elementary rule in Montana

1996We have also stated that "[t]his Court has consistently held that the master has a duty to use reasonable care to provide a reasonably safe place for his servants to work and to provide reasonably safe tools and appliances with which to perform the tasks assigned." Pollard, 418 P.2d at 872 .

1996We have also stated that “[t]his Court has consistently held that the master has a duty to use reasonable care to provide a reasonably safe place for his servants to work and to provide reasonably safe tools and appliances with which to perform the tasks assigned.” Pollard, 418 P.2d at 872 .

1993In Roy v. Neibauer (1981), 191 Mont. 224, 226 , 623 P.2d 555, 556 , we held that: It is an elementary principle of law that before a claim for relief can be made against a defendant for negligence, the existence of a duty by the defendant to the plaintiff must be shown, along with the breach of that duty and a resulting injury.

1993In Roy v. Neibauer (1981), 191 Mont. 224, 226 , 623 P.2d 555, 556 , we held that: It is an elementary principle of law that before a claim for relief can be made against a defendant for negligence, the existence of a duty by the defendant to the plaintiff must be shown, along with the breach of that duty and a resulting injury.

1989“It is an elementary principle of law that before a claim for relief can be made against a defendant for negligence, the existence of a duty by the defendant to the plaintiff must be shown, along with the breach of the duty and a resulting injury.” Roy v. Neibauer (Mont. 1981), [ 191 Mont. 221 ,] 623 P.2d 555, 556 , 38 St.Rep. 173 , 174; Jackson v. William Dingwall Co. (1965), 145 Mont. 127 , 399 P.2d 236 ; Kakos v. Byrum (1930), 88 Mont. 309 , 292 P. 909 .

1989“It is an elementary principle of law that before a claim for relief can be made against a defendant for negligence, the existence of a duty by the defendant to the plaintiff must be shown, along with the breach of the duty and a resulting injury.” Roy v. Neibauer (Mont. 1981), [ 191 Mont. 221 ,] 623 P.2d 555, 556 , 38 St.Rep. 173 , 174; Jackson v. William Dingwall Co. (1965), 145 Mont. 127 , 399 P.2d 236 ; Kakos v. Byrum (1930), 88 Mont. 309 , 292 P. 909 .

1989“It is an elementary principle of law that before a claim for relief can be made against a defendant for negligence, the existence of a duty by the defendant to the plaintiff must be shown, along with the breach of the duty and a resulting injury.” Roy v. Neibauer (Mont. 1981), [ 191 Mont. 221 ,] 623 P.2d 555, 556 , 38 St.Rep. 173 , 174; Jackson v. William Dingwall Co. (1965), 145 Mont. 127 , 399 P.2d 236 ; Kakos v. Byrum (1930), 88 Mont. 309 , 292 P. 909 .

1989“It is an elementary principle of law that before a claim for relief can be made against a defendant for negligence, the existence of a duty by the defendant to the plaintiff must be shown, along with the breach of the duty and a resulting injury.” Roy v. Neibauer (Mont. 1981), [ 191 Mont. 221 ,] 623 P.2d 555, 556 , 38 St.Rep. 173 , 174; Jackson v. William Dingwall Co. (1965), 145 Mont. 127 , 399 P.2d 236 ; Kakos v. Byrum (1930), 88 Mont. 309 , 292 P. 909 .

1962This court has qualified the above rule by the following language: ‘But questions of fact may be involved in the determination of questions of law, so that an order, regular on its face, may be set aside if it appears that the rate is so low as to be confiscatory and in violation of the constitutional prohibition against taking property without due process of law; or if the Commission acted so arbitrarily and unjustly as to fix rates contrary to evidence, or without evidence to support it; or if the authority therein involved has been executed in such an unreasonable manner as to cause it to b

1962This court has qualified the above rule by the following language: ‘But questions of fact may be involved in the determination of questions of law, so that an order, regular on its face, may be set aside if it appears that the rate is so low as to be confiscatory and in violation of the constitutional prohibition against taking property without due process of law; or if the Commission acted so arbitrarily and unjustly as to fix rates contrary to evidence, or without evidence to support it; or if the authority therein involved has been executed in such an unreasonable manner as to cause it to b

1949Estate of Phelps, 182 Cal. 752 , 756 , 190 P. 17 ; Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 337 , 343 , 55 P. 1011 ; In re Estate of Phoebe Benolken, 122 Mont. 425 , 205 P.2d 1141 , 1 St.

1949Estate of Phelps, 182 Cal. 752 , 756 , 190 P. 17 ; Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 337 , 343 , 55 P. 1011 ; In re Estate of Phoebe Benolken, 122 Mont. 425 , 205 P.2d 1141 , 1 St.

1949Estate of Phelps, 182 Cal. 752 , 756 , 190 P. 17 ; Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 337 , 343 , 55 P. 1011 ; In re Estate of Phoebe Benolken, 122 Mont. 425 , 205 P.2d 1141 , 1 St.

