blood alcohol test in Alaska

2001Similarly, AS 28.15.165(c), mandates license revocation for drivers who fail statutorily authorized breath tests or who refuse to submit to the tests—refusal remains a ground for revocation regardless of what the test results would have been. [26] See Brown v. State, 739 P.2d 182, 183 (Alaska App.1987) (defendant may be guilty of criminal refusal to submit to a breath test regardless of whether he believed himself to be intoxicated); Svedlund v. Municipality of Anchorage, 671 P.2d 378, 386 (Alaska App.1983) (same); Jensen v. State, 667 P.2d 188, 190 (Alaska App. 1983)(same).

2001Whisenhunt v. State, Department of Public Safety, Division of Motor Vehicles, 746 P.2d 1298 (Alaska 1987), and Smith v. State, 948 P.2d 473 (Alaska 1997), both cited by Snyder, concern only the right of an arrestee to contact an attorney under AS 12.25.150. [23] 930 P.2d at 1277-78 . [24] See, e.g., Briggs, 732 P.2d at 1082-83 (where criminal DWI case resulted in suppression of the defendant's breath test results on due process grounds, State was collaterally estopped from relitigating the suppression issue in a subsequent license revocation proceeding). [25] As we noted in Snyder I, "[r]efusa

2001Similarly, AS 28.15.165(c), mandates license revocation for drivers who fail statutorily authorized breath tests or who refuse to submit to the tests—refusal remains a ground for revocation regardless of what the test results would have been. [26] See Brown v. State, 739 P.2d 182, 183 (Alaska App.1987) (defendant may be guilty of criminal refusal to submit to a breath test regardless of whether he believed himself to be intoxicated); Svedlund v. Municipality of Anchorage, 671 P.2d 378, 386 (Alaska App.1983) (same); Jensen v. State, 667 P.2d 188, 190 (Alaska App. 1983)(same).

2001Similarly, AS 28.15.165(c), mandates license revocation for drivers who fail statutorily authorized breath tests or who refuse to submit to the tests—refusal remains a ground for revocation regardless of what the test results would have been. [26] See Brown v. State, 739 P.2d 182, 183 (Alaska App.1987) (defendant may be guilty of criminal refusal to submit to a breath test regardless of whether he believed himself to be intoxicated); Svedlund v. Municipality of Anchorage, 671 P.2d 378, 386 (Alaska App.1983) (same); Jensen v. State, 667 P.2d 188, 190 (Alaska App. 1983)(same).

1993See also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 ; 105 S.Ct. 1611, 1617 ; 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985): “Schmerber recognized society’s judgment that blood tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an individual’s personal privacy and bodily integrity.” All doubt on this point was laid to rest in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 , 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), where the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a state may “force a person suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood-alcohol test”, and that any right of the motorist to refuse a blood test was a matter of leg

1993See also Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 ; 105 S.Ct. 1611, 1617 ; 84 L.Ed.2d 662 (1985): “Schmerber recognized society’s judgment that blood tests do not constitute an unduly extensive imposition on an individual’s personal privacy and bodily integrity.” All doubt on this point was laid to rest in South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 , 103 S.Ct. 916 , 74 L.Ed.2d 748 (1983), where the Supreme Court reaffirmed that a state may “force a person suspected of driving while intoxicated to submit to a blood-alcohol test”, and that any right of the motorist to refuse a blood test was a matter of leg

1983See, e.g., Page v. State, 657 P.2d 850 (Alaska App.1983) (where an inference from one specific fact to another fact requires reliance on a proposition of generalized knowledge, which is not subject to judicial notice, the proposition must be proved by expert testimony).

1983See, e.g., Page v. State, 657 P.2d 850 (Alaska App. 1983) (where an inference from one specific fact to another fact requires reliance on a proposition of generalized knowledge, which is not subject to judicial notice, the proposition must be proved by expert testimony).

1983See also Johnson v. State, 662 P.2d 981, 987 (Alaska App.1983) (police request that suspect submit to combing for public hair did not constitute interrogation); Coleman v. State, 658 P.2d 1364, 1365-66 (Alaska App.1983) (since there is no constitutional right to refuse to take the breathalyzer examination, the refusal cannot be protected by the privilege against self-incrimination).

1983See also Johnson v. State, 662 P.2d 981, 987 (Alaska App.1983) (police request that suspect submit to combing for public hair did not constitute interrogation); Coleman v. State, 658 P.2d 1364, 1365-66 (Alaska App.1983) (since there is no constitutional right to refuse to take the breathalyzer examination, the refusal cannot be protected by the privilege against self-incrimination).

1983As we stated in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 [ 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 ] (1980), police words or actions “normally attendant to arrest and custody” do not constitute interrogation.

1983As we stated in Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 [ 100 S.Ct. 1682, 1689 , 64 L.Ed.2d 297 ] (1980), police words or actions “normally attendant to arrest and custody” do not constitute interrogation.

1982In making this argument, Nelson looks to Alaska’s Implied Consent Statutes, AS 28.35.031 and 28.35.032, and he relies on Anchorage v. Geher, 592 P.2d 1187, 1191 (Alaska 1979), wherein it was held that once a breath test is refused, no other chemical test can be administered.

