elementary rule in Virginia

2019Code 20-109(C) provides that in cases where the parties have executed a property settlement agreement prior to the entry of a final decree of divorce, “no decree or order directing the payment of . . . counsel fee[s] . . . shall be entered except in accordance with that stipulation or contract.” Moreover, [i]n order to find in this agreement a requirement for attorney’s fees in other unspecified instances, we “would have to insert words into the writing contrary to the elementary rule that the function of the court is to construe the contract made by the parties, not to make a contract for the

2019Code 20-109(C) provides that in cases where the parties have executed a property settlement agreement prior to the entry of a final decree of divorce, “no decree or order directing the payment of . . . counsel fee[s] . . . shall be entered except in accordance with that stipulation or contract.” Moreover, [i]n order to find in this agreement a requirement for attorney’s fees in other unspecified instances, we “would have to insert words into the writing contrary to the elementary rule that the function of the court is to construe the contract made by the parties, not to make a contract for the

2009In other words, “what the parties claim they might have said, or should have said, cannot alter what they actually said.” Wilson [v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 184, 188 , 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1984)].

2009In other words, “what the parties claim they might have said, or should have said, cannot alter what they actually said.” Wilson [v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 184, 188 , 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1984)].

2008See Janvier v. Arminio, 272 Va. 353, 366 , 634 S.E.2d 754, 761 (2006); Jackson v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 269 Va. 303, 313 , 608 S.E.2d 901, 906 (2005) (“Where the General Assembly has expressed its intent in clear and unequivocal terms, it is not the province of the judiciary to add words to the statute or alter its plain meaning.”); Bullock v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 359, 369 , 631 S.E.2d 334, 339 (2006) (“[W]e are guided by the elementary principle that ‘[t]he primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Za

2008See Janvier v. Arminio, 272 Va. 353, 366 , 634 S.E.2d 754, 761 (2006); Jackson v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 269 Va. 303, 313 , 608 S.E.2d 901, 906 (2005) (“Where the General Assembly has expressed its intent in clear and unequivocal terms, it is not the province of the judiciary to add words to the statute or alter its plain meaning.”); Bullock v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 359, 369 , 631 S.E.2d 334, 339 (2006) (“[W]e are guided by the elementary principle that ‘[t]he primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Za

1999The fact that counsel had notice is further demonstrated by the fact that counsel sought to withdraw by letter dated only three days prior to the scheduled hearing for the presentation of the final decree. 1 An elementary requirement of due process in any proceeding is “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Such notice “must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance.” Eddine v. Eddine, 12 Va.App. 760, 763 , 406 S.E.2d 914, 91

1999The fact that counsel had notice is further demonstrated by the fact that counsel sought to withdraw by letter dated only three days prior to the scheduled hearing for the presentation of the final decree. 1 An elementary requirement of due process in any proceeding is “notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections.” Such notice “must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance.” Eddine v. Eddine, 12 Va.App. 760, 763 , 406 S.E.2d 914, 91

1996“Inconsistencies in testamentary documents ‘are not looked upon with favor and the court should undertake, wherever it is possible, to reconcile conflicting provisions, *201 keeping in mind always this elementary rule, the testatrix’s intentions control.’ ” West v. Hines, 245 Va. 379, 384 , 429 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1993) (quoting Whittle v. Roper, 156 Va. 407, 413 , 157 S.E. 827, 829 (1931)).

1996“Inconsistencies in testamentary documents ‘are not looked upon with favor and the court should undertake, wherever it is possible, to reconcile conflicting provisions, *201 keeping in mind always this elementary rule, the testatrix’s intentions control.’ ” West v. Hines, 245 Va. 379, 384 , 429 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1993) (quoting Whittle v. Roper, 156 Va. 407, 413 , 157 S.E. 827, 829 (1931)).

2025Co., 179 Va. 642, 648 (1942))); Seilheimer v. Melville, 224 Va. 323, 327 (1982) (same).

