elementary rule in Michigan

2018Id. at 421 .15 The Alawi parties’ admission could be interpreted 13 Although it is not necessary to the analysis, we note that the Alawi parties’ attorney drafted the Sykes release, and that in Shay, 487 Mich at 673 , the Supreme Court stated that “[i]t is an elementary rule of construction of contracts that in case of doubt, a contract is to be strictly construed against the party by whose agent it was drafted.” Therefore, even if a latent ambiguity existed here, it is far from clear that this would lead to an outcome favorable to the Alawi parties. 14 As Chapman’s appellate brief explains, t

2018Id. at 421 .15 The Alawi parties’ admission could be interpreted 13 Although it is not necessary to the analysis, we note that the Alawi parties’ attorney drafted the Sykes release, and that in Shay, 487 Mich at 673 , the Supreme Court stated that “[i]t is an elementary rule of construction of contracts that in case of doubt, a contract is to be strictly construed against the party by whose agent it was drafted.” Therefore, even if a latent ambiguity existed here, it is far from clear that this would lead to an outcome favorable to the Alawi parties. 14 As Chapman’s appellate brief explains, t

2018Id. at 421 .15 The Alawi parties’ admission could be interpreted 13 Although it is not necessary to the analysis, we note that the Alawi parties’ attorney drafted the Sykes release, and that in Shay, 487 Mich at 673 , the Supreme Court stated that “[i]t is an elementary rule of construction of contracts that in case of doubt, a contract is to be strictly construed against the party by whose agent it was drafted.” Therefore, even if a latent ambiguity existed here, it is far from clear that this would lead to an outcome favorable to the Alawi parties. 14 As Chapman’s appellate brief explains, t

2018Id. at 421 .15 The Alawi parties’ admission could be interpreted 13 Although it is not necessary to the analysis, we note that the Alawi parties’ attorney drafted the Sykes release, and that in Shay, 487 Mich at 673 , the Supreme Court stated that “[i]t is an elementary rule of construction of contracts that in case of doubt, a contract is to be strictly construed against the party by whose agent it was drafted.” Therefore, even if a latent ambiguity existed here, it is far from clear that this would lead to an outcome favorable to the Alawi parties. 14 As Chapman’s appellate brief explains, t

2018Id. at 421 .15 The Alawi parties’ admission could be interpreted 13 Although it is not necessary to the analysis, we note that the Alawi parties’ attorney drafted the Sykes release, and that in Shay, 487 Mich at 673 , the Supreme Court stated that “[i]t is an elementary rule of construction of contracts that in case of doubt, a contract is to be strictly construed against the party by whose agent it was drafted.” Therefore, even if a latent ambiguity existed here, it is far from clear that this would lead to an outcome favorable to the Alawi parties. 14 As Chapman’s appellate brief explains, t

2018Id. at 421 .15 The Alawi parties’ admission could be interpreted 13 Although it is not necessary to the analysis, we note that the Alawi parties’ attorney drafted the Sykes release, and that in Shay, 487 Mich at 673 , the Supreme Court stated that “[i]t is an elementary rule of construction of contracts that in case of doubt, a contract is to be strictly construed against the party by whose agent it was drafted.” Therefore, even if a latent ambiguity existed here, it is far from clear that this would lead to an outcome favorable to the Alawi parties. 14 As Chapman’s appellate brief explains, t

2017The language of a contract should be given its ordinary and plain meaning. [Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 721-722 ; 565 NW2d 401 (1997) (citations omitted).] “It is an elementary rule of construction of contracts that in case of doubt, a contract is to be strictly construed against the party by whose agent it was drafted.” Shay v Aldrich, 487 Mich 648, 673 ; 790 NW2d 629 (2010).

