blood alcohol test in Minnesota

2015As recently as the 1980s, the Supreme Court saw no fundamental right for a suspected drunk driver to refuse to be tested in the implied-eon-sent setting, declaring bluntly, “Respondent’s right to refuse the blood-alcohol test, by contrast [to a right rooted in the Constitution], is simply a matter of grace bestowed by the [state] legislature.” Neville, 459 U.S. at 565 , 103 S.Ct. at 923 .

2015As recently as the 1980s, the Supreme Court saw no fundamental right for a suspected drunk driver to refuse to be tested in the implied-eon-sent setting, declaring bluntly, “Respondent’s right to refuse the blood-alcohol test, by contrast [to a right rooted in the Constitution], is simply a matter of grace bestowed by the [state] legislature.” Neville, 459 U.S. at 565 , 103 S.Ct. at 923 .

1991Although Schmerber allows the state to compel an individual arrested for driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood alcohol test, the legislature has enacted the implied consent law to “avoid the violent confrontations which could occur when people are forced to submit to testing.” Nyflot v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 369 N.W.2d 512, 517 (Minn.1985) (citing Neville, 459 U.S. at 559-60 , 103 S.Ct. at 920-21 ).

1990In South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 , 564 n. 15, 103 S.Ct. 916 , 923 n. 15, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), the United States Supreme Court likewise announced that inquiry of "whether the suspect will take a blood-alcohol test" is not-an interrogation for purposes of Miranda . .“It is axiomatic that a state supreme court may interpret its own state constitution to offer greater protection of individual rights than does the federal constitution." State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn.1985); see Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 523 (Yetka, J., dissenting) (urging expanded protection under the state consti

1990See Prideaux v. State, 310 Minn. 405, 412 , 247 N.W.2d 385, 390 (1976) (in dicta the supreme court stated that a driver may reasonably refuse a blood alcohol test “where the officer * * * confused the driver as to his rights”).

1990See Prideaux v. State, 310 Minn. 405, 412 , 247 N.W.2d 385, 390 (1976) (in dicta the supreme court stated that a driver may reasonably refuse a blood alcohol test “where the officer * * * confused the driver as to his rights”).

2015Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (“Subjecting a person to a breathalyzer test, which generally requires the production of alveolar or ‘deep lung’ breath for chemical analysis, implicates similar concerns about bodily integrity and, like the blood-alcohol test we considered in Schmerber, should also be deemed a ’ search.” (citations omitted)); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (recognizing that a “compelled intrusion[ ] into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content” must be deemed

2015Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (“Subjecting a person to a breathalyzer test, which generally requires the production of alveolar or ‘deep lung’ breath for chemical analysis, implicates similar concerns about bodily integrity and, like the blood-alcohol test we considered in Schmerber, should also be deemed a ’ search.” (citations omitted)); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (recognizing that a “compelled intrusion[ ] into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content” must be deemed

2013And most importantly, when the officers collected blood and urine samples from Brooks, they did so in accordance with this court’s decision in State v. Netland, which approved of the warrantless collection of blood-alcohol evidence based on a single-factor exigency derived from the evanescent nature of alcohol in the bloodstream. 762 N.W.2d 202, 214 (Minn.2009) (“[U]nder the exigency exception, no warrant is necessary to secure a blood-alcohol test where there is probable cause to suspect a crime in which chemical impairment is an element of the offense.”), abrogated in part by Missouri v. McN

2013And most importantly, when the officers collected blood and urine samples from Brooks, they did so in accordance with this court’s decision in State v. Netland, which approved of the warrantless collection of blood-alcohol evidence based on a single-factor exigency derived from the evanescent nature of alcohol in the bloodstream. 762 N.W.2d 202, 214 (Minn.2009) (“[U]nder the exigency exception, no warrant is necessary to secure a blood-alcohol test where there is probable cause to suspect a crime in which chemical impairment is an element of the offense.”), abrogated in part by Missouri v. McN

