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25 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1977–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
South Dakota v. Nevillegreen2 sentences2023STAT. § 343.305(4), and both are “searches” for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, see Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 454-55 (2016). 15 No. 2022AP800 reflected a change in constitutional law.8 This change, according to both Kosch and Levanduski, means that the 1983 case of South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560 (1983)—which held that “a person suspected of drunk driving has no constitutional right to refuse to take a blood-alcohol test”—is no longer controlling and that the refusal of a person suspected of driving under the influence cannot constitutionally be used against th 2020Contrasting the use at trial of a defendant’s refusal to take the witness stand with the use of a defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood draw, the Court expressed that “a prosecutor’s or trial court’s comments on a defendant’s refusal to take the witness stand impermissibly burdened the defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to refuse,” but in the case of a refusal to submit to a blood draw “a person suspected of drunk driving has no constitutional right to refuse to take a blood-alcohol test.” Id. at 560 n.10. ¶8 Neville also challenged the use of his refusal on due process grounds because altho | 3 | 6 |
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernardgreen2 sentences2023STAT. § 343.305(4), and both are “searches” for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment, see Birchfield v. North Dakota, 579 U.S. 438, 454-55 (2016). 15 No. 2022AP800 reflected a change in constitutional law.8 This change, according to both Kosch and Levanduski, means that the 1983 case of South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560 (1983)—which held that “a person suspected of drunk driving has no constitutional right to refuse to take a blood-alcohol test”—is no longer controlling and that the refusal of a person suspected of driving under the influence cannot constitutionally be used against th 2018Neville , 459 U.S. at 560 n.10 & 565, 103 S.Ct. 916 (explaining that "a person suspected of drunk driving has no constitutional right to refuse to take a blood-alcohol test" and that the person's "right to refuse the blood-alcohol test [ ] is simply a matter of grace bestowed by the South Dakota legislature."); see also Birchfield , 136 S.Ct. at 2186 ("the Fourth Amendment *137 did not require officers to obtain a warrant prior to demanding the [breath] test, and Bernard had no right to refuse it."). ¶88 Second, the cases cited by the majority do not provide support for the contention that Dal | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Robert James Snydergreen2 sentences2020In Snyder, the court concluded that the United States Supreme Court, in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), “viewed the seizure and separate search of the blood as a single event for fourth amendment purposes” and that the Schmerber Court “therefore necessarily viewed the right to seize the 9 No. 2019AP924-CR blood as encompassing the right to conduct a blood-alcohol test at some later time.” Snyder, 852 F.2d at 474 . ¶23 In Riedel, the defendant challenged the testing of his lawfully seized blood, arguing that the testing was a second search that required a warrant. 2019The [ Schmerber ] Court therefore necessarily viewed the right to seize the blood as encompassing the right to conduct a blood-alcohol test at some later time. *770 852 F.2d 471 , 473-74 (9th Cir. 1988). | 1 | 4 |
California v. Trombettagreen1 sentence2024Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17 (“Subjecting a person to a breathalyzer test, which generally requires the production of alveolar or ‘deep lung’ breath for chemical analysis, see e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 481 (1984), implicates similar concerns about bodily integrity and, like the blood-alcohol test we considered in Schmerber [v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)], should also be deemed a search.”); see also County of Milwaukee v. Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 623 , 291 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing that “the taking of a breath sample is a search and seizure within the meani | 1 | 1 |
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn.green1 sentence2024Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17 (“Subjecting a person to a breathalyzer test, which generally requires the production of alveolar or ‘deep lung’ breath for chemical analysis, see e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 481 (1984), implicates similar concerns about bodily integrity and, like the blood-alcohol test we considered in Schmerber [v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)], should also be deemed a search.”); see also County of Milwaukee v. Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 623 , 291 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing that “the taking of a breath sample is a search and seizure within the meani | 1 | 1 |
