94 Illinois opinions name it 2 courts 1972–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
People v. Wegielnikgreen2 sentences2006Further, in looking at this state’s consent statute (625 ILCS 5/11— 501.1 (West 2002)), our supreme court has stated the following: “The implied-consent statute serves the legislative purpose of promoting highway safety by assisting in the determination of whether drivers suspected of intoxication are in fact under the influence of alcohol. [Citation.] The threat of summary suspension for refusing to take a blood-alcohol test motivates drivers to take the test, thereby allowing the State to obtain objective evidence of intoxication.” People v. Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d 418, 425 , 605 N.E.2d 487, 2006Further, in looking at this state’s consent statute (625 ILCS 5/11— 501.1 (West 2002)), our supreme court has stated the following: “The implied-consent statute serves the legislative purpose of promoting highway safety by assisting in the determination of whether drivers suspected of intoxication are in fact under the influence of alcohol. [Citation.] The threat of summary suspension for refusing to take a blood-alcohol test motivates drivers to take the test, thereby allowing the State to obtain objective evidence of intoxication.” People v. Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d 418, 425 , 605 N.E.2d 487, | 5 | 13 |
People v. Espositogreen2 sentences1998See also People v. Esposito, 121 Ill. 2d 491, 510 (1988); 7A Am. 1998See also People v. Esposito , 121 Ill. 2d 491, 510 (1988); 7A Am. | 2 | 5 |
People v. Coffingreen2 sentences2008App. 3d 595, 598-600 , 712 N.E.2d 909, 911-12 (1999) (holding that the State is not estopped from using the result of a blood-alcohol test performed on a blood sample obtained in a hospital emergency room to prosecute the defendant for DUI even though the State previously used the defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test to obtain summary suspension of his driver's license as the positions taken by the State were not factually inconsistent). 2008App. 3d 595, 598-600 , 712 N.E.2d 909, 911-12 (1999) (holding that the State is not estopped from using the result of a blood-alcohol test performed on a blood sample obtained in a hospital emergency room to prosecute the defendant for DUI even though the State previously used the defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test to obtain summary suspension of his driver’s license as the positions taken by the State were not factually inconsistent). | 2 | 3 |
People v. Eghangreen2 sentences2016Compare People v. Eghan, 344 Ill. 2016Compare People v. Eghan, 344 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Careygreen2 sentences2011To the extent that defendant argues that the toxicology results of his blood and urine tests should have been suppressed because they were obtained after his arrest in the absence of Miranda warnings, we reiterate that "police inquiry into whether a suspect would submit to a blood-alcohol test [is] not interrogation within the meaning of Miranda . " People v. Bell, 261 Ill.App.3d 980, 981 , 202 Ill.Dec. 559 , 638 N.E.2d 205, 206 (1994); see also People v. Carey, 386 Ill.App.3d 254, 267 , 325 Ill.Dec. 848 , 898 N.E.2d 1127, 1139 (2008) (results of a State-compelled blood-alcohol test constitute 2011To the extent that defendant argues that the toxicology results of his blood and urine tests should have been suppressed because they were obtained after his arrest in the absence of Miranda warnings, we reiterate that "police inquiry into whether a suspect would submit to a blood-alcohol test [is] not interrogation within the meaning of Miranda . " People v. Bell, 261 Ill.App.3d 980, 981 , 202 Ill.Dec. 559 , 638 N.E.2d 205, 206 (1994); see also People v. Carey, 386 Ill.App.3d 254, 267 , 325 Ill.Dec. 848 , 898 N.E.2d 1127, 1139 (2008) (results of a State-compelled blood-alcohol test constitute | 2 | 2 |
People v. Bellgreen2 sentences2011To the extent that defendant argues that the toxicology results of his blood and urine tests should have been suppressed because they were obtained after his arrest in the absence of Miranda warnings, we reiterate that "police inquiry into whether a suspect would submit to a blood-alcohol test [is] not interrogation within the meaning of Miranda . " People v. Bell, 261 Ill.App.3d 980, 981 , 202 Ill.Dec. 559 , 638 N.E.2d 205, 206 (1994); see also People v. Carey, 386 Ill.App.3d 254, 267 , 325 Ill.Dec. 848 , 898 N.E.2d 1127, 1139 (2008) (results of a State-compelled blood-alcohol test constitute 2011To the extent that defendant argues that the toxicology results of his blood and urine tests should have been suppressed because they were obtained after his arrest in the absence of Miranda warnings, we reiterate that "police inquiry into whether a suspect would submit to a blood-alcohol test [is] not interrogation within the meaning of Miranda . " People v. Bell, 261 Ill.App.3d 980, 981 , 202 Ill.Dec. 559 , 638 N.E.2d 205, 206 (1994); see also People v. Carey, 386 Ill.App.3d 254, 267 , 325 Ill.Dec. 848 , 898 N.E.2d 1127, 1139 (2008) (results of a State-compelled blood-alcohol test constitute | 2 | 2 |
People v. Millergreen2 sentences2005See People v. Miller , 166 Ill. 2005See People v. Miller, 166 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
