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51 West Virginia opinions name it 1 courts 1884–2024 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by West Virginia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
In re Tonjia M.green2 sentences2016Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik Und Eisengieberei mbH v. Starcher, 174 W.Va. 618 , 626 n. 12, 328 S.E.2d 492 , 500 n. 12 (1985) (“An elementary principle of statutory construction is that the word ‘may’ is inherently permissive in nature and connotes discretion.” (citations omitted)); see also In re Tonjia M, 212 W.Va. 443, 448 , 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002) (stating that “[w]e have held that the granting of an improvement period is within the circuit court’s discretion.”). 2016Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik Und Eisengieberei mbH v. Starcher, 174 W.Va. 618 , 626 n. 12, 328 S.E.2d 492 , 500 n. 12 (1985) (“An elementary principle of statutory construction is that the word ‘may’ is inherently permissive in nature and connotes discretion.” (citations omitted)); see also In re Tonjia M, 212 W.Va. 443, 448 , 573 S.E.2d 354, 359 (2002) (stating that “[w]e have held that the granting of an improvement period is within the circuit court’s discretion.”). | 4 | 4 |
Marriage of Rosen v. Rosengreen2 sentences2009See Rosen v. Rosen, 222 W.Va. 402 , 664 S.E.2d 743, 750 (2008) (“An elementary principle of statutory construction is that the word ‘may1 is inherently permissive in nature and connotes discretion.”); In re Cesar L., 221 W.Va. 249, 261 , 654 S.E.2d 373, 385 (2007) (“[T]he word ‘may’ generally is afforded a permissive connotation, which renders the referenced act discretionary, rather than mandatory, in nature.”); State v. Hedrick, 204 W.Va. 547, 552 , 514 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1999) (“The word ‘m&f generally signifies permission and connotes discretion.”). 2009See Rosen v. Rosen, 222 W.Va. 402 , 664 S.E.2d 743, 750 (2008) (“An elementary principle of statutory construction is that the word ‘may1 is inherently permissive in nature and connotes discretion.”); In re Cesar L., 221 W.Va. 249, 261 , 654 S.E.2d 373, 385 (2007) (“[T]he word ‘may’ generally is afforded a permissive connotation, which renders the referenced act discretionary, rather than mandatory, in nature.”); State v. Hedrick, 204 W.Va. 547, 552 , 514 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1999) (“The word ‘m&f generally signifies permission and connotes discretion.”). | 2 | 2 |
Edwards v. Squier, Wardengreen2 sentences2010As one court pointed out, requiring too precise an identity between the character of the offenses “would fail to give effect to the word ‘similar’ succeeding the word ‘same’ and thus violate an elementary rule of statutory construction.” Edwards v. Squier, 178 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir.1949) Mere lapse of time between the commission of the offenses does not render joinder improper. 2010As one court pointed out, requiring too precise an identity between the character of the offenses "would fail to give effect to the word `similar' succeeding the word `same' and thus violate an elementary rule of statutory construction." Edwards v. Squier, 178 F.2d 758, 759 (9th Cir.1949) . . . | 2 | 2 |
Walton v. Givengreen2 sentences1990“It is an elementary principle of the law that negligence will not be imputed or presumed.” Walton v. Given, 158 W.Va. 897, 902 , 215 S.E.2d 647, 651 (1975). 1990“It is an elementary principle of the law that negligence will not be imputed or presumed.” Walton v. Given, 158 W.Va. 897, 902 , 215 S.E.2d 647, 651 (1975). | 2 | 2 |
Gebr. Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik Und Eisengieberei mbH v. Starchergreen2 sentences2016Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik Und Eisengieberei mbH v. Starcher, 174 W.Va. 618 , 626 n.12, 328 S.E.2d 492 , 500 n.12 (1985) (“An elementary principle of statutory construction is that the word ‘may1 is inherently permissive in nature and connotes discretion.” (citations omitted)). 2016Eickhoff Maschinenfabrik Und Eisengieberei mbH v. Starcher, 174 W.Va. 618 , 626 n.12, 328 S.E.2d 492 , 500 n.12 (1985) (“An elementary principle of statutory construction is that the word ‘may1 is inherently permissive in nature and connotes discretion.” (citations omitted)). | 1 | 18 |
