63 Wisconsin opinions name it 3 courts 1875–2022 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Lewellyn v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relationsgreen2 sentences1969In Lewellyn v. ILHR Department (1968), 38 Wis. 2d 43, 51, 52 , 155 N. W. 2d 678 , a case also dealing with an alleged industrial back injury, the court summarized much of the law as follows: “ Tf credible evidence exists in support of the commission’s findings, such findings are conclusive. . . . “ ‘ “The question is not whether there is credible evidence in the record to sustain a finding the commission did not make, but whether there is any credible evidence to sustain the finding the commission did make.” ’ ” “ Tt is an elementary principle of law that the applicant has the burden of proof 1969In Lewellyn v. ILHR Department (1968), 38 Wis. 2d 43, 51, 52 , 155 N. W. 2d 678 , a case also dealing with an alleged industrial back injury, the court summarized much of the law as follows: “ Tf credible evidence exists in support of the commission’s findings, such findings are conclusive. . . . “ ‘ “The question is not whether there is credible evidence in the record to sustain a finding the commission did not make, but whether there is any credible evidence to sustain the finding the commission did make.” ’ ” “ Tt is an elementary principle of law that the applicant has the burden of proof | 1 | 3 |
Fink v. City of Milwaukeegreen2 sentences2015See Fink v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 26, 28 (1863) ("It is an elementary rule of criminal law, that. . . the facts and circumstances which constitute the offense . . . must be stated with such certainty and precision that the defendant may be enabled to judge whether they constitute an indictable offense or not. . . ."). 2011It was in this context that the test that came to be known as the Holesome test was first set forth: Now it is an elementary rule of criminal law, that. . . the facts and circumstances which constitute the offense . . . must be stated with such certainty and precision that the defendant may be enabled to judge whether they constitute an indictable offense or not, in order that he may demur or plead to the indictment accordingly, prepare his defense, and be able to plead the conviction or acquittal in bar of another prosecution for the same offense." Fink, 17 Wis. at 28-29 . | 1 | 2 |
United Leasing & Financial Services, Inc. v. R. F. Optical, Inc.green2 sentences2020Optical, Inc., 103 Wis. 2d 488, 492 , 309 N.W.2d 23 (Ct. App. 1981) (“The elementary rule of contract damages is that a party is entitled to be placed in the same position as if the breach had not occurred.”). 2020Optical, Inc., 103 Wis. 2d 488, 492 , 309 N.W.2d 23 (Ct. App. 1981) (“The elementary rule of contract damages is that a party is entitled to be placed in the same position as if the breach had not occurred.”). | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Fort Howard Paper Co. v. State of Wisconsin Lake District Board of Reviewgreen2 sentences2005Bd., 82 Wis. 2d 491, 505 , 263 N.W.2d 178 (1978) ("The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to preserve a statute and find it constitutional if it is at all possible to do so."); White House Milk Co. v. Reynolds, 12 Wis. 2d 143, 150-51 , 106 N.W.2d 441 (1960) ("It is an elementary principle of law in this state that this court will search for a means to sustain a statute.... 2005Bd., 82 Wis. 2d 491, 505 , 263 N.W.2d 178 (1978) ("The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to preserve a statute and find it constitutional if it is at all possible to do so."); White House Milk Co. v. Reynolds, 12 Wis. 2d 143, 150-51 , 106 N.W.2d 441 (1960) ("It is an elementary principle of law in this state that this court will search for a means to sustain a statute.... | 1 | 1 |
