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8 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1979–2009 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Schmerber v. Californiagreen2 sentences2009See Schmerber, 884 U.S. at 765, 86 S.Ct. 1826 (holding that submission to a blood-alcohol test could legitimately be coerced because blood tests produce physical evidence, which is not protected by the privilege, rather than testimonial evidence, which is protected). 1979We note that the physical and psychological disturbance of the individual involved in obtaining a breath sample is apt to be significantly less than that involved in extracting a blood sample, an evidence gathering technique recently approved in Schmerber v. State of California (1966) 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 , and that the blood alcohol test and the breath test for alcoholic absorption are alternate means for determining the percentage of alcohol in the blood. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Cruzgreen2 sentences1987For this reason, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Cruz, 21 Utah 2d 406 , 446 P.2d 307 (1968), required actual consent to a blood alcohol test when the driver was not under arrest. 1987For this reason, the Utah Supreme Court in State v. Cruz, 21 Utah 2d 406 , 446 P.2d 307 (1968), required actual consent to a blood alcohol test when the driver was not under arrest. | 1 | 2 |
Pennsylvania v. Munizgreen2 sentences2009Thus, the offer to submit to chemical testing became "no less legitimate when the [s]tate offer[ed] a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice." Neville, 459 U.S. at 563 , 103 S.Ct. 916 ; see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 , 605 n. 19, 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (extending the holding of Neville to breathalyzer tests). 129 Utah has adopted an implied consent law, which is similar to the South Dakota statute considered by the Supreme Court in Neville. 2009Thus, the offer to submit to chemical testing became "no less legitimate when the [s]tate offer[ed] a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice." Neville, 459 U.S. at 563 , 103 S.Ct. 916 ; see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 , 605 n. 19, 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (extending the holding of Neville to breathalyzer tests). 129 Utah has adopted an implied consent law, which is similar to the South Dakota statute considered by the Supreme Court in Neville. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Pitchfordgreen1 sentence2000See id. | 1 | 1 |
Salt Lake City v. Carnergreen1 sentence1987See State v. Hoenscheid, 374 N.W.2d 128 (S.D. 1985). [23] State v. Compton, 233 Kan. 690 , 664 P.2d 1370 (1983). [24] Id. at 694-95 , 664 P.2d at 1375 . [1] The applicability of the Miranda rule was assumed without a holding in Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983) because the issue was not raised or briefed by the parties. [2] I would also stress that this opinion in no way undermines efforts by the state to eliminate drunk driving. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Comptongreen2 sentences1987See State v. Hoenscheid, 374 N.W.2d 128 (S.D. 1985). [23] State v. Compton, 233 Kan. 690 , 664 P.2d 1370 (1983). [24] Id. at 694-95 , 664 P.2d at 1375 . [1] The applicability of the Miranda rule was assumed without a holding in Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983) because the issue was not raised or briefed by the parties. [2] I would also stress that this opinion in no way undermines efforts by the state to eliminate drunk driving. 1987See State v. Hoenscheid, 374 N.W.2d 128 (S.D. 1985). [23] State v. Compton, 233 Kan. 690 , 664 P.2d 1370 (1983). [24] Id. at 694-95 , 664 P.2d at 1375 . [1] The applicability of the Miranda rule was assumed without a holding in Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983) because the issue was not raised or briefed by the parties. [2] I would also stress that this opinion in no way undermines efforts by the state to eliminate drunk driving. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hoenscheidgreen2 sentences1987See State v. Hoenscheid, 374 N.W.2d 128 (S.D. 1985). [23] State v. Compton, 233 Kan. 690 , 664 P.2d 1370 (1983). [24] Id. at 694-95 , 664 P.2d at 1375 . [1] The applicability of the Miranda rule was assumed without a holding in Salt Lake City v. Carner, 664 P.2d 1168 (Utah 1983) because the issue was not raised or briefed by the parties. [2] I would also stress that this opinion in no way undermines efforts by the state to eliminate drunk driving. 1987See State v. Hoenscheid, 374 N.W.2d 128 (S.D.1985). . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
South Dakota v. Neville
green