Craig v. Hukillgreen2 sentences1953In Carder v. Matthey, supra, it was stated that: "* * * not only will a court of equity ordinarily refuse to act affirmatively in the enforcement of a forfeiture, but will often relieve against it." The Court, in the same case, quoted Engel v. South Penn Oil Co., 106 W.Va. 339 , pts. 2 and 3 syl., 146 S.E. 385 , and said further: "A condition subsequent defeating the title upon nonperformance must be clearly expressed or arise by necessary implication from the language used in the deed"; "After an estate has been vested by apt and proper deed, the courts will always construe the deed so as to 1953In Carder v. Matthey, supra, it was stated that: "* * * not only will a court of equity ordinarily refuse to act affirmatively in the enforcement of a forfeiture, but will often relieve against it." The Court, in the same case, quoted Engel v. South Penn Oil Co., 106 W.Va. 339 , pts. 2 and 3 syl., 146 S.E. 385 , and said further: "A condition subsequent defeating the title upon nonperformance must be clearly expressed or arise by necessary implication from the language used in the deed"; "After an estate has been vested by apt and proper deed, the courts will always construe the deed so as to | 1 | 2 |
Lazzell v. Garlowgreen2 sentences2024Va. 466, 482 , 30 S.E. 171, 177 (1898) (citations omitted). 2024Not only is this so by force of the maxim we have quoted ‘Once a highway always a highway,’ but it is so by force of the elementary rule that ‘a thing shown to exist is presumed to continue until the contrary is made to appear.’ Lazzell v. Garlow, 44 W. | 1 | 1 |
Davis v. Nokomis Quarry, Inc.green2 sentences2015Such “royalty only5’ leases are “held unenforceable for lack of mutuality, based on the elementary principle of the law of contracts that if one party to a contract is under-no obligation to perform at all, the contract is void.” Davis v. Nokomis Quarry, Inc., 77 Ill.App.3d 1011, 1013, 33 Ill.Dec. 883 , 397 N.E.2d 216, 218 (1979) (quotation omitted). 2015Such “royalty only5’ leases are “held unenforceable for lack of mutuality, based on the elementary principle of the law of contracts that if one party to a contract is under-no obligation to perform at all, the contract is void.” Davis v. Nokomis Quarry, Inc., 77 Ill.App.3d 1011, 1013, 33 Ill.Dec. 883 , 397 N.E.2d 216, 218 (1979) (quotation omitted). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Cesar L.green2 sentences2009See Rosen v. Rosen, 222 W.Va. 402 , 664 S.E.2d 743, 750 (2008) (“An elementary principle of statutory construction is that the word ‘may1 is inherently permissive in nature and connotes discretion.”); In re Cesar L., 221 W.Va. 249, 261 , 654 S.E.2d 373, 385 (2007) (“[T]he word ‘may’ generally is afforded a permissive connotation, which renders the referenced act discretionary, rather than mandatory, in nature.”); State v. Hedrick, 204 W.Va. 547, 552 , 514 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1999) (“The word ‘m&f generally signifies permission and connotes discretion.”). 2009See Rosen v. Rosen, 222 W.Va. 402 , 664 S.E.2d 743, 750 (2008) (“An elementary principle of statutory construction is that the word ‘may1 is inherently permissive in nature and connotes discretion.”); In re Cesar L., 221 W.Va. 249, 261 , 654 S.E.2d 373, 385 (2007) (“[T]he word ‘may’ generally is afforded a permissive connotation, which renders the referenced act discretionary, rather than mandatory, in nature.”); State v. Hedrick, 204 W.Va. 547, 552 , 514 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1999) (“The word ‘m&f generally signifies permission and connotes discretion.”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hedrickgreen2 sentences2009See Rosen v. Rosen, 222 W.Va. 402 , 664 S.E.2d 743, 750 (2008) (“An elementary principle of statutory construction is that the word ‘may1 is inherently permissive in nature and connotes discretion.”); In re Cesar L., 221 W.Va. 249, 261 , 654 S.E.2d 373, 385 (2007) (“[T]he word ‘may’ generally is afforded a permissive connotation, which renders the referenced act discretionary, rather than mandatory, in nature.”); State v. Hedrick, 204 W.Va. 547, 552 , 514 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1999) (“The word ‘m&f generally signifies permission and connotes discretion.”). 2009See Rosen v. Rosen, 222 W.Va. 402 , 664 S.E.2d 743, 750 (2008) (“An elementary principle of statutory construction is that the word ‘may1 is inherently permissive in nature and connotes discretion.”); In re Cesar L., 221 W.Va. 249, 261 , 654 S.E.2d 373, 385 (2007) (“[T]he word ‘may’ generally is afforded a permissive connotation, which renders the referenced act discretionary, rather than mandatory, in nature.”); State v. Hedrick, 204 W.Va. 547, 552 , 514 S.E.2d 397, 402 (1999) (“The word ‘m&f generally signifies permission and connotes discretion.”). | 1 | 1 |
