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25 Virginia opinions name it 7 courts 1966–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
South Dakota v. Nevillegreen2 sentences2019See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 161 (2013) (“[A]ll 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense.”); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560 (1983) (noting one-year license revocation “for refusing to take a blood-alcohol test is unquestionably legitimate”). -6- 2. 2006This is so because “police inquiry of whether the suspect will take a blood-alcohol test is not an -2- interrogation within the meaning of Miranda.” Id. at 564 n.15. | 4 | 6 |
Essex v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2004“Code § 18.2-269 expressly provides that the presumptions it creates arise only when a blood-alcohol test is conducted ‘in accordance with the provisions of § 18.2-268 [now Code § 18.2-268.2 et seq.].’” Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273, 286 , 322 S.E.2d 216, 223 (1984) -8- (footnote omitted). 2004“Code § 18.2-269 expressly provides that the presumptions it creates arise only when a blood-alcohol test is conducted ‘in accordance with the provisions of § 18.2-268 [now Code § 18.2-268.2 et seq.].’” Essex v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 273, 286 , 322 S.E.2d 216, 223 (1984) -8- (footnote omitted). | 4 | 4 |
Smith v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2006This appeal challenges the validity of an arrest before removing blood pursuant to the implied consent law, Code § 18.2-268.2, and the admission into evidence of the certificate of analysis of the blood. “[I]f the arrest is not lawful, consent for the blood alcohol test is not implied, and the results of any such test are not admissible [to prove] intoxication.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 32 Va.App. 228, 233-34 , 527 S.E.2d 456, 459 (2000). 2006This appeal challenges the validity of an arrest before removing blood pursuant to the implied consent law, Code § 18.2-268.2, and the admission into evidence of the certificate of analysis of the blood. “[I]f the arrest is not lawful, consent for the blood alcohol test is not implied, and the results of any such test are not admissible [to prove] intoxication.” Smith v. Commonwealth, 32 Va.App. 228, 233-34 , 527 S.E.2d 456, 459 (2000). | 3 | 3 |
Davis v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2006The second presumption arises from Davis v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 291 , 381 S.E.2d 11 (1989), in which the Court of Appeals held that, in a prosecution for a violation of clause (i) of § 18.2-266 (the so-called “per se” offense), the blood alcohol test result “is an evidentiary fact which creates a rebuttable presumption that the measurement accurately reflects the blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.” Davis, 8 Va. App. at 298 . 2006The second presumption arises from Davis v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 291 , 381 S.E.2d 11 (1989), in which the Court of Appeals held that, in a prosecution for a violation of clause (i) of § 18.2-266 (the so-called “per se” offense), the blood alcohol test result “is an evidentiary fact which creates a rebuttable presumption that the measurement accurately reflects the blood alcohol concentration at the time of driving.” Davis, 8 Va. App. at 298 . | 1 | 2 |
Missouri v. McNeelygreen1 sentence2019See Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 161 (2013) (“[A]ll 50 States have adopted implied consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the State, to consent to BAC testing if they are arrested or otherwise detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense.”); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 560 (1983) (noting one-year license revocation “for refusing to take a blood-alcohol test is unquestionably legitimate”). -6- 2. | 1 | 1 |
Groggins v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2009The Court based its holding on the plain language of the statute: “Code § 18.2-269 expressly provides that the presumptions it creates arise only when a blood-alcohol test is conducted ‘in accordance with the provi *728 sions of [§§ 18.2-268.1 through 18.2-268.12].’ ” Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Groggins v. Commonwealth, 34 Va.App. 19, 23 , 537 S.E.2d 605, 607 (2000) (“Those presumptions apply only when a blood or breath test is administered pursuant to Code §§ 18.2-268.1 through - 268.12.”). 2009The Court based its holding on the plain language of the statute: “Code § 18.2-269 expressly provides that the presumptions it creates arise only when a blood-alcohol test is conducted ‘in accordance with the provi *728 sions of [§§ 18.2-268.1 through 18.2-268.12].’ ” Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Groggins v. Commonwealth, 34 Va.App. 19, 23 , 537 S.E.2d 605, 607 (2000) (“Those presumptions apply only when a blood or breath test is administered pursuant to Code §§ 18.2-268.1 through - 268.12.”). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Town of Mariongreen1 sentence2000See id. | 1 | 1 |
Lamay v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2000See Lamay v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 461, 476 , 513 S.E.2d 411, 418 (1999). 2000See Lamay v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.App. 461, 476 , 513 S.E.2d 411, 418 (1999). | 1 | 1 |
Wright v. Commonwealthgreen1 sentence1991South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 564 (1982); Wright v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 743, 746 (1986). | 1 | 1 |