County of Milwaukee v. Proeglergreen2 sentences2024Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17 (“Subjecting a person to a breathalyzer test, which generally requires the production of alveolar or ‘deep lung’ breath for chemical analysis, see e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 481 (1984), implicates similar concerns about bodily integrity and, like the blood-alcohol test we considered in Schmerber [v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)], should also be deemed a search.”); see also County of Milwaukee v. Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 623 , 291 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing that “the taking of a breath sample is a search and seizure within the meani 2024Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17 (“Subjecting a person to a breathalyzer test, which generally requires the production of alveolar or ‘deep lung’ breath for chemical analysis, see e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 481 (1984), implicates similar concerns about bodily integrity and, like the blood-alcohol test we considered in Schmerber [v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)], should also be deemed a search.”); see also County of Milwaukee v. Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 623 , 291 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing that “the taking of a breath sample is a search and seizure within the meani | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dawn J. Levanduskigreen2 sentences2023Levanduski, 393 Wis. 2d 674, ¶3 . 2023See Levanduski, 393 Wis. 2d 674, ¶¶7, 10-11 . ¶29 The Levanduski court held, however, that while a “State may not make a drunk-driving suspect’s refusal a crime itself, [it] may impose civil penalties and ‘evidentiary consequences’ on such refusals.” Id., ¶12 (citation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Riedelgreen1 sentence2020Riedel, 259 Wis. 2d 921, ¶¶2, 4, 7 . | 1 | 1 |
People of Michigan v. Glorianna Woodardgreen2 sentences2019Safety , 781 N.W.2d 918 , 921 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) ("[W]hen the state has lawfully obtained a sample of a person's blood under the implied-consent law, specifically for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration, the person has lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in the alcohol concentration derived from analysis of the sample."); People v. Woodard , 321 Mich.App. 377 , 909 N.W.2d 299 , 305 (2017) ("[S]ociety is not prepared to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in the alcohol content of a blood sample voluntarily given by a defendant to the police for the purposes of 2019Safety , 781 N.W.2d 918 , 921 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) ("[W]hen the state has lawfully obtained a sample of a person's blood under the implied-consent law, specifically for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration, the person has lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in the alcohol concentration derived from analysis of the sample."); People v. Woodard , 321 Mich.App. 377 , 909 N.W.2d 299 , 305 (2017) ("[S]ociety is not prepared to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in the alcohol content of a blood sample voluntarily given by a defendant to the police for the purposes of | 1 | 1 |
Harrison v. Commissioner of Public Safetygreen2 sentences2019Safety, 781 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) ("[W]hen the state has lawfully obtained a sample of a person's blood under the implied-consent law, specifically for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration, the person has lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in the alcohol concentration derived from analysis of the sample."); People v. Woodard, 909 N.W.2d 299, 305 (Mich. Ct. App. 2017) ("[S]ociety is not prepared to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in the alcohol content of a blood sample voluntarily given by a defendant to the police for the purposes of blood alc 2019Safety , 781 N.W.2d 918 , 921 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) ("[W]hen the state has lawfully obtained a sample of a person's blood under the implied-consent law, specifically for the purpose of determining alcohol concentration, the person has lost any legitimate expectation of privacy in the alcohol concentration derived from analysis of the sample."); People v. Woodard , 321 Mich.App. 377 , 909 N.W.2d 299 , 305 (2017) ("[S]ociety is not prepared to recognize a reasonable expectation of privacy in the alcohol content of a blood sample voluntarily given by a defendant to the police for the purposes of | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Craig Sanders, A/K/A Sparksgreen2 sentences2018But almost immediately afterwards it also said: "Of course, consent voluntarily-given before a blood draw may be withdrawn with or without a statutory reminder." Lead op., ¶40 (citing United States v. Sanders, 424 F.3d 768, 774 (8th Cir. 2005)). 2018But almost immediately afterwards it also said: "Of course, consent voluntarily-given before a blood draw may be withdrawn with or without a statutory reminder." Lead op., ¶ 40 (citing United States v. Sanders , 424 F.3d 768 , 774 (8th Cir. 2005) ). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Banksgreen2 sentences1986See State v. Banks, 105 Wis.2d 32, 48-50 . 313 N.W.2d 67, 74-75 (1981). 1986See State v. Banks, 105 Wis.2d 32, 48-50 . 313 N.W.2d 67, 74-75 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Nevillegreen1 sentence1986In State v. Neville, 346 N.W. 2d 425, 430-31 (S.D. 1984), the South Dakota Supreme Court held that the defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test could not be admitted in evidence without denying his due process rights under that state’s constitution. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ehlengreen2 sentences1985See also Ehlen, 119 Wis. 2d at 457 , 351 N.W.2d at 506 . 1985See also Ehlen, 119 Wis. 2d at 457 , 351 N.W.2d at 506 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Carlton E. Bryant, United States of America v. William E. Turnergreen2 sentences1984Under the statutes, the blood test results are admissible. 6 The disclosure by the state of the blood alcohol analysis and the names of the technician (s) who drew or analyzed the blood comports with the concern that the trial be “more a ‘quest for truth’ than a ‘sporting event.’ ” United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 644 (D.C. 1984Under the statutes, the blood test results are admissible. 6 The disclosure by the state of the blood alcohol analysis and the names of the technician (s) who drew or analyzed the blood comports with the concern that the trial be “more a ‘quest for truth’ than a ‘sporting event.’ ” United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642, 644 (D.C. | 1 | 1 |
