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19 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1907–2018 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hardaway v. Southern Railwaygreen2 sentences2018Co., 90 S.C. 475, 488-89 , 73 S.E. 1020, 1025 (1912) ("It is an elementary principle that no action will lie to recover money voluntarily paid with full knowledge of all the facts" and "'without any fraud, duress, or extortion, although no obligation to make such payment existed.'" (quoting 30 Cyc. 1298)); Moody v. Stem, 214 S.C. 45, 60 , 51 S.E.2d 163, 169 (1948) ("Ordinarily money voluntarily paid on a claim of right, with full knowledge of all the facts, in the absence of fraud, duress, or compulsion, cannot be recovered back merely because the aggrieved party was ignorant of the law relati 2018Co., 90 S.C. 475, 488-89 , 73 S.E. 1020, 1025 (1912) ("It is an elementary principle that no action will lie to recover money voluntarily paid with full knowledge of all the facts" and "'without any fraud, duress, or extortion, although no obligation to make such payment existed.'" (quoting 30 Cyc. 1298)); Moody v. Stem, 214 S.C. 45, 60 , 51 S.E.2d 163, 169 (1948) ("Ordinarily money voluntarily paid on a claim of right, with full knowledge of all the facts, in the absence of fraud, duress, or compulsion, cannot be recovered back merely because the aggrieved party was ignorant of the law relati | 2 | 3 |
Pond Place Partners, Inc. v. Poolegreen2 sentences2018As to whether the trial court erred in imposing a two-year statute of limitations on its slander of title cause of action: Pond Place Partners, Inc. v. Poole, 351 S.C. 1, 18 , 567 S.E.2d 881, 890 (Ct. App. 2002) ("The term 'slander of title' is defined as a false and malicious statement, oral or written, made in disparagement of a person's title to real or personal property, causing him injury." (quoting 50 Am. 2018As to whether the trial court erred in imposing a two-year statute of limitations on its slander of title cause of action: Pond Place Partners, Inc. v. Poole, 351 S.C. 1, 18 , 567 S.E.2d 881, 890 (Ct. App. 2002) ("The term 'slander of title' is defined as a false and malicious statement, oral or written, made in disparagement of a person's title to real or personal property, causing him injury." (quoting 50 Am. | 1 | 1 |
Moody v. Stemgreen2 sentences2018Co., 90 S.C. 475, 488-89 , 73 S.E. 1020, 1025 (1912) ("It is an elementary principle that no action will lie to recover money voluntarily paid with full knowledge of all the facts" and "'without any fraud, duress, or extortion, although no obligation to make such payment existed.'" (quoting 30 Cyc. 1298)); Moody v. Stem, 214 S.C. 45, 60 , 51 S.E.2d 163, 169 (1948) ("Ordinarily money voluntarily paid on a claim of right, with full knowledge of all the facts, in the absence of fraud, duress, or compulsion, cannot be recovered back merely because the aggrieved party was ignorant of the law relati 2018Co., 90 S.C. 475, 488-89 , 73 S.E. 1020, 1025 (1912) ("It is an elementary principle that no action will lie to recover money voluntarily paid with full knowledge of all the facts" and "'without any fraud, duress, or extortion, although no obligation to make such payment existed.'" (quoting 30 Cyc. 1298)); Moody v. Stem, 214 S.C. 45, 60 , 51 S.E.2d 163, 169 (1948) ("Ordinarily money voluntarily paid on a claim of right, with full knowledge of all the facts, in the absence of fraud, duress, or compulsion, cannot be recovered back merely because the aggrieved party was ignorant of the law relati | 1 | 1 |
Simmons v. City of Columbiagreen2 sentences2013See Adams v. Texfi Indus., 320 S.C. 213, 217 , 464 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1995) (“In construing a statute, the Court looks to its language as a whole in light of its manifest purpose.” (citing Simmons v. City of Columbia, 280 S.C. 163 , 311 S.E.2d 732 (1984))); Cokeley v. Robert Lee, Inc., 197 S.C. 157, 169 , 14 S.E.2d 889, 894 (1941) (“While it is an elementary rule of construction that words used in a statute should be given their plain and ordinary meaning this, as all other rules, is subject to the prime object of ascertaining and giving effect to the legislative intention. 2013See Adams v. Texfi Indus., 320 S.C. 213, 217 , 464 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1995) (“In construing a statute, the Court looks to its language as a whole in light of its manifest purpose.” (citing Simmons v. City of Columbia, 280 S.C. 163 , 311 S.E.2d 732 (1984))); Cokeley v. Robert Lee, Inc., 197 S.C. 157, 169 , 14 S.E.2d 889, 894 (1941) (“While it is an elementary rule of construction that words used in a statute should be given their plain and ordinary meaning this, as all other rules, is subject to the prime object of ascertaining and giving effect to the legislative intention. | 1 | 1 |