Wade v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1966Cf. Brooks, Adm'r v. Hufham, 200 Va. 488, 493 , 106 S. E. 2d 631 ; Russell, Adm'x v. Hammond, 200 Va. 600, 604 , 106 S. E. 2d 626 ; Wade v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 117, 121, 122 , 116 S. E. 2d 99 ; and Laughlin v. Rose, Adm'x, 200 Va. 127, 131 , 104 S. E. 2d 782 . 1966Cf. Brooks, Adm'r v. Hufham, 200 Va. 488, 493 , 106 S. E. 2d 631 ; Russell, Adm'x v. Hammond, 200 Va. 600, 604 , 106 S. E. 2d 626 ; Wade v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 117, 121, 122 , 116 S. E. 2d 99 ; and Laughlin v. Rose, Adm'x, 200 Va. 127, 131 , 104 S. E. 2d 782 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences1991In Neville , following its prior decision in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) holding that an accused could be forced to undergo a blood-alcohol test without violating his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination *375 because the test results did not involve testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused, the Supreme Court held that the refusal to take a test which is statutorily authorized by state law does not involve unconstitutional compulsion under the fifth amendment. 1991In Neville , following its prior decision in Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966) holding that an accused could be forced to undergo a blood-alcohol test without violating his fifth amendment right against self-incrimination *375 because the test results did not involve testimonial compulsion upon or enforced communication by the accused, the Supreme Court held that the refusal to take a test which is statutorily authorized by state law does not involve unconstitutional compulsion under the fifth amendment. | 3 | 1990–1991 |
Russell v. Hammond
green
2 sentences1980In Russell, Admr. v. Hammond, 200 Va. 600 (1959), the Virginia Supreme Court held that the certificate of analysis of a blood alcohol test administered to a person was admissible only in a criminal prosecution and was properly excluded in a civil case. 1966Cf. Brooks, Adm'r v. Hufham, 200 Va. 488, 493 , 106 S. E. 2d 631 ; Russell, Adm'x v. Hammond, 200 Va. 600, 604 , 106 S. E. 2d 626 ; Wade v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 117, 121, 122 , 116 S. E. 2d 99 ; and Laughlin v. Rose, Adm'x, 200 Va. 127, 131 , 104 S. E. 2d 782 . | 2 | 1966–1980 |
Cash v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2016We held that this “[implied] consent is *104 not ‘qualified’ or ‘conditional.’ ” Id. at 187 , 629 S.E.2d at 191 (quoting Cash, 251 Va. at 49 , 466 S.E.2d at 738 ). 1 Contrary to appellant’s arguments, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), has not implicated the constitutional validity of Virginia’s implied consent statute as it relates to civil penalties for refusing a blood alcohol test. 2 In Birchfiel d, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether blood tests obtained without a warrant are permissible “based 2016We held that this “[implied] consent is *104 not ‘qualified’ or ‘conditional.’ ” Id. at 187 , 629 S.E.2d at 191 (quoting Cash, 251 Va. at 49 , 466 S.E.2d at 738 ). 1 Contrary to appellant’s arguments, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), has not implicated the constitutional validity of Virginia’s implied consent statute as it relates to civil penalties for refusing a blood alcohol test. 2 In Birchfiel d, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether blood tests obtained without a warrant are permissible “based | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Rowley v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2016We held that this “[implied] consent is *104 not ‘qualified’ or ‘conditional.’ ” Id. at 187 , 629 S.E.2d at 191 (quoting Cash, 251 Va. at 49 , 466 S.E.2d at 738 ). 1 Contrary to appellant’s arguments, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), has not implicated the constitutional validity of Virginia’s implied consent statute as it relates to civil penalties for refusing a blood alcohol test. 2 In Birchfiel d, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether blood tests obtained without a warrant are permissible “based 2016We held that this “[implied] consent is *104 not ‘qualified’ or ‘conditional.’ ” Id. at 187 , 629 S.E.2d at 191 (quoting Cash, 251 Va. at 49 , 466 S.E.2d at 738 ). 1 Contrary to appellant’s arguments, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), has not implicated the constitutional validity of Virginia’s implied consent statute as it relates to civil penalties for refusing a blood alcohol test. 2 In Birchfiel d, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether blood tests obtained without a warrant are permissible “based | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Birchfield v. N. Dakota. William Robert Bernard
green
2 sentences2016We held that this “[implied] consent is *104 not ‘qualified’ or ‘conditional.’ ” Id. at 187 , 629 S.E.2d at 191 (quoting Cash, 251 Va. at 49 , 466 S.E.2d at 738 ). 1 Contrary to appellant’s arguments, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), has not implicated the constitutional validity of Virginia’s implied consent statute as it relates to civil penalties for refusing a blood alcohol test. 2 In Birchfiel d, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether blood tests obtained without a warrant are permissible “based 2016We held that this “[implied] consent is *104 not ‘qualified’ or ‘conditional.’ ” Id. at 187 , 629 S.E.2d at 191 (quoting Cash, 251 Va. at 49 , 466 S.E.2d at 738 ). 1 Contrary to appellant’s arguments, the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Birchfield v. North Dakota, — U.S. -, 136 S.Ct. 2160 , 195 L.Ed.2d 560 (2016), has not implicated the constitutional validity of Virginia’s implied consent statute as it relates to civil penalties for refusing a blood alcohol test. 2 In Birchfiel d, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether blood tests obtained without a warrant are permissible “based | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn.
