elementary rule in Texas

2021See City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 29 (Tex. 2003) (explaining that Legislature would not have illustrated four types of specific power if “general control” could be read to include power of annexation and quoting Spence v. Fenchler, 107 Tex. 443 , 180 S.W. 597, 601 (1915), for proposition that “[i]t is an elementary rule of construction that, when possible to do so, effect must be given to every sentence, clause, and word of a statute so that no part thereof be rendered superfluous or inoperative”).

2020See City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 20 (Tex. 2003) (rejecting construction that would render some statutory language unnecessary and citing Spence v. Fenchler, 180 S.W. 597, 601 (Tex. 1915), for proposition that “[i]t is an elementary rule of construction that, when possible to do so, effect must be given to every sentence, clause, and word of a statute so that no part thereof be rendered superfluous or inoperative”).

2023Subsection 74.104(b) then states in relevant Auth. v. Medina, 627 S.W.3d 618 , 628 (Tex. 2021) (“It is an elementary rule of construction that, when possible to do so, effect must be given to every sentence, clause, and word of a statute so that no part thereof be rendered superfluous or inoperative.” (quoting Spence v. Fenchler, 180 S.W. 597, 601 (Tex. 1915))). 3 While you ask only about a district judge’s authority to appoint a court coordinator pursuant to Government Code section 74.101, we note that courts also possess inherent authority “derived not from statute but born of the constituti

2021End, Inc., 463 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam); see Spence v. Fenchler, 180 S.W. 597, 601 (Tex. 1915) (“It is an elementary rule of construction that, when possible to do so, effect must be given to every sentence, clause, and word of a statute so that no part thereof be rendered superfluous or inoperative.”).

2018Sanchez v. State, 995 S.W.2d 677, 683 (Tex. Crim.

2018Sanchez v. State , 995 S.W.2d 677 , 683 (Tex. Crim.

2000However, “[i]t is an elementary principle that before one person can be held responsible for the acts of another, in the absence of special circumstances, it must appear that the latter was the agent of the former.” Moreland v. Leslie, 140 Tex. 170 , 166 S.W.2d 902, 904 (1942).

2000However, “[i]t is an elementary principle that before one person can be held responsible for the acts of another, in the absence of special circumstances, it must appear that the latter was the agent of the former.” Moreland v. Leslie, 140 Tex. 170 , 166 S.W.2d 902, 904 (1942).

2025Tex. Motor Lines, Inc. v. Hodges, 158 S.W.2d 487 , 488 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1942) (“It is an elementary principle supported by many authorities that a litigant cannot ask something of a court and then complain that the court committed error in giving it to him.”).

2024Tex. Motor Lines, Inc. v. Hodges, 138 Tex. 280, 282 , 158 S.W.2d 487 , 488 (1942) (“It is an elementary principle supported by many authorities that a litigant cannot ask something of a court and then complain that the court committed error in giving it to him.

2007Co. v. Sanchez , 149 S.W.3d 111 , 115 (Tex. 2004) ("[W]e presume that every word of a statute has been included or excluded for a reason. . . ."); City of Marshall v. City of Uncertain , 206 S.W.3d 97, 105 (Tex. 2006) (quoting City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne , 111 S.W.3d 22, 29 (Tex. 2003)) ("It is an elementary rule of construction that, when possible to do so, effect must be given to every sentence, clause, and word of a statute so that no part thereof be rendered superfluous.").

2007Co. v. Sanchez, 149 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex. 2004) ("[Wle presume that every word of a statute has been included or excluded for a reason. . . ."); City ofMarshal1 v. City of Uncertain, 206 S.W.3d 97,105 (Tex. 2006) (quoting City of Sun Antonio v. City ofBoerne, 111 S.W.3d 22,29 (Tex. 2003)) ("It is an elementary rule of construction that, when possible to do so, effect must be given to every sentence, clause, and word of a statute so that no part thereof be rendered superfluous.").

2025“The rule thus announced is, indeed, an elementary principle which has come down to us from the earliest days of the common law,” Gunn, 391 S.W.2d at 724-25 , and it has been the unquestioned law of this state since at least 1847, when this Court held that a “writ [of error] can only issue at the instance of a party to the suit, or of one whose privity of estate, title or interest appears from the record of the cause in the court below, or who may be the legal representative of such party,” Smith v. Gerlach, 2 Tex. 424, 426 (Tex. 1847).

2015One such rule — “an elementary principle, which has come down to us from the earliest days of the common law” — provides that only those with a justiciable interest in a trial court’s judgment have standing to appeal: It was decided by this court, as long ago as the case of Smith v. Gerlach, 2 Tex. 424 , and has never been since questioned, “that this writ [of error] can only issue at the instance of a party to the suit, or of one whose privity of estate, title, or interest appears from the record of the cause in the court below, or who may be the legal representative of such party.” Wood v. Y

2005See Wilbarger County v. Hall, Tex. Com.App., 55 S.W.2d 797 ; 2 Am.Jur., Appeal and Error s 11.