Adams v. Texfi Industriesgreen2 sentences2013See Adams v. Texfi Indus., 320 S.C. 213, 217 , 464 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1995) (“In construing a statute, the Court looks to its language as a whole in light of its manifest purpose.” (citing Simmons v. City of Columbia, 280 S.C. 163 , 311 S.E.2d 732 (1984))); Cokeley v. Robert Lee, Inc., 197 S.C. 157, 169 , 14 S.E.2d 889, 894 (1941) (“While it is an elementary rule of construction that words used in a statute should be given their plain and ordinary meaning this, as all other rules, is subject to the prime object of ascertaining and giving effect to the legislative intention. 2013See Adams v. Texfi Indus., 320 S.C. 213, 217 , 464 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1995) (“In construing a statute, the Court looks to its language as a whole in light of its manifest purpose.” (citing Simmons v. City of Columbia, 280 S.C. 163 , 311 S.E.2d 732 (1984))); Cokeley v. Robert Lee, Inc., 197 S.C. 157, 169 , 14 S.E.2d 889, 894 (1941) (“While it is an elementary rule of construction that words used in a statute should be given their plain and ordinary meaning this, as all other rules, is subject to the prime object of ascertaining and giving effect to the legislative intention. | 1 | 1 |
Cokeley v. Robert Lee, Inc.green2 sentences2013See Adams v. Texfi Indus., 320 S.C. 213, 217 , 464 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1995) (“In construing a statute, the Court looks to its language as a whole in light of its manifest purpose.” (citing Simmons v. City of Columbia, 280 S.C. 163 , 311 S.E.2d 732 (1984))); Cokeley v. Robert Lee, Inc., 197 S.C. 157, 169 , 14 S.E.2d 889, 894 (1941) (“While it is an elementary rule of construction that words used in a statute should be given their plain and ordinary meaning this, as all other rules, is subject to the prime object of ascertaining and giving effect to the legislative intention. 2013See Adams v. Texfi Indus., 320 S.C. 213, 217 , 464 S.E.2d 109, 112 (1995) (“In construing a statute, the Court looks to its language as a whole in light of its manifest purpose.” (citing Simmons v. City of Columbia, 280 S.C. 163 , 311 S.E.2d 732 (1984))); Cokeley v. Robert Lee, Inc., 197 S.C. 157, 169 , 14 S.E.2d 889, 894 (1941) (“While it is an elementary rule of construction that words used in a statute should be given their plain and ordinary meaning this, as all other rules, is subject to the prime object of ascertaining and giving effect to the legislative intention. | 1 | 1 |
Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc.green2 sentences2009Co. of Sumter, Inc. , 357 S.C. 363, 367 , 593 S.E.2d 170, 172 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding an action for breach of contract seeking damages is an action at law); Sea Cabins on the Ocean IV Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of North Myrtle Beach , 337 S.C. 380, 388 , 523 S.E.2d 193, 197 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating in an action at law, an appellate court must affirm a master's factual findings unless no evidence reasonably supporting those findings); Parks v. Lyons , 219 S.C. 40, 48 , 64 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1951) ("It is an elementary principle that one who seeks to recover damages for the breach of a contra 2009Co. of Sumter, Inc. , 357 S.C. 363, 367 , 593 S.E.2d 170, 172 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding an action for breach of contract seeking damages is an action at law); Sea Cabins on the Ocean IV Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of North Myrtle Beach , 337 S.C. 380, 388 , 523 S.E.2d 193, 197 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating in an action at law, an appellate court must affirm a master's factual findings unless no evidence reasonably supporting those findings); Parks v. Lyons , 219 S.C. 40, 48 , 64 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1951) ("It is an elementary principle that one who seeks to recover damages for the breach of a contra | 1 | 1 |
Electro-Lab of Aiken, Inc. v. Sharp Construction Co. of Sumter, Inc.green2 sentences2009Co. of Sumter, Inc. , 357 S.C. 363, 367 , 593 S.E.2d 170, 172 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding an action for breach of contract seeking damages is an action at law); Sea Cabins on the Ocean IV Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of North Myrtle Beach , 337 S.C. 380, 388 , 523 S.E.2d 193, 197 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating in an action at law, an appellate court must affirm a master's factual findings unless no evidence reasonably supporting those findings); Parks v. Lyons , 219 S.C. 40, 48 , 64 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1951) ("It is an elementary principle that one who