48 Massachusetts opinions name it 5 courts 1880–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Rocci v. Massachusetts Accident Co.green2 sentences2024"It is an elementary rule in the interpretation of contracts that whenever reasonably practicable every word shall be given effect," Rocci v. Mass. Accident Co., 222 Mass. 336, 343 (1916), "and a reading of a contract which gives a reasonable meaning to all [its] provisions . . . is . . . preferred to one which leaves a part useless or inexplicable" (quotation and citation omitted). 2000See Rocci v. Massachusetts Accident Co., 222 Mass. 336, 344 (1916) (Rugg, C.J.) (“It is an elementary rule in the interpretation of contracts that whenever reasonably practicable every word shall be given effect. | 3 | 5 |
Hagerty v. Myersgreen2 sentences2013“It is an elementary rule in the interpretation of contracts that whenever reasonably practicable every word shall be given effect.” Hagerty v. Myers, supra, quoting Rocci v. Massachusetts Acc. Co., supra. DeWolfe’s construction of the exculpatory clause plainly gives effect to the phrase “or previously made in writing.” Under the defendants’ construction, by contrast, the meaning of the clause is the same whether or not the phrase is included, and that construction therefore gives the phrase no effect. 1992“It is an elementary rule in the interpreta tion of contracts that whenever reasonably practicable every word shall be given effect.” Hagerty v. Myers, 333 Mass. 387, 388 (1955), quoting from Rocci v. Massachusetts Acc. Co., 222 Mass. 336, 343 (1916). | 1 | 2 |
Freelander v. G. & K. REALTY CORP.green1 sentence2025Realty Corp., 357 Mass. 512, 516 (1970), and IPI provides no compelling reason to deviate from this principle. | 1 | 1 |
Kingstown Corp. v. Black Cat Cranberry Corp.green1 sentence2024Kingstown Corp. v. Black Cat Cranberry Corp., 65 Mass. App. Ct. 154, 158 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Martinezgreen2 sentences2019See also Commonwealth v. Martinez , 425 Mass. 382 , 398-399, 681 N.E.2d 818 (1997) (one person's guilty plea may not be used to prove guilt of another); Commonwealth v. Tilley , 327 Mass. 540 , 548, 99 N.E.2d 749 (1951) (art. 12 of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights prohibits use of criminal conviction against another party to establish truth of any fact involved in conviction). 9 "[I]t is an elementary principle of justice, that one [person] shall not be affected by another's act or omission, to which he is a stranger." Elisha , supra at 461. 2019See also Commonwealth v. Martinez , 425 Mass. 382 , 398-399, 681 N.E.2d 818 (1997) (one person's guilty plea may not be used to prove guilt of another); Commonwealth v. Tilley , 327 Mass. 540 , 548, 99 N.E.2d 749 (1951) (art. 12 of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights prohibits use of criminal conviction against another party to establish truth of any fact involved in conviction). 9 "[I]t is an elementary principle of justice, that one [person] shall not be affected by another's act or omission, to which he is a stranger." Elisha , supra at 461. | 1 | 1 |
Riley v. Presnellgreen1 sentence2014See Riley v. Presnell, 409 Mass. 239, 242 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
JRY CORP. v. LeRouxgreen1 sentence1992See also JRY Corp. v. LeRoux, 18 Mass. App. Ct. 153, 159-160 (1984). | 1 | 1 |
Union Old Lowell National Bank v. Painegreen1 sentence1991Dolan v. Boston & Maine R.R., 328 Mass. 532, 535 (1952); Union Old Lowell Nat'l Bk. v. Paine, 318 Mass. 313, 324-325 (1945); Newlin v. New Eng. | 1 | 1 |
Dolan v. Boston & Maine Railroadgreen1 sentence1991Dolan v. Boston & Maine R.R., 328 Mass. 532, 535 (1952); Union Old Lowell Nat'l Bk. v. Paine, 318 Mass. 313, 324-325 (1945); Newlin v. New Eng. | 1 | 1 |
Tobey v. McFarlingreen1 sentence1960See Tobey v. McFarlin, 115 Mass. 98 G. | 1 | 1 |
| Comerford v. Meiergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Epstein v. Epsteingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Drew v. Beard
green
2 sentences1941“It is an elementary rule of equity pleading, that the bill must contain a clear and exact statement of all the material facts upon which the plaintiff’s right to the relief sought depends, and that he can only introduce evidence of such facts as are thus stated.” Drew v. Beard, 107 Mass. 64, 73 . 1939“A bill of this nature [as in the case at bar] on a legal cause of action should set out the cause of action as specifically as is required in an action at law,” Sandford v. Wright, 164 Mass. 85, 87 , and “‘It is an elementary rule of equity pleading, that the bill must contain a clear and exact statement of all the material facts upon which the plaintiff’s right to the relief sought depends, and that he can only introduce evidence of such facts as are thus stated.’ Drew v. Beard, 107 Mass. 64, 73 .” Arnold v. Maxwell, 223 Mass. 47, 48 . | 4 | 1924–1941 |
Zuckernik v. Jordan Marsh Co.