People v. Gayfieldgreen2 sentences2002App. 3d at 598 (holding that the State is not estopped from using results of a blood-alcohol test performed on blood sample obtained in a hospital emergency room to prosecute the defendant for DUI, even though the State previously used defendant’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test to obtain summary suspension of driver’s license; the positions taken by the State were not factually inconsistent); People v. Gayfield, 261 Ill. 2002App.3d at 598 , 238 Ill.Dec. 805 , 712 N.E.2d 909 (holding that the State is not estopped from using results of a blood-alcohol test performed on blood sample obtained in a hospital emergency room to prosecute the defendant for DUI, even though the State previously used defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test to obtain summary suspension of driver's license; the positions taken by the State were not factually inconsistent); People v. Gayfield, 261 Ill.App.3d 379, 386 , 199 Ill.Dec. 123 , 633 N.E.2d 919 (1994) (holding that the State did not take contradictory positions in two pro | 2 | 2 |
People v. Wisbrockgreen2 sentences2002App.3d at 598 , 238 Ill.Dec. 805 , 712 N.E.2d 909 (holding that the State is not estopped from using results of a blood-alcohol test performed on blood sample obtained in a hospital emergency room to prosecute the defendant for DUI, even though the State previously used defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test to obtain summary suspension of driver's license; the positions taken by the State were not factually inconsistent); People v. Gayfield, 261 Ill.App.3d 379, 386 , 199 Ill.Dec. 123 , 633 N.E.2d 919 (1994) (holding that the State did not take contradictory positions in two pro 2002App.3d at 598 , 238 Ill.Dec. 805 , 712 N.E.2d 909 (holding that the State is not estopped from using results of a blood-alcohol test performed on blood sample obtained in a hospital emergency room to prosecute the defendant for DUI, even though the State previously used defendant's refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test to obtain summary suspension of driver's license; the positions taken by the State were not factually inconsistent); People v. Gayfield, 261 Ill.App.3d 379, 386 , 199 Ill.Dec. 123 , 633 N.E.2d 919 (1994) (holding that the State did not take contradictory positions in two pro | 2 | 2 |
People v. Wilbergreen2 sentences2000See People v. Wilber , 279 Ill. 2000See People v. Wilber, 279 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
Marshall v. Osborngreen2 sentences1998See Marshall , 213 Ill. 1998See Marshall, 213 Ill. | 2 | 2 |
South Dakota v. Nevillegreen2 sentences1992Ed. 2d at 760 , 103 S. Ct. at 923 .) Due process does not require that police warn drivers of the consequences of refusing to take a blood-alcohol test pursuant to an implied-consent statute. 1990Ed. 2d 748, 759 , 103 S. Ct. 916, 923 ; People v. Rolfingsmeyer (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 137, 142 .) The Neville Court specifically stated that a police officer’s inquiry as to whether a defendant will take a blood-alcohol test is not an interrogation within the context of Miranda. | 1 | 10 |
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusettsgreen2 sentences2013Second, Justice Thomas, a deciding vote, wrote a concurrence distancing himself from consideration of the purpose of the out-of-court statement and repeating his prior position that the confrontation clause is implicated only by extrajudicial statements “ ‘contained in formalized testimonial materials.’ ” Id. at 329 (Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 365 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, joined by Scalia, J.)). ¶ 53 In Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. ___ , 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011), the Supreme Court considered whether a defe 2012Id. at ___ n.6, 131 S. Ct. at 2714 n.6. ¶ 109 As applied to the facts of this case, the blood-alcohol test results were testimonial in nature because the report was “created solely for an ‘evidentiary purpose’ *** in aid of a police investigation.” Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2717 (quoting Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at ___ , 129 S. Ct. at 2532 ). | 1 | 4 |
People v. Fortneygreen2 sentences2019App. 3d at 540 (quoting People v. Fortney, 297 Ill. 2018App. 3d at 540 , 325 Ill.Dec. 599 , 898 N.E.2d 646 (quoting People v. Fortney , 297 Ill. | 1 | 2 |
People v. Steppangreen2 sentences2019App. 3d at 678 (citing People v. Steppan, 105 Ill. 2d 310, 316 (1985)). ¶ 30 In keeping with Ernst and the language of section 11-501.4-1, we find no error in Trooper Krzysiak’s consideration of the results of the hospital’s blood alcohol test in determining whether there were reasonable grounds to believe defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. 2018App. 3d at 678 , 244 Ill.Dec. 264 , 725 N.E.2d 59 (citing People v. Steppan , 105 Ill. 2d 310 , 316, 85 Ill.Dec. 495 , 473 N.E.2d 1300 (1985) ). ¶ 30 In keeping with Ernst and the language of section 11-501.4-1, we find no error in Troop Krzysiak's consideration of the results of the hospital's blood alcohol test in determining whether there were reasonable grounds to believe defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Kirbygreen | 1 | 2 |