Bolick v. Gallaghergreen2 sentences1997Haessly argues that "Wisconsin has long recognized the doctrine of successive torts" and then quotes from Bolick v. Gallagher, 268 Wis. 421, 427 , 67 N.W.2d 860, 863 (1955): "It is an elementary principle that where independent torts result in separate injuries, each tort-feasor is separately liable for his own torts." In further support of her argument, Haessly directs us to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 322 (1965), "Duty to Aid Another Harmed by Actor's Conduct," which provides: If the actor knows or has reason to know that by his [or her] conduct, whether tortious or innocent, he [or 1997Haessly argues that "Wisconsin has long recognized the doctrine of successive torts" and then quotes from Bolick v. Gallagher, 268 Wis. 421, 427 , 67 N.W.2d 860, 863 (1955): "It is an elementary principle that where independent torts result in separate injuries, each tort-feasor is separately liable for his own torts." In further support of her argument, Haessly directs us to the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 322 (1965), "Duty to Aid Another Harmed by Actor's Conduct," which provides: If the actor knows or has reason to know that by his [or her] conduct, whether tortious or innocent, he [or | 1 | 1 |
Burke v. E.L.C. Investors, Inc.green2 sentences1994See Burke, 110 Wis. 2d at 410 , 329 N.W.2d at 261 . 1994See Burke, 110 Wis. 2d at 410 , 329 N.W.2d at 261 . | 1 | 1 |
Fred Rueping Leather Co. v. City of Fond Du Lacgreen2 sentences1994The elementary rule of statutory construction that "a statute which expresses one thing is exclusive of another" compels us to the logical inference that the right to petition for judicial review in § 150.43, Stats., is an exclusive right of the "applicant." See Fred Rueping Leather Co. v. City of Fond du Lac, 99 Wis. 2d 1, 5 , 298 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Ct. App. 1980). 1994The elementary rule of statutory construction that "a statute which expresses one thing is exclusive of another" compels us to the logical inference that the right to petition for judicial review in § 150.43, Stats., is an exclusive right of the "applicant." See Fred Rueping Leather Co. v. City of Fond du Lac, 99 Wis. 2d 1, 5 , 298 N.W.2d 227, 230 (Ct. App. 1980). | 1 | 1 |
Dehnart v. Waukesha Brewing Co.green2 sentences1991Dehnart v. Waukesha Brewing Co., 21 Wis. 2d 583, 589 , 124 N.W.2d 664, 667 (1963); Restatement (Second) of Judgments sec. 84 (1982). 1991Dehnart v. Waukesha Brewing Co., 21 Wis. 2d 583, 589 , 124 N.W.2d 664, 667 (1963); Restatement (Second) of Judgments sec. 84 (1982). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Christensengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Lehner v. Kelleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bridgkort Racquet Club, Inc. v. University Bankgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Timberlake v. Kenkelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Wisconsin. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Fitz v. Industrial Commission
green
2 sentences1980Nielsen v. Industrial Comm. (1961), 14 Wis. (2d) 112, 109 N.W. (2d) 483 ; Fitz v. Industrial Comm. (1960), 10 Wis. (2d) 202, 102 N.W. (2d) 93 ; and Johnston v. Industrial Comm. (1958), 3 Wis. (2d) 173, 87 N.W. (2d) 822 .’ ” Lewellyn v. ILHR Department (1968), 38 Wis.2d 43, 52 , 155 N.W.2d 678 .” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 118 . 1970Nielsen v. Industrial Comm. (1961), 14 Wis. (2d) 112, 109 N. W. (2d) 483 ; Fitz v. Industrial Comm. (1960), 10 Wis. (2d) 202, 102 N. W. (2d) 93 ; and Johnston v. Industrial Comm. (1958), 3 Wis. (2d) 173, 87 N. W. (2d) 822 .’ ” Lewellyn v. ILHR Department (1968), 38 Wis. 2d 43, 52 , 155 N. W. 2d 678 . *119 However, when compensation is denied there must be sufficient evidence to support the department’s findings that the facts are not as the applicant alleged them to be. “. . . | 3 | 1962–1980 |
Nielsen v. Industrial Commission
neutral