2013And most importantly, when the officers collected blood and urine samples from Brooks, they did so in accordance with this court’s decision in State v. Netland, which approved of the warrantless collection of blood-alcohol evidence based on a single-factor exigency derived from the evanescent nature of alcohol in the bloodstream. 762 N.W.2d 202, 214 (Minn.2009) (“[U]nder the exigency exception, no warrant is necessary to secure a blood-alcohol test where there is probable cause to suspect a crime in which chemical impairment is an element of the offense.”), abrogated in part by Missouri v. McN

2010In State v. Net-land, the Minnesota Supreme Court specifically held that “under the exigency exception, no warrant is necessary to secure a blood-alcohol test where there is probable cause to suspect a crime in which chemical impairment is an element of the offense.” 762 N.W.2d 202, 214 (Minn. *921 2009).

1993Safety, 368 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Minn.1985): As a matter of federal constitutional law, the warrantless removal of blood for a blood alcohol test is clearly permitted if police have probable cause to believe that the defendant has committed the offense of DWI and that the removal of blood is necessary to preserve evidence of the defendant’s guilt.

1991Tyler, 368 N.W.2d 275, 278 (Minn.1985) (citing Neville, 459 U.S. at 558-64 , 103 S.Ct. at 920-23 ).

2015Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (“Subjecting a person to a breathalyzer test, which generally requires the production of alveolar or ‘deep lung’ breath for chemical analysis, implicates similar concerns about bodily integrity and, like the blood-alcohol test we considered in Schmerber, should also be deemed a ’ search.” (citations omitted)); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (recognizing that a “compelled intrusion[ ] into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content” must be deemed

2015Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 , 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (1989) (“Subjecting a person to a breathalyzer test, which generally requires the production of alveolar or ‘deep lung’ breath for chemical analysis, implicates similar concerns about bodily integrity and, like the blood-alcohol test we considered in Schmerber, should also be deemed a ’ search.” (citations omitted)); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767-68 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) (recognizing that a “compelled intrusion[ ] into the body for blood to be analyzed for alcohol content” must be deemed

2015Stavish, however, does not argue that the State lacked probable cause to conclude that he committed criminal vehicular operation or DWI, or that the administration of a blood alcohol test would not result in the discovery of evidence relevant to the prosecution of a crime. 12 D.A.G., 484 N.W.2d 787, 791 (Minn. 1992) (“[W]e make our own evaluation of the found facts in determining whether exigent circumstances exist.”).

2013And most importantly, when the officers collected blood and urine samples from Brooks, they did so in accordance with this court’s decision in State v. Netland, which approved of the warrantless collection of blood-alcohol evidence based on a single-factor exigency derived from the evanescent nature of alcohol in the bloodstream. 762 N.W.2d 202, 214 (Minn.2009) (“[U]nder the exigency exception, no warrant is necessary to secure a blood-alcohol test where there is probable cause to suspect a crime in which chemical impairment is an element of the offense.”), abrogated in part by Missouri v. McN

2008When addressing the constitutionality of taking blood samples without a warrant, this court has consistently taken into account all circumstances that inform the question of whether a peace officer could reasonably believe there was a risk of “imminent destruction or removal of evidence.” In State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Minn.1978), this court concluded that blood alcohol evidence would have been lost not only because alcohol dissipates with the passage of time, but also because more than 4 hours had passed since the accident. 2 In State v. Storvick, 428 N.W.2d 55, 60-61 (Minn.1988) wh

2008When addressing the constitutionality of taking blood samples without a warrant, this court has consistently taken into account all circumstances that inform the question of whether a peace officer could reasonably believe there was a risk of "imminent destruction or removal of evidence." In State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Minn.1978), this court concluded that blood alcohol evidence would have been lost not only because alcohol dissipates with the passage of time, but also because more than 4 hours had passed since the accident. [2] In State v. Storvick, 428 N.W.2d 55, 60-61 (Minn.1988)