Gretchen Getter v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.green2 sentences2006This is precisely the type of relationship that requires the ... court to presume bias and dismiss the prospective juror for cause.” Id. 2006The Dotson court endorsed “the policy of removing for cause any juror about whom any possible cloud of bias might arise due to the intimacies of family relationship to one party litigant or the other _any doubt must give way to an uncompromising atmosphere of impartiality and open-mindedness _ The efficacy and future existence of our jury system of trial is dependent upon the relentless enforcement of this elementary rule of justice.” See also, Getter v. Wal-Mart, 66 F.3d 1119, 1122 (10th Cir.1995) (it was an abuse of discretion for a trial court to fail to excuse for cause a prospective juror | 1 | 1 |
Burgess v. Jeffersongreen2 sentences2003The bare fact of an injury standing alone, without supporting evidence, is not sufficient to justify an inference of negligence.” Walton v. Given, 158 W.Va. 897, 902 , 215 S.E.2d 647, 651 (1975). 4 Moreover, “[n]egligence ... is a jury question when the evidence is conflicting or the facts are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them.” Burgess v. Jefferson, 162 W.Va. 1, 3 , 245 S.E.2d 626, 628 (1978). 2003The bare fact of an injury standing alone, without supporting evidence, is not sufficient to justify an inference of negligence.” Walton v. Given, 158 W.Va. 897, 902 , 215 S.E.2d 647, 651 (1975). 4 Moreover, “[n]egligence ... is a jury question when the evidence is conflicting or the facts are such that reasonable men may draw different conclusions from them.” Burgess v. Jefferson, 162 W.Va. 1, 3 , 245 S.E.2d 626, 628 (1978). | 1 | 1 |
Sturm v. Crowleygreen2 sentences2002In construing the Forfeiture Act, 10 we are mindful that “[fjorfeiture has been described as ‘a harsh, even dreadful, remedy'; courts generally disfavor it ‘and never apply it except where the law clearly warrants.’” Pearson v. Dodd, 159 W.Va. 254, 261 , 221 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Lilly v. Duke, 180 W.Va. 228 , 376 S.E.2d 122 (1988) (quoting State v. Cheney, 45 W.Va. 478, 480 , 31 S.E. 920, 921 (1898)); see also Sturm v. Crowley, 131 W.Va. 505, 509 , 48 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1948) (recognizing that “[i]t is an elementary rule that a forfeiture is never favored”). 2002In construing the Forfeiture Act, 10 we are mindful that “[fjorfeiture has been described as ‘a harsh, even dreadful, remedy'; courts generally disfavor it ‘and never apply it except where the law clearly warrants.’” Pearson v. Dodd, 159 W.Va. 254, 261 , 221 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Lilly v. Duke, 180 W.Va. 228 , 376 S.E.2d 122 (1988) (quoting State v. Cheney, 45 W.Va. 478, 480 , 31 S.E. 920, 921 (1898)); see also Sturm v. Crowley, 131 W.Va. 505, 509 , 48 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1948) (recognizing that “[i]t is an elementary rule that a forfeiture is never favored”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Cheneygreen2 sentences2002In construing the Forfeiture Act, 10 we are mindful that “[fjorfeiture has been described as ‘a harsh, even dreadful, remedy'; courts generally disfavor it ‘and never apply it except where the law clearly warrants.’” Pearson v. Dodd, 159 W.Va. 254, 261 , 221 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Lilly v. Duke, 180 W.Va. 228 , 376 S.E.2d 122 (1988) (quoting State v. Cheney, 45 W.Va. 478, 480 , 31 S.E. 920, 921 (1898)); see also Sturm v. Crowley, 131 W.Va. 505, 509 , 48 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1948) (recognizing that “[i]t is an elementary rule that a forfeiture is never favored”). 2002In construing the Forfeiture Act, 10 we are mindful that “[fjorfeiture has been described as ‘a harsh, even dreadful, remedy'; courts generally disfavor it ‘and never apply it except where the law clearly warrants.’” Pearson v. Dodd, 159 W.Va. 254, 261 , 221 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Lilly v. Duke, 180 W.Va. 228 , 376 S.E.2d 122 (1988) (quoting State v. Cheney, 45 W.Va. 478, 480 , 31 S.E. 920, 921 (1898)); see also Sturm v. Crowley, 131 W.Va. 505, 509 , 48 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1948) (recognizing that “[i]t is an elementary rule that a forfeiture is never favored”). | 1 | 1 |
