elementary principle in Washington

2015FDIC claims the exemption applies to a court-ordered sale where a receiver is appointed under RCW 7.60.025(1 )(c) to "give effect to the judgment." FDIC claims the language "to give effect to the judgment" is the same as "execution" of a judgment." We disagree with FDIC. " '[l]t is an elementary rule that where the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent.'" Guillen v. Contreras. 169 Wn.2d 769, 776 , 238 P.3d 1168 (2010)8 (quoting State v. Jackson, 137 Wn.2d 712, 724 , 976 P.2d 1229 (1999)).

2015FDIC claims the exemption applies to a court-ordered sale where a receiver is appointed under RCW 7.60.025(l)(c) to “give effect to the judgment.” FDIC claims the language “to give effect to the judgment” is the same as “execution of a judgment.” We disagree with FDIC. ¶27 “ ‘[fit is an elementary rule that where the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent.’ ” Guillen v. Contreras, 169 Wn.2d 769, 776 , 238 P.3d 1168 (2010) 7 (quoting State v. Jackson, 137 Wn.2d 712, 724 , 976 P.2d 1229 (1999)).

2015FDIC claims the exemption applies to a court-ordered sale where a receiver is appointed under RCW 7.60.025(1 )(c) to "give effect to the judgment." FDIC claims the language "to give effect to the judgment" is the same as "execution" of a judgment." We disagree with FDIC. " '[l]t is an elementary rule that where the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent.'" Guillen v. Contreras. 169 Wn.2d 769, 776 , 238 P.3d 1168 (2010)8 (quoting State v. Jackson, 137 Wn.2d 712, 724 , 976 P.2d 1229 (1999)).

2015FDIC claims the exemption applies to a court-ordered sale where a receiver is appointed under RCW 7.60.025(l)(c) to “give effect to the judgment.” FDIC claims the language “to give effect to the judgment” is the same as “execution of a judgment.” We disagree with FDIC. ¶27 “ ‘[fit is an elementary rule that where the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent.’ ” Guillen v. Contreras, 169 Wn.2d 769, 776 , 238 P.3d 1168 (2010) 7 (quoting State v. Jackson, 137 Wn.2d 712, 724 , 976 P.2d 1229 (1999)).

2015FDIC claims the exemption applies to a court-ordered sale where a receiver is appointed under RCW 7.60.025(1 )(c) to "give effect to the judgment." FDIC claims the language "to give effect to the judgment" is the same as "execution" of a judgment." We disagree with FDIC. " '[l]t is an elementary rule that where the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent.'" Guillen v. Contreras. 169 Wn.2d 769, 776 , 238 P.3d 1168 (2010)8 (quoting State v. Jackson, 137 Wn.2d 712, 724 , 976 P.2d 1229 (1999)).

2015FDIC claims the exemption applies to a court-ordered sale where a receiver is appointed under RCW 7.60.025(l)(c) to “give effect to the judgment.” FDIC claims the language “to give effect to the judgment” is the same as “execution of a judgment.” We disagree with FDIC. ¶27 “ ‘[fit is an elementary rule that where the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent.’ ” Guillen v. Contreras, 169 Wn.2d 769, 776 , 238 P.3d 1168 (2010) 7 (quoting State v. Jackson, 137 Wn.2d 712, 724 , 976 P.2d 1229 (1999)).

2015FDIC claims the exemption applies to a court-ordered sale where a receiver is appointed under RCW 7.60.025(1 )(c) to "give effect to the judgment." FDIC claims the language "to give effect to the judgment" is the same as "execution" of a judgment." We disagree with FDIC. " '[l]t is an elementary rule that where the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent.'" Guillen v. Contreras. 169 Wn.2d 769, 776 , 238 P.3d 1168 (2010)8 (quoting State v. Jackson, 137 Wn.2d 712, 724 , 976 P.2d 1229 (1999)).

2015FDIC claims the exemption applies to a court-ordered sale where a receiver is appointed under RCW 7.60.025(l)(c) to “give effect to the judgment.” FDIC claims the language “to give effect to the judgment” is the same as “execution of a judgment.” We disagree with FDIC. ¶27 “ ‘[fit is an elementary rule that where the Legislature uses certain statutory language in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent.’ ” Guillen v. Contreras, 169 Wn.2d 769, 776 , 238 P.3d 1168 (2010) 7 (quoting State v. Jackson, 137 Wn.2d 712, 724 , 976 P.2d 1229 (1999)).