| Scales v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Coolidge v. New Hampshiregreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences2024Skinner, 489 U.S. at 616-17 (“Subjecting a person to a breathalyzer test, which generally requires the production of alveolar or ‘deep lung’ breath for chemical analysis, see e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 481 (1984), implicates similar concerns about bodily integrity and, like the blood-alcohol test we considered in Schmerber [v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966)], should also be deemed a search.”); see also County of Milwaukee v. Proegler, 95 Wis. 2d 614, 623 , 291 N.W.2d 608 (Ct. App. 1980) (recognizing that “the taking of a breath sample is a search and seizure within the meani 2020In Snyder, the court concluded that the United States Supreme Court, in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966), “viewed the seizure and separate search of the blood as a single event for fourth amendment purposes” and that the Schmerber Court “therefore necessarily viewed the right to seize the 9 No. 2019AP924-CR blood as encompassing the right to conduct a blood-alcohol test at some later time.” Snyder, 852 F.2d at 474 . ¶23 In Riedel, the defendant challenged the testing of his lawfully seized blood, arguing that the testing was a second search that required a warrant. | 3 | 2001–2024 |
State v. Zielke
green
2 sentences2001As we explained in Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d at 55 -56: We acknowledge that in [ McCrossen ] this court approved suppression of a blood alcohol test in a driving while intoxicated prosecution. 2001As we explained in Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d at 55 -56: We acknowledge that in [McCrossen\ this court approved suppression of a blood alcohol test in a driving while intoxicated prosecution. | 3 | 2001–2020 |
State v. Disch
green
2 sentences1999Thurk points to a sentence in the court's opinion in which it held that, "Due Process in respect to the blood alcohol test is afforded the defendant because she had the right to have a second test for intoxication conducted by the police or, alternatively, another or different alcohol test conducted by a person of her own choosing . . . ." See Disch, 119 Wis. 2d at 463 , 351 N.W.2d at 493 . 1999Thurk points to a sentence in the court's opinion in which it held that, "Due Process in respect to the blood alcohol test is afforded the defendant because she had the right to have a second test for intoxication conducted by the police or, alternatively, another or different alcohol test conducted by a person of her own choosing . . . ." See Disch, 119 Wis. 2d at 463 , 351 N.W.2d at 493 . | 2 | 1985–1999 |
State v. Williams
green
2 sentences2024State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶18 , 255 Wis. 2d 1 , 646 N.W.2d 834 . 2024State v. Williams, 2002 WI 94, ¶18 , 255 Wis. 2d 1 , 646 N.W.2d 834 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Miranda v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2020First, the right to silence underlying the Miranda warnings is one of constitutional dimension, and thus cannot be unduly burdened. [Neville’s] right to refuse the blood-alcohol test, by contrast, is simply a matter of grace bestowed by the South Dakota legislature. 3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 5 No. 2019AP1144-CR Id. (citation omitted). 2020First, the right to silence underlying the Miranda warnings is one of constitutional dimension, and thus cannot be unduly burdened. [Neville’s] right to refuse the blood-alcohol test, by contrast, is simply a matter of grace bestowed by the South Dakota legislature. 3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 5 No. 2019AP1144-CR Id. (citation omitted). | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Crandall
green
2 sentences2020The Court found no due process violation and noted that it was a lawful “consequence” that evidence of Neville’s refusal could be used against him “in court” and “at trial.” Id. at 565-66 . ¶9 Two years after Neville, in State v. Bolstad, 124 Wis. 2d 576, 585 , 370 N.W.2d 257 (1985), our supreme court expressed that “[t]he state may submit [at trial] the … admissible evidence that Bolstad refused” to permit a blood draw to “test for blood alcohol content.” Then, in State v. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d 39, 50-51 , 403 N.W.2d 427 (1987), another blood-draw case, the court indicated that if law enforceme 2020The Court found no due process violation and noted that it was a lawful “consequence” that evidence of Neville’s refusal could be used against him “in court” and “at trial.” Id. at 565-66 . ¶9 Two years after Neville, in State v. Bolstad, 124 Wis. 2d 576, 585 , 370 N.W.2d 257 (1985), our supreme court expressed that “[t]he state may submit [at trial] the … admissible evidence that Bolstad refused” to permit a blood draw to “test for blood alcohol content.” Then, in State v. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d 39, 50-51 , 403 N.W.2d 427 (1987), another blood-draw case, the court indicated that if law enforceme | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Bolstad
green