2004Co., 179 Va. 642 , 648, 20 S.E.2d 489 , 491 (1942) (quoting Moore v. Richmond, 85 Va. 538 , 539, 8 S.E. 387 , 388 (1888)).

2009Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 202 Va. 13, 19 , 116 S.E.2d 44, 48 (1960) ("The elementary rule of statutory construction is that the construction accorded a statute by public officials charged with its administration and enforcement is entitled to be given weight by the court.

2009Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 202 Va. 13, 19 , 116 S.E.2d 44, 48 (1960) ("The elementary rule of statutory construction is that the construction accorded a statute by public officials charged with its administration and enforcement is entitled to be given weight by the court.

2025Co., 179 Va. 642, 648 (1942))); Seilheimer v. Melville, 224 Va. 323, 327 (1982) (same).

2025For “[i]t - 13 - is an elementary rule that a declaration must allege material facts sufficient to show a complete right of action in the plaintiff.” Craft v. Moloney Belting Co., 117 Va. 480, 484 (1915) (emphasis added).

2025Id.; see also Stottlemyer v. -9- Ghramm, 268 Va. 7, 12 (2004) (“It is an elementary rule that the evidence must be confined to the point in issue, and hence evidence of collateral facts, from which no fair inferences can be drawn tending to throw light upon the fact under investigation, is excluded[.]” (quoting Jackson v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.

2024Rep. 857, 863 (K.B. 1838); see also Code § 1-200; Cherry v. Lawson Realty Corp., 295 Va. 369, 376 (2018) (“Statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed and not to be enlarged in their operation by construction beyond their express terms.” (quoting Chesapeake & Ohio Ry.

2024After finding her testimony unworthy of belief, the trial judge also “could draw the reasonable inference that [Welch] testified falsely ‘in an effort to conceal h[er] guilt.’” Morris v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 127, 133 (2005) (quoting Covil v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 692, 696 (2004)).

2024After finding her testimony unworthy of belief, the trial judge also “could draw the reasonable inference that [Welch] testified falsely ‘in an effort to conceal h[er] guilt.’” Morris v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 127, 133 (2005) (quoting Covil v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 692, 696 (2004)).

2015Courts “must resolve any reasonable doubt regarding the constitutionality of a law in favor of its validity.” Boyd v. County of Henrico, 42 Va. App. 495, 507 , 592 S.E.2d 768, 774 (2004).

2015Courts “must resolve any reasonable doubt regarding the constitutionality of a law in favor of its validity.” Boyd v. County of Henrico, 42 Va. App. 495, 507 , 592 S.E.2d 768, 774 (2004).

2015Courts have a “duty to construe statutes subject to a constitutional challenge in a manner that ‘avoid[s] any conflict with the Constitution’.” Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183, 193 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 16 (2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Doe, 278 Va. 223, 229 , 682 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2009)); see Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 406 (2010) (“The elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”) (emphasis in original).

2015Courts have a “duty to construe statutes subject to a constitutional challenge in a manner that ‘avoid[s] any conflict with the Constitution’.” Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183, 193 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 16 (2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Doe, 278 Va. 223, 229 , 682 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2009)); see Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 406 (2010) (“The elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”) (emphasis in original).

2015Courts have a “duty to construe statutes subject to a constitutional challenge in a manner that ‘avoid[s] any conflict with the Constitution’.” Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183, 193 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 16 (2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Doe, 278 Va. 223, 229 , 682 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2009)); see Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 406 (2010) (“The elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”) (emphasis in original).

2015Courts have a “duty to construe statutes subject to a constitutional challenge in a manner that ‘avoid[s] any conflict with the Constitution’.” Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183, 193 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 16 (2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Doe, 278 Va. 223, 229 , 682 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2009)); see Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 406 (2010) (“The elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”) (emphasis in original).