1981The majority opinion places the burden on the defendant motorist to establish her confusion before the arresting officer is required to explain that the Miranda rights are not applicable to the breathalyzer examination proceedings. [2] Although that holding is consistent with those in a number of jurisdictions, see West v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 275 Cal. App.2d 908 , 80 Cal. Rptr. 385, 387-88 (1969); Swenumson v. Department of Public Safety, 210 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Iowa 1973); Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724 , 211 N.W.2d 906, 910 (1973); State v. Riba, 10 Wash. App. 857 , 520 P.2d 942, 9

1981The majority opinion places the burden on the defendant motorist to establish her confusion before the arresting officer is required to explain that the Miranda rights are not applicable to the breathalyzer examination proceedings. [2] Although that holding is consistent with those in a number of jurisdictions, see West v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 275 Cal. App.2d 908 , 80 Cal. Rptr. 385, 387-88 (1969); Swenumson v. Department of Public Safety, 210 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Iowa 1973); Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724 , 211 N.W.2d 906, 910 (1973); State v. Riba, 10 Wash. App. 857 , 520 P.2d 942, 9

1981The majority opinion places the burden on the defendant motorist to establish her confusion before the arresting officer is required to explain that the Miranda rights are not applicable to the breathalyzer examination proceedings. [2] Although that holding is consistent with those in a number of jurisdictions, see West v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 275 Cal. App.2d 908 , 80 Cal. Rptr. 385, 387-88 (1969); Swenumson v. Department of Public Safety, 210 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Iowa 1973); Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724 , 211 N.W.2d 906, 910 (1973); State v. Riba, 10 Wash. App. 857 , 520 P.2d 942, 9

1981The majority opinion places the burden on the defendant motorist to establish her confusion before the arresting officer is required to explain that the Miranda rights are not applicable to the breathalyzer examination proceedings. 2 Although that holding is consistent with those in a number of jurisdictions, see West v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 275 Cal.App.2d 908 , 80 Cal.Rptr. 385, 387-88 (1969); Swenumson v. Department of Public Safety, 210 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Iowa 1973); Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724 , 211 N.W.2d 906, 910 (1973); State v. Riba, 10 Wash.App. 857 , 520 P.2d 942, 945 (1

1981The majority opinion places the burden on the defendant motorist to establish her confusion before the arresting officer is required to explain that the Miranda rights are not applicable to the breathalyzer examination proceedings. [2] Although that holding is consistent with those in a number of jurisdictions, see West v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 275 Cal. App.2d 908 , 80 Cal. Rptr. 385, 387-88 (1969); Swenumson v. Department of Public Safety, 210 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Iowa 1973); Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724 , 211 N.W.2d 906, 910 (1973); State v. Riba, 10 Wash. App. 857 , 520 P.2d 942, 9

1981The majority opinion places the burden on the defendant motorist to establish her confusion before the arresting officer is required to explain that the Miranda rights are not applicable to the breathalyzer examination proceedings. [2] Although that holding is consistent with those in a number of jurisdictions, see West v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 275 Cal. App.2d 908 , 80 Cal. Rptr. 385, 387-88 (1969); Swenumson v. Department of Public Safety, 210 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Iowa 1973); Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724 , 211 N.W.2d 906, 910 (1973); State v. Riba, 10 Wash. App. 857 , 520 P.2d 942, 9

1981The majority opinion places the burden on the defendant motorist to establish her confusion before the arresting officer is required to explain that the Miranda rights are not applicable to the breathalyzer examination proceedings. [2] Although that holding is consistent with those in a number of jurisdictions, see West v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 275 Cal. App.2d 908 , 80 Cal. Rptr. 385, 387-88 (1969); Swenumson v. Department of Public Safety, 210 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Iowa 1973); Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724 , 211 N.W.2d 906, 910 (1973); State v. Riba, 10 Wash. App. 857 , 520 P.2d 942, 9

1981The majority opinion places the burden on the defendant motorist to establish her confusion before the arresting officer is required to explain that the Miranda rights are not applicable to the breathalyzer examination proceedings. [2] Although that holding is consistent with those in a number of jurisdictions, see West v. Department of Motor Vehicles, 275 Cal. App.2d 908 , 80 Cal. Rptr. 385, 387-88 (1969); Swenumson v. Department of Public Safety, 210 N.W.2d 660, 663 (Iowa 1973); Wiseman v. Sullivan, 190 Neb. 724 , 211 N.W.2d 906, 910 (1973); State v. Riba, 10 Wash. App. 857 , 520 P.2d 942, 9

1981Applying the same concept of fairness from Ellis to the circumstances in Rust, the court of appeal required that when a driver expresses a misconception of his Miranda rights, by a request for an attorney, the officer "should have qualified his advice" by stating that the right to counsel was inapplicable to the blood alcohol test. 73 Cal. Rptr. at 368.

1981Applying the same concept of fairness from Ellis to the circumstances in Rust, the court of appeal required that when a driver expresses a misconception of his Miranda rights, by a request for an attorney, the officer “should have qualified his advice” by stating that the right to counsel was inapplicable to the blood alcohol test. 73 Cal.Rptr. at 368.

1979See also Oveson v. Municipality of Anchorage, 574 P.2d 801 (Alaska 1978).