1947“That the power to make and correct surveys of the public lands belongs to the political department of the government and that, whilst the lands are subject to the supervision of the General Land Office, the decisions of that bureau in all such cases, like that of other special tribunals upon matters within their exclusive jurisdiction, are unassailable by the courts, except by a direct proceeding; and that the latter have no concurrent or original power to make similar corrections, if not an elementary principle of our land law, is settled by such a mass of decisions of this court that its me

1947“That the power to make and correct surveys of the public lands belongs to the political department of the government and that, whilst the lands are subject to the supervision of the General Land Office, the decisions of that bureau in all such cases, like that of other special tribunals upon matters within their exclusive jurisdiction, are unassailable by the courts, except by a direct proceeding; and that the latter have no concurrent or original power to make similar corrections, if not an elementary principle of our land law, is settled by such a mass of decisions of this court that its me

1941In one of the recent cases re-announcing the doctrine, Central Metal Products Corporation v. O’Brien, 278 Fed. 827 , it is said ‘it is settled law that one may not induce or persuade, much less coerce, one to break his contract with another.’ New England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern, 218 Mass. 198 , 105 N. E. 885 ; Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council of Santa Clara County, 154 Cal. 581 , 98 Pac. 1027 .

1941In one of the recent cases re-announcing the doctrine, Central Metal Products Corporation v. O’Brien, 278 Fed. 827 , it is said ‘it is settled law that one may not induce or persuade, much less coerce, one to break his contract with another.’ New England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern, 218 Mass. 198 , 105 N. E. 885 ; Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council of Santa Clara County, 154 Cal. 581 , 98 Pac. 1027 .

1941In one of the recent cases re-announcing the doctrine, Central Metal Products Corporation v. O’Brien, 278 Fed. 827 , it is said ‘it is settled law that one may not induce or persuade, much less coerce, one to break his contract with another.’ New England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern, 218 Mass. 198 , 105 N. E. 885 ; Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council of Santa Clara County, 154 Cal. 581 , 98 Pac. 1027 .

1923In one of the recent cases re-announcing the doctrine, Central Metal Products Corporation v. O’Brien, 278 Fed. 827 , it is said “it is settled law that one may not induce or persuade, much less coerce, one to break his contract with another.” New England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern, 218 Mass. 198 , 105 N. E. 885 ; Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council of Santa Clara County, 154 Cal. 581 , 98 Pac. 1027 .

1941In one of the recent cases re-announcing the doctrine, Central Metal Products Corporation v. O’Brien, 278 Fed. 827 , it is said ‘it is settled law that one may not induce or persuade, much less coerce, one to break his contract with another.’ New England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern, 218 Mass. 198 , 105 N. E. 885 ; Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council of Santa Clara County, 154 Cal. 581 , 98 Pac. 1027 .

1941In one of the recent cases re-announcing the doctrine, Central Metal Products Corporation v. O’Brien, 278 Fed. 827 , it is said ‘it is settled law that one may not induce or persuade, much less coerce, one to break his contract with another.’ New England Cement Gun Co. v. McGivern, 218 Mass. 198 , 105 N. E. 885 ; Parkinson Co. v. Building Trades Council of Santa Clara County, 154 Cal. 581 , 98 Pac. 1027 .

1937Thorpe v. Tenem Ditch Co., 1 Wash, 566 ( 20 Pac. 588 ); Geddis v. Parrish, 1 Wash. 587 ( 21 Pac. 314 ); Black, Pomeroy’s Water Rights, § 68, and following.

1901Thorpe v. Tenem Ditch Co., 1 Wash. 566 ( 20 Pac. 588 ) ; Geddis v. Parrish, 1 Wash. 587 ( 21 Pac. 314 ) ; Black, Pomeroy’s Water Bights, § 68, and following.

1937Thorpe v. Tenem Ditch Co., 1 Wash, 566 ( 20 Pac. 588 ); Geddis v. Parrish, 1 Wash. 587 ( 21 Pac. 314 ); Black, Pomeroy’s Water Rights, § 68, and following.

1901Thorpe v. Tenem Ditch Co., 1 Wash. 566 ( 20 Pac. 588 ) ; Geddis v. Parrish, 1 Wash. 587 ( 21 Pac. 314 ) ; Black, Pomeroy’s Water Bights, § 68, and following.

1937Thorpe v. Tenem Ditch Co., 1 Wash, 566 ( 20 Pac. 588 ); Geddis v. Parrish, 1 Wash. 587 ( 21 Pac. 314 ); Black, Pomeroy’s Water Rights, § 68, and following.