2 sentences1980Nielsen v. Industrial Comm. (1961), 14 Wis. (2d) 112, 109 N.W. (2d) 483 ; Fitz v. Industrial Comm. (1960), 10 Wis. (2d) 202, 102 N.W. (2d) 93 ; and Johnston v. Industrial Comm. (1958), 3 Wis. (2d) 173, 87 N.W. (2d) 822 .’ ” Lewellyn v. ILHR Department (1968), 38 Wis.2d 43, 52 , 155 N.W.2d 678 .” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 118 . 1970Nielsen v. Industrial Comm. (1961), 14 Wis. (2d) 112, 109 N. W. (2d) 483 ; Fitz v. Industrial Comm. (1960), 10 Wis. (2d) 202, 102 N. W. (2d) 93 ; and Johnston v. Industrial Comm. (1958), 3 Wis. (2d) 173, 87 N. W. (2d) 822 .’ ” Lewellyn v. ILHR Department (1968), 38 Wis. 2d 43, 52 , 155 N. W. 2d 678 . *119 However, when compensation is denied there must be sufficient evidence to support the department’s findings that the facts are not as the applicant alleged them to be. “. . . | 3 | 1962–1980 |
Johnston v. Industrial Commission
neutral
2 sentences1980Nielsen v. Industrial Comm. (1961), 14 Wis. (2d) 112, 109 N.W. (2d) 483 ; Fitz v. Industrial Comm. (1960), 10 Wis. (2d) 202, 102 N.W. (2d) 93 ; and Johnston v. Industrial Comm. (1958), 3 Wis. (2d) 173, 87 N.W. (2d) 822 .’ ” Lewellyn v. ILHR Department (1968), 38 Wis.2d 43, 52 , 155 N.W.2d 678 .” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. at 118 . 1970Nielsen v. Industrial Comm. (1961), 14 Wis. (2d) 112, 109 N. W. (2d) 483 ; Fitz v. Industrial Comm. (1960), 10 Wis. (2d) 202, 102 N. W. (2d) 93 ; and Johnston v. Industrial Comm. (1958), 3 Wis. (2d) 173, 87 N. W. (2d) 822 .’ ” Lewellyn v. ILHR Department (1968), 38 Wis. 2d 43, 52 , 155 N. W. 2d 678 . *119 However, when compensation is denied there must be sufficient evidence to support the department’s findings that the facts are not as the applicant alleged them to be. “. . . | 3 | 1962–1980 |
CODEPT, INC. v. More-Way North Corp.
green
2 sentences2022The trial court's decision concerning an injunction will not be reversed unless the discretion has been abused."); Codept, Inc. v. More- Way N. Corp., 23 Wis. 2d 165, 171 , 127 N.W.2d 29 (1964) ("It is an elementary rule of law that the granting or refusal of a 25 No. 2020AP1032 motion would never be appropriate, we are unable to find any support for the proposition that addressing a new motion for injunctive relief under § 813.02 would be proper at this juncture. ¶38 The original preliminary injunction motion under § 813.02 remains pending in circuit court. 2022The trial court's decision concerning an injunction will not be reversed unless the discretion has been abused."); Codept, Inc. v. More- Way N. Corp., 23 Wis. 2d 165, 171 , 127 N.W.2d 29 (1964) ("It is an elementary rule of law that the granting or refusal of a 25 No. 2020AP1032 motion would never be appropriate, we are unable to find any support for the proposition that addressing a new motion for injunctive relief under § 813.02 would be proper at this juncture. ¶38 The original preliminary injunction motion under § 813.02 remains pending in circuit court. | 2 | 1995–2022 |
Culligan, Inc. v. Rheaume
green
2 sentences1974Fassbender v. Peters (1923), 179 Wis. 587, 588 , 191 N. W. 973 ; Culligan, Inc. v. Rheaume (1955), 269 Wis. 242, 248 , 68 N. W. (2d) 810 . 1974Fassbender v. Peters (1923), 179 Wis. 587, 588 , 191 N. W. 973 ; Culligan, Inc. v. Rheaume (1955), 269 Wis. 242, 248 , 68 N. W. (2d) 810 . | 2 | 1964–1974 |
Fassbender v. Peters
neutral
2 sentences1974Fassbender v. Peters (1923), 179 Wis. 587, 588 , 191 N. W. 973 ; Culligan, Inc. v. Rheaume (1955), 269 Wis. 242, 248 , 68 N. W. (2d) 810 . 1974Fassbender v. Peters (1923), 179 Wis. 587, 588 , 191 N. W. 973 ; Culligan, Inc. v. Rheaume (1955), 269 Wis. 242, 248 , 68 N. W. (2d) 810 . | 2 | 1964–1974 |
Northern Discount Co. v. Luebke
neutral
2 sentences1974If the legislature has created redundancies, it is not up to this court to create functions for such parts.” 5 Prechel v. Monroe (1968), 40 Wis. 2d 231, 239 , 161 N. W. 2d 373 , stating: “‘It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that effect must be given if possible to every word, clause and sentence thereof. . . .' ” (Quoting Northern Discount Co. v. Luebke (1959), 6 Wis. 2d 313, 316 , 94 N. W. 2d 605 .) 6 Art. 1974If the legislature has created redundancies, it is not up to this court to create functions for such parts.” 5 Prechel v. Monroe (1968), 40 Wis. 2d 231, 239 , 161 N. W. 2d 373 , stating: “‘It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that effect must be given if possible to every word, clause and sentence thereof. . . .' ” (Quoting Northern Discount Co. v. Luebke (1959), 6 Wis. 2d 313, 316 , 94 N. W. 2d 605 .) 6 Art. | 2 | 1974–1974 |