green
2 sentences2015The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects individuals from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” This Court recognizes that “[subjecting a person to a breathalyzer test, which generally requires production of alveolar or ‘deep lung’ breath for chemical analysis, implicates similar concerns about bodily integrity and, like the blood-alcohol test. . . should also be deemed a search [under the Fourth Amendment].” Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 , 109 S. Ct. 1402 , 103 L. 2015The Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution protects individuals from “unreasonable searches and seizures.” This Court recognizes that “[subjecting a person to a breathalyzer test, which generally requires production of alveolar or ‘deep lung’ breath for chemical analysis, implicates similar concerns about bodily integrity and, like the blood-alcohol test. . . should also be deemed a search [under the Fourth Amendment].” Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 616-17 , 109 S. Ct. 1402 , 103 L. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
green
1 sentence2010When the defendant in Melendez-Diaz was arrested for suspicion of drug distribution, id. at 2530 , the arresting officers found a white substance on his person. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Gagelonia v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2009Gagelonia, 52 Va. App. at 113 , 661 S.E.2d at 509-10 . 2 2 The Commonwealth asserts that appellant’s Brady claim fails because he had actual knowledge that a blood alcohol test had been performed. 2009Gagelonia, 52 Va. App. at 113 , 661 S.E.2d at 509-10 . 2 2 The Commonwealth asserts that appellant’s Brady claim fails because he had actual knowledge that a blood alcohol test had been performed. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Wilson v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2006However, under Wilson v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 33 , 301 S.E.2d 1 (1983), the court is required to analyze the rebuttable presumptions at issue as permissive inferences, as to which the defendant has no standing to make a facial constitutional challenge. 2006However, under Wilson v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 33 , 301 S.E.2d 1 (1983), the court is required to analyze the rebuttable presumptions at issue as permissive inferences, as to which the defendant has no standing to make a facial constitutional challenge. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
1 sentence2006The Admissibility of the Blood Alcohol Certificate The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right ... to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” In Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the admission into evidence of a “testimonial” hearsay statement violates the Confrontation Clause, unless the declarant is unavailable and the accused had a prior opportunity to cross-examine. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Dobson v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2006In a criminal case, “[t]he Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element necessary to establish the crime charged.”Dobson v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 71, 74 , 531 S.E.2d 569 (2000). 2006In a criminal case, “[t]he Due Process Clause requires the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every element necessary to establish the crime charged.”Dobson v. Commonwealth, 260 Va. 71, 74 , 531 S.E.2d 569 (2000). | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Holt v. United States
green
1 sentence1990Petitioner's testimonial capacities were in no way implicated; indeed, his participation, except as a donor, was irrelevant to the results of the test, which depend on chemical analysis and on that alone." Id. at 765 , 86 S.Ct. at 1833 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Laughlin v. Rose, Administratrix
green
2 sentences1966Cf. Brooks, Adm'r v. Hufham, 200 Va. 488, 493 , 106 S. E. 2d 631 ; Russell, Adm'x v. Hammond, 200 Va. 600, 604 , 106 S. E. 2d 626 ; Wade v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 117, 121, 122 , 116 S. E. 2d 99 ; and Laughlin v. Rose, Adm'x, 200 Va. 127, 131 , 104 S. E. 2d 782 . 1966Cf. Brooks, Adm'r v. Hufham, 200 Va. 488, 493 , 106 S. E. 2d 631 ; Russell, Adm'x v. Hammond, 200 Va. 600, 604 , 106 S. E. 2d 626 ; Wade v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 117, 121, 122 , 116 S. E. 2d 99 ; and Laughlin v. Rose, Adm'x, 200 Va. 127, 131 , 104 S. E. 2d 782 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Brooks v. Hufham
green
2 sentences1966Cf. Brooks, Adm'r v. Hufham, 200 Va. 488, 493 , 106 S. E. 2d 631 ; Russell, Adm'x v. Hammond, 200 Va. 600, 604 , 106 S. E. 2d 626 ; Wade v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 117, 121, 122 , 116 S. E. 2d 99 ; and Laughlin v. Rose, Adm'x, 200 Va. 127, 131 , 104 S. E. 2d 782 . 1966Cf. Brooks, Adm'r v. Hufham, 200 Va. 488, 493 , 106 S. E. 2d 631 ; Russell, Adm'x v. Hammond, 200 Va. 600, 604 , 106 S. E. 2d 626 ; Wade v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 117, 121, 122 , 116 S. E. 2d 99 ; and Laughlin v. Rose, Adm'x, 200 Va. 127, 131 , 104 S. E. 2d 782 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.