2 sentences2020The Court found no due process violation and noted that it was a lawful “consequence” that evidence of Neville’s refusal could be used against him “in court” and “at trial.” Id. at 565-66 . ¶9 Two years after Neville, in State v. Bolstad, 124 Wis. 2d 576, 585 , 370 N.W.2d 257 (1985), our supreme court expressed that “[t]he state may submit [at trial] the … admissible evidence that Bolstad refused” to permit a blood draw to “test for blood alcohol content.” Then, in State v. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d 39, 50-51 , 403 N.W.2d 427 (1987), another blood-draw case, the court indicated that if law enforceme 2020The Court found no due process violation and noted that it was a lawful “consequence” that evidence of Neville’s refusal could be used against him “in court” and “at trial.” Id. at 565-66 . ¶9 Two years after Neville, in State v. Bolstad, 124 Wis. 2d 576, 585 , 370 N.W.2d 257 (1985), our supreme court expressed that “[t]he state may submit [at trial] the … admissible evidence that Bolstad refused” to permit a blood draw to “test for blood alcohol content.” Then, in State v. Zielke, 137 Wis. 2d 39, 50-51 , 403 N.W.2d 427 (1987), another blood-draw case, the court indicated that if law enforceme | 1 | 2020–2020 |
Bullcoming v. New Mexico
green
2 sentences2015The court held that "one expert cannot act as a mere conduit for the opinion of another" without violating the defendant's constitutional right to confront the State's witnesses.5 ¶66 Similarly, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011), in which the certified results of a blood alcohol test were introduced with testimony from "a scientist who did not sign the certification or perform or observe the test reported in the certification," the United States Supreme Court "bluntly held that such 'surrogate' expert testimony violates the confrontation right. 2015Similarly, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011), in which the certified results of a blood alcohol test were introduced with testimony from "a scientist who did not sign the certification or perform or observe the test reported in the certification," the United States Supreme Court "bluntly held that such 'surrogate' expert testimony violates the confrontation right. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Krajewski
green
2 sentences2002South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563 (1983); State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, ¶ 57 , 255 Wis. 2d 98 , 648 N.W.2d 385 . 2002South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563 (1983); State v. Krajewski, 2002 WI 97, ¶ 57 , 255 Wis. 2d 98 , 648 N.W.2d 385 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Kroening
green
2 sentences2001For example, Kroening held that a blood alcohol test, taken without a warrant or the defendant's consent after the defendant admitted that he had been the driver of an automobile involved in an accident in the opposite lane of traffic, violated Article I, Section 11. 274 Wis. at 271 . 2001For example, Kroening held that a blood alcohol test, taken without a warrant or the defendant's consent after the defendant admitted that he had been the driver of an automobile involved in an accident in the opposite lane of traffic, violated Article I, Section 11. 274 Wis. at 271 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
County of Ozaukee v. Quelle
green
2 sentences1997In County of Ozaukee v. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d 269 , 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1995), we set forth a three-pronged test to use when an allegedly intoxicated driver claims that a refusal to take a blood alcohol test stemmed from an officer's having either not sufficiently read the Informing the Accused form or having gone beyond simply reading the form. 1997In County of Ozaukee v. Quelle, 198 Wis. 2d 269 , 542 N.W.2d 196 (Ct. App. 1995), we set forth a three-pronged test to use when an allegedly intoxicated driver claims that a refusal to take a blood alcohol test stemmed from an officer's having either not sufficiently read the Informing the Accused form or having gone beyond simply reading the form. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
State v. Seibel
neutral
2 sentences1991Id. at 318-19 . 1991Id. at 318-19 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
State v. McCrossen
green
2 sentences1987We acknowledge that in State v. McCrossen, 129 Wis. 2d 277 , 385 N.W.2d 161 (1986) this court approved suppression of a blood alcohol test in a driving while intoxicated prosecution. 1987We acknowledge that in State v. McCrossen, 129 Wis. 2d 277 , 385 N.W.2d 161 (1986) this court approved suppression of a blood alcohol test in a driving while intoxicated prosecution. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Welsh
green
2 sentences1983In a recent case this court said: “The sole purpose of the blood alcohol test is to facilitate prosecution of those driving while under the influence of an intoxicant.” State v. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 336-37 , 321 N.W.2d 245 (1982), cert granted on other grounds,-U.S.-(1983). 1983In a recent case this court said: “The sole purpose of the blood alcohol test is to facilitate prosecution of those driving while under the influence of an intoxicant.” State v. Welsh, 108 Wis. 2d 319, 336-37 , 321 N.W.2d 245 (1982), cert granted on other grounds,-U.S.-(1983). | 1 | 1983–1983 |
United States v. Curtis Leroy Love and Alto Oglesby
green
1 sentence1983The state contends that our decision is contrary to precedent, relying on Gedicks v. State, 62 Wis. 2d 74 , 214 N.W.2d 659 (1974), and on United States v. Love, 482 F. 2d 213 (5th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
| Gedicks v. State green | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.