blood alcohol test in Pennsylvania

2020See South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 554 (1983) (“admission into evidence of a defendant’s refusal to submit to [a blood-alcohol test] does not offend the right against -9- J-S06009-20 self-incrimination”).3 The Supreme Court further clarified that there is no Fifth Amendment violation where a prosecutor argues that a defendant’s refusal to take a blood-alcohol test is evidence of their guilt.

2019Generalized acceptance of this theory was particularly understandable following the Court's dictum in South Dakota v. Neville , 459 U.S. 553 , 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), wherein the Court-addressing whether evidence of a motorist's refusal to comply is "testimonial" for purposes of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination-stated broadly that " Schmerber ... clearly allows a State to force a person suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood alcohol test." Neville , 459 U.S. at 559 , 103 S.Ct. 916 .

1994(See PennDOT v. O’Connell, 521 Pa. 242 , 555 A.2d 873 (1989).) Unfortunately, Trooper Dugan was unable to locate the O’Connell explanation and simply notified Lindenfeldar that he was required to undergo a blood alcohol test.

1994(See PennDOT v. O’Connell, 521 Pa. 242 , 555 A.2d 873 (1989).) Unfortunately, Trooper Dugan was unable to locate the O’Connell explanation and simply notified Lindenfeldar that he was required to undergo a blood alcohol test.

2002See Commonwealth v. Simon, 440 Pa. Super. 428 , 655 A.2d 1024 (1995) (The Superior Court has repeatedly upheld probable cause to conduct a blood alcohol test under subsection (a)(1) of the implied consent statute where the defendant “has looked and smelled like he has consumed alcohol and a serious one-car or head-on accident has occurred.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 382 Pa. Super. 288, 297 , 555 A.2d 185, 189 (1989), allocatur denied, 524 Pa. 607 , 569 A.2d 1366 (1989)).

2002See Commonwealth v. Simon, 440 Pa. Super. 428 , 655 A.2d 1024 (1995) (The Superior Court has repeatedly upheld probable cause to conduct a blood alcohol test under subsection (a)(1) of the implied consent statute where the defendant “has looked and smelled like he has consumed alcohol and a serious one-car or head-on accident has occurred.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 382 Pa. Super. 288, 297 , 555 A.2d 185, 189 (1989), allocatur denied, 524 Pa. 607 , 569 A.2d 1366 (1989)).

2000According to Mr. Justice Cappy, “[o]nce the Commonwealth has introduced evidence to establish that the defendant’s blood alcohol test registered at least .10 percent, the Commonwealth has made a prima facie case under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(4).” Commonwealth v. Jarman, 529 Pa. 92, 98 , 601 A.2d 1229, 1232 (1992) (Cappy, J. dissenting).

2000According to Mr. Justice Cappy, “[o]nce the Commonwealth has introduced evidence to establish that the defendant’s blood alcohol test registered at least .10 percent, the Commonwealth has made a prima facie case under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(4).” Commonwealth v. Jarman, 529 Pa. 92, 98 , 601 A.2d 1229, 1232 (1992) (Cappy, J. dissenting).

1990See Commonwealth v. Griscavage, 336 Pa.Super. 141 , 152 n. 5, 485 A.2d 470 , 476 n. 5 (1984) rev’d on other grounds, 512 Pa. 540 , 517 A.2d 1256 (1986) (“[ajttempts to relate back blood/alcohol levels to a time prior to the admission of the test are regarded with skepticism”); Couts v. Ghion, 281 Pa.Super. 135, 145 , 421 A.2d 1184, 1189 (1980) (“[ejvidence ‘relating back’ a blood alcohol test to a time before the test was administered has been viewed with skepticism”); Schwarzbach v. Dunn, 252 Pa.Super. 454, 462 , 381 A.2d 1295, 1299 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[wje regard with skepticism any

1990See Commonwealth v. Griscavage, 336 Pa.Super. 141 , 152 n. 5, 485 A.2d 470 , 476 n. 5 (1984) rev’d on other grounds, 512 Pa. 540 , 517 A.2d 1256 (1986) (“[ajttempts to relate back blood/alcohol levels to a time prior to the admission of the test are regarded with skepticism”); Couts v. Ghion, 281 Pa.Super. 135, 145 , 421 A.2d 1184, 1189 (1980) (“[ejvidence ‘relating back’ a blood alcohol test to a time before the test was administered has been viewed with skepticism”); Schwarzbach v. Dunn, 252 Pa.Super. 454, 462 , 381 A.2d 1295, 1299 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[wje regard with skepticism any

1992In Commonwealth v. Speights, 353 Pa.Super. 258 , 509 A.2d 1263 (1986), this court held that a blood alcohol test result can, by itself, support a conviction for a violation of section 3731(a)(4), but the test results do not compel the fact finder to reach this conclusion where there is competent evidence challenging the results.

