence2015The evidence does not support a charge of vehicular homicide by intoxication, id. at (a)(2), because Defendant voluntarily submitted to a blood alcohol test within two hours of the accident which showed that she was not intoxicated. 5 We note that the supreme court has cautioned that “the circumstances of the offense and the need for deterrence „cannot be given controlling weight unless they are of such overwhelming significance that they [necessarily] outweigh all other factors.‟” Stanton, 395 S.W.3d at 686 (quoting McKim, 215 S.W.3d at 787 (emphasis and alteration in original)). -13- Parker | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kinggreen1 sentence2015See King, 432 S.W.3d at 326 . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Collinsgreen1 sentence2013See, e.g., State v. Collins, 166 S.W.3d 721, 728 (Tenn. 2005) (“The provisions for advising a driver of the consequences of refusing a drug or alcohol test only apply to the State’s ability to seek the civil penalty of license suspension . . . . | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nidiffergreen1 sentence2011See Daniel, 12 S.W.3d at 423-24 (stating “the trial court’s conclusion that a seizure did not occur is a conclusion of law derived from an application of the law to the undisputed facts of this case”); State v. Nidiffer, 173 S.W.3d 62, 64 (Tenn.Crim.App. 2004) (reviewing issue of whether defendant was under arrest when he refused to consent to a blood alcohol test under de novo standard); State v. McCrary, 45 S.W.3d 36, 43 (Tenn.Crim.App.2000) (stating that “[i]n contrast to the determination of when a seizure has occurred, the determination of whether a consent to a search was voluntarily giv | 1 | 1 |
State v. McCrarygreen1 sentence2011See Daniel, 12 S.W.3d at 423-24 (stating “the trial court’s conclusion that a seizure did not occur is a conclusion of law derived from an application of the law to the undisputed facts of this case”); State v. Nidiffer, 173 S.W.3d 62, 64 (Tenn.Crim.App. 2004) (reviewing issue of whether defendant was under arrest when he refused to consent to a blood alcohol test under de novo standard); State v. McCrary, 45 S.W.3d 36, 43 (Tenn.Crim.App.2000) (stating that “[i]n contrast to the determination of when a seizure has occurred, the determination of whether a consent to a search was voluntarily giv | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Isabel G. Hernandezgreen1 sentence2011See Daniel, 12 S.W.3d at 423-24 (stating “the trial court’s conclusion that a seizure did not occur is a conclusion of law derived from an application of the law to the undisputed facts of this case”); State v. Nidiffer, 173 S.W.3d 62, 64 (Tenn.Crim.App. 2004) (reviewing issue of whether defendant was under arrest when he refused to consent to a blood alcohol test under de novo standard); State v. McCrary, 45 S.W.3d 36, 43 (Tenn.Crim.App.2000) (stating that “[i]n contrast to the determination of when a seizure has occurred, the determination of whether a consent to a search was voluntarily giv | 1 | 1 |
State v. Danielgreen1 sentence2011See Daniel, 12 S.W.3d at 423-24 (stating “the trial court’s conclusion that a seizure did not occur is a conclusion of law derived from an application of the law to the undisputed facts of this case”); State v. Nidiffer, 173 S.W.3d 62, 64 (Tenn.Crim.App. 2004) (reviewing issue of whether defendant was under arrest when he refused to consent to a blood alcohol test under de novo standard); State v. McCrary, 45 S.W.3d 36, 43 (Tenn.Crim.App.2000) (stating that “[i]n contrast to the determination of when a seizure has occurred, the determination of whether a consent to a search was voluntarily giv | 1 | 1 |
State v. Stadegreen1 sentence2005See State v. Stade, 683 A.2d 164, 166 (Me.1996) (“[Although the State’s interest in preventing drunk drivers from operating on our highways is great, the State has no legitimate interest in allowing its law enforcement officers ... to affirmatively mislead citizens about the consequences of taking or failing to take a blood-alcohol test.”). | 1 | 1 |
Crawford v. Washingtongreen1 sentence2004See Crawford v. Washington, ___ U.S. ___, 124 S. Ct. 1354 (2004) (general historical discussion of Confrontation Clause). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Vassergreen1 sentence2004Had the Appellant pled guilty under count two, driving while her alcohol content was .10 percent or more in violation of Tennessee Code Annotated section 55-10-401(a)(2), the blood alcohol test would have been dispositive of the case. -3- State v. Vasser, 870 S.W.2d 543, 544 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Cordergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Goldstongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Browngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lattarulo v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Snappgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Blackwoodgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Jackson v. Virginiared | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bradengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rhode Island v. Innisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Crawley v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Greer v. Lawhongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Law v. Louisville N.R. Co.green | 1 | 1 |