2015Courts have a “duty to construe statutes subject to a constitutional challenge in a manner that ‘avoid[s] any conflict with the Constitution’.” Copeland v. Todd, 282 Va. 183, 193 , 715 S.E.2d 11, 16 (2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Doe, 278 Va. 223, 229 , 682 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2009)); see Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 406 (2010) (“The elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.”) (emphasis in original).

2009The legislature is presumed to be cognizant of such construction."); Chauncey F. Hutter, Inc. v. Va. Employment Comm'n, 50 Va.App. 590, 594 , 652 S.E.2d 151, 153 (2007); cf. Purolator Courier Corp. v. Clemons Courier Corp., 236 Va. 394, 400 , 374 S.E.2d 42, 45 (1988).

2009The legislature is presumed to be cognizant of such construction."); Chauncey F. Hutter, Inc. v. Va. Employment Comm'n, 50 Va.App. 590, 594 , 652 S.E.2d 151, 153 (2007); cf. Purolator Courier Corp. v. Clemons Courier Corp., 236 Va. 394, 400 , 374 S.E.2d 42, 45 (1988).

2009The legislature is presumed to be cognizant of such construction."); Chauncey F. Hutter, Inc. v. Va. Employment Comm'n, 50 Va.App. 590, 594 , 652 S.E.2d 151, 153 (2007); cf. Purolator Courier Corp. v. Clemons Courier Corp., 236 Va. 394, 400 , 374 S.E.2d 42, 45 (1988).

2009The legislature is presumed to be cognizant of such construction."); Chauncey F. Hutter, Inc. v. Va. Employment Comm'n, 50 Va.App. 590, 594 , 652 S.E.2d 151, 153 (2007); cf. Purolator Courier Corp. v. Clemons Courier Corp., 236 Va. 394, 400 , 374 S.E.2d 42, 45 (1988).

2008See Janvier v. Arminio, 272 Va. 353, 366 , 634 S.E.2d 754, 761 (2006); Jackson v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 269 Va. 303, 313 , 608 S.E.2d 901, 906 (2005) (“Where the General Assembly has expressed its intent in clear and unequivocal terms, it is not the province of the judiciary to add words to the statute or alter its plain meaning.”); Bullock v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 359, 369 , 631 S.E.2d 334, 339 (2006) (“[W]e are guided by the elementary principle that ‘[t]he primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Za

2008See Janvier v. Arminio, 272 Va. 353, 366 , 634 S.E.2d 754, 761 (2006); Jackson v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 269 Va. 303, 313 , 608 S.E.2d 901, 906 (2005) (“Where the General Assembly has expressed its intent in clear and unequivocal terms, it is not the province of the judiciary to add words to the statute or alter its plain meaning.”); Bullock v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 359, 369 , 631 S.E.2d 334, 339 (2006) (“[W]e are guided by the elementary principle that ‘[t]he primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Za

2008See Janvier v. Arminio, 272 Va. 353, 366 , 634 S.E.2d 754, 761 (2006); Jackson v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 269 Va. 303, 313 , 608 S.E.2d 901, 906 (2005) (“Where the General Assembly has expressed its intent in clear and unequivocal terms, it is not the province of the judiciary to add words to the statute or alter its plain meaning.”); Bullock v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 359, 369 , 631 S.E.2d 334, 339 (2006) (“[W]e are guided by the elementary principle that ‘[t]he primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Za

2008See Janvier v. Arminio, 272 Va. 353, 366 , 634 S.E.2d 754, 761 (2006); Jackson v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 269 Va. 303, 313 , 608 S.E.2d 901, 906 (2005) (“Where the General Assembly has expressed its intent in clear and unequivocal terms, it is not the province of the judiciary to add words to the statute or alter its plain meaning.”); Bullock v. Commonwealth, 48 Va. App. 359, 369 , 631 S.E.2d 334, 339 (2006) (“[W]e are guided by the elementary principle that ‘[t]he primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent.’” (quoting Commonwealth v. Za