1992In Commonwealth v. Speights, 353 Pa.Super. 258 , 509 A.2d 1263 (1986), this court held that a blood alcohol test result can, by itself, support a conviction for a violation of section 3731(a)(4), but the test results do not compel the fact finder to reach this conclusion where there is competent evidence challenging the results.

2025We previously addressed the concept of using a license suspension as a “bargaining chip” in Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Lefever, 533 A.2d 501 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987), stating: The statutory suspensions following a refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test or a conviction for driving under the influence are not bargaining chips to be traded in exchange for criminal convictions; rather, they are mandatory civil penalties, imposed not for penal purposes, but “to protect the public by providing an effective means of denying an intoxicated motorist the privilege of using

2025We previously addressed the concept of using a license suspension as a “bargaining chip” in Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Lefever, 533 A.2d 501 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987), stating: The statutory suspensions following a refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test or a conviction for driving under the influence are not bargaining chips to be traded in exchange for criminal convictions; rather, they are mandatory civil penalties, imposed not for penal purposes, but “to protect the public by providing an effective means of denying an intoxicated motorist the privilege of using

2016See Gallagher v. Ing, 367 Pa.Super. 346 , 532 A.2d 1179 , 1183 (1987), appeal denied, 519 Pa. 665 , 548 A.2d 255 (1988) ( "The 'other' evidence necessary to render admissible a blood alcohol content in excess of .10 percent, it has been held, may consist of expert testimony interpreting the significance of the results of blood alcohol tests with respect to unfitness to drive.") (citation omitted); see also Braun v. Target Corp., 983 A.2d 752 , 760 (Pa.Super.2009), appeal denied, 604 Pa. 701 , 987 A.2d 158 (2009) ("Corroborative evidence to establish intoxication can be in the form of expert te

2016See Gallagher v. Ing, 532 A.2d 1179, 1183 (Pa.Super. 1987), appeal denied, 548 A.2d 255 (Pa. 1988) (“The ‘other’ evidence necessary to render admissible a blood alcohol content in excess of .10 percent, it has been held, may consist of expert testimony interpreting the significance of the results of blood alcohol tests with respect to unfitness to drive.”) (citation omitted); see also Braun v. Target Corp., 983 A.2d 752, 760 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied, 987 A.2d 158 (Pa. 2009) (“Corroborative evidence to establish intoxication can be in the form of expert testimony, indicating that the lev

1997See also Commonwealth v. Kelly, 365 Pa.Super. 28, 32-33 , 528 A.2d 1346, 1347-48 , alloc. denied, 517 Pa. 598 , 535 A.2d 1057 (1987)(stating that officers with probable cause are entitled to results of medical purposes blood test pursuant to section 1547 regardless of whether search warrant for medical records was valid; “if the initial ‘taking’ was lawful, police were entitled to the disclosure of the blood alcohol test results without further showing or additional legal process.”).

1997See also Commonwealth v. Kelly, 365 Pa.Super. 28, 32-33 , 528 A.2d 1346, 1347-48 , alloc. denied, 517 Pa. 598 , 535 A.2d 1057 (1987)(stating that officers with probable cause are entitled to results of medical purposes blood test pursuant to section 1547 regardless of whether search warrant for medical records was valid; “if the initial ‘taking’ was lawful, police were entitled to the disclosure of the blood alcohol test results without further showing or additional legal process.”).

2025We previously addressed the concept of using a license suspension as a “bargaining chip” in Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing v. Lefever, 533 A.2d 501 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1987), stating: The statutory suspensions following a refusal to submit to a blood alcohol test or a conviction for driving under the influence are not bargaining chips to be traded in exchange for criminal convictions; rather, they are mandatory civil penalties, imposed not for penal purposes, but “to protect the public by providing an effective means of denying an intoxicated motorist the privilege of using

1987S. §1532(b)(3). 3 Commonwealth v. Ebert, 31 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 82, 87-88 , 375 A.2d 837, 839 (1977).