2005See Wilbarger County v. Hall, Tex. Com.App., 55 S.W.2d 797 ; 2 Am.Jur., Appeal and Error s 11.

2026See Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.221(b); Gregory v. Stetson, 133 U.S. 579, 586 (1890) (“It is an elementary principle that a court cannot adjudicate directly upon a person’s right without having him either actually or constructively before it.

2026See Tex. Gov’t Code § 22.221(b); Gregory v. Stetson, 133 U.S. 579, 586 (1890) (“It is an elementary principle that a court cannot adjudicate directly upon a person’s right without having him either actually or constructively before it.

2007Co. v. Sanchez , 149 S.W.3d 111 , 115 (Tex. 2004) ("[W]e presume that every word of a statute has been included or excluded for a reason. . . ."); City of Marshall v. City of Uncertain , 206 S.W.3d 97, 105 (Tex. 2006) (quoting City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne , 111 S.W.3d 22, 29 (Tex. 2003)) ("It is an elementary rule of construction that, when possible to do so, effect must be given to every sentence, clause, and word of a statute so that no part thereof be rendered superfluous.").

2007Co. v. Sanchez, 149 S.W.3d 111, 115 (Tex. 2004) ("[Wle presume that every word of a statute has been included or excluded for a reason. . . ."); City ofMarshal1 v. City of Uncertain, 206 S.W.3d 97,105 (Tex. 2006) (quoting City of Sun Antonio v. City ofBoerne, 111 S.W.3d 22,29 (Tex. 2003)) ("It is an elementary rule of construction that, when possible to do so, effect must be given to every sentence, clause, and word of a statute so that no part thereof be rendered superfluous.").

2003Co. , 296 S.W. 1090 , 1094 (Tex. 1927) ("It is an elementary rule that the contemporaneous and practical construction of a statute by those whose duty it is to carry it into effect is entitled to great respect in the courts.").

2003Co., 296 S.W. 1090, 1094 (Tex. 1927) (“It is an elementary rule that the contemporaneous and practical construction of a statute by those whose duty it is to carry it into effect is entitled to great respect in the courts.“).

2004Ass’n v. Holmes, 145 Tex. 158 , 196 S.W.2d 390, 395 (1946) (“There is another well-settled rule to guide us in the construction of a statute which is uncertain and ambiguous ...: ‘Where a statute which has been construed, either by a court of last resort or by executive officers, is re-enacted without any substantial change of verbiage, it will continue to receive the same construction.’ ”); Tex. Fid. & Bonding Co. v. City of Austin, 112 Tex. 229 , 246 S.W. 1026, 1029 (1922) (“It is an elementary rule of construction that where, after a statute has been construed by the highest court of the st

2004Ass’n v. Holmes, 145 Tex. 158 , 196 S.W.2d 390, 395 (1946) (“There is another well-settled rule to guide us in the construction of a statute which is uncertain and ambiguous ...: ‘Where a statute which has been construed, either by a court of last resort or by executive officers, is re-enacted without any substantial change of verbiage, it will continue to receive the same construction.’ ”); Tex. Fid. & Bonding Co. v. City of Austin, 112 Tex. 229 , 246 S.W. 1026, 1029 (1922) (“It is an elementary rule of construction that where, after a statute has been construed by the highest court of the st

2025Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985).

1995Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. at 76 , 105 S.Ct. at 1092 , 84 L.Ed.2d at 61 .

2022“The specific provisions [in a will] control over [] general statement[s].” Perry v. Hinshaw, 633 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1982); see Classen v. Freeman, 236 S.W. 979, 981 (Tex. [Comm’n Op.] 1922) (“It is an elementary principle of law that specific provisions of a will control its general provisions.”).

1937In Classen v. Freeman, 236 S.W. 979, 981 , Judge Powell, of the Commission of Appeals, says: “It is an elementary principle of law that specific provisions of a will control its general provisions.” The instrument .is testamentary in character, and the bequests therein made take effect and become the property of the beneficiaries immediately upon the death of the testator.

1969Co. v. Shirley, 45 Tex. 355, 377 (1876): “It is, however, a well-established elementary principle, that, he ‘who seeks to rectify an instrument, on the ground of mistake, must be able to prove not only that there has been a mistake, but must be able to show exactly and precisely the form to which the deed ought to be brought, in order that it may be set right according to what was really intended, and must be able to establish, in the clearest and most satisfactory manner, that the alleged intention of the *403 parties to which he desires to make it conformable, continued concurrently to the m

1952Co. v. Shirley, 45 Tex. 355 , the Supreme Court said: “It is, however, a well-established elementary principle, that, he ‘who seeks to rectify an instrument, on the ground of mistake, must be able to prove not only that there has been a mistake, but must be able to show exactly and . precisely the formjo,which the deed ought to be brought, in order that it jmay., be set right accordinsL-to what was really intended, and must be able to establish, in the clearest and most satisfactory manner, that the alleged intention of the parties to which he desires to make it conformable, continued concurre