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31 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1967–2020 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Montano v. Superior Court Pima Countygreen2 sentences2007Montano v. Superior Court, 149 Ariz. 385, 389 , 719 P.2d 271, 275 (1986). 2007Montano v. Superior Court, 149 Ariz. 385, 389 , 719 P.2d 271, 275 (1986). | 2 | 3 |
Campbell v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences2010Cf. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559 , 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (stating that under Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), a state may “force a person suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood alcohol test”) (footnote omitted); Campbell, 106 Ariz. at 554 , 479 P.2d at 697 (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to implied consent law as meritless in light of Schmerber). 2010Cf. South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559 , 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (stating that under Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966), a state may “force a person suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood alcohol test”) (footnote omitted); Campbell, 106 Ariz. at 554 , 479 P.2d at 697 (rejecting Fourth Amendment challenge to implied consent law as meritless in light of Schmerber). | 1 | 5 |
State v. Riveragreen2 sentences2007Id.; see also State v. Rivera, 152 Ariz. 507, 513 , 733 P.2d 1090, 1096 (1987) (holding that to satisfy Miranda, “the State must show that defendant understood his rights”). ¶ 12 In this case, the trial court found Defendant was properly advised in Spanish of his right to obtain an independent blood alcohol test and denied the motion to suppress. 2007Id.; see also State v. Rivera, 152 Ariz. 507, 513 , 733 P.2d 1090, 1096 (1987) (holding that to satisfy Miranda, “the State must show that defendant understood his rights”). ¶ 12 In this case, the trial court found Defendant was properly advised in Spanish of his right to obtain an independent blood alcohol test and denied the motion to suppress. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Stanleygreen2 sentences2016State v. Stanley, 217 Ariz. 253 , 258 ¶ 24, 172 P.3d 848, 853 (App. 2007). 2016State v. Stanley, 217 Ariz. 253 , 258 ¶ 24, 172 P.3d 848, 853 (App. 2007). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Roquegreen2 sentences2015Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting the forensic examination report. ¶12 Appellant further argues the admission of this report constitutes prosecutorial misconduct because Appellant “would have argued [his] case different[ly].” To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, “[a] defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 228, ¶ 152 , 141 P.3d 368, 403 (2006). 2015Accordingly, the trial court did not err in admitting the forensic examination report. ¶12 Appellant further argues the admission of this report constitutes prosecutorial misconduct because Appellant “would have argued [his] case different[ly].” To prevail on a claim of prosecutorial misconduct, “[a] defendant must demonstrate that the prosecutor’s misconduct so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” State v. Roque, 213 Ariz. 193, 228, ¶ 152 , 141 P.3d 368, 403 (2006). | 1 | 1 |
State v. SUPERIOR COURT IN & FOR CTY. OF YAVAPAIgreen2 sentences2015However, “due process has never required and still does not require police to inform DUI suspects of their right to procure an independent blood alcohol test when implied consent has been invoked.” Norris, 179 Ariz. at 345 - 46, 878 P.2d at 1383-84 (emphasis added) (recognizing Montano as “exception to the general rule [that] has been consistently limited to its facts in subsequent cases”); see also Mack v. Cruikshank, 196 Ariz. 541, 546, ¶ 14 , 2 P.3d 100, 105 (App. 1999). ¶9 In his supplemental brief, Kuzmanov argues that while the general rule is that due process does not require the State 2015However, “due process has never required and still does not require police to inform DUI suspects of their right to procure an independent blood alcohol test when implied consent has been invoked.” Norris, 179 Ariz. at 345 - 46, 878 P.2d at 1383-84 (emphasis added) (recognizing Montano as “exception to the general rule [that] has been consistently limited to its facts in subsequent cases”); see also Mack v. Cruikshank, 196 Ariz. 541, 546, ¶ 14 , 2 P.3d 100, 105 (App. 1999). ¶9 In his supplemental brief, Kuzmanov argues that while the general rule is that due process does not require the State | 1 | 1 |
MacK v. Cruikshankgreen2 sentences2015However, “due process has never required and still does not require police to inform DUI suspects of their right to procure an independent blood alcohol test when implied consent has been invoked.” Norris, 179 Ariz. at 345 - 46, 878 P.2d at 1383-84 (emphasis added) (recognizing Montano as “exception to the general rule [that] has been consistently limited to its facts in subsequent cases”); see also Mack v. Cruikshank, 196 Ariz. 541, 546, ¶ 14 , 2 P.3d 100, 105 (App. 1999). ¶9 In his supplemental brief, Kuzmanov argues that while the general rule is that due process does not require the State 2015However, “due process has never required and still does not require police to inform DUI suspects of their right to procure an independent blood alcohol test when implied consent has been invoked.” Norris, 179 Ariz. at 345 - 46, 878 P.2d at 1383-84 (emphasis added) (recognizing Montano as “exception to the general rule [that] has been consistently limited to its facts in subsequent cases”); see also Mack v. Cruikshank, 196 Ariz. 541, 546, ¶ 14 , 2 P.3d 100, 105 (App. 1999). ¶9 In his supplemental brief, Kuzmanov argues that while the general rule is that due process does not require the State | 1 | 1 |