seeks to recover damages for the breach of a contra 2009Co. of Sumter, Inc. , 357 S.C. 363, 367 , 593 S.E.2d 170, 172 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding an action for breach of contract seeking damages is an action at law); Sea Cabins on the Ocean IV Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of North Myrtle Beach , 337 S.C. 380, 388 , 523 S.E.2d 193, 197 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating in an action at law, an appellate court must affirm a master's factual findings unless no evidence reasonably supporting those findings); Parks v. Lyons , 219 S.C. 40, 48 , 64 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1951) ("It is an elementary principle that one who seeks to recover damages for the breach of a contra | 1 | 1 |
Sea Cabins on the Ocean IV Homeowners Ass'n v. City of North Myrtle Beachgreen2 sentences2009Co. of Sumter, Inc. , 357 S.C. 363, 367 , 593 S.E.2d 170, 172 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding an action for breach of contract seeking damages is an action at law); Sea Cabins on the Ocean IV Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of North Myrtle Beach , 337 S.C. 380, 388 , 523 S.E.2d 193, 197 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating in an action at law, an appellate court must affirm a master's factual findings unless no evidence reasonably supporting those findings); Parks v. Lyons , 219 S.C. 40, 48 , 64 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1951) ("It is an elementary principle that one who seeks to recover damages for the breach of a contra 2009Co. of Sumter, Inc. , 357 S.C. 363, 367 , 593 S.E.2d 170, 172 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding an action for breach of contract seeking damages is an action at law); Sea Cabins on the Ocean IV Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of North Myrtle Beach , 337 S.C. 380, 388 , 523 S.E.2d 193, 197 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating in an action at law, an appellate court must affirm a master's factual findings unless no evidence reasonably supporting those findings); Parks v. Lyons , 219 S.C. 40, 48 , 64 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1951) ("It is an elementary principle that one who seeks to recover damages for the breach of a contra | 1 | 1 |
Parks v. LYONSgreen2 sentences2009Co. of Sumter, Inc. , 357 S.C. 363, 367 , 593 S.E.2d 170, 172 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding an action for breach of contract seeking damages is an action at law); Sea Cabins on the Ocean IV Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of North Myrtle Beach , 337 S.C. 380, 388 , 523 S.E.2d 193, 197 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating in an action at law, an appellate court must affirm a master's factual findings unless no evidence reasonably supporting those findings); Parks v. Lyons , 219 S.C. 40, 48 , 64 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1951) ("It is an elementary principle that one who seeks to recover damages for the breach of a contra 2009Co. of Sumter, Inc. , 357 S.C. 363, 367 , 593 S.E.2d 170, 172 (Ct. App. 2004) (holding an action for breach of contract seeking damages is an action at law); Sea Cabins on the Ocean IV Homeowners Ass'n, Inc. v. City of North Myrtle Beach , 337 S.C. 380, 388 , 523 S.E.2d 193, 197 (Ct. App. 1999) (stating in an action at law, an appellate court must affirm a master's factual findings unless no evidence reasonably supporting those findings); Parks v. Lyons , 219 S.C. 40, 48 , 64 S.E.2d 123, 126 (1951) ("It is an elementary principle that one who seeks to recover damages for the breach of a contra | 1 | 1 |
Duncan Ex Rel. Will of Duncan v. Investors Diversified Services, Inc.green2 sentences1997Inc., 285 S.C. 467, 470 , 330 S.E.2d 295, 296 (1985) (“Generally, and by analogy, with respect to an ordinary life insurance policy, it is an elementary principle of law that if a policy is validly issued, then, in the absence of a contrary provision in the policy, a contrary statute, or a contrary insurance regulation, the rights of the beneficiary are not affected even though the beneficiary ceases to have an insurable interest in the life of the insured.”). 1997Inc., 285 S.C. 467, 470 , 330 S.E.2d 295, 296 (1985) (“Generally, and by analogy, with respect to an ordinary life insurance policy, it is an elementary principle of law that if a policy is validly issued, then, in the absence of a contrary provision in the policy, a contrary statute, or a contrary insurance regulation, the rights of the beneficiary are not affected even though the beneficiary ceases to have an insurable interest in the life of the insured.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cockerhamgreen2 sentences1990See State v. Cockerham , 294 S.C. 380 , 365 S.E. (2d) 22 (1988); State v. Linder , 276 S.C. 304 , 278 S.E. (2d) 335 (1981). 1990See State v. Cockerham , 294 S.C. 380 , 365 S.E. (2d) 22 (1988); State v. Linder , 276 S.C. 304 , 278 S.E. (2d) 335 (1981). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Pennoyer v. Neff
