blood alcohol test in Maine

2017See id.; see also State v. Richford, 519 A.2d 193, 194-96 (Me. 1986) (concluding, in a case were the defendant was charged only under the “impairment” prong of the OUI statute after he refused a blood alcohol test, that the court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining the State’s relevance objection to the defendant’s proffered Widmark formula evidence when the offer of proof did not include any information about his blood alcohol level or “the degree of impairment [he] would have suffered given that range”). [¶ 11] Similar to Gngsby, the sole issue in this case was whether Souther was imp

2017See id.; see also State v. Richford, 519 A.2d 193, 194-96 (Me. 1986) (concluding, in a case were the defendant was charged only under the “impairment” prong of the OUI statute after he refused a blood alcohol test, that the court did not abuse its discretion by sustaining the State’s relevance objection to the defendant’s proffered Widmark formula evidence when the offer of proof did not include any information about his blood alcohol level or “the degree of impairment [he] would have suffered given that range”). [¶ 11] Similar to Gngsby, the sole issue in this case was whether Souther was imp

2017Id. at 504.

2017Souther’s offer of proof therefore was insufficient to establish a nexus between the Widmark-based theoretical blood alcohol level and the issue of impairment. [¶ 12] Perhaps recognizing that deficiency, Souther argues that the missing element in her offer of proof is resolved by the application of 29-A M.R.S. § 2432(1), which provides, “If a person has an alcohol level of 0.05 grams or less of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood or 210 liters of breath, it is prima facie evidence that that person is not under the influence of alcohol.” Construing an earlier version of section 2432, however,

2017Defendant argues that the State is lin1ited to the specific reasons stated in his report and these factors were insufficient for probable cause to arrest the defendant. 2 DISCUSSION Even if the court were to throw out the factors not specifically stated in the police report, defendant would still fail in his argument because "[t]he probable cause standard for requiring a person to take a blood-alcohol test has a very low threshold ." State v. Forsyth, 2002 ME 75, 9 [ 14, 795 A. 2d 66, 70 (citations omitted) "For there to be probable cause for OUI, an officer only needs evidence sufficient ,- •

2017Defendant argues that the State is lin1ited to the specific reasons stated in his report and these factors were insufficient for probable cause to arrest the defendant. 2 DISCUSSION Even if the court were to throw out the factors not specifically stated in the police report, defendant would still fail in his argument because "[t]he probable cause standard for requiring a person to take a blood-alcohol test has a very low threshold ." State v. Forsyth, 2002 ME 75, 9 [ 14, 795 A. 2d 66, 70 (citations omitted) "For there to be probable cause for OUI, an officer only needs evidence sufficient ,- •

2018See Birchfield , 579 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 2185 (referring "approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply"); McNeely , 569 U.S. at 161 , 133 S.Ct. 1552 ; see also South Dakota v. Neville , 459 U.S. 553 , 559-60, 564-66, 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (holding that a license suspension for refusing a blood-alcohol test is "unquestionably legitimate" and that the admission of a suspect's refusal to take a blood-alcohol test violates neither the privilege against self-incrimination

2018See Birchfield , 579 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 2185 (referring "approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply"); McNeely , 569 U.S. at 161 , 133 S.Ct. 1552 ; see also South Dakota v. Neville , 459 U.S. 553 , 559-60, 564-66, 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (holding that a license suspension for refusing a blood-alcohol test is "unquestionably legitimate" and that the admission of a suspect's refusal to take a blood-alcohol test violates neither the privilege against self-incrimination

2018See Birchfield, 579 U.S. at ---, 136 S. Ct. at 2185 (referring “approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply”); McNeely, 569 U.S. at 161 ; see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559-60, 564-66 (1983) (holding that a license suspension for refusing a blood-alcohol test is “unquestionably legitimate” and that the admission of a suspect’s refusal to take a blood-alcohol test violates neither the privilege against self-incrimination nor the suspect’s right to due process).10 The questi

2018See Birchfield , 579 U.S. at ----, 136 S.Ct. at 2185 (referring "approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply"); McNeely , 569 U.S. at 161 , 133 S.Ct. 1552 ; see also South Dakota v. Neville , 459 U.S. 553 , 559-60, 564-66, 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983) (holding that a license suspension for refusing a blood-alcohol test is "unquestionably legitimate" and that the admission of a suspect's refusal to take a blood-alcohol test violates neither the privilege against self-incrimination

2018See Birchfield, 579 U.S. at ---, 136 S. Ct. at 2185 (referring “approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply”); McNeely, 569 U.S. at 161 ; see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559-60, 564-66 (1983) (holding that a license suspension for refusing a blood-alcohol test is “unquestionably legitimate” and that the admission of a suspect’s refusal to take a blood-alcohol test violates neither the privilege against self-incrimination nor the suspect’s right to due process).10 The questi

2018See Birchfield, 579 U.S. at ---, 136 S. Ct. at 2185 (referring “approvingly to the general concept of implied-consent laws that impose civil penalties and evidentiary consequences on motorists who refuse to comply”); McNeely, 569 U.S. at 161 ; see also South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553, 559-60, 564-66 (1983) (holding that a license suspension for refusing a blood-alcohol test is “unquestionably legitimate” and that the admission of a suspect’s refusal to take a blood-alcohol test violates neither the privilege against self-incrimination nor the suspect’s right to due process).10 The questi

2017State v. Pike, 632 A.2d 132, 133 (Me. 1993); State v. Pickering, 462 A.2d 1151, 1156 (Me. 1983) (evidence as to the accuracy and reliability of a blood-alcohol test is an issue for the fact-finder).