People v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2015In Harris, 184 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 204 , 210- 12, the arresting deputy told the driver that refusal to submit to testing would result in license suspension, it could be used against him in court, and he was required to submit to the test. 2015In Harris, 184 Cal.Rptr.3d at 204, 210-12 , the arresting deputy told the driver that refusal to submit to testing would result in license suspension, it could be used against him in court, and he was required to submit to the test. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Esteban Leon Gonzalesgreen1 sentence2007See U.S. v. Gonzales, 749 F.2d 1329, 1336 (9th Cir.1984) (noting that even if an officer spoke “very poor Spanish” and appellant spoke “very poor English,” a written Spanish-language waiver form “would have conveyed to appellant a sufficient understanding of his rights”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Estradagreen2 sentences2007State v. Estrada, 209 Ariz. 287, 292, ¶ 22 , 100 P.3d 452, 457 (App.2004). ¶ 11 Due process requires the police inform a DUI suspect of the right to obtain an independent blood alcohol test. 2007State v. Estrada, 209 Ariz. 287, 292, ¶ 22 , 100 P.3d 452, 457 (App.2004). ¶ 11 Due process requires the police inform a DUI suspect of the right to obtain an independent blood alcohol test. | 1 | 1 |
Collins v. Superior Courtgreen2 sentences1999See Collins v. Superior Ct., 158 Ariz. 145, 146 , 761 P.2d 1049, 1050 (1988). ¶ 24 In 1990, however, the legislature amended the implied consent statute to allow an officer to obtain a blood sample pursuant to a search warrant following a driver’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test. 1999See Collins v. Superior Ct., 158 Ariz. 145, 146 , 761 P.2d 1049, 1050 (1988). ¶ 24 In 1990, however, the legislature amended the implied consent statute to allow an officer to obtain a blood sample pursuant to a search warrant following a driver’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Millergreen2 sentences1994Mil *346 Ur, 161 Ariz. at 470 , 778 P.2d at 1366 (Mon-tano does not apply where the police have invoked the implied consent law.); Ramos, 155 Ariz. at 154 , 745 P.2d at 602 (other than the limited circumstances of Montano , police officers are under no obligation to inform a DUI suspect of his right to have an independent blood alcohol test done). 1994Mil *346 Ur, 161 Ariz. at 470 , 778 P.2d at 1366 (Mon-tano does not apply where the police have invoked the implied consent law.); Ramos, 155 Ariz. at 154 , 745 P.2d at 602 (other than the limited circumstances of Montano , police officers are under no obligation to inform a DUI suspect of his right to have an independent blood alcohol test done). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Ramosgreen2 sentences1994Mil *346 Ur, 161 Ariz. at 470 , 778 P.2d at 1366 (Mon-tano does not apply where the police have invoked the implied consent law.); Ramos, 155 Ariz. at 154 , 745 P.2d at 602 (other than the limited circumstances of Montano , police officers are under no obligation to inform a DUI suspect of his right to have an independent blood alcohol test done). 1994Mil *346 Ur, 161 Ariz. at 470 , 778 P.2d at 1366 (Mon-tano does not apply where the police have invoked the implied consent law.); Ramos, 155 Ariz. at 154 , 745 P.2d at 602 (other than the limited circumstances of Montano , police officers are under no obligation to inform a DUI suspect of his right to have an independent blood alcohol test done). | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Jacobsengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Capps v. Lynchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
South Dakota v. Neville
green
2 sentences2015Further, in South Dakota v. Neville, a Fifth Amendment case, the Court stated that a license-revocation “penalty for refusing to take a blood-alcohol test [under an implied consent statute similar to Arizona’s] is unquestionably legitimate, assuming appropriate procedural protections.” 459 U.S. 553, 560 , 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (emphasis added). 2015Further, in South Dakota v. Neville, a Fifth Amendment case, the Court stated that a license-revocation “penalty for refusing to take a blood-alcohol test [under an implied consent statute similar to Arizona’s] is unquestionably legitimate, assuming appropriate procedural protections.” 459 U.S. 553, 560 , 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (emphasis added). | 4 | 1986–2015 |
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences2015The Court further explained: The simple blood-alcohol test is so safe, painless, and commonplace, see Schmerber, 384 U.S., at 771 , 86 S.Ct., at 1836 , that respondent concedes, as he must, that the state could legitimately compel the suspect, against his will, to accede to the test. 4 Given, then, that the offer of taking a blood-alcohol test is clearly legitimate, the action becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice. 2015The Court further explained: The simple blood-alcohol test is so safe, painless, and commonplace, see Schmerber, 384 U.S., at 771 , 86 S.Ct., at 1836 , that respondent concedes, as he must, that the state could legitimately compel the suspect, against his will, to accede to the test. 4 Given, then, that the offer of taking a blood-alcohol test is clearly legitimate, the action becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice. | 3 | 1967–2015 |
McNutt v. Superior Court of State of Ariz.