| Edwards v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences1996In its rationale as to the Fifth Amendment claim, the Court first noted that Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), clearly established that a State could compel a defendant to submit to a blood alcohol test without violating the Fifth Amendment. 1996In its rationale as to the Fifth Amendment claim, the Court first noted that Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), clearly established that a State could compel a defendant to submit to a blood alcohol test without violating the Fifth Amendment. | 2 | 1975–1996 |
Bullcoming v. New Mexico
green
1 sentence2016VI, XIV; Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011) (holding that the Confrontation Clause provided a criminal defendant with the right to confront an analyst who conducted a blood alcohol analysis before testimonial report authored by the analyst could be received as evidence); Tenn. R. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Sidney S. Stanton III v. State of Tennessee
green
1 sentence2015The evidence does not support a charge of vehicular homicide by intoxication, id. at (a)(2), because Defendant voluntarily submitted to a blood alcohol test within two hours of the accident which showed that she was not intoxicated. 5 We note that the supreme court has cautioned that “the circumstances of the offense and the need for deterrence „cannot be given controlling weight unless they are of such overwhelming significance that they [necessarily] outweigh all other factors.‟” Stanton, 395 S.W.3d at 686 (quoting McKim, 215 S.W.3d at 787 (emphasis and alteration in original)). -13- Parker | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Roy A. Jordan
green
1 sentence2014Jordan, 7 S.W.3d at 99 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Wyrick v. Fields
green
2 sentences2013In Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 , 103 S. Ct. 394 , 74 L. 2013In Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42 , 103 S. Ct. 394 , 74 L. | 1 | 2013–2013 |
State v. Pully
green
2 sentences2009We reversed upon consideration of the following three factors: “‘(i) the public interest served by the seizure, (ii) the nature and scope of the intrusion, and (iii) the objective facts upon which the law enforcement officer relied in light of his knowledge and experience.’” Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 34 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 561 ). 2009We reversed upon consideration of the following three factors: “ ‘(i) the public interest served by the seizure, (ii) the nature and scope of the intrusion, and (iii) the objective facts upon which the law enforcement officer relied in light of his knowledge and experience.’ ” Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 34 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 561 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 ). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Brown v. Municipal Court
green
1 sentence2009This court, in Livesay stated, “We do not believe that simply suppressing the State’s blood alcohol test is a sufficient safeguard of the [defendant's right to be able to gather and preserve evidence in his defense.” Id. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. Mendenhall
green
2 sentences2009We reversed upon consideration of the following three factors: “ ‘(i) the public interest served by the seizure, (ii) the nature and scope of the intrusion, and (iii) the objective facts upon which the law enforcement officer relied in light of his knowledge and experience.’ ” Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 34 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 561 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 ). 2009We reversed upon consideration of the following three factors: “ ‘(i) the public interest served by the seizure, (ii) the nature and scope of the intrusion, and (iii) the objective facts upon which the law enforcement officer relied in light of his knowledge and experience.’ ” Pulley, 863 S.W.2d at 34 (quoting Mendenhall, 446 U.S. at 561 , 100 S.Ct. 1870 ). | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Ferguson green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Haas v. State green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| State v. McClintock green | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| State v. Golden green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Commonwealth v. Kelley green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Commonwealth v. Rosewarne green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| Breithaupt v. Abram green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Strong v. State green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| People v. Keen green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Scales v. State green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.