1993In State v. Pickering, 462 A.2d 1151, 1156 (Me.1983), we held that evidence as to the accuracy and reliability of a blood-alcohol test was an issue for the factfinder.

2015Taking into account the totality of the observations and circumstances described above, the officer had probable cause to believe the defendant was operating under the influence of intoxicants, and thus arrest the defendant for same.' Probable cause to arrest for purposes of requiring a blood-alcohol test exists when "facts and circumstances of which the arresting officer has reasonably trustworthy information would warrant an ordinarily prudent and cautious police officer to believe the subject did commit or was committing a crime." State v. Boylan, 665 A.2d 1016, 1019 (Me, 1995).

1998PROBABLE CAUSE [¶ 7] Probable cause to arrest for purposes of requiring a blood-alcohol test exists when “facts and circumstances of which the arresting officer has reasonably trustworthy information would warrant an ordinarily prudent and cautious police officer to believe the subject did commit or was committing a crime.” State v. Boylan, 665 A.2d 1016, 1019 (Me.1995).

2002“The probable cause standard for requiring a person to take a blood-alcohol test has a very low threshold.” State v. Webster, 2000 ME 115, ¶ 7 , 754 A.2d 976, 977-78 ; see also State v. Bolduc, 1998 ME 255, ¶ 7 , 722 A.2d 44, 45 (the standard for probable cause is less than that for a fair preponderance of the evidence).

2002“The probable cause standard for requiring a person to take a blood-alcohol test has a very low threshold.” State v. Webster, 2000 ME 115, ¶ 7 , 754 A.2d 976, 977-78 ; see also State v. Bolduc, 1998 ME 255, ¶ 7 , 722 A.2d 44, 45 (the standard for probable cause is less than that for a fair preponderance of the evidence).

2017Conclusions of Law Probable Cause for Test "The probable cause standard for requiring a person to take a blood alcohol test has a very low threshold." State v. Webster, 2000 ME 115 , ! 7, 754 A.2d 976 .

2017Conclusions of Law Probable Cause for Test "The probable cause standard for requiring a person to take a blood alcohol test has a very low threshold." State v. Webster, 2000 ME 115 , ! 7, 754 A.2d 976 .

2016The State has no legitimate interest in allowing law enforcement otlicers "to affinnatively mislead citizens abot1t the consequences of taki1~g or failing to take a blood-alcohol test." Id. (emphasis supplied).

2016The State has no legitimate interest in allowing its law enforcement officers "to affirmatively mislead citizens about the consequences of taking or failing to take a blood-alcohol test." Id.

1983Because a blood-alcohol test does not violate the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 , 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1830-31 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 914 (1966), the issue is, therefore, whether a blood-alcohol test is a “critical stage” of the prosecution.

1983Because a blood-alcohol test does not violate the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 , 86 S.Ct. 1826, 1830-31 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908, 914 (1966), the issue is, therefore, whether a blood-alcohol test is a “critical stage” of the prosecution.

2016XIV, § 1. "[W]hen a defendant asserts that the circumstances surrounding a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test have violated her right to due process, we review the procedures used by the police to determine if the conduct 'offends the community's sense of justice, decency, and fair play."' State v. Bavouset, 2001 ME 141 , ~ 7, 784 A.2d 27 (quoting Roberls v. State of Maine, 48 F.3d 1287, 1291 (1st Cir. 1995)).

2016Protection, 604 A.2d 433, 437 (Me.1992)). "[L]oss of [a defendant's] driver's license is a property interest worthy of due process protection." Stade, 683 A.2d at 166 , See also State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Me.1995). "29-A M.R.S.A. § 2521(3} requires that before a blood-alcohol test is administered to a person suspected of operating under the influence, the law enforcement officer must inform the person of the consequences of the failure to submit to and complete a test." Id. at 165. "[A]n erroneous deprivation of liberty can result from asuspect's behavior under rather dubious circum

2001Moreover, in State v. Cote, 1999 ME 128 , 736 A.2d 262 , we held that an OUI arrestee has no constitutional right to be informed of every possible consequence of refusing to submit to a blood-alcohol test as long as he or she is warned that significant negative consequences will result.

2001Rather, when a defendant asserts that the circumstances surrounding a refusal to take a blood-alcohol test have violated her right to due process, we review the procedures used by the police to determine if the conduct “offends the community’s sense of justice, decency, and fair play.” Id. at ¶ 11, 736 A.2d at 265 (quoting Roberts, 48 F.3d at 1291 ). [¶ 8] In this case, we conclude that Ba-vouset was sufficiently informed that significant negative consequences would result from her refusal and that the officer’s misstatement does not offend the community’s sense of justice, decency, or fan-pla

1983As we explained in Van Reenan, supra, the Legislature has given a motorist the power to refuse a blood-alcohol test, because it did not want law-enforcement officers to use force to obtain those tests.