Barker Barrel Co. v. Fisher
neutral
2 sentences1964Barker Barrel Co. v. Fisher (1960), 10 Wis. (2d) 197, 102 N. W. (2d) 107 .” Thompson v. Beth (1961), 14 Wis. (2d) 271, 279, 111 N. W. (2d) 171 . 1961Barker Barrel Co. v. Fisher (1960), 10 Wis. (2d) 197, 102 N. W. (2d) 107 . (3) Allowance of interest. | 2 | 1961–1964 |
Lansing v. Carpenter
neutral
2 sentences1885Chief Justice RyaN said in that case: “We take it to be an elementary rule that‘words are actionable which directly tend to the prejudice of any one in his office, profession, trade, or business.’ ” 1 Stai’kie, Sland. 117; Lansing v. Carpenter, 9 Wis. 540 ; Townsh. 1875This rule is expressly recognized and asserted in Lansing v. Carpen ter, 9 Wis., 540 . | 2 | 1875–1885 |
Leist v. Labor & Industry Review Commission
green
2 sentences2022The burden of showing that LIRC’s decision was not supported by credible and substantial evidence “is on the party seeking to set aside LIRC’s findings and order.” Xcel Energy Servs., Inc., v. LIRC, 2013 WI 64, ¶48 , 349 Wis. 2d 234 , 833 N.W.2d 665 . ¶35 In fact, it is “‘an elementary principle’ that the claimant has the burden of proving beyond a legitimate doubt all the facts essential to the recovery of compensation.” Leist v. LIRC, 183 Wis. 2d 450, 457 , 515 N.W.2d 268 (1994) 1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted. 11 No. 2021AP1155 (c 2022The burden of showing that LIRC’s decision was not supported by credible and substantial evidence “is on the party seeking to set aside LIRC’s findings and order.” Xcel Energy Servs., Inc., v. LIRC, 2013 WI 64, ¶48 , 349 Wis. 2d 234 , 833 N.W.2d 665 . ¶35 In fact, it is “‘an elementary principle’ that the claimant has the burden of proving beyond a legitimate doubt all the facts essential to the recovery of compensation.” Leist v. LIRC, 183 Wis. 2d 450, 457 , 515 N.W.2d 268 (1994) 1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted. 11 No. 2021AP1155 (c | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Xcel Energy Services, Inc. v. Labor & Industry Review Commission
green
2 sentences2022The burden of showing that LIRC’s decision was not supported by credible and substantial evidence “is on the party seeking to set aside LIRC’s findings and order.” Xcel Energy Servs., Inc., v. LIRC, 2013 WI 64, ¶48 , 349 Wis. 2d 234 , 833 N.W.2d 665 . ¶35 In fact, it is “‘an elementary principle’ that the claimant has the burden of proving beyond a legitimate doubt all the facts essential to the recovery of compensation.” Leist v. LIRC, 183 Wis. 2d 450, 457 , 515 N.W.2d 268 (1994) 1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted. 11 No. 2021AP1155 (c 2022The burden of showing that LIRC’s decision was not supported by credible and substantial evidence “is on the party seeking to set aside LIRC’s findings and order.” Xcel Energy Servs., Inc., v. LIRC, 2013 WI 64, ¶48 , 349 Wis. 2d 234 , 833 N.W.2d 665 . ¶35 In fact, it is “‘an elementary principle’ that the claimant has the burden of proving beyond a legitimate doubt all the facts essential to the recovery of compensation.” Leist v. LIRC, 183 Wis. 2d 450, 457 , 515 N.W.2d 268 (1994) 1 All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019-20 version unless otherwise noted. 11 No. 2021AP1155 (c | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Quintana
green
2 sentences2014(Emphasis added.) The statute explicitly says that a temporary restraining order can be extended "once for 14 days upon a finding that the respondent has not been served with a copy of the temporary restraining order." Id. (emphasis added). " 'It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must he given, if possible, to every word, clause, and sentence of a statute.' " State v. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, ¶ 60 , 308 Wis. 2d 615 , 748 N.W.2d 447 (citations omitted). 2014(Emphasis added.) The statute explicitly says that a temporary restraining order can be extended "once for 14 days upon a finding that the respondent has not been served with a copy of the temporary restraining order." Id. (emphasis added). " 'It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must he given, if possible, to every word, clause, and sentence of a statute.' " State v. Quintana, 2008 WI 33, ¶ 60 , 308 Wis. 2d 615 , 748 N.W.2d 447 (citations omitted). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