1949Estate of Phelps, 182 Cal. 752 , 756 , 190 P. 17 ; Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 337 , 343 , 55 P. 1011 ; In re Estate of Phoebe Benolken, 122 Mont. 425 , 205 P.2d 1141 , 1 St.

1949Estate of Phelps, 182 Cal. 752 , 756 , 190 P. 17 ; Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 337 , 343 , 55 P. 1011 ; In re Estate of Phoebe Benolken, 122 Mont. 425 , 205 P.2d 1141 , 1 St.

1949Estate of Phelps, 182 Cal. 752 , 756 , 190 P. 17 ; Estate of Young, 123 Cal. 337 , 343 , 55 P. 1011 ; In re Estate of Phoebe Benolken, 122 Mont. 425 , 205 P.2d 1141 , 1 St.

1935Foot v. Burr, 73 Mont. 586 , 238 Pac. 585 ; Hale v. Belgrade Co., 74 Mont. 308 , 240 Pac. 371 .) * * * The amended Act must be held valid, unless it violates the elementary rule that ‘if the amendatory Act is not germane to the subject-matter of the Act to be amended, then it is not of any effect whatever as an amendment.’ (Dolenty v. Broadwater County, 45 Mont. 261 , 122 Pac. 919, 921 .) ‘Germane’ *411 means ‘in close relationship; appropriate; relevant; pertinent.’ The question as to what is germane to a subject is one of fact, rather than law, and there can be no clear line of demarcation b

1935Foot v. Burr, 73 Mont. 586 , 238 Pac. 585 ; Hale v. Belgrade Co., 74 Mont. 308 , 240 Pac. 371 .) * * * The amended Act must be held valid, unless it violates the elementary rule that ‘if the amendatory Act is not germane to the subject-matter of the Act to be amended, then it is not of any effect whatever as an amendment.’ (Dolenty v. Broadwater County, 45 Mont. 261 , 122 Pac. 919, 921 .) ‘Germane’ *411 means ‘in close relationship; appropriate; relevant; pertinent.’ The question as to what is germane to a subject is one of fact, rather than law, and there can be no clear line of demarcation b

1933Co., 78 Mont. 579 , 254 Pac. 880 .) This is said to be an elementary rule of statutory construction.

1933Co., 78 Mont. 579 , 254 Pac. 880 .) This is said to be an elementary rule of statutory construction.

1927They violated the elementary rule of evidence that, before book entries are admissible, it must be shown that the books were kept in the usual course of business, were kept honestly and correctly, and that the entries were duly made, contemporaneously with the transactions to which they relate.” In the absence of such a preliminary showing, such book entries are never admissible. (1 Greenleaf on Evidence, 16th ed., sec. 120; 3 Jones on Evidence, sec. 573; Ryan v. Dunphy, 4 Mont. 356 , Ann.

1925(Ryan v. Dunphy, 4 Mont. 356 , 47 Am.

1996Gordon also argues that the Safety Act excludes from its definition of "employee" individuals who perform *1151 household or domestic service as well as, under certain circumstances, "casual employees." We have stated that "[i]t is an elementary principle that an employer must provide its employees with a safe place to work." Reynolds, 621 P.2d at 1037 .

1996Gordon also argues that the Safety Act excludes from its definition of “employee” individuals who perform household or domestic service as well as, under certain circumstances, “casual employees.” We have stated that “[i]t is an elementary principle that an employer must provide its employees with a safe place to work.” Reynolds, 621 P.2d at 1037 .

1992Rollins v. Blair (1989), 235 Mont. 343, 346 , 767 P.2d 328, 330 .

1992Rollins v. Blair (1989), 235 Mont. 343, 346 , 767 P.2d 328, 330 .

1989“It is an elementary principle of law that before a claim for relief can be made against a defendant for negligence, the existence of a duty by the defendant to the plaintiff must be shown, along with the breach of the duty and a resulting injury.” Roy v. Neibauer (Mont. 1981), [ 191 Mont. 221 ,] 623 P.2d 555, 556 , 38 St.Rep. 173 , 174; Jackson v. William Dingwall Co. (1965), 145 Mont. 127 , 399 P.2d 236 ; Kakos v. Byrum (1930), 88 Mont. 309 , 292 P. 909 .

1986It is an elementary principle of constitutional law that “the same statute may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional, and that if the parts are wholly independent of each other, that which is constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected.” Brockett, 105 S.Ct. at 2801 , quoting from Allen v. La. (1881), 103 U.S. 80, 83-84 , 13 Otto 80 , 26 L.Ed. 318 .

1986It is an elementary principle of constitutional law that “the same statute may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional, and that if the parts are wholly independent of each other, that which is constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected.” Brockett, 105 S.Ct. at 2801 , quoting from Allen v. La. (1881), 103 U.S. 80, 83-84 , 13 Otto 80 , 26 L.Ed. 318 .

1986(Citation omitted.) “ ‘If an agreement be so vague and indefinite that it is not possible to collect from it the full intention of the parties, it is void; for neither the court nor the jury can make an agreement for the parties.’ Price v. Stipek, 39 Mont. 426 , 104 P. 195 .” Schwab v. McVey (1918), 54 Mont. 422, 425 , 171 P. 277, 278 .