2023See Commonwealth v. Mobley, 14 A.3d 887, 890 (Pa. Super. 2011) (evidence was sufficient to show substantial impairment under DUI-general impairment statute where defendant “failed four separate field sobriety tests, smelled of alcohol, and proceeded to coast through a stop sign despite a police officer being in plain view”); Commonwealth v. Smith, 904 A.2d 30, 39 (Pa. Super. 2006) (evidence was sufficient to show substantial impairment where defendant “drove onto a grassy median, drove in the wrong lane of traffic, smelled of alcohol, was unsteady on her feet, was combative, failed the field s

2020Cf. Commonwealth v. Mobley, 14 A.3d 887, 890 (Pa. Super. 2011) (evidence was sufficient to show substantial impairment under the DUI-general impairment statute where the defendant “failed four separate field sobriety tests, smelled of alcohol, and proceeded to coast through a stop sign despite a police officer being in plain view”); Commonwealth v. Smith, 904 A.2d 30, 39 (Pa. Super. 2006) (evidence was sufficient to show substantial impairment where the defendant “drove onto a grassy median, drove in the wrong lane of traffic, smelled of alcohol, was unsteady on her feet, was combative, failed

2023See Commonwealth v. Mobley, 14 A.3d 887, 890 (Pa. Super. 2011) (evidence was sufficient to show substantial impairment under DUI-general impairment statute where defendant “failed four separate field sobriety tests, smelled of alcohol, and proceeded to coast through a stop sign despite a police officer being in plain view”); Commonwealth v. Smith, 904 A.2d 30, 39 (Pa. Super. 2006) (evidence was sufficient to show substantial impairment where defendant “drove onto a grassy median, drove in the wrong lane of traffic, smelled of alcohol, was unsteady on her feet, was combative, failed the field s

2020Cf. Commonwealth v. Mobley, 14 A.3d 887, 890 (Pa. Super. 2011) (evidence was sufficient to show substantial impairment under the DUI-general impairment statute where the defendant “failed four separate field sobriety tests, smelled of alcohol, and proceeded to coast through a stop sign despite a police officer being in plain view”); Commonwealth v. Smith, 904 A.2d 30, 39 (Pa. Super. 2006) (evidence was sufficient to show substantial impairment where the defendant “drove onto a grassy median, drove in the wrong lane of traffic, smelled of alcohol, was unsteady on her feet, was combative, failed

2016See Gallagher v. Ing, 367 Pa.Super. 346 , 532 A.2d 1179 , 1183 (1987), appeal denied, 519 Pa. 665 , 548 A.2d 255 (1988) ( "The 'other' evidence necessary to render admissible a blood alcohol content in excess of .10 percent, it has been held, may consist of expert testimony interpreting the significance of the results of blood alcohol tests with respect to unfitness to drive.") (citation omitted); see also Braun v. Target Corp., 983 A.2d 752 , 760 (Pa.Super.2009), appeal denied, 604 Pa. 701 , 987 A.2d 158 (2009) ("Corroborative evidence to establish intoxication can be in the form of expert te

2016See Gallagher v. Ing, 532 A.2d 1179, 1183 (Pa.Super. 1987), appeal denied, 548 A.2d 255 (Pa. 1988) (“The ‘other’ evidence necessary to render admissible a blood alcohol content in excess of .10 percent, it has been held, may consist of expert testimony interpreting the significance of the results of blood alcohol tests with respect to unfitness to drive.”) (citation omitted); see also Braun v. Target Corp., 983 A.2d 752, 760 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied, 987 A.2d 158 (Pa. 2009) (“Corroborative evidence to establish intoxication can be in the form of expert testimony, indicating that the lev

2016See Gallagher v. Ing, 367 Pa.Super. 346 , 532 A.2d 1179 , 1183 (1987), appeal denied, 519 Pa. 665 , 548 A.2d 255 (1988) ( "The 'other' evidence necessary to render admissible a blood alcohol content in excess of .10 percent, it has been held, may consist of expert testimony interpreting the significance of the results of blood alcohol tests with respect to unfitness to drive.") (citation omitted); see also Braun v. Target Corp., 983 A.2d 752 , 760 (Pa.Super.2009), appeal denied, 604 Pa. 701 , 987 A.2d 158 (2009) ("Corroborative evidence to establish intoxication can be in the form of expert te

2016See Gallagher v. Ing, 532 A.2d 1179, 1183 (Pa.Super. 1987), appeal denied, 548 A.2d 255 (Pa. 1988) (“The ‘other’ evidence necessary to render admissible a blood alcohol content in excess of .10 percent, it has been held, may consist of expert testimony interpreting the significance of the results of blood alcohol tests with respect to unfitness to drive.”) (citation omitted); see also Braun v. Target Corp., 983 A.2d 752, 760 (Pa.Super. 2009), appeal denied, 987 A.2d 158 (Pa. 2009) (“Corroborative evidence to establish intoxication can be in the form of expert testimony, indicating that the lev