Pearson v. Doddgreen2 sentences2002In construing the Forfeiture Act, 10 we are mindful that “[fjorfeiture has been described as ‘a harsh, even dreadful, remedy'; courts generally disfavor it ‘and never apply it except where the law clearly warrants.’” Pearson v. Dodd, 159 W.Va. 254, 261 , 221 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Lilly v. Duke, 180 W.Va. 228 , 376 S.E.2d 122 (1988) (quoting State v. Cheney, 45 W.Va. 478, 480 , 31 S.E. 920, 921 (1898)); see also Sturm v. Crowley, 131 W.Va. 505, 509 , 48 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1948) (recognizing that “[i]t is an elementary rule that a forfeiture is never favored”). 2002In construing the Forfeiture Act, 10 we are mindful that “[fjorfeiture has been described as ‘a harsh, even dreadful, remedy'; courts generally disfavor it ‘and never apply it except where the law clearly warrants.’” Pearson v. Dodd, 159 W.Va. 254, 261 , 221 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Lilly v. Duke, 180 W.Va. 228 , 376 S.E.2d 122 (1988) (quoting State v. Cheney, 45 W.Va. 478, 480 , 31 S.E. 920, 921 (1898)); see also Sturm v. Crowley, 131 W.Va. 505, 509 , 48 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1948) (recognizing that “[i]t is an elementary rule that a forfeiture is never favored”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Louis Wernergreen2 sentences1989United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir.1980). 1989United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 926 (2d Cir.1980). | 1 | 1 |
Hodge v. Ginsberggreen2 sentences1985See Hodge v. Ginsberg, 172 W.Va. 17 , 303 S.E.2d 245, 250 (1983); 82 C.J.S. 1985See Hodge v. Ginsberg, 172 W.Va. 17 , 303 S.E.2d 245, 250 (1983); 82 C.J.S. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in West Virginia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
List v. City of Wheeling
green
2 sentences1961An elementary rule of construction, applicable to every kind of written instruments, is that all parts of the instrument under consideration shall be considered, and every portion, paragraph, clause and word given effect, if it be susceptible of such construction, and, whether it be so susceptible or not, all of its parts must be considered, and no court is warranted in expunging or declaring meaningless or ineffective any word, phrase or clause, except in the case of irreconcilable conflict and repugnance." The opinion also contains this pertinent language: "Courts are bound, in construing a 1961Va. 711 ; List v. City of Wheeling, 7 W. | 3 | 1953–1961 |
State v. Kyle
green
2 sentences1961An elementary rule of construction, applicable to every kind of written instruments, is that all parts of the instrument under consideration shall be considered, and every portion, paragraph, clause and word given effect, if it be susceptible of such construction, and, whether it be so susceptible or not, all of its parts must be considered, and no court is warranted in expunging or declaring meaningless or ineffective any word, phrase or clause, except in the case of irreconcilable conflict and repugnance." The opinion also contains this pertinent language: "Courts are bound, in construing a 1961Va. 765 , 77 S. E. 2d 890 , this Court said that “An elementary rule of construction is that, if possible, effect should be given to every part and to every word of a constitutional provision and that, unless there is some clear reason to the contrary, no part of the fundamental law should be regarded as superfluous.” See also State v. Kyle, 8 W. | 3 | 1953–1961 |
Marbury v. Madison
green
2 sentences1961An elementary rule of construction, applicable to every kind of written instruments, is that all parts of the instrument under consideration shall be considered, and every portion, paragraph, clause and word given effect, if it be susceptible of such construction, and, whether it be so susceptible or not, all of its parts must be considered, and no court is warranted in expunging or declaring meaningless or ineffective any word, phrase or clause, except in the case of irreconcilable conflict and repugnance." The opinion also contains this pertinent language: "Courts are bound, in construing a 1953Va. 313 , 58 S.E. 715 , 60 S.E. 394 ; State v. Kyle, 8 W.Va. 711 ; List v. City of Wheeling, 7 W.Va. 501 ; Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch (U.S.) 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 ; Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 , 47 S.Ct. 21 , 71 *896 L.Ed. 160; State ex rel. | 2 | 1953–1961 |
Myers v. United States
green