1986(Citation omitted.) “ ‘If an agreement be so vague and indefinite that it is not possible to collect from it the full intention of the parties, it is void; for neither the court nor the jury can make an agreement for the parties.’ Price v. Stipek, 39 Mont. 426 , 104 P. 195 .” Schwab v. McVey (1918), 54 Mont. 422, 425 , 171 P. 277, 278 .

1986(Citation omitted.) “ ‘If an agreement be so vague and indefinite that it is not possible to collect from it the full intention of the parties, it is void; for neither the court nor the jury can make an agreement for the parties.’ Price v. Stipek, 39 Mont. 426 , 104 P. 195 .” Schwab v. McVey (1918), 54 Mont. 422, 425 , 171 P. 277, 278 .

1986(Citation omitted.) “ ‘If an agreement be so vague and indefinite that it is not possible to collect from it the full intention of the parties, it is void; for neither the court nor the jury can make an agreement for the parties.’ Price v. Stipek, 39 Mont. 426 , 104 P. 195 .” Schwab v. McVey (1918), 54 Mont. 422, 425 , 171 P. 277, 278 .

1986It is an elementary principle of constitutional law that “the same statute may be in part constitutional and in part unconstitutional, and that if the parts are wholly independent of each other, that which is constitutional may stand while that which is unconstitutional will be rejected.” Brockett, 105 S.Ct. at 2801 , quoting from Allen v. La. (1881), 103 U.S. 80, 83-84 , 13 Otto 80 , 26 L.Ed. 318 .

1980Shannon v. Howard S. Wright Const. Co. (1979), 181 Mont. 269 , 593 P.2d 438 ; Pollard, 418 P.2d at 872 ; Allen v. Bear Creek Coal Co. (1911), 43 Mont. 269 , 115 P. 673, 677 ; Anderson v. Northern Pac.

1980Shannon v. Howard S. Wright Const. Co. (1979), 181 Mont. 269 , 593 P.2d 438 ; Pollard, 418 P.2d at 872 ; Allen v. Bear Creek Coal Co. (1911), 43 Mont. 269 , 115 P. 673, 677 ; Anderson v. Northern Pac.

1980Shannon v. Howard S. Wright Const. Co. (1979), 181 Mont. 269 , 593 P.2d 438 ; Pollard, 418 P.2d at 872 ; Allen v. Bear Creek Coal Co. (1911), 43 Mont. 269 , 115 P. 673, 677 ; Anderson v. Northern Pac.

1980Shannon v. Howard S. Wright Const. Co. (1979), 181 Mont. 269 , 593 P.2d 438 ; Pollard, 418 P.2d at 872 ; Allen v. Bear Creek Coal Co. (1911), 43 Mont. 269 , 115 P. 673, 677 ; Anderson v. Northern Pac.

1975If, within a reasonable time after notice to the lessor of dilapidations which he ought to repair, he neglects to do so, the lessee may repair the same himself, where the costs of such repairs do not require an expenditure greater than one month’s rent of the premises, and deduct the ex *158 penses of such repairs from the rent, or the lessee may vacate-the premises, in which case he shall be discharged from further payment of rent, or performance of other conditions.” Section 42-105, R.C.M.1947, simply states: “The hirer of a thing must repair all deteriorations or injuries thereto occasioned

1975If, within a reasonable time after notice to the lessor of dilapidations which he ought to repair, he neglects to do so, the lessee may repair the same himself, where the costs of such repairs do not require an expenditure greater than one month’s rent of the premises, and deduct the ex *158 penses of such repairs from the rent, or the lessee may vacate-the premises, in which case he shall be discharged from further payment of rent, or performance of other conditions.” Section 42-105, R.C.M.1947, simply states: “The hirer of a thing must repair all deteriorations or injuries thereto occasioned

1975Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com’n, 74 Cal.App.2d 911 , 170 P.2d 36, 37 , the California Industrial Accident Commission referred a case to two independent physicians because of conflicting medical testimony.

1975Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com’n, 74 Cal.App.2d 911 , 170 P.2d 36, 37 , the California Industrial Accident Commission referred a case to two independent physicians because of conflicting medical testimony.

1970In Thacker we stated at p. 103, 204 P. at p. 380 : “It is an elementary rule of statutory construction that every word, phrase, clause, and sentence in an act must be given meaning if it is possible to do so * * Therefore the principal question is, subsequent to holding that the South Shore Inn is a business, whether or not fire protection is a business use.

1940The case of Hume v. Seattle Dock Co., 68 Or. 477 , 137 Pac. 752 , 50 L.

1940The case of Hume v. Seattle Dock Co., 68 Or. 477 , 137 Pac. 752 , 50 L.

1939Codes; see, also, section 7542, Id.; Backer v. Parker-Morelli-Barclay Motor Co., 87 Mont. 595 , 289 Pac. 571 ; New Home Sewing Machine Co. v. Songer, 91 Mont. 127 , 7