| People v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| White v. Illinoisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Ayresgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Byrdgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hartgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Hathawaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Walljaspergreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Wolskgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences1990Ed. 2d 908 , 86 S. Ct. 1826 , the Supreme Court in Neville held that the admission into evidence of a motorist’s refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test did not constitute a fifth amendment violation and thus was not protected by the privilege against self-incrimination. 1979App. 3d 700 , 338 N.E.2d 480 , held another portion of the section applicable to a charge of involuntary manslaughter even though the section is captioned “Article V, Driving While Intoxicated, Transporting Alcoholic Liquor, and Reckless Driving.” As to the refusal to submit to a blood-alcohol test, Schmerber v. California (1966), 384 U.S. 757 , 16 L. | 5 | 1972–2021 |
Bullcoming v. New Mexico
green
2 sentences2015Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2709 . ¶ 48 In vacating the defendant’s conviction, the Bullcoming Court stressed that the blood-alcohol test results were testimonial in nature because the report was created solely for an “ ‘evidentiary purpose’ ” in aid of a police investigation. 2015Id. at ___, 131 S. Ct. at 2709 . ¶ 48 In vacating the defendant’s conviction, the Bullcoming Court stressed that the blood-alcohol test results were testimonial in nature because the report was created solely for an “ ‘evidentiary purpose’ ” in aid of a police investigation. | 4 | 2012–2015 |
People v. Rolfingsmeyer
green
2 sentences1998(People v. Rolfingsmeyer (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 137, 139 .) The threat of summary suspension for refusing to take a blood-alcohol test motivates drivers to take the test, thereby allowing the State to obtain objective evidence of intoxication.” Wegielnik, 152 Ill. 2d at 425 . 1998As this court has explained, “The implied-consent statute serves the legislative purpose of promoting highway safety by assisting in the determination of whether drivers suspected of intoxication are in fact under the influence of alcohol. ( People v. Rolfingsmeyer (1984), 101 Ill. 2d 137, 139 .) The threat of summary suspension for refusing to take a blood-alcohol test motivates drivers to take the test, thereby allowing the State to obtain objective evidence of intoxication.” Wegielnik , 152 Ill. 2d at 425 . | 4 | 1990–1998 |
Cuellar v. Hout
green
2 sentences2008Cuellar v. Hout, 168 Ill. 1999In Cuellar, the court concluded that, “[sjince this is not a prosecution for driving under the influence and section 11—501.2(a) of the Illinois Vehicle Code does not apply, the ordinary standards of admissibility apply to the evidence of the blood-alcohol test.” Cuellar, 168 Ill. | 3 | 1999–2008 |
People v. Henderson
green
2 sentences2024Id. 8 ¶ 21 Defendant argues that a motion to suppress the blood-alcohol test results on grounds that the warrantless blood search violated his fourth amendment rights would have been meritorious and that the trial outcome would have been different had the evidence been suppressed. 2024Id. 8 ¶ 21 Defendant argues that a motion to suppress the blood-alcohol test results on grounds that the warrantless blood search violated his fourth amendment rights would have been meritorious and that the trial outcome would have been different had the evidence been suppressed. | 2 | 2024–2024 |
People v. Wozniak
green
2 sentences2021Wozniak, 199 Ill. 2020Wozniak, 199 Ill. | 2 | 2020–2021 |
People v. Fonner
green
2 sentences2019Rather, the trooper merely testified to his knowledge of the blood alcohol test results as one piece of background information that, in combination with other factors, led him to effectuate an arrest of defendant for driving under the influence. ¶ 34 “To determine whether reasonable grounds and/or probable cause existed for a defendant’s arrest, a court ‘must determine whether a reasonable and prudent person, having the knowledge possessed by the officer at the time of the arrest, would believe the defendant committed the offense.’ ” Fonner, 385 Ill. 2018App. 3d at 539 -40 , 325 Ill.Dec. 599 , 898 N.E.2d 646 (in proceedings on a petition to rescind a statutory summary suspension "reasonable grounds" is synonymous with "probable cause"). ¶ 32 We find that, by permitting and, in fact, requiring the release of the blood alcohol test results to law enforcement when there has been a motor vehicle collision, it is reasonable to conclude that the legislature, in enacting section 11-501.4-1, intended that the blood alcohol test results would be used by law enforcement to determine reasonable grounds to believe a defendant has been driving impaired for | 2 | 2018–2019 |
People v. Nohren
green
2 sentences2015Nohren, 283 Ill. 2015Nohren, 283 Ill. | 2 | 2015–2015 |
People v. Krueger
green
