blood alcohol test in Hawaii

2020We found that the nature of the misrepresentation — that Wilson’s driver’s license would be suspended for less time if he took a test and failed, than if he refused a test — “was relevant to [the defendant’s] decision whether to agree to or refuse the blood alcohol test.” Id. at 51, 987 P.2d at 274 .

2017See State v. Wilson, 92 Hawai'i 45, 53-54 , 987 P.2d 268, 276-77 (1999) (use of a form providing “inaccurate and misleading” information on the penalties for failing a blood alcohol test rendered a defendant’s consent to submit to such a test not knowing and intelligent); see also Castro v. Admin.

2001Citing State v. Pattioay, 78 Hawai`i 455, 467, 896 P.2d 911, 923 (1995), the Wilson majority noted that "the exclusion of evidence based on a statutory violation is proper under appropriate circumstances" and that "[s]uch exclusion is appropriate here." 92 Hawai`i at 52 n. 10, 987 P.2d at 276 n. 10.

2001As a result, the majority directed that "the arresting officer's violation of HRS chapter 286's consent requirement precludes admissibility of Wilson's blood test results in his related criminal DUI proceeding" and affirmed suppression of the test results by the district court, id. at 53-54, 987 P.2d at 276-77 (footnote omitted), under this court's supervisory powers as espoused in State v. Pattioay, 78 Hawai`i 455, 469, 896 P.2d 911, 925 (1995).

2015These administrative sanctions operate constitutionally, as the Supreme Court has explained: “Given ... that the offer of taking a blood-alcohol test is clearly legitimate, the action becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice.” South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563-64 , 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983).

2015These administrative sanctions operate constitutionally, as the Supreme Court has explained: “Given ... that the offer of taking a blood-alcohol test is clearly legitimate, the action becomes no less legitimate when the State offers a second option of refusing the test, with the attendant penalties for making that choice.” South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 563-64 , 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983).

2001See Garcia, 96 Hawai‘i at 204, 29 P.3d at 923 . (“Viewing the misleading information as ‘relevant to his decision whether to agree to or refuse the blood alcohol test[,]’ a majority of this court ... concluded that [arrestee] ‘did not make a knowing and intelligent decision whether to exercise his statutory right of consent or refusal.’ ” (quoting Wilson , 92 Hawai‘i at 51, 987 P.2d at 274 )).

2001See Garcia, at 204, 29 P.3d at 923 . ("Viewing the misleading information as `relevant to his decision whether to agree to or refuse the blood alcohol test[,]' a majority of this court . . . concluded that [arrestee] `did not make a knowing and intelligent decision whether to exercise his statutory right of consent or refusal.'" (quoting Wilson , 92 Hawai`i at 51, 987 P.2d at 274 )).

2014In Schmerber , the United States Supreme Court upheld a warrantless blood draw to conduct a blood-alcohol test from a non-consenting person arrested for OVUII, because the officer “might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence[.]” Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2014In Schmerber , the United States Supreme Court upheld a warrantless blood draw to conduct a blood-alcohol test from a non-consenting person arrested for OVUII, because the officer “might reasonably have believed that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the destruction of evidence[.]” Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

2001This court rejected the City and its employees' claim that the admission of the blood alcohol test results in Rossell's criminal DUI case "estopped" Rossell from "relitigating in [the] civil suit the issue of the legality of the blood sample." Id. at 187 , 579 P.2d at 672 .

2001This court rejected the City and its employees' claim that the admission of the blood alcohol test results in Rossell's criminal DUI case "estopped" Rossell from "relitigating in [the] civil suit the issue of the legality of the blood sample." Id. at 187 , 579 P.2d at 672 .

2019See Wilson , 92 Hawai'i at 53 -54 , 987 P.2d at 276-77 (affirming the suppression of the results of a blood alcohol test because the implied consent form provided "inaccurate and misleading" information on the penalties for failing a blood alcohol test, rendering a defendant's consent to submit to such a test not knowing and intelligent).