2017The language of a contract should be given its ordinary and plain meaning. [Meagher v Wayne State Univ, 222 Mich App 700, 721-722 ; 565 NW2d 401 (1997) (citations omitted).] “It is an elementary rule of construction of contracts that in case of doubt, a contract is to be strictly construed against the party by whose agent it was drafted.” Shay v Aldrich, 487 Mich 648, 673 ; 790 NW2d 629 (2010).

1960The following citations are in support of such rule: County of Wayne v. State Department of Social Welfare, 343 Mich 475 ; Dearborn Township Clerk v. Jones, 335 Mich 658 ; Palmer v. State Land Office Board, 304 Mich 628 .

1960The following citations are in support of such rule: County of Wayne v. State Department of Social Welfare, 343 Mich 475 ; Dearborn Township Clerk v. Jones, 335 Mich 658 ; Palmer v. State Land Office Board, 304 Mich 628 .

1960The following citations are in support of such rule: County of Wayne v. State Department of Social Welfare, 343 Mich 475 ; Dearborn Township Clerk v. Jones, 335 Mich 658 ; Palmer v. State Land Office Board, 304 Mich 628 .

1960The following citations are in support of such rule: County of Wayne v. State Department of Social Welfare, 343 Mich 475 ; Dearborn Township Clerk v. Jones, 335 Mich 658 ; Palmer v. State Land Office Board, 304 Mich 628 .

1960The following citations are in support of such rule: County of Wayne v. State Department of Social Welfare, 343 Mich 475 ; Dearborn Township Clerk v. Jones, 335 Mich 658 ; Palmer v. State Land Office Board, 304 Mich 628 .

1960The following citations are in support of such rule: County of Wayne v. State Department of Social Welfare, 343 Mich 475 ; Dearborn Township Clerk v. Jones, 335 Mich 658 ; Palmer v. State Land Office Board, 304 Mich 628 .

1960While it is true that In re Reid's Estate, 248 Mich 360 , is authority for the position that the jurisdiction of circuit courts in cases of will contests by certification is in the nature of an appeal, and while it is equally true that Court Rule No 75, § 21 (1945), [**] provides in part "Where any interested party desires *172 to have a will contest certified to the circuit court * * * he shall file his written application and bond in the same way and subject to the same provisions as are now provided for in appeals from the probate court to the circuit court," it is an elementary rule of law

1960While it is true that In re Reid’s Estate, 248 Mich 360 , is authority for the position that the jurisdiction of circuit courts in cases of will contests by certification is in the nature of an appeal, and while it is equally true that Court Rule No 75, § 21 (1945), provides in part “Where any interested party desires to have a will contest certified to the circuit court * * * he shall file his written application and bond in the same way and subject to the same provisions as are now provided for in appeals from the probate court to the circuit court,” it is an elementary rule of law regarding

1914A. [N. S.] 712), the writer of the opinion, in commenting upon this exception to the general rule, says: “One reasonable justification for this exception * * * is the elementary principle that when a man acts according to his best judgment in an emergency, but fails to act judiciously, he is not chargeable with negligence. * * * Physicians in the nature of things are sought for and must act in emergencies, and if a surgeon waits too long before undertaking a necessary amputation, he must be held to have known the probable-consequences of such delay, and may be held liable for the resulting dam

1914A. [N. S.] 712), the writer of the opinion, in commenting upon this exception to the general rule, says: “One reasonable justification for this exception * * * is the elementary principle that when a man acts according to his best judgment in an emergency, but fails to act judiciously, he is not chargeable with negligence. * * * Physicians in the nature of things are sought for and must act in emergencies, and if a surgeon waits too long before undertaking a necessary amputation, he must be held to have known the probable-consequences of such delay, and may be held liable for the resulting dam

2026Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich 169 , 195 n 18; 821 NW2d 520 (2012). -5-