green
2 sentences1988Superior Court ] supra, 133 Ariz. [7] at 10 n. 2, 648 P.2d 122 [ (1982) ] “a defendant has no right to delay by demanding to consult with counsel before being required to choose a blood alcohol test or possible driver’s license suspension as provided for in A.R.S. § 28-691.” However, that is not the factual situation before us. 1985As we noted in McNutt, supra, 133 Ariz. at 10 n. 2, 648 P.2d 122 , “a defendant has no right to delay by demanding to consult with counsel before being required to choose a blood alcohol test or possible driver’s license suspension as provided for in A.R.S. § 28-691.” However, that is not the factual situation before us. | 2 | 1985–1988 |
State v. Santeyan
green
2 sentences1985We agree that the admission of the blood test results was error, see State v. Santeyan, 136 Ariz. 108 , 664 P.2d 652 (1983), but find that its admission was harmless error. 1985We agree that the admission of the blood test results was error, see State v. Santeyan, 136 Ariz. 108 , 664 P.2d 652 (1983), but find that its admission was harmless error. | 2 | 1985–1985 |
State of Arizona v. Hon. butler/tyler B.
green
2 sentences2015Id. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1566 . ¶ 18 Regarding Butler , Valenzuela is correct that the court concluded, “[A] compelled blood draw, even when administered pursuant to [the implied consent statute], is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment’s constraints.” 232 Ariz. 84, ¶ 10 , 302 P.3d at 612 . 2015Id. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1566 . ¶ 18 Regarding Butler , Valenzuela is correct that the court concluded, “[A] compelled blood draw, even when administered pursuant to [the implied consent statute], is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment’s constraints.” 232 Ariz. 84, ¶ 10 , 302 P.3d at 612 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Missouri v. McNeely
green
2 sentences2015Id. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1566 . ¶ 18 Regarding Butler , Valenzuela is correct that the court concluded, “[A] compelled blood draw, even when administered pursuant to [the implied consent statute], is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment’s constraints.” 232 Ariz. 84, ¶ 10 , 302 P.3d at 612 . 2015Id. at -, 133 S.Ct. at 1566 . ¶ 18 Regarding Butler , Valenzuela is correct that the court concluded, “[A] compelled blood draw, even when administered pursuant to [the implied consent statute], is a search subject to the Fourth Amendment’s constraints.” 232 Ariz. 84, ¶ 10 , 302 P.3d at 612 . | 1 | 2015–2015 |
State v. Smith
red
2 sentences2015The special concurrence simplified the reasoning to a single sentence: “While the voluntariness of consent is decided from the totality of the circumstances, submitting to a blood alcohol test is not rendered involuntary merely by an officer fairly giving the implied consent advisory including the criminal penalty for refusing to take the test.” Id. at 606-07 . ¶24 Even when statutes do not require a law enforcement officer to inform a driver about what the law ‘requires,’ it is not a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment if the officer phrases the admonition as a requirement. 2015The special concurrence simplified the reasoning to a single sentence: “While the voluntariness of consent is decided from the totality of the circumstances, submitting to a blood alcohol test is not rendered involuntary merely by an officer fairly giving the implied consent advisory including the criminal penalty for refusing to take the test.” Id. at 606-07 . ¶ 24 Even when statutes do not require a law enforcement officer to inform a driver about what the law ‘requires,’ it is not a per se violation of the Fourth Amendment if the officer phrases the admonition as a requirement. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Bullcoming v. New Mexico
green
2 sentences2014Notably, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 2710 , 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011), the Court held that blood-alcohol analysis reports were testimonial and that a non-testifying analyst’s report stating the defendant’s BAC, offered into evidence through the laboratory supervisor, was erroneously admitted. 2014Notably, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, — U.S. -, 131 S.Ct. 2705, 2710 , 180 L.Ed.2d 610 (2011), the Court held that blood-alcohol analysis reports were testimonial and that a non-testifying analyst’s report stating the defendant’s BAC, offered into evidence through the laboratory supervisor, was erroneously admitted. | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Carleton v. Superior Court
green