2017Dir. of the Courts, 97 Hawai'i 463, 470 , 40 P.3d 865, 872 (2002) (same); State v. Garcia, 96 Hawai'i 200 , 29 P.3d 919 (2001) (applying Wilson retroactively). *466 The reasoning of the Iowa Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of New York is also persuasive.

2017Dir. of the Courts, 97 Hawai'i 463, 470 , 40 P.3d 865, 872 (2002) (same); State v. Garcia, 96 Hawai'i 200 , 29 P.3d 919 (2001) (applying Wilson retroactively). *466 The reasoning of the Iowa Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals of New York is also persuasive.

2015Id. at 616-17 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 (emphases and paragraph break added).

2015Id. at 616-17 , 109 S.Ct. 1402 (emphases and paragraph break added).

1999Court, 105 Wash.2d 278 , 714 P.2d 1183, 1187 (1986) ("If an individual is informed that it is more likely that negative consequences will follow a certain decision, it seems obvious that more pressure is being brought to bear on the accused to make that decision which would avoid the negative consequences."). [8] The record contains no evidence supporting or refuting Wilson's representation of himself as a first-time offender, but we accept this self-portrayal as accurate for purposes of this opinion. [9] The dissent disingenuously claims that, given the "the obvious consequences of taking and

1999Court, 105 Wash.2d 278 , 714 P.2d 1183, 1187 (1986) ("If an individual is informed that it is more likely that negative consequences will follow a certain decision, it seems obvious that more pressure is being brought to bear on the accused to make that decision which would avoid the negative consequences."). [8] The record contains no evidence supporting or refuting Wilson's representation of himself as a first-time offender, but we accept this self-portrayal as accurate for purposes of this opinion. [9] The dissent disingenuously claims that, given the "the obvious consequences of taking and

1999See State v. Moylett, 313 Or. 540 , 836 P.2d 1329, 1333 (1992) (blood test evidence obtained from an arrestee in violation of Oregon's implied consent statute is inadmissible in the arrestee's DUI prosecution); Bartels, 774 P.2d at 1186 (en banc) ("when the State has interfered with a driver's opportunity to make an intelligent judgment whether to submit to a blood alcohol test, we have suppressed test results" in corresponding criminal prosecutions) (citations omitted); State v. Berry, 121 N.H. 324 , 428 A.2d 1250, 1252 (1981) (provisions of New Hampshire's implied consent law apply to "any o

1999See State v. Moylett, 313 Or. 540 , 836 P.2d 1329, 1333 (1992) (blood test evidence obtained from an arrestee in violation of Oregon's implied consent statute is inadmissible in the arrestee's DUI prosecution); Bartels, 774 P.2d at 1186 (en banc) ("when the State has interfered with a driver's opportunity to make an intelligent judgment whether to submit to a blood alcohol test, we have suppressed test results" in corresponding criminal prosecutions) (citations omitted); State v. Berry, 121 N.H. 324 , 428 A.2d 1250, 1252 (1981) (provisions of New Hampshire's implied consent law apply to "any o

1999See State v. Moylett, 313 Or. 540 , 836 P.2d 1329, 1333 (1992) (blood test evidence obtained from an arrestee in violation of Oregon's implied consent statute is inadmissible in the arrestee's DUI prosecution); Bartels, 774 P.2d at 1186 (en banc) ("when the State has interfered with a driver's opportunity to make an intelligent judgment whether to submit to a blood alcohol test, we have suppressed test results" in corresponding criminal prosecutions) (citations omitted); State v. Berry, 121 N.H. 324 , 428 A.2d 1250, 1252 (1981) (provisions of New Hampshire's implied consent law apply to "any o

1999See State v. Moylett, 313 Or. 540, 836 P.2d 1329, 1333 (1992) (blood test evidence obtained from an arrestee in violation of Oregon’s implied consent statute is inadmissible in the arrestee’s DUI prosecution); Bartels, 774 P.2d at 1186 (en banc) (“when the State has interfered with a driver’s opportunity to make an intelligent judgment whether to submit to a blood alcohol test, we have suppressed test results” in corresponding criminal prosecutions) (citations omitted); State v. Berry, 121 N.H. 324 , 428 A.2d 1250, 1252 (1981) (provisions of New Hampshire’s implied consent law apply to “any of

1999See 902 P.2d at 161-62 .