2 sentences2009Thus, the offer to submit to chemical testing became "no less legitimate when the [s]tate offer[ed] a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice." Neville, 459 U.S. at 563 , 103 S.Ct. 916 ; see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 , 605 n. 19, 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (extending the holding of Neville to breathalyzer tests). 129 Utah has adopted an implied consent law, which is similar to the South Dakota statute considered by the Supreme Court in Neville. 2009Thus, the offer to submit to chemical testing became "no less legitimate when the [s]tate offer[ed] a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice." Neville, 459 U.S. at 563 , 103 S.Ct. 916 ; see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 , 605 n. 19, 110 S.Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (extending the holding of Neville to breathalyzer tests). 129 Utah has adopted an implied consent law, which is similar to the South Dakota statute considered by the Supreme Court in Neville. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. Thomas P. Attson
green
2 sentences1998The Ninth Circuit characterized the issue to be decided as “whether the strictures of the Fourth Amendment apply to the conduct of a government doctor who, for medical reasons, takes a blood sample from a criminal suspect and conducts a blood alcohol analysis on that sample.” Id. at 1429 . 1998The Ninth Circuit characterized the issue to be decided as “whether the strictures of the Fourth Amendment apply to the conduct of a government doctor who, for medical reasons, takes a blood sample from a criminal suspect and conducts a blood alcohol analysis on that sample.” Id. at 1429 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Burkett v. Schwendiman
green
2 sentences1990Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42 (Utah 1989) (defendant refused to take a blood alcohol test and the one year revocation period had expired so that the requested judicial relief, reversal of the revocation order could not affect his rights; therefore the case was moot). 1990Burkett v. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d 42 (Utah 1989) (defendant refused to take a blood alcohol test and the one year revocation period had expired so that the requested judicial relief, reversal of the revocation order could not affect his rights; therefore the case was moot). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
American Fork City v. Crosgrove
green
1 sentence1987Clearly, under our holding in Crosgrove, 701 P.2d at 1075 , there is no self-incrimination violation if the defendant does provide such evidence even though his actions in doing so are compelled. [19] Like Utah, many states have statutes that provide for the admissibility into evidence of a defendant's refusal to take a blood alcohol test. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Neville
green
2 sentences1987On remand, the Supreme Court of South Dakota interpreted the South Dakota Constitution to the contrary, State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D. 1984), but has since partially overruled that decision, concluding that a refusal to perform a blood alcohol test does not constitute communicative or testimonial evidence. 1987On remand, the Supreme Court of South Dakota interpreted the South Dakota Constitution to the contrary, State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D.1984), but has since partially overruled that decision, concluding that a refusal to perform a blood alcohol test does not constitute communicative or testimonial evidence. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
People v. Duroncelay
green
2 sentences1979The value of such objective scientific data of intoxication to supplement the fallible observations by humans of behavior seemingly symptomatic of intoxication cannot be disputed. ( People v. Duroncelay *353 (1957) 48 Cal.2d 766, 772 , 312 P.2d 690 .) In a day when excessive loss of life and property is caused by inebriated drivers, an imperative need exists for a fair, efficient, and accurate system of detection, enforcement and, hence prevention. [Citations omitted.] The Arizona Supreme Court in Campbell v. Superior Court [16] denied any right to counsel under its implied consent law and hel 1979The value of such objective scientific data of intoxication to supplement the fallible observations by humans of behavior seemingly symptomatic of intoxication cannot be disputed. ( People v. Duroncelay *353 (1957) 48 Cal.2d 766, 772 , 312 P.2d 690 .) In a day when excessive loss of life and property is caused by inebriated drivers, an imperative need exists for a fair, efficient, and accurate system of detection, enforcement and, hence prevention. [Citations omitted.] The Arizona Supreme Court in Campbell v. Superior Court [16] denied any right to counsel under its implied consent law and hel | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.