2026Johnson v Recca, 492 Mich 169 , 195 n 18; 821 NW2d 520 (2012). -5-

2023It is an elementary rule of statutory interpretation that courts “cannot and should not add requirements to the statute that are not found there.” Scugoza v Metro Direct Prop & Cas Ins Co, 316 Mich App 218, 228 ; 891 NW2d 274 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2023It is an elementary rule of statutory interpretation that courts “cannot and should not add requirements to the statute that are not found there.” Scugoza v Metro Direct Prop & Cas Ins Co, 316 Mich App 218, 228 ; 891 NW2d 274 (2016) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2021See Krolik v Lang, 187 Mich 286, 291 ; 153 NW 686 (1915) (“It is an elementary rule that much latitude may be allowed in admission of circumstantial evidence in cases where fraud is charged[.]”) The defendant’s argument that he never read the policy application that he signed is of no defense either, as he is charged with knowledge of its terms and his signature attested to the fact that he represented the information contained in the policy to be accurate.1 As we noted above, there is 1 See Montgomery v Fid & Guar Life Ins Co, 269 Mich App 126, 130 ; 713 NW2d 801 (2005) (internal citations om

2021See Krolik v Lang, 187 Mich 286, 291 ; 153 NW 686 (1915) (“It is an elementary rule that much latitude may be allowed in admission of circumstantial evidence in cases where fraud is charged[.]”) The defendant’s argument that he never read the policy application that he signed is of no defense either, as he is charged with knowledge of its terms and his signature attested to the fact that he represented the information contained in the policy to be accurate.1 As we noted above, there is 1 See Montgomery v Fid & Guar Life Ins Co, 269 Mich App 126, 130 ; 713 NW2d 801 (2005) (internal citations om

2017Although, depending on the method of payment, Lawrence may have been required to prove that she did not receive payments after the MUIA proved that it issued payments, the MUIA offered no such proof here and Lawrence could not reasonably be expected to prove that the MUIA issued benefit payments. “[I]t is an elementary principle of law . . . that the burden of proving payment rests upon the party who claims to have made it.” Taylor v Taylor’s Estate, 138 Mich 658, 662-663 ; 101 NW 832 (1904).

2017Although, depending on the method of payment, Lawrence may have been required to prove that she did not receive payments after the MUIA proved that it issued payments, the MUIA offered no such proof here and Lawrence could not reasonably be expected to prove that the MUIA issued benefit payments. “[I]t is an elementary principle of law . . . that the burden of proving payment rests upon the party who claims to have made it.” Taylor v Taylor’s Estate, 138 Mich 658, 662-663 ; 101 NW 832 (1904).

2016“Conspiracy is defined by common law as ‘a partnership in criminal purposes.’ ” People v Justice, 454 Mich 334, 345 ; 562 NW2d 652 (1997), quoting People v Atley, 392 Mich 298, 310 ; 220 NW2d 465 (1974).

2016“Conspiracy is defined by common law as ‘a partnership in criminal purposes.’ ” People v Justice, 454 Mich 334, 345 ; 562 NW2d 652 (1997), quoting People v Atley, 392 Mich 298, 310 ; 220 NW2d 465 (1974).

2016“Conspiracy is defined by common law as ‘a partnership in criminal purposes.’ ” People v Justice, 454 Mich 334, 345 ; 562 NW2d 652 (1997), quoting People v Atley, 392 Mich 298, 310 ; 220 NW2d 465 (1974).

2016“Conspiracy is defined by common law as ‘a partnership in criminal purposes.’ ” People v Justice, 454 Mich 334, 345 ; 562 NW2d 652 (1997), quoting People v Atley, 392 Mich 298, 310 ; 220 NW2d 465 (1974).

2016Consistent with this principle, “[i]t is an elementary principle of construction that [this Court] will assign to common-law terms their common-law meaning unless the Legislature directs otherwise.” People v Young, 418 Mich 1, 13 ; 340 NW2d 805 (1983).

2016Consistent with this principle, “[i]t is an elementary principle of construction that [this Court] will assign to common-law terms their common-law meaning unless the Legislature directs otherwise.” People v Young, 418 Mich 1, 13 ; 340 NW2d 805 (1983).