green
2 sentences1971The exception to this finding of fact “viólateos] the elementary rule that exceptions to a master’s report cannot avail unless the error is made to appear upon the face of the report itself.” Zuckernik v. Jordan Marsh Co. 290 Mass. 151, 155 . 1942Zuckernick v. Jordan Marsh Co. 290 Mass. 151, 155 . | 3 | 1937–1971 |
Commonwealth v. McDermott
green
2 sentences1972Commonwealth *387 v. McDermott, 347 Mass. 246 . [3] In the instant case the police were not aware of the theft reported to station 9 nor were they engaged in a cooperative effort with officers in connection with the stolen bonds who did have this knowledge. 1972Common wealth v. McDermott, 347 Mass. 246 . 3 In the instant case the police were not aware of the theft reported to station 9 nor were they engaged in a cooperative effort with officers in connection with the stolen bonds who did have this knowledge. | 2 | 1966–1972 |
Brown v. Neelon
green
2 sentences1972L. c. 231 A, § 1, that an “actual controversy” be “specifically set forth in the pleadings.” “It is an elementary rule of equity pleading that the bill must contain a clear and exact statement of all the material facts upon which the plaintiff’s right to relief sought depends in order that the defendant may answer fully and fairly and know what he will be called upon to meet. . . . ‘Averments of crucial facts in a pleading should be clear, direct and unequivocal.’ ” Brown v. Neelon, supra, 361 . 1972“It is an elementary rule of equity pleading that the bill must contain a clear and exact statement of all the material *205 facts upon which the plaintiff’s right to relief sought depends in order that the defendant may answer fully and fairly and know what he will be called upon to meet.” Brown v. Neelon, 335 Mass. 357, 361 , and cases cited. | 2 | 1972–1972 |
Grise v. Rieutord
green
2 sentences1971Grise v. Rieutord, 305 Mass. 61, 64 . 1957Grise v. Rieutord, 305 Mass. 61, 64 . | 2 | 1957–1971 |
Iannelle v. Fire Commissioner of Boston
green
2 sentences1962Iannelle v. Fire Commr. of Boston, 331 Mass. 250, 253 . 1958Iannelle v. Fire Commr. of Boston, 331 Mass. 250, 253 . | 2 | 1958–1962 |
Arnold v. Maxwell
green
2 sentences1947Arnold v. Maxwell, 223 Mass. 47, 48 . 1939“A bill of this nature [as in the case at bar] on a legal cause of action should set out the cause of action as specifically as is required in an action at law,” Sandford v. Wright, 164 Mass. 85, 87 , and “‘It is an elementary rule of equity pleading, that the bill must contain a clear and exact statement of all the material facts upon which the plaintiff’s right to the relief sought depends, and that he can only introduce evidence of such facts as are thus stated.’ Drew v. Beard, 107 Mass. 64, 73 .” Arnold v. Maxwell, 223 Mass. 47, 48 . | 2 | 1939–1947 |
Richards v. Attleborough Branch Railroad
green
1 sentence2021Co., 153 Mass. 120 , 122 (1891). "[I]t is an elementary principle of law, that a person cannot grant or convey property of which he is not possessed, and to which he has no title." Gardner v. Hooper, 69 Mass. 398 , 400 (1855). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Gardner v. Hooper
neutral
1 sentence2021Co., 153 Mass. 120 , 122 (1891). "[I]t is an elementary principle of law, that a person cannot grant or convey property of which he is not possessed, and to which he has no title." Gardner v. Hooper, 69 Mass. 398 , 400 (1855). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Kirby v. United States
green
2 sentences2019In Kirby , 174 U.S. at 53 -55 , 19 S.Ct. 574 , the United States Supreme Court reached the same result. 2019In Kirby , 174 U.S. at 53 -55 , 19 S.Ct. 574 , the United States Supreme Court reached the same result. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Commonwealth v. Tilley
green
