blood alcohol test in Maryland

2004As the Supreme Court observed, Respondent’s right to refuse the blood-alcohol test is simply a matter of grace bestowed by the South Dakota Legislature. 459 U.S. at 565 , 103 S.Ct. 916 (emphasis supplied).

2004As the Supreme Court observed, Respondent’s right to refuse the blood-alcohol test is simply a matter of grace bestowed by the South Dakota Legislature. 459 U.S. at 565 , 103 S.Ct. 916 (emphasis supplied).

2022Rather, in Vanderpool, id. at 110 , the Court held that, under its case law, the trial court had erred in determining “that the blood alcohol test results were inadmissible solely because the trooper did not maintain an uninterrupted 15- minute observation while transporting [the driver] to the Sheriff’s Department for administration of the test.” In other words, in Vanderpool, the Court did not hold that the 12 Dejarnette appears to cite two sets of cases, the first of which includes Reed and other cases in which courts allegedly excluded breath test results for lack of compliance with an obs

2022Id. (cleaned up).

2021In addition, although the majority opinion in Bullcoming observed that the blood-alcohol test report in that case was “‘formalized’ in a signed document,” Bullcoming, 564 U.S. at 665 , Justice Thomas has since made clear his view that what made the Bullcoming report formal was not only the presence of a signature but, crucially, its certification of the truth of the analyst’s findings.

2015“Appellant concedes, and we recognize, that the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Neville ... held that the admission into evidence of a defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not offend the constitutional right against self incrimination.” 149 Md.App. at 570 , 817 A.2d 901 .

2015“Appellant concedes, and we recognize, that the Supreme Court in South Dakota v. Neville ... held that the admission into evidence of a defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test does not offend the constitutional right against self incrimination.” 149 Md.App. at 570 , 817 A.2d 901 .

2012The trial court apparently also relied upon State v. Werkheiser, 299 Md. 529 , 474 A.2d 898 (1984), which held an officer’s failure to obtain a blood sample from the defendant in the circumstances of that case allowed an inference that the results of a blood alcohol test would have been favorable to the defendant.

2012The trial court apparently also relied upon State v. Werkheiser, 299 Md. 529 , 474 A.2d 898 (1984), which held an officer’s failure to obtain a blood sample from the defendant in the circumstances of that case allowed an inference that the results of a blood alcohol test would have been favorable to the defendant.

2011The motorist argued in that case that the MVA must establish as part of its prima facie case for license suspension that the blood alcohol test was administered by a “qualified person,” as that term is defined in C.J. § 10-304, and that the testing equipment was approved by the State toxicologist. 418 Md. at 32-36 , 12 A.3d at 668-70 .

2011The motorist argued in that case that the MVA must establish as part of its prima facie case for license suspension that the blood alcohol test was administered by a “qualified person,” as that term is defined in C.J. § 10-304, and that the testing equipment was approved by the State toxicologist. 418 Md. at 32-36 , 12 A.3d at 668-70 .

2004Of particular pertinence to the case at hand, Judge Bell cited with approval State v. Mercer, 211 N.J.Super. 388 , 511 A.2d 1233 (1986) (due process does not require the police officer to inform defendant of the right to an independent blood alcohol test).

2004Of particular pertinence to the case at hand, Judge Bell cited with approval State v. Mercer, 211 N.J.Super. 388 , 511 A.2d 1233 (1986) (due process does not require the police officer to inform defendant of the right to an independent blood alcohol test).

2004In McAvoy v. State, 314 Md. 509 , 551 A.2d 875 (1989), the appellant also argued that his due process right not to have the police interfere with his requested communication with counsel created, ipso facto, a concomitant due process right to be affirmatively advised of that entitlement to counsel.

2004In McAvoy v. State, 314 Md. 509 , 551 A.2d 875 (1989), the appellant also argued that his due process right not to have the police interfere with his requested communication with counsel created, ipso facto, a concomitant due process right to be affirmatively advised of that entitlement to counsel.

1994Id. at 1004 .

1994On remand, the defendant again moved to suppress the blood alcohol test, arguing, this time, that it was the product of an illegal arrest. 10 Without objection, and, in fact, agreeing that an evidentiary hearing on the issue was appropriate, id., the prosecutor countered by offering testimony not offered at the first suppression hearing to prove that there was probable cause for the arrest.

1989As we stated in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 , 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), police words or actions “normally attendant to arrest and custody” do not constitute an interrogation.

1989As we stated in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 , 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980), police words or actions “normally attendant to arrest and custody” do not constitute an interrogation.

1989Drawing on our holdings in Brosan v. Cochran, 307 Md. 662 , 516 A.2d 970 (1986), and Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702 , 481 A.2d 192 (1984), McAvoy argues that because we have recognized a constitutional right to counsel on the part of a person who is put to the decision of taking or refusing a blood-alcohol test, it follows that the results of a test cannot be admitted unless the record shows the defendant had counsel or voluntarily and intelligently waived the right to counsel.

1989Drawing on our holdings in Brosan v. Cochran, 307 Md. 662 , 516 A.2d 970 (1986), and Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702 , 481 A.2d 192 (1984), McAvoy argues that because we have recognized a constitutional right to counsel on the part of a person who is put to the decision of taking or refusing a blood-alcohol test, it follows that the results of a test cannot be admitted unless the record shows the defendant had counsel or voluntarily and intelligently waived the right to counsel.

1989Drawing on our holdings in Brosan v. Cochran, 307 Md. 662 , 516 A.2d 970 (1986), and Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702 , 481 A.2d 192 (1984), McAvoy argues that because we have recognized a constitutional right to counsel on the part of a person who is put to the decision of taking or refusing a blood-alcohol test, it follows that the results of a test cannot be admitted unless the record shows the defendant had counsel or voluntarily and intelligently waived the right to counsel.

1989Drawing on our holdings in Brosan v. Cochran, 307 Md. 662 , 516 A.2d 970 (1986), and Sites v. State, 300 Md. 702 , 481 A.2d 192 (1984), McAvoy argues that because we have recognized a constitutional right to counsel on the part of a person who is put to the decision of taking or refusing a blood-alcohol test, it follows that the results of a test cannot be admitted unless the record shows the defendant had counsel or voluntarily and intelligently waived the right to counsel.

1989In Abdi v. State, 249 Ga. 827 , 294 S.E.2d 506 (1982), the court found manifest necessity for a mistrial in a rape case when defense counsel questioned the complaining witness regarding her sexual experience.

1989In Abdi v. State, 249 Ga. 827 , 294 S.E.2d 506 (1982), the court found manifest necessity for a mistrial in a rape case when defense counsel questioned the complaining witness regarding her sexual experience.

1986In Curley , the State nolle prossed the charges against the accused on the 180th day, citing as reasons, “the apparent inadmissibility of the blood alcohol test ... and ... the request made of the State by the family of the victim.” Id. 299 Md. at 453, 474 A.2d 502 .