1984The Couts, supra, court, quoting with approval from the decision in Cusatis v. Reichert, 267 Pa.Super. 247 , 406 A.2d 787 (1979) stated: “[o]ur legislature has expressly approved the blood alcohol test as a means of determining whether a person is driving under the influence of intoxi *101 eating beverages.” (Cusatis, supra 267 Pa.Superior Ct. 251, 406 A.2d at 789 , Couts, supra, 281 Pa.Superior Ct. 144, 421 A.2d at 1189 (emphasis added).

1984The Couts, supra, court, quoting with approval from the decision in Cusatis v. Reichert, 267 Pa.Super. 247 , 406 A.2d 787 (1979) stated: “[o]ur legislature has expressly approved the blood alcohol test as a means of determining whether a person is driving under the influence of intoxi *101 eating beverages.” (Cusatis, supra 267 Pa.Superior Ct. 251, 406 A.2d at 789 , Couts, supra, 281 Pa.Superior Ct. 144, 421 A.2d at 1189 (emphasis added).

1990In Commonwealth v. Hipp , the Pennsylvania court reiterated the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s acceptance of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Schmerber v. California, that the U.S. Constitution does not require exclusion of a blood alcohol test taken in a medically reasonable way after a suspect’s refusal “where the police have probable cause to believe the suspect was driving while intoxicated, in order to get evidence of the blood, alcohol level, evidence that is particularly evanescent.” Hipp at 357-8 , 551 A.2d at 1092 , quoting Commonwealth v. Funk, 254 Pa. Super. 233, 241 , 385 A.2d 9

1990In Commonwealth v. Hipp , the Pennsylvania court reiterated the Pennsylvania Superior Court’s acceptance of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Schmerber v. California, that the U.S. Constitution does not require exclusion of a blood alcohol test taken in a medically reasonable way after a suspect’s refusal “where the police have probable cause to believe the suspect was driving while intoxicated, in order to get evidence of the blood, alcohol level, evidence that is particularly evanescent.” Hipp at 357-8 , 551 A.2d at 1092 , quoting Commonwealth v. Funk, 254 Pa. Super. 233, 241 , 385 A.2d 9

2000Subsequently, in Commonwealth v. Yarger, 648 A.2d at 531 , where a person's blood alcohol test revealed levels of alcohol significantly above the legal limit and where there was not a significant lapse of time between when the driver was stopped and when the blood test was administered, we found that the Commonwealth was not required to present expert testimony to make out a prima facie case that the defendant drove with a BAC of .10% or greater.

1998As noted supra, the Supreme Court sought to inject more predictability and uniformity into adjudications under Section 3731(a)(4), and opined that “once the Commonwealth has introduced evidence to establish that the defendant’s blood alcohol test registered at least .10 percent, the Commonwealth has made a prima facie case under 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731(a)(4).” Yarger, 538 Pa. at 334, 335 , 648 A.2d at 531 , citing Commonwealth v. Jarman, 529 Pa. 92, 98 , 601 A.2d 1229, 1232 (1992) (Cappy, J., dissenting).

1990Thus, we find that the refusal to submit to the blood alcohol test as requested by the officer has no bearing upon the admissibility of the results of the medical purposes blood alcohol test.” Commonwealth v. Hipp, supra, 380 Pa. Super. at 360 , 551 A.2d at 1093 .

1990Thus, we find that the refusal to submit to the blood alcohol test as requested by the officer has no bearing upon the admissibility of the results of the medical purposes blood alcohol test.” Commonwealth v. Hipp, supra, 380 Pa. Super. at 360 , 551 A.2d at 1093 .

1988Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Michalec, 52 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 89 , 415 A.2d 921 (1980).

1988Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Michalec, 52 Pa. Commonwealth Ct. 89 , 415 A.2d 921 (1980).

2016In Commonwealth v. Barton-Martin, 5 A.3d 363 (Pa.Super. 2010), we held that under Melendez-Diaz, neither the laboratory administrative director nor the custodian of records for the hospital where a blood alcohol analysis was performed could testify about a forensic report under the Confrontation Clause.

2013See Barton-Martin, 5 A.3d at 365 (“Because the Commonwealth did not summon at trial the analyst who prepared Appellant’s lab report, we conclude that Appellant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause were violated and that the lab report showing her blood-alcohol content was inadmissible.”).