1901Thorpe v. Tenem Ditch Co., 1 Wash. 566 ( 20 Pac. 588 ) ; Geddis v. Parrish, 1 Wash. 587 ( 21 Pac. 314 ) ; Black, Pomeroy’s Water Bights, § 68, and following.

2025In support of their argument, First Liberty cites Palmer v. Washington Securities Investment Company in which the court stated: It is an elementary rule of law that, to successfully insist upon the rescission of a contract for the purchase of real estate for nonperformance by the [seller], a [buyer] must not only be without default, but he must also be able to show by competent evidence that he has performed the agreement upon his part, or is in a position to do so, and willing to do so. 43 Wash. 451, 455 , 86 P. 640 (1906) (emphasis added).

2025In support of their argument, First Liberty cites Palmer v. Washington Securities Investment Company in which the court stated: It is an elementary rule of law that, to successfully insist upon the rescission of a contract for the purchase of real estate for nonperformance by the [seller], a [buyer] must not only be without default, but he must also be able to show by competent evidence that he has performed the agreement upon his part, or is in a position to do so, and willing to do so. 43 Wash. 451, 455 , 86 P. 640 (1906) (emphasis added).

2000In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 8 , 969 P.2d 21 (1998). [67] In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d at 8, 969 P.2d 21 . [68] Accord Seeber, 96 Wash.2d at 139 , 634 P.2d 303 . ("It is an elementary rule that where certain language is used in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent."). [69] Chapter 42.17 RCW. [70] 2 U.S.C. § 431-55 . [71] Geschwind v. Flanagan, 121 Wash.2d 833, 840 , 854 P.2d 1061 (1993). [72] Geschwind, 121 Wash.2d at 841 , 854 P.2d 1061 . [73] Double D Hop Ranch v. Sanchez, 133 Wash.2d 793, 799 , 947 P.2d 727 , 952 P.2d

2000In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 8 , 969 P.2d 21 (1998). [67] In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d at 8, 969 P.2d 21 . [68] Accord Seeber, 96 Wash.2d at 139 , 634 P.2d 303 . ("It is an elementary rule that where certain language is used in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent."). [69] Chapter 42.17 RCW. [70] 2 U.S.C. § 431-55 . [71] Geschwind v. Flanagan, 121 Wash.2d 833, 840 , 854 P.2d 1061 (1993). [72] Geschwind, 121 Wash.2d at 841 , 854 P.2d 1061 . [73] Double D Hop Ranch v. Sanchez, 133 Wash.2d 793, 799 , 947 P.2d 727 , 952 P.2d

2000In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 8 , 969 P.2d 21 (1998). [67] In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d at 8, 969 P.2d 21 . [68] Accord Seeber, 96 Wash.2d at 139 , 634 P.2d 303 . ("It is an elementary rule that where certain language is used in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent."). [69] Chapter 42.17 RCW. [70] 2 U.S.C. § 431-55 . [71] Geschwind v. Flanagan, 121 Wash.2d 833, 840 , 854 P.2d 1061 (1993). [72] Geschwind, 121 Wash.2d at 841 , 854 P.2d 1061 . [73] Double D Hop Ranch v. Sanchez, 133 Wash.2d 793, 799 , 947 P.2d 727 , 952 P.2d

2000In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 8 , 969 P.2d 21 (1998). [67] In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d at 8, 969 P.2d 21 . [68] Accord Seeber, 96 Wash.2d at 139 , 634 P.2d 303 . ("It is an elementary rule that where certain language is used in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent."). [69] Chapter 42.17 RCW. [70] 2 U.S.C. § 431-55 . [71] Geschwind v. Flanagan, 121 Wash.2d 833, 840 , 854 P.2d 1061 (1993). [72] Geschwind, 121 Wash.2d at 841 , 854 P.2d 1061 . [73] Double D Hop Ranch v. Sanchez, 133 Wash.2d 793, 799 , 947 P.2d 727 , 952 P.2d

2000In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 8 , 969 P.2d 21 (1998). [67] In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d at 8, 969 P.2d 21 . [68] Accord Seeber, 96 Wash.2d at 139 , 634 P.2d 303 . ("It is an elementary rule that where certain language is used in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent."). [69] Chapter 42.17 RCW. [70] 2 U.S.C. § 431-55 . [71] Geschwind v. Flanagan, 121 Wash.2d 833, 840 , 854 P.2d 1061 (1993). [72] Geschwind, 121 Wash.2d at 841 , 854 P.2d 1061 . [73] Double D Hop Ranch v. Sanchez, 133 Wash.2d 793, 799 , 947 P.2d 727 , 952 P.2d