1999See Bostrom, 902 P.2d at 162 ("Amidst this climate of public intolerance for drunk driving, we cannot accept the contention that the implied consent warnings somehow misled the [arrestees] into believing that there could be no immediate administrative consequence for a breath test over the legal limit."). [6] Where the legislature enacts the statute in order to avoid violent confrontation and physical coercion between officers and refusing arrestees, I have difficulty accepting that the difference between three months and a year materially altered the balance of options faced by Wilson and som

1999See State v. Moylett, 313 Or. 540 , 836 P.2d 1329, 1333 (1992) (blood test evidence obtained from an arrestee in violation of Oregon's implied consent statute is inadmissible in the arrestee's DUI prosecution); Bartels, 774 P.2d at 1186 (en banc) ("when the State has interfered with a driver's opportunity to make an intelligent judgment whether to submit to a blood alcohol test, we have suppressed test results" in corresponding criminal prosecutions) (citations omitted); State v. Berry, 121 N.H. 324 , 428 A.2d 1250, 1252 (1981) (provisions of New Hampshire's implied consent law apply to "any o

1999See State v. Moylett, 313 Or. 540 , 836 P.2d 1329, 1333 (1992) (blood test evidence obtained from an arrestee in violation of Oregon's implied consent statute is inadmissible in the arrestee's DUI prosecution); Bartels, 774 P.2d at 1186 (en banc) ("when the State has interfered with a driver's opportunity to make an intelligent judgment whether to submit to a blood alcohol test, we have suppressed test results" in corresponding criminal prosecutions) (citations omitted); State v. Berry, 121 N.H. 324 , 428 A.2d 1250, 1252 (1981) (provisions of New Hampshire's implied consent law apply to "any o

1996Safety, 383 N.W.2d 335, 336-37 (Minn.Ct.App.), review denied (1986) (margin of error did not need to be considered because Minn.Stat. § 169.123, subd. 4 required license revocation “when ‘the test results indicate[d] an alcohol concentration of .10 or more.’ ”).

1996In a number of other jurisdictions, courts have found that the legislature intended that licenses be suspended or revoked if drivers’ BAC tests produced readings above the legal limit, irrespective of the margin of error, because the statutory language provided for revocation based on “test results.” See, e.g., Wieseler v. Prins, 167 Ariz. 223 , 805 P.2d 1044, 1046 (App.1990), review denied (1991) (margin of error did not need to be considered because A.R.S. § 28-694(A) authorized license suspension when “a blood alcohol test result ‘indicate[d] 0.10 or more alcohol concentration in the person

1996In a number of other jurisdictions, courts have found that the legislature intended that licenses be suspended or revoked if drivers’ BAC tests produced readings above the legal limit, irrespective of the margin of error, because the statutory language provided for revocation based on “test results.” See, e.g., Wieseler v. Prins, 167 Ariz. 223 , 805 P.2d 1044, 1046 (App.1990), review denied (1991) (margin of error did not need to be considered because A.R.S. § 28-694(A) authorized license suspension when “a blood alcohol test result ‘indicate[d] 0.10 or more alcohol concentration in the person

1996In a number of other jurisdictions, courts have found that the legislature intended that licenses be suspended or revoked if drivers’ BAC tests produced readings above the legal limit, irrespective of the margin of error, because the statutory language provided for revocation based on “test results.” See, e.g., Wieseler v. Prins, 167 Ariz. 223 , 805 P.2d 1044, 1046 (App.1990), review denied (1991) (margin of error did not need to be considered because A.R.S. § 28-694(A) authorized license suspension when “a blood alcohol test result ‘indicate[d] 0.10 or more alcohol concentration in the person