State v. Martin
green
2 sentences2008"It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause, and sentence of a statute." 2A Singer et al., supra, § 46.6; State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 894 , 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991). *650 ¶ 61. 2008"It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause, and sentence of a statute." 2A Singer et al., supra, § 46.6; State v. Martin, 162 Wis. 2d 883, 894 , 470 N.W.2d 900 (1991). *650 ¶ 61. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
White House Milk Co. v. Reynolds
green
2 sentences2005Bd., 82 Wis. 2d 491, 505 , 263 N.W.2d 178 (1978) ("The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to preserve a statute and find it constitutional if it is at all possible to do so."); White House Milk Co. v. Reynolds, 12 Wis. 2d 143, 150-51 , 106 N.W.2d 441 (1960) ("It is an elementary principle of law in this state that this court will search for a means to sustain a statute.... 2005Bd., 82 Wis. 2d 491, 505 , 263 N.W.2d 178 (1978) ("The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to preserve a statute and find it constitutional if it is at all possible to do so."); White House Milk Co. v. Reynolds, 12 Wis. 2d 143, 150-51 , 106 N.W.2d 441 (1960) ("It is an elementary principle of law in this state that this court will search for a means to sustain a statute.... | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Greenebaum v. Department of Taxation
green
2 sentences2001Further, although L'Arciere correctly points out that "process" appears with "manufactured" and "serviced" it does not necessarily follow that "process" is to be interpreted as meaning "a transformation as occurs in manufacturing."" 'It is an elementary rule for the construction of statutes that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause, and sentence thereof.'" Greenebaum v. Dep't of Taxation, 1 Wis. 2d 234, 238 , 83 N.W.2d 682 (1957) (quoting State v. Columbian Nat. 2001Further, although L'Arciere correctly points out that "process" appears with "manufactured" and "serviced" it does not necessarily follow that "process" is to be interpreted as meaning "a transformation as occurs in manufacturing."" 'It is an elementary rule for the construction of statutes that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause, and sentence thereof.'" Greenebaum v. Dep't of Taxation, 1 Wis. 2d 234, 238 , 83 N.W.2d 682 (1957) (quoting State v. Columbian Nat. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Bumpas v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations
green
2 sentences2000Bumpas v. DILHR, 95 Wis. 2d 334, 342-43 , 290 N.W.2d 504 (1980) (citation omitted). 2000Bumpas v. DILHR, 95 Wis. 2d 334, 342-43 , 290 N.W.2d 504 (1980) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Belich v. Szymaszek
green
2 sentences2000Reasonable inferences were discussed recently in Belich v. Szymaszek, 224 Wis. 2d 419, 425 , 592 N.W.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1999), in which the court said: An elementary principle is that an inferred fact is a logical, factual conclusion drawn from basic facts or historical evidence. 2000Reasonable inferences were discussed recently in Belich v. Szymaszek, 224 Wis. 2d 419, 425 , 592 N.W.2d 254 (Ct. App. 1999), in which the court said: An elementary principle is that an inferred fact is a logical, factual conclusion drawn from basic facts or historical evidence. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Akin v. Kewaskum Community Schools
green