2 sentences2012As most DUI arrests are of motorists who have been driving or in control of vehicles on the highway, the necessary finding of reasonable cause will generally be tantamount to a finding that the arrest was legal, and a finding of no probable cause will necessitate rescission of the suspension even where the motorist failed or refused to take a blood-alcohol test." (Emphasis added.) People v. Krueger, 208 Ill.App.3d at 906 , 153 Ill.Dec. 759 , 567 N.E.2d 717 . ¶ 33 The Krueger court then succinctly held that, under the Vehicle Code, the Secretary of State's power to suspend a driver's license is 2012As most DUI arrests are of motorists who have been driving or in control of vehicles on the highway, the necessary finding of reasonable cause will generally be tantamount to a finding that the arrest was legal, and a finding of no probable cause will necessitate rescission of the suspension even where the motorist failed or refused to take a blood-alcohol test." (Emphasis added.) People v. Krueger, 208 Ill.App.3d at 906 , 153 Ill.Dec. 759 , 567 N.E.2d 717 . ¶ 33 The Krueger court then succinctly held that, under the Vehicle Code, the Secretary of State's power to suspend a driver's license is | 2 | 2012–2012 |
Fink v. Ryan
green
2 sentences2011In Fink, 174 Ill. 2d at 311 , this implied-consent statute was held constitutional because it was narrowly drawn to apply only to drivers involved in more serious accidents, in which the expectation of privacy is diminished and the administration of the blood-alcohol test is minimally intrusive. 2011In Fink, 174 Ill. 2d at 311 , this implied-consent statute was held constitutional because it was narrowly drawn to apply only to drivers involved in more serious accidents, in which the expectation of privacy is diminished and the administration of the blood-alcohol test is minimally intrusive. | 2 | 2011–2011 |
People v. Newberry
green
2 sentences2006XIV), and, on the authority of People v. Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d 310 , 652 N.E.2d 288 (1995), and Rule 415(g)(i) (134 Ill. 2d R. 415(g)(i)), he requested a suppression of the blood alcohol analysis. 2006XIV), and, on the authority of People v. Newberry, 166 Ill. 2d 310 , 652 N.E.2d 288 (1995), and Rule 415(g)(i) (134 Ill. 2d R. 415(g)(i)), he requested a suppression of the blood alcohol analysis. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
People v. Menssen
green
2 sentences2002A simple mathematical calculation would show that translating the serum-alcohol results to blood-alcohol level still places defendant in a state of intoxication.” Menssen, 263 Ill. 2002A simple mathematical calculation would show that translating the serum-alcohol results to blood-alcohol level still places defendant in a state of intoxication." Menssen , 263 Ill. | 2 | 2002–2002 |
Village of Algonquin v. Ford
green
2 sentences2001Village of Algonquin v. Ford, 145 Ill. 2001Village of Algonquin v. Ford , 145 Ill. | 2 | 2001–2001 |
Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc.
green
2 sentences2000The trial court ruled that this was a violation of the principles articulated in Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc. , 148 Ill. 2000The trial court ruled that this was a violation of the principles articulated in Petrillo v. Syntex Laboratories, Inc., 148 Ill. | 2 | 2000–2000 |
Village of Cary v. Jakubek
green
2 sentences1999The court in Kern found as follows: “[W]hile a defendant’s conditioning his taking of a blood-alcohol test on his ability to consult legal counsel may constitute a refusal (Village of Cary v. Jakubek (1984) 121 Ill. 1989Additionally, we note that while a defendant’s conditioning his taking of a blood-alcohol test on his ability to consult legal counsel may constitute a refusal (Village of Cary v. Jakubek (1984), 121 Ill. | 2 | 1989–1999 |
| People v. Honaker green | 2 | 1985–1992 |
| People v. Murphy green | 2 | 1988–1992 |
| People v. Leffew green | 2 | 1979–1983 |
| Village of Bull Valley, Illinois v. Winterpacht green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Hutchinson green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| People v. Ernst green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| People v. Hasselbring green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Bauer green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| People v. Hasselbring green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| City of Seattle v. Ludvigsen green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Ludvigsen v. City of Seattle green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| People Ex Rel. Fisher v. Carey green | 1 | 1996–1996 |
| People v. Mueller green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| People v. Reardon neutral | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| Wilson v. Clark green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Thomas green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Lendabarker green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| People v. Roberts green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Doyle v. Ohio green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Martinez v. Peterson green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Solzak green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| Yokoyama v. Commissioner of Public Safety green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| People v. Wegielnik neutral | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Hurbean green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| In Re Summary Susp. of Driver's License green | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.