2008When addressing the constitutionality of taking blood samples without a warrant, this court has consistently taken into account all circumstances that inform the question of whether a peace officer could reasonably believe there was a risk of “imminent destruction or removal of evidence.” In State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Minn.1978), this court concluded that blood alcohol evidence would have been lost not only because alcohol dissipates with the passage of time, but also because more than 4 hours had passed since the accident. 2 In State v. Storvick, 428 N.W.2d 55, 60-61 (Minn.1988) wh

2008When addressing the constitutionality of taking blood samples without a warrant, this court has consistently taken into account all circumstances that inform the question of whether a peace officer could reasonably believe there was a risk of "imminent destruction or removal of evidence." In State v. Oevering, 268 N.W.2d 68, 74 (Minn.1978), this court concluded that blood alcohol evidence would have been lost not only because alcohol dissipates with the passage of time, but also because more than 4 hours had passed since the accident. [2] In State v. Storvick, 428 N.W.2d 55, 60-61 (Minn.1988)

2007The supreme court has emphasized that an officer need not have probable cause to believe that a driver is intoxicated in order to have blood drawn, only “probable cause to believe that administration of a blood alcohol test will result in the discovery of evidence relevant in the prosecution of a crime.” State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn.1998).

2007The supreme court has emphasized that an officer need not have probable cause to believe that a driver is intoxicated in order to have blood drawn, only "probable cause to believe that administration of a blood alcohol test will result in the discovery of evidence relevant in the prosecution of a crime." State v. Lee, 585 N.W.2d 378, 382 (Minn.1998).

2000See generally State v. Jensen, 482 N.W.2d 238, 239 (Minn.App.1992), rev. denied (Minn. May 15, 1992).

1995Safety, 473 N.W.2d 848 (Minn.1991), the defendant argued that the addition of potential criminal penalties for refusing a blood-alcohol test required a different conclusion than that reached by the Supreme Court in Neville.

1995Id. at 855.

1995South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 , 564 n. 15, 103 S.Ct. 916 , 923 n. 15, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983); see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 605 , 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2652 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (implied consent advisory involves "limited and focused inquiries" that are "not likely to be perceived as calling for any incriminating response").

1995South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 , 564 n. 15, 103 S.Ct. 916 , 923 n. 15, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983); see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 605 , 110 S.Ct. 2638, 2652 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 (1990) (implied consent advisory involves "limited and focused inquiries" that are "not likely to be perceived as calling for any incriminating response").

1994Dep’t of Transp., 467 N.W.2d 420, 422 (N.D.1991) (refusing to allow a North Dakota peace officer to request a blood alcohol test where the driving conduct occurred within North Dakota but the suspect was transported onto the Turtle Mountain Indian Reservation).

1994State v. Dille, 258 N.W.2d 565, 567 (Minn. 1977).

1990In South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 , 564 n. 15, 103 S.Ct. 916 , 923 n. 15, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), the United States Supreme Court likewise announced that inquiry of "whether the suspect will take a blood-alcohol test" is not-an interrogation for purposes of Miranda . .“It is axiomatic that a state supreme court may interpret its own state constitution to offer greater protection of individual rights than does the federal constitution." State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn.1985); see Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 523 (Yetka, J., dissenting) (urging expanded protection under the state consti

1990In South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 , 564 n. 15, 103 S.Ct. 916 , 923 n. 15, 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), the United States Supreme Court likewise announced that inquiry of "whether the suspect will take a blood-alcohol test" is not an interrogation for purposes of Miranda . [2] "It is axiomatic that a state supreme court may interpret its own state constitution to offer greater protection of individual rights than does the federal constitution." State v. Fuller, 374 N.W.2d 722, 726 (Minn.1985); see Nyflot, 369 N.W.2d at 523 (Yetka, J., dissenting) (urging expanded protection under the state con