2 sentences1961An elementary rule of construction, applicable to every kind of written instruments, is that all parts of the instrument under consideration shall be considered, and every portion, paragraph, clause and word given effect, if it be susceptible of such construction, and, whether it be so susceptible or not, all of its parts must be considered, and no court is warranted in expunging or declaring meaningless or ineffective any word, phrase or clause, except in the case of irreconcilable conflict and repugnance." The opinion also contains this pertinent language: "Courts are bound, in construing a 1961An elementary rule of construction, applicable to every kind of written instruments, is that all parts of the instrument under consideration shall be considered, and every portion, paragraph, clause and word given effect, if it be susceptible of such construction, and, whether it be so susceptible or not, all of its parts must be considered, and no court is warranted in expunging or declaring meaningless or ineffective any word, phrase or clause, except in the case of irreconcilable conflict and repugnance." The opinion also contains this pertinent language: "Courts are bound, in construing a | 2 | 1953–1961 |
Flesher v. Board of Review, West Virginia Department of Veterans' Affairs
green
2 sentences1961Va. 765 , 77 S. E. 2d 890 , this Court said that “An elementary rule of construction is that, if possible, effect should be given to every part and to every word of a constitutional provision and that, unless there is some clear reason to the contrary, no part of the fundamental law should be regarded as superfluous.” See also State v. Kyle, 8 W. 1961An elementary rule of construction, applicable to every kind of written instruments, is that all parts of the instrument under consideration shall be considered, and every portion, paragraph, clause and word given effect, if it be susceptible of such construction, and, whether it be so susceptible or not, all of its parts must be considered, and no court is warranted in expunging or declaring meaningless or ineffective any word, phrase or clause, except in the case of irreconcilable conflict and repugnance.” The opinion also contains this pertinent language: “Courts are bound, in construing a | 2 | 1961–1961 |
State v. Harden
green
2 sentences1953An elementary rule of construction is that, if possible, effect should be given to every part and to every word of a constitutional provision and that, unless there is some clear reason to the contrary, no part of the fundamental law should be regarded as superfluous. 11 Am.Jur., Constitutional Law, Section 55; State v. Harden, 62 W. 1953Jur., Constitutional Law, Section 55; State v. Harden, 62 W. | 2 | 1953–1953 |
Hooper v. California
green
2 sentences1942We are bound by the elementary rule “that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648 , 15 S. Ct. 207, 211 , 39 L. 1942We are bound by the elementary rule “that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648 , 15 S. Ct. 207, 211 , 39 L. | 2 | 1910–1942 |
East Ohio Gas Co. v. Walker
green
1 sentence2013The circuit court denied petitioner’s motion because: (1) the alleged newly discovered evidence was not of the quality that will be considered under the newly discovered evidence standard, citing Ohio Gas Co. v. Walker, 394 N.E.2d 348 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978) (holding that unsworn allegations of operative facts contained in a motion for relief from judgment or in a brief attached to the motion are not sufficient evidence upon which to grant a motion to vacate judgment”); (2) petitioner was not diligent in discovering the evidence, nor did he explain why it took so long to obtain such an elementary | 1 | 2013–2013 |
United States v. Percy Franklin
green
1 sentence2010United States v. Franklin, 452 F.2d 926 (8th Cir.1971). | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Lilly v. Duke
green
2 sentences2002In construing the Forfeiture Act, 10 we are mindful that “[fjorfeiture has been described as ‘a harsh, even dreadful, remedy'; courts generally disfavor it ‘and never apply it except where the law clearly warrants.’” Pearson v. Dodd, 159 W.Va. 254, 261 , 221 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Lilly v. Duke, 180 W.Va. 228 , 376 S.E.2d 122 (1988) (quoting State v. Cheney, 45 W.Va. 478, 480 , 31 S.E. 920, 921 (1898)); see also Sturm v. Crowley, 131 W.Va. 505, 509 , 48 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1948) (recognizing that “[i]t is an elementary rule that a forfeiture is never favored”). 2002In construing the Forfeiture Act, 10 we are mindful that “[fjorfeiture has been described as ‘a harsh, even dreadful, remedy'; courts generally disfavor it ‘and never apply it except where the law clearly warrants.’” Pearson v. Dodd, 159 W.Va. 254, 261 , 221 S.E.2d 171, 176 (1975), overruled on other grounds by Lilly v. Duke, 180 W.Va. 228 , 376 S.E.2d 122 (1988) (quoting State v. Cheney, 45 W.Va. 478, 480 , 31 S.E. 920, 921 (1898)); see also Sturm v. Crowley, 131 W.Va. 505, 509 , 48 S.E.2d 350, 353 (1948) (recognizing that “[i]t is an elementary rule that a forfeiture is never favored”). | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Thomas v. Leverette
