12 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1907–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Turley v. Stategreen2 sentences2011See Turley v. State, 96 N.M. 579, 581 , 633 P.2d 687, 689 (1981) (“It is an elementary principle of law that a person may do anything through an agent that he may lawfully do personally, unless public policy or some agreement requires personal performance.”), overruled on other grounds by U.S. Brewers Ass’to, Inc. v. Dir. of the N.M. 2011See Turley v. State, 96 N.M. 579, 581 , 633 P.2d 687, 689 (1981) (“It is an elementary principle of law that a person may do anything through an agent that he may lawfully do personally, unless public policy or some agreement requires personal performance.”), overruled on other grounds by U.S. Brewers Ass’to, Inc. v. Dir. of the N.M. | 1 | 1 |
United States Brewers Ass'n v. Director of the New Mexico Department of Alcoholic Beverage Controlgreen2 sentences2011Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 100 N.M. 216, 219 , 668 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1983). {25} A person may use an agent to take action under the authority of a statute, even when the agent is not the person specifically identified in the statute. 2011Dep’t of Alcoholic Beverage Control, 100 N.M. 216, 219 , 668 P.2d 1093, 1096 (1983). {25} A person may use an agent to take action under the authority of a statute, even when the agent is not the person specifically identified in the statute. | 1 | 1 |
Manu-Tronics, Inc. v. Effective Management Systems, Inc.green2 sentences1995Co., 70 Wash.App. 796 , 855 P.2d 1223, 1225-26 (Ct.App.1993) (noting that an arbitration proceeding can be the basis for collateral estoppel when the parties received a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues), review denied, 123 Wash.2d 1004 , 868 P.2d 872 (1994); Manu-Tronics, Inc. v. Effective Management Sys., Inc., 163 Wis.2d 304 , 471 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Ct.App.) (“Essential to arbitration remaining useful is the elementary principle that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are applicable to arbitration awards.”), review denied, 475 N.W.2d 164 (Wis.1991). 1995Co., 70 Wash.App. 796 , 855 P.2d 1223, 1225-26 (Ct.App.1993) (noting that an arbitration proceeding can be the basis for collateral estoppel when the parties received a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues), review denied, 123 Wash.2d 1004 , 868 P.2d 872 (1994); Manu-Tronics, Inc. v. Effective Management Sys., Inc., 163 Wis.2d 304 , 471 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Ct.App.) (“Essential to arbitration remaining useful is the elementary principle that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are applicable to arbitration awards.”), review denied, 475 N.W.2d 164 (Wis.1991). | 1 | 1 |
Neff v. Allstate Insurance Co.green2 sentences1995Co., 70 Wash.App. 796 , 855 P.2d 1223, 1225-26 (Ct.App.1993) (noting that an arbitration proceeding can be the basis for collateral estoppel when the parties received a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues), review denied, 123 Wash.2d 1004 , 868 P.2d 872 (1994); Manu-Tronics, Inc. v. Effective Management Sys., Inc., 163 Wis.2d 304 , 471 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Ct.App.) (“Essential to arbitration remaining useful is the elementary principle that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are applicable to arbitration awards.”), review denied, 475 N.W.2d 164 (Wis.1991). 1995Co., 70 Wash.App. 796 , 855 P.2d 1223, 1225-26 (Ct.App.1993) (noting that an arbitration proceeding can be the basis for collateral estoppel when the parties received a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issues), review denied, 123 Wash.2d 1004 , 868 P.2d 872 (1994); Manu-Tronics, Inc. v. Effective Management Sys., Inc., 163 Wis.2d 304 , 471 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Ct.App.) (“Essential to arbitration remaining useful is the elementary principle that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are applicable to arbitration awards.”), review denied, 475 N.W.2d 164 (Wis.1991). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sakariason v. Mechem
green
2 sentences1954Sakariason v. Mechem, 20 N.M. 307 , 149 P. 352 ; Reese v. Dempsey, 48 N.M. 417 , 152 P.2d 157 . 1941 Comp. § 57-925 makes provision for the increase or diminution of compensation awards at six months’ intervals upon proper application and showing of either the recovery or increased disability of the worker. 1954Sakariason v. Mechem, 20 N.M. 307 , 149 P. 352 ; Reese v. Dempsey, 48 N.M. 417 , 152 P.2d 157 . 1941 Comp. § 57-925 makes provision for the increase or diminution of compensation awards at six months’ intervals upon proper application and showing of either the recovery or increased disability of the worker. | 2 | 1941–1954 |
Reagan v. El Paso & Northeastern Railway Co.