2 sentences1995Further, "' [i]t is an elementary rule of law that the granting or refusal of a temporary injunction is a matter lying within the discretion of the trial court, and its determination in regard thereto will not be upset on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown.'" Akin v. Kewaskum Community Schools, 64 Wis. 2d 154, 159 , 218 N.W.2d 494 (1974) (quoting Codept, Inc. v. More-Way North Corp., 23 Wis. 2d 165, 171 , 127 N.W.2d 29 (1964)). 1995Further, "' [i]t is an elementary rule of law that the granting or refusal of a temporary injunction is a matter lying within the discretion of the trial court, and its determination in regard thereto will not be upset on appeal unless an abuse of discretion is shown.'" Akin v. Kewaskum Community Schools, 64 Wis. 2d 154, 159 , 218 N.W.2d 494 (1974) (quoting Codept, Inc. v. More-Way North Corp., 23 Wis. 2d 165, 171 , 127 N.W.2d 29 (1964)). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Erickson v. Department of Industry, Labor & Human Relations
green
1 sentence1994Id. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Crowley v. Knapp
green
2 sentences1987Second, "in harmony with the elementary principle of property law favoring the free and unrestricted use of land," it accomplishes the remedial purpose of "enabl[ing] `persons who otherwise would be institutionalized to live in normal residential settings.'" Crowley v. Knapp , 94 Wis.2d 421 , 433 n. 1, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980). 1987Second, "in harmony with the elementary principle of property law favoring the free and unrestricted use of land," it accomplishes the remedial purpose of "enabl[ing] `persons who otherwise would be institutionalized to live in normal residential settings.'" Crowley v. Knapp , 94 Wis.2d 421 , 433 n. 1, 288 N.W.2d 815 (1980). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
State v. Britzke
green
2 sentences1984See State v. Christensen , 110 Wis.2d 538 , 543 n. 6, 329 N.W.2d 382 (1983); State v. Britzke , 108 Wis.2d 675 , 681 , 324 N.W.2d 289 (Ct.App. 1982), aff'd , 110 Wis.2d 728 , 329 N.W.2d 207 (1983). 1984See State v. Christensen , 110 Wis.2d 538 , 543 n. 6, 329 N.W.2d 382 (1983); State v. Britzke , 108 Wis.2d 675 , 681 , 324 N.W.2d 289 (Ct.App. 1982), aff'd , 110 Wis.2d 728 , 329 N.W.2d 207 (1983). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
State v. Britzke
green
2 sentences1984See State v. Christensen , 110 Wis.2d 538 , 543 n. 6, 329 N.W.2d 382 (1983); State v. Britzke , 108 Wis.2d 675 , 681 , 324 N.W.2d 289 (Ct.App. 1982), aff'd , 110 Wis.2d 728 , 329 N.W.2d 207 (1983). 1984See State v. Christensen , 110 Wis.2d 538 , 543 n. 6, 329 N.W.2d 382 (1983); State v. Britzke , 108 Wis.2d 675 , 681 , 324 N.W.2d 289 (Ct.App. 1982), aff'd , 110 Wis.2d 728 , 329 N.W.2d 207 (1983). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Wolff v. McDonnell green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Morrissey v. Brewer green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Prechel v. City of Monroe green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Madler v. Matzen green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Department of Taxation v. Pabst green | 1 | 1972–1972 |
| Van Valin v. Industrial Commission green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Thompson v. Beth green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| Boden v. City of Milwaukee green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Bradley v. Andrus neutral | 1 | 1961–1961 |
| State v. Willing neutral | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Hartman v. Loverud neutral | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Estate of Eannelli green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Swazee v. Lee neutral | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Ische v. Ische green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Lerner v. Lerner neutral | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Oconto Co. v. Bacon green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Wille v. State ex rel. Kessler neutral | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Pauly v. Keebler green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.