2 sentences2019See also Commonwealth v. Martinez , 425 Mass. 382 , 398-399, 681 N.E.2d 818 (1997) (one person's guilty plea may not be used to prove guilt of another); Commonwealth v. Tilley , 327 Mass. 540 , 548, 99 N.E.2d 749 (1951) (art. 12 of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights prohibits use of criminal conviction against another party to establish truth of any fact involved in conviction). 9 "[I]t is an elementary principle of justice, that one [person] shall not be affected by another's act or omission, to which he is a stranger." Elisha , supra at 461. 2019See also Commonwealth v. Martinez , 425 Mass. 382 , 398-399, 681 N.E.2d 818 (1997) (one person's guilty plea may not be used to prove guilt of another); Commonwealth v. Tilley , 327 Mass. 540 , 548, 99 N.E.2d 749 (1951) (art. 12 of Massachusetts Declaration of Rights prohibits use of criminal conviction against another party to establish truth of any fact involved in conviction). 9 "[I]t is an elementary principle of justice, that one [person] shall not be affected by another's act or omission, to which he is a stranger." Elisha , supra at 461. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
LaLonde v. LaLonde
green
1 sentence1995It is an elementary principle that “appellate review may proceed only from a final judgment.” Lalonde v. Lalonde, 28 Mass. App. Ct. 969 (1990). | 1 | 1995–1995 |
Little v. Heimlich
green
1 sentence1983Little v. Heimlich, 1980 Mass. App. Div. 122 and cases cited. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Commonwealth v. Ballou
green
2 sentences1972We cannot, in the circumstances of this case, apply "the elementary rule of composite knowledge of police officers engaged in a cooperative effort, where the knowledge of one may be the knowledge of all." Commonwealth v. Ballou, 350 Mass. 751, 757 . 1972We cannot, in the circumstances of this case, apply “the elementary rule of composite knowledge of police officers engaged in a cooperative effort, where the knowledge of one may be the knowledge of all.” Commonwealth v. Ballou, 350 Mass. 751, 757 . | 1 | 1972–1972 |
Chopelas v. Chopelas
green
1 sentence1971Chopelas v. Chopelas, 303 Mass. 33, 36 . | 1 | 1971–1971 |
Frizzell v. Metropolitan Coal Co.
green
1 sentence1965This is the elementary rule (Frizzell v. Metropolitan Coal Co. 298 Mass. 189, 191 , and cases cited) and is assumed by all the parties in the cases at bar. | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Pioneer Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1965Pioneer Steel Erectors, Inc. v. Commonwealth, 344 Mass. 195, 200 . | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Madden v. Secretary of the Commonwealth
green
1 sentence1965We note at the outset that “[i]t is an elementary principle that mandamus will not lie where there is available another and effective remedy.” Madden v. Secretary of the Commonwealth, 337 Mass. 758, 761 . | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Commonwealth v. Aronson
green
1 sentence1962Commonwealth v. Aronson, 312 Mass. 347, 351-352 ) we cannot say that the finding of an intent to deceive was without sound evidential basis. | 1 | 1962–1962 |
County of Essex v. City of Newburyport
green
1 sentence1958County of Essex v. Newburyport, 254 Mass. 232, 237 . | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Leventhal v. Jennings green | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Carson v. Gikas green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Seder v. Kozlowski green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Chinese American Restaurant Corp. v. Finigan neutral | 1 | 1941–1941 |
| Fuller v. Lovell green | 1 | 1940–1940 |
| Sandford v. Wright green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| National Rockland Bank v. Johnston green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Bumpus v. Church green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Baush Machine Tool Co. v. Hill green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Lawrence v. Rosenberg green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Moss v. Old Colony Trust Co. green | 1 | 1932–1932 |
| Garfield & Proctor Coal Co. v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad neutral | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Low v. Pew green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Malden & Melrose Gas Light Co. v. Chandler neutral | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| Pickard v. Clancy green | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| Williams v. Inhabitants of Winthrop neutral | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Bjornquist v. Boston & Albany Railroad neutral | 1 | 1905–1905 |
| Gold v. Eddy neutral | 1 | 1880–1880 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.