red
2 sentences1966And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity ; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions. * * *" (Emphasis added.) Pennoyer v. Neff , 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L. 1966And so it is laid down by jurists, as an elementary principle, that the laws of one State have no operation outside of its territory, except so far as is allowed by comity ; and that no tribunal established by it can extend its process beyond that territory so as to subject either persons or property to its decisions. * * *" (Emphasis added.) Pennoyer v. Neff , 95 U.S. 714 , 24 L. | 4 | 1966–2006 |
State Ex Rel. Walker v. Sawyer
green
2 sentences1942Walker v. Sawyer, 104 S. C., 342, 88 S. E., 894 , 895: While it is an elementary rule of construction that words used in a statute should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, this, as all other rules, is subject to the prime object of ascertaining and giving effect to the legislative intention. 1935Walker v. Sawyer, 104 S. C., 342, 88 S. E., 894 , 895 : “While it is an elementary rule of construction that words used in a statute should be given their plain and ordinary meaning, this, as all other rules, is subject to the prime object of ascertaining and giving effect to the legislative intention. | 3 | 1935–1942 |
State v. Pickens
green
2 sentences2010In support of his argument, Wiley cites to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); 2 State v. Primus, 349 S.C. 576 , 564 S.E.2d 103 (2002) 3 overruled on other grounds by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93 , 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005); and State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528 , 466 S.E.2d 364 , (1996). 4 In the present matter, the trial court sustained Wiley’s objection and gave a curative instruction. 2010In support of his argument, Wiley cites to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); 2 State v. Primus, 349 S.C. 576 , 564 S.E.2d 103 (2002) 3 overruled on other grounds by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93 , 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005); and State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528 , 466 S.E.2d 364 , (1996). 4 In the present matter, the trial court sustained Wiley’s objection and gave a curative instruction. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Gentry
green
2 sentences2010In support of his argument, Wiley cites to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); 2 State v. Primus, 349 S.C. 576 , 564 S.E.2d 103 (2002) 3 overruled on other grounds by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93 , 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005); and State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528 , 466 S.E.2d 364 , (1996). 4 In the present matter, the trial court sustained Wiley’s objection and gave a curative instruction. 2010In support of his argument, Wiley cites to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); 2 State v. Primus, 349 S.C. 576 , 564 S.E.2d 103 (2002) 3 overruled on other grounds by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93 , 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005); and State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528 , 466 S.E.2d 364 , (1996). 4 In the present matter, the trial court sustained Wiley’s objection and gave a curative instruction. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
State v. Primus
green
2 sentences2010In support of his argument, Wiley cites to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); 2 State v. Primus, 349 S.C. 576 , 564 S.E.2d 103 (2002) 3 overruled on other grounds by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93 , 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005); and State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528 , 466 S.E.2d 364 , (1996). 4 In the present matter, the trial court sustained Wiley’s objection and gave a curative instruction. 2010In support of his argument, Wiley cites to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); 2 State v. Primus, 349 S.C. 576 , 564 S.E.2d 103 (2002) 3 overruled on other grounds by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93 , 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005); and State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528 , 466 S.E.2d 364 , (1996). 4 In the present matter, the trial court sustained Wiley’s objection and gave a curative instruction. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Doyle v. Ohio