2 sentences2000As a California court held, "[a]bsent a clear legislative mandate giving a defendant absolute control of whether a blood alcohol test may be obtained, the lack of such evidence should not turn on the degree of a defendant's cooperation with a premium given to the more obstreperous drunk driver who is more successful in forcibly resisting the withdrawal of a blood sample." Carleton v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App.3d 1182, 1191 , 216 Cal.Rptr. 890 (1985). ¶ 24 Finding no prohibition in the statute to taking evidence by reasonable force and analogous authority in forceful execution of search warr 2000As a California court held, "[a]bsent a clear legislative mandate giving a defendant absolute control of whether a blood alcohol test may be obtained, the lack of such evidence should not turn on the degree of a defendant's cooperation with a premium given to the more obstreperous drunk driver who is more successful in forcibly resisting the withdrawal of a blood sample." Carleton v. Superior Court, 170 Cal. App.3d 1182, 1191 , 216 Cal.Rptr. 890 (1985). ¶ 24 Finding no prohibition in the statute to taking evidence by reasonable force and analogous authority in forceful execution of search warr | 1 | 2000–2000 |
State v. Zmich
green
2 sentences1991State v. Zmich, 160 Ariz. 108 , 770 P.2d 776 (1989). 1991State v. Zmich, 160 Ariz. 108 , 770 P.2d 776 (1989). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
California v. Trombetta
green
2 sentences1990Id. at 490 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 2535 n. 11. [7] Replicate breath testing is a series of two consecutive breath tests spaced by air blanks to flush out the sample chambers. 1990Id. at 490 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 2535 n. 11. [7] Replicate breath testing is a series of two consecutive breath tests spaced by air blanks to flush out the sample chambers. | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Sherrill v. Arizona Department of Transportation
green
2 sentences1990Nancy Jane Sherrill (petitioner) seeks review of a court of appeals decision affirming her license suspension for refusal to successfully complete a blood alcohol test. 164 Ariz. 442 , 793 P.2d 1109 . 1990Nancy Jane Sherrill (petitioner) seeks review of a court of appeals decision affirming her license suspension for refusal to successfully complete a blood alcohol test. 164 Ariz. 442 , 793 P.2d 1109 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Waicelunas
green
2 sentences1987On November 13, 1985, the superior court granted the motion relying upon State v. Waicelunas, 138 Ariz. 16 , 672 P.2d 968 (App.1983), in which this court held that an arrest was required prior to the taking of a blood sample. 1987On November 13, 1985, the superior court granted the motion relying upon State v. Waicelunas, 138 Ariz. 16 , 672 P.2d 968 (App.1983), in which this court held that an arrest was required prior to the taking of a blood sample. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Neville
green
2 sentences1987In State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D. 1981), the Supreme Court of South Dakota held that the statute providing for admissi *577 bility of evidence of a person’s refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test at a later trial for DUI violated both the state and federal constitutional privileges against self-incrimination. 1987In a case concerning the admissibility of evidence of á defendant’s refusal to take a blood alcohol test as well as a field sobriety test, the court stated: This case presents an opportunity to correct the error we made in State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D.1981) (Neville I); and in State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D.1984) (Neville II). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Baca v. Smith
green
1 sentence1987Id. | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Cocio
green
2 sentences1987We reverse on the basis of A.R.S. § 13-3925(A), which creates a good faith exception to the rule excluding evidence unlawfully obtained, and in doing so discuss the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Cocio, 147 Ariz. 277 , 709 P.2d 1336 (1985). 1987We reverse on the basis of A.R.S. § 13-3925(A), which creates a good faith exception to the rule excluding evidence unlawfully obtained, and in doing so discuss the decision of the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Cocio, 147 Ariz. 277 , 709 P.2d 1336 (1985). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Neville
green
2 sentences1987In a case concerning the admissibility of evidence of á defendant’s refusal to take a blood alcohol test as well as a field sobriety test, the court stated: This case presents an opportunity to correct the error we made in State v. Neville, 312 N.W.2d 723 (S.D.1981) (Neville I); and in State v. Neville, 346 N.W.2d 425 (S.D.1984) (Neville II). 1987That error was our holding that “Neville’s refusal to submit to a blood test is evidence of a testimonial nature and thus within the protection of the privilege against self-incrimination.” 346 N.W.2d at 429 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
| Gaunt v. Motor Vehicle Div., Dept. of Transp. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| State v. Holland green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Branch v. Wilkinson green | 1 | 1985–1985 |
| State v. Stelzriede neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.