1983Instead, the State “should rely upon the sanction of suspension to persuade arrested drivers to submit and to influence other drivers to maintain sobriety.” State v. Van Reenan, 355 A.2d 392, 395 (Me.1976).

2025See, e.g., State v. Vliet, 19 P.3d 42 , 62 13 (Haw. 2001) (relying on Tibbetts for the proposition that “[a]n expert’s application of the Widmark formula to assess the defendant’s BAC goes to the weight the jury should assign such testimony, rather than to the admissibility of the testimony itself” and noting that “[i]t may be error for a trial court to exclude expert testimony involving a Widmark calculation”); State v. Fode, 452 N.W.2d 779, 781-82 (S.D. 1990) (affirming the admission of chemist’s testimony extrapolating defendant’s BAC “based upon [the defendant’s] body weight [and] the time

2025See, e.g., State v. Vliet, 19 P.3d 42 , 62 13 (Haw. 2001) (relying on Tibbetts for the proposition that “[a]n expert’s application of the Widmark formula to assess the defendant’s BAC goes to the weight the jury should assign such testimony, rather than to the admissibility of the testimony itself” and noting that “[i]t may be error for a trial court to exclude expert testimony involving a Widmark calculation”); State v. Fode, 452 N.W.2d 779, 781-82 (S.D. 1990) (affirming the admission of chemist’s testimony extrapolating defendant’s BAC “based upon [the defendant’s] body weight [and] the time

2025But see Evans v. State, 558 S.E.2d 51, 56 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding the exclusion of expert testimony when “there was an insufficient factual basis upon which [the expert] could accurately calculate [the defendant’s] blood alcohol content using the Widmark formula” (alterations, quotation marks, and footnotes omitted)); State v. Wolf, 605 N.W.2d 381, 385 (Minn. 2000) (affirming exclusion of expert testimony because “[t]he record does not contain such basic information as when [the defendant] last consumed alcoholic beverages, the amount and type of alcohol consumed, or even his accurate h

2019Therefore, the instructions constituted 7 In State v. Pineau, we stated that a suspect’s “failure to comply with the statutory obligation [to submit to a blood-alcohol test] is admissible in evidence on the issue of whether he was operating while under the influence.” 491 A.2d 1165, 1167 (Me. 1985).

2019In support of that proposition, we cited the now-repealed 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312(8) (Supp. 1983-1984), which read, in relevant part, “[t]he failure of a person to comply with the duty . . . to submit to a blood-alcohol test shall be admissible in evidence on the issue of whether that person was under the influence of intoxicating liquor.” (Emphasis added.) Pineau, 491 A.2d at 1167 ; see P.L. 1993, ch. 683, § A-1 (effective Jan. 1, 1995).

2019See State v. Morrison, 2015 ME 153 , ! 9, 128 A.3d 1060 .

2019See State v. Morrison, 2015 ME 153 , ! 9, 128 A.3d 1060 .

2017Voluntary ~tatements In order to find a statement voluntary, the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the statement resulted from the "defendant's exercise of his own free will and rational intellect." State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120, 1123-24 (Me. 1982).

2017State v. Pike, 632 A.2d 132, 133 (Me. 1993); State v. Pickering, 462 A.2d 1151, 1156 (Me. 1983) (evidence as to the accuracy and reliability of a blood-alcohol test is an issue for the fact-finder).

2016Protection, 604 A.2d 433, 437 (Me.1992)). "[L]oss of [a defendant's] driver's license is a property interest worthy of due process protection." Stade, 683 A.2d at 166 , See also State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Me.1995). "29-A M.R.S.A. § 2521(3} requires that before a blood-alcohol test is administered to a person suspected of operating under the influence, the law enforcement officer must inform the person of the consequences of the failure to submit to and complete a test." Id. at 165. "[A]n erroneous deprivation of liberty can result from asuspect's behavior under rather dubious circum

2016Protection, 604 A.2d 433, 437 (Me.1992)). "[L]oss of [a defendant's] driver's license is a property interest worthy of due process protection." Stade, 683 A.2d at 166 , See also State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1267 (Me.1995). "29-A M.R.S.A. § 2521(3} requires that before a blood-alcohol test is administered to a person suspected of operating under the influence, the law enforcement officer must inform the person of the consequences of the failure to submit to and complete a test." Id. at 165. "[A]n erroneous deprivation of liberty can result from asuspect's behavior under rather dubious circum

2014Those decisions, however, are inapposite because they relate to the admissibility of breath tests administered by the State and (1) offered by the State to attempt to prove an element of the crime of operating under the influence, see, e.g., Ifill, 560 A.2d at 1077 (stating that the results of a state-administered portable ALERT test are inadmissible), or (2) offered by a defendant attempting to rebut the State’s evidence, see State v. McConvey, 459 A.2d 562, 569 (Me.1983) (“Blood-alcohol test results may be admissible as rebuttal evidence provided the results are reliable.”). [¶ 10] We agree