green
2 sentences2010In support of his argument, Wiley cites to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); 2 State v. Primus, 349 S.C. 576 , 564 S.E.2d 103 (2002) 3 overruled on other grounds by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93 , 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005); and State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528 , 466 S.E.2d 364 , (1996). 4 In the present matter, the trial court sustained Wiley’s objection and gave a curative instruction. 2010In support of his argument, Wiley cites to Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 , 96 S.Ct. 2240 , 49 L.Ed.2d 91 (1976); 2 State v. Primus, 349 S.C. 576 , 564 S.E.2d 103 (2002) 3 overruled on other grounds by State v. Gentry, 363 S.C. 93 , 610 S.E.2d 494 (2005); and State v. Pickens, 320 S.C. 528 , 466 S.E.2d 364 , (1996). 4 In the present matter, the trial court sustained Wiley’s objection and gave a curative instruction. | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Inman Ex Rel. Estate of Inman v. Thompson
green
2 sentences1996Inman v. Thompson, 297 S.C. 221 , 375 S.E.2d 358 (Ct.App.1988) (affirming a verdict for the plaintiff, holding even if the trial court erred in charging the doctrine of last clear chance, it could not be determined whether the jury could have found that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident or merely that the child was not contributorily negligent). 1996Inman v. Thompson, 297 S.C. 221 , 375 S.E.2d 358 (Ct.App.1988) (affirming a verdict for the plaintiff, holding even if the trial court erred in charging the doctrine of last clear chance, it could not be determined whether the jury could have found that the defendant had the last clear chance to avoid the accident or merely that the child was not contributorily negligent). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Linder
green
2 sentences1990See State v. Cockerham , 294 S.C. 380 , 365 S.E. (2d) 22 (1988); State v. Linder , 276 S.C. 304 , 278 S.E. (2d) 335 (1981). 1990See State v. Cockerham , 294 S.C. 380 , 365 S.E. (2d) 22 (1988); State v. Linder , 276 S.C. 304 , 278 S.E. (2d) 335 (1981). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Moore v. Waters, County Superintendent of Education
neutral
1 sentence1935In doing this, we are not to be governed by the apparent meaning of words found in one clause, sentence, or part of the Act, but by a consideration of the whole Act, read in the light of the conditions and circumstances as we may judicially know they appeared to the Legislature, and the purpose sought to be ac *293 complished.” To illustrate: This Court has held, in order to effectuate legislative intention, that “and” should read “or” (Robson v. Cantwell, 143 S. C., 104, 141 S. E., 180 , 181); that “may” is often construed “must” or “shall” (Moore v. Waters, 148 S. C., 326, 146 S. E., 92 ); t | 1 | 1935–1935 |
Wood v. Victor Mfg. Co.
neutral
1 sentence1930Co., 66 S. C., 482, 45 S. E., 81 , 82: “The elementary rule is that it is the duty of the employer to furnish appliances free from defects discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care. * * * The employee * * * has the right to rest on the assumption that appliances furnished are free from the defects discoverable by proper inspection.” (Emphasis added), The logical effect of the charge complained of is that, if there is a defect in an appliance, latent, not obvious, “that could not be seen,” regardless of the plainly circumscribed duty of the master above set out, to exercise reasonable care | 1 | 1930–1930 |
Ariail v. Ariail
green
1 sentence1923In Vernon v. Ehrich’s Ex’rs, 2 Hill, Eq., 259, 261, Judge Harper, while conceding that in a suit in equity the administrator was a necessary party, intimated that an action at law by a creditor might be sustained against the heir alone, and that in such an action “the executor neither would nor could be joined.” There are expressions of like import in Reeder v. Speake, 4 S. C., 293; Lanier v. Griffin, 11 S. C., 582; and Ariail v. Ariail, 29 S. C., 84, 7 S. E., 35 . | 1 | 1923–1923 |
Utsey v. Hiott
neutral
1 sentence1907The rule by which this question is to be determined is thus stated in Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations, approved in Utsey v. Hiott, 30 S. C., 360, 9 S. E., 338 : “It would be inconsistent with all just principles of constitutional law to adjudge these enactments void because they are associated in the same act, but not connected with or dependent upon others which are constitutional; when, therefore, a part of a statute is unconstitutional that fact does not authorize the Court to declare the remainder void also unless all the provisions are connected in subject matter depending on each oth | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.