green
2 sentences1986Similarly, in Thomas v. Leverette, 166 W.Va. 185 , 273 S.E.2d 364 (1980), overruling Lycans v. Bordenkircher, 159 W.Va. 137 , 222 S.E.2d 14 (1975), we noted again the lack of express provision for a life term for aggravated robbery and held that aggravated robbery is not a “capital offense” for the purpose of W.Va.Code, 49-5-3 [1975], ex-eluding from the juvenile jurisdiction of the circuit court juveniles charged with the commission of acts which would be “capital offenses” (punishable by death or life imprisonment) if committed by an adult. 3 An important elementary principle which is applic 1986Similarly, in Thomas v. Leverette, 166 W.Va. 185 , 273 S.E.2d 364 (1980), overruling Lycans v. Bordenkircher, 159 W.Va. 137 , 222 S.E.2d 14 (1975), we noted again the lack of express provision for a life term for aggravated robbery and held that aggravated robbery is not a “capital offense” for the purpose of W.Va.Code, 49-5-3 [1975], ex-eluding from the juvenile jurisdiction of the circuit court juveniles charged with the commission of acts which would be “capital offenses” (punishable by death or life imprisonment) if committed by an adult. 3 An important elementary principle which is applic | 1 | 1986–1986 |
Lycans v. Bordenkircher
green
2 sentences1986Similarly, in Thomas v. Leverette, 166 W.Va. 185 , 273 S.E.2d 364 (1980), overruling Lycans v. Bordenkircher, 159 W.Va. 137 , 222 S.E.2d 14 (1975), we noted again the lack of express provision for a life term for aggravated robbery and held that aggravated robbery is not a “capital offense” for the purpose of W.Va.Code, 49-5-3 [1975], ex-eluding from the juvenile jurisdiction of the circuit court juveniles charged with the commission of acts which would be “capital offenses” (punishable by death or life imprisonment) if committed by an adult. 3 An important elementary principle which is applic 1986Similarly, in Thomas v. Leverette, 166 W.Va. 185 , 273 S.E.2d 364 (1980), overruling Lycans v. Bordenkircher, 159 W.Va. 137 , 222 S.E.2d 14 (1975), we noted again the lack of express provision for a life term for aggravated robbery and held that aggravated robbery is not a “capital offense” for the purpose of W.Va.Code, 49-5-3 [1975], ex-eluding from the juvenile jurisdiction of the circuit court juveniles charged with the commission of acts which would be “capital offenses” (punishable by death or life imprisonment) if committed by an adult. 3 An important elementary principle which is applic | 1 | 1986–1986 |
State v. Ward
green
2 sentences1978State v. Ward, 112 W. 1978State v. Ward, 112 W.Va. 552 , 165 S.E. 803 (1932). | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Shew v. Prince neutral | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Lamar Water & Electric Light Co. v. City of Lamar neutral | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| State ex rel. Walker v. Bus green | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| Mathews v. Jarrett neutral | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Engel v. South Penn Oil Co. neutral | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Walker v. Hillyer neutral | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Hall v. W. M. Ritter Lumber Co. neutral | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Estate of Elizabeth E. Fox green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| West Central Producers Co-Operative Ass'n v. Commissioner of Agriculture neutral | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Lockhart v. Hoke neutral | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Crickard v. Crouch's Adm'rs green | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Interstate Commerce Commission v. Union Pacific Railroad green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Brown v. Gorsuch & Sons green | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Matheny v. Allen green | 1 | 1915–1915 |
| Kraus v. Sentinel Co. neutral | 1 | 1906–1906 |
| Freeman v. Sanderson neutral | 1 | 1906–1906 |
| Burley v. Weller neutral | 1 | 1900–1900 |
| Stewart v. Ackley neutral | 1 | 1884–1884 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.