2000In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 8 , 969 P.2d 21 (1998). [67] In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d at 8, 969 P.2d 21 . [68] Accord Seeber, 96 Wash.2d at 139 , 634 P.2d 303 . ("It is an elementary rule that where certain language is used in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent."). [69] Chapter 42.17 RCW. [70] 2 U.S.C. § 431-55 . [71] Geschwind v. Flanagan, 121 Wash.2d 833, 840 , 854 P.2d 1061 (1993). [72] Geschwind, 121 Wash.2d at 841 , 854 P.2d 1061 . [73] Double D Hop Ranch v. Sanchez, 133 Wash.2d 793, 799 , 947 P.2d 727 , 952 P.2d

2000In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 8 , 969 P.2d 21 (1998). [67] In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d at 8, 969 P.2d 21 . [68] Accord Seeber, 96 Wash.2d at 139 , 634 P.2d 303 . ("It is an elementary rule that where certain language is used in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent."). [69] Chapter 42.17 RCW. [70] 2 U.S.C. § 431-55 . [71] Geschwind v. Flanagan, 121 Wash.2d 833, 840 , 854 P.2d 1061 (1993). [72] Geschwind, 121 Wash.2d at 841 , 854 P.2d 1061 . [73] Double D Hop Ranch v. Sanchez, 133 Wash.2d 793, 799 , 947 P.2d 727 , 952 P.2d

2000In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 8 , 969 P.2d 21 (1998). [67] In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d at 8, 969 P.2d 21 . [68] Accord Seeber, 96 Wash.2d at 139 , 634 P.2d 303 . ("It is an elementary rule that where certain language is used in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent."). [69] Chapter 42.17 RCW. [70] 2 U.S.C. § 431-55 . [71] Geschwind v. Flanagan, 121 Wash.2d 833, 840 , 854 P.2d 1061 (1993). [72] Geschwind, 121 Wash.2d at 841 , 854 P.2d 1061 . [73] Double D Hop Ranch v. Sanchez, 133 Wash.2d 793, 799 , 947 P.2d 727 , 952 P.2d

2000In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d 1, 8 , 969 P.2d 21 (1998). [67] In re Custody of Smith, 137 Wash.2d at 8, 969 P.2d 21 . [68] Accord Seeber, 96 Wash.2d at 139 , 634 P.2d 303 . ("It is an elementary rule that where certain language is used in one instance, and different language in another, there is a difference in legislative intent."). [69] Chapter 42.17 RCW. [70] 2 U.S.C. § 431-55 . [71] Geschwind v. Flanagan, 121 Wash.2d 833, 840 , 854 P.2d 1061 (1993). [72] Geschwind, 121 Wash.2d at 841 , 854 P.2d 1061 . [73] Double D Hop Ranch v. Sanchez, 133 Wash.2d 793, 799 , 947 P.2d 727 , 952 P.2d

1991We long ago stated: It is an elementary principle of the law of appropriation of water for irrigation that the first appropriator is entitled to the quantity of water appropriated by him, to the exclusion of subsequent claimants .... *241 Longmire, 26 Wash. at 447 .

1986Because it is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word of a statute, Hayes v. Yount, 87 Wn.2d 280, 290 , 552 P.2d 1038 (1976); Western Wash. Cement Masons Funds v. Hillis Homes, Inc., 26 Wn.

1986Because it is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word of a statute, Hayes v. Yount, 87 Wn.2d 280, 290 , 552 P.2d 1038 (1976); Western Wash. Cement Masons Funds v. Hillis Homes, Inc., 26 Wn.

1986Because it is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word of a statute, Hayes v. Yount, 87 Wn.2d 280, 290 , 552 P.2d 1038 (1976); Western Wash. Cement Masons Funds v. Hillis Homes, Inc., 26 Wn.

1986App. 224, 232 , 612 P.2d 436 (1980); 2A N. Singer, Statutory Construction § 46.06, at 104 (4th ed. 1984), we conclude that the Legislature did not intend to limit the meaning of damages to the diminution in value.

1981Crawford v. Burke, *140 195 U.S. 176, 190 , 49 L.Ed. 147 , 25 S.Ct. 9 (1904); Lankford v. Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, 620 F.2d 35, 36 (4th Cir.1980); Aurora Pizza Hut, Inc. v. Hayter, 79 Ill.