2010Considering the language of the releases and the extrinsic evidence presented, it is clear that the settling parties did not include the term “persons” in the releases in order to effectuate an intent to release the Melvindale Officers from liability. 67 Id. at 411 (citation omitted). 68 W O Barnes Co, Inc v Folsinski, 337 Mich 370, 376-377 ; 60 NW2d 302 (1953). 69 Id. at 377 . 25 It is an elementary rule of construction of contracts that in case of doubt, a contract is to be strictly construed against the party by whose agent it was drafted.70 However, the drafter here agrees with plaintiff’s

2010Considering the language of the releases and the extrinsic evidence presented, it is clear that the settling parties did not include the term “persons” in the releases in order to effectuate an intent to release the Melvindale Officers from liability. 67 Id. at 411 (citation omitted). 68 W O Barnes Co, Inc v Folsinski, 337 Mich 370, 376-377 ; 60 NW2d 302 (1953). 69 Id. at 377 . 25 It is an elementary rule of construction of contracts that in case of doubt, a contract is to be strictly construed against the party by whose agent it was drafted.70 However, the drafter here agrees with plaintiff’s

2003The United States Supreme Court expressed the concern I raise when it made its decision in the case of United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 , 116 S.Ct. 1480 , 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996), quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962).

2003The United States Supreme Court expressed the concern I raise when it made its decision in the case of United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 , 116 S.Ct. 1480 , 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996), quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962).

2003The United States Supreme Court expressed the concern I raise when it made its decision in the case of United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 , 116 S.Ct. 1480 , 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996), quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962).

2003The United States Supreme Court expressed the concern I raise when it made its decision in the case of United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 , 116 S.Ct. 1480 , 134 L.Ed.2d 687 (1996), quoting Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 456 , 82 S.Ct. 501 , 7 L.Ed.2d 446 (1962).

1998Indeed, exposition of this elementary rule of statutory construction can be found in a recent opinion of this Court where Chief Justice Mallett stated it well: Courts cannot assume that the Legislature inadvertently omitted from one statute the language that it placed in another *318 statute, and then, on the basis of that assumption, apply what is not there. [Citations omitted.] In the instant case, the Legislature chose not to include such language, as it had on other occasions.... [T]his Court may not do on its own accord what the Legislature has seen fit not to do. [ Farrington v. Total Pe

1998Indeed, exposition of this elementary rule of statutory construction can be found in a recent opinion of this Court where Chief Justice Mallett stated it well: Courts cannot assume that the Legislature inadvertently omitted from one statute the language that it placed in another *318 statute, and then, on the basis of that assumption, apply what is not there. [Citations omitted.] In the instant case, the Legislature chose not to include such language, as it had on other occasions.... [T]his Court may not do on its own accord what the Legislature has seen fit not to do. [ Farrington v. Total Pe

1988Production Credit Ass’n of Lansing v Dep’t of Treasury, 404 Mich 301, 312 ; 273 NW2d 10 (1978). 5 We are aware that a number of our sister states have adopted rules which expressly state that investigative subpoenas are available in attorney grievance proceedings prior to the filing of a formal complaint. 6 In fact, a number of states have authorized random audits of client trust accounts. 7 Since the Michigan rule is not as explicit, it might be argued that the use of investigative subpoenas in this manner was not intended.

1988Production Credit Ass’n of Lansing v Dep’t of Treasury, 404 Mich 301, 312 ; 273 NW2d 10 (1978). 5 We are aware that a number of our sister states have adopted rules which expressly state that investigative subpoenas are available in attorney grievance proceedings prior to the filing of a formal complaint. 6 In fact, a number of states have authorized random audits of client trust accounts. 7 Since the Michigan rule is not as explicit, it might be argued that the use of investigative subpoenas in this manner was not intended.