neutral
2 sentences2023Co., 1910-NMSC-006 , ¶ 8, 15 N.M. 270 , 106 P. 376 (“It is an elementary principle of law. . . that before a plaintiff can recover he must prove his case.”). 2023Co., 1910-NMSC-006 , ¶ 8, 15 N.M. 270 , 106 P. 376 (“It is an elementary principle of law. . . that before a plaintiff can recover he must prove his case.”). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Perea v. Martinez
neutral
2 sentences1984These defendants correctly state the elementary principle that “in a suit to quiet title to real estate, the plaintiff must recover upon the strength of his own title and not the weakness of that of his adversary.” Perea v. Martinez, 95 N.M. 84 , 619 P.2d 188 (1980). 1984These defendants correctly state the elementary principle that “in a suit to quiet title to real estate, the plaintiff must recover upon the strength of his own title and not the weakness of that of his adversary.” Perea v. Martinez, 95 N.M. 84 , 619 P.2d 188 (1980). | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Komadina v. Edmondson
green
2 sentences1984Defendants rely on Komadina v. Edmondson, 81 N.M. 467 , 468 P.2d 632 (1970) for the following proposition: It is fundamental that “In order to make a valid conveyance of land, it is essential that the land itself, the subject of the conveyance, be capable of identification, and, if the conveyance does not describe the land with such particularity as to render this possible, the conveyance is absolutely nugatory, * * * ” 4 Tiffany, Real Property § 990 (3rd ed. Jones 1939). 81 N.M. at 469 , 468 P.2d 632 . 1984Defendants rely on Komadina v. Edmondson, 81 N.M. 467 , 468 P.2d 632 (1970) for the following proposition: It is fundamental that “In order to make a valid conveyance of land, it is essential that the land itself, the subject of the conveyance, be capable of identification, and, if the conveyance does not describe the land with such particularity as to render this possible, the conveyance is absolutely nugatory, * * * ” 4 Tiffany, Real Property § 990 (3rd ed. Jones 1939). 81 N.M. at 469 , 468 P.2d 632 . | 1 | 1984–1984 |
Smith v. Walcott
green
2 sentences1981Smith v. Walcott, 85 N.M. 351 , 512 P.2d 679 (1973); Coldwater Cattle Co. v. Portales Valley Project, Inc., 78 N.M. 41 , 428 P.2d 15 (1967); 3 AM.JUR.2d, Agency, § 20 (1962); Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 17 (1958). 1981Smith v. Walcott, 85 N.M. 351 , 512 P.2d 679 (1973); Coldwater Cattle Co. v. Portales Valley Project, Inc., 78 N.M. 41 , 428 P.2d 15 (1967); 3 AM.JUR.2d, Agency, § 20 (1962); Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 17 (1958). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Coldwater Cattle Co. v. Portales Valley Project, Inc.
green
2 sentences1981Smith v. Walcott, 85 N.M. 351 , 512 P.2d 679 (1973); Coldwater Cattle Co. v. Portales Valley Project, Inc., 78 N.M. 41 , 428 P.2d 15 (1967); 3 AM.JUR.2d, Agency, § 20 (1962); Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 17 (1958). 1981Smith v. Walcott, 85 N.M. 351 , 512 P.2d 679 (1973); Coldwater Cattle Co. v. Portales Valley Project, Inc., 78 N.M. 41 , 428 P.2d 15 (1967); 3 AM.JUR.2d, Agency, § 20 (1962); Restatement (Second) of Agency, § 17 (1958). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Binkley v. Hunter
green
1 sentence1964Binkley v. Hunter (C.C.A. 10) 170 F.2d 848 ; McCutcheon v. Cox, supra. “It is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word, clause and sentence of a statute.” 2 Sutherland Statutory Construction (3rd Ed.) § 4705. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Reese v. Dempsey
green
2 sentences1954Sakariason v. Mechem, 20 N.M. 307 , 149 P. 352 ; Reese v. Dempsey, 48 N.M. 417 , 152 P.2d 157 . 1941 Comp. § 57-925 makes provision for the increase or diminution of compensation awards at six months’ intervals upon proper application and showing of either the recovery or increased disability of the worker. 1954Sakariason v. Mechem, 20 N.M. 307 , 149 P. 352 ; Reese v. Dempsey, 48 N.M. 417 , 152 P.2d 157 . 1941 Comp. § 57-925 makes provision for the increase or diminution of compensation awards at six months’ intervals upon proper application and showing of either the recovery or increased disability of the worker. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
State v. Kelly
neutral
1 sentence1941Accordingly, the great weight of authority is to the effect that, in order for a school board to bind the district in ■ the employment of teachers, it is necessary that the members of the board act as a board, and that to do so it is imperative that all meet together, or at least be notified of such meeting, and have an opportunity to meet together, to consult over the employment of such teachers.” In State v. Kelly, supra [ 27 N.M. 412 , 202 P. 532 , 21 A.L.R. 156 ], we accepted as a matter of course counsel’s argument that such is the true rule. | 1 | 1941–1941 |
United States v. Mills
green
1 sentence1936In United States v. Mills, 7 Pet. [138] 142 ( 8 L.Ed. 636 ), this was construed to mean, that the indictment must set forth the offense “with clearness and all necessary certainty, to apprise the accused of the' crime with which he stands charged;” and in United States v. Cook, 17 Wall. [168] 174, 21 L.Ed. 538 , that “every ingredient of0which the offense is composed must be accurately and clearly alleged.” It is an elementary principle of criminal pleading, that where the definition of an offense, whether it be at common law or by statute, “includes generic terms, it is not sufficient that th | 1 | 1936–1936 |
United States v. Cook
green
1 sentence1936In United States v. Mills, 7 Pet. [138] 142 ( 8 L.Ed. 636 ), this was construed to mean, that the indictment must set forth the offense “with clearness and all necessary certainty, to apprise the accused of the' crime with which he stands charged;” and in United States v. Cook, 17 Wall. [168] 174, 21 L.Ed. 538 , that “every ingredient of0which the offense is composed must be accurately and clearly alleged.” It is an elementary principle of criminal pleading, that where the definition of an offense, whether it be at common law or by statute, “includes generic terms, it is not sufficient that th | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Knights Templars' & Masons' Life Indemnity Co. v. Jarman
green
1 sentence1910In Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 657 , it is said: “The elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” In Knights Templar’s Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187 U. S. 197, 205 , it is said: “Were the act of 1887 more ambiguous than it is as to its application to past transactions, we would still be disposed to apply the cardinal rule of construction, that where the language of an act would bear two interpretations equally obvious that the one which is clearly in accordance with the provisions of the constitution is | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Hooper v. California
green
1 sentence1910In Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648, 657 , it is said: “The elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” In Knights Templar’s Indemnity Co. v. Jarman, 187 U. S. 197, 205 , it is said: “Were the act of 1887 more ambiguous than it is as to its application to past transactions, we would still be disposed to apply the cardinal rule of construction, that where the language of an act would bear two interpretations equally obvious that the one which is clearly in accordance with the provisions of the constitution is | 1 | 1910–1910 |
Wood v. Ridgeville College
neutral
1 sentence1907Ency. of Law, (2nd Ed.) 144; Bradley v. Marshall, 54 Ill. 183 ; Wood v. Ridgeville College, 114 Ind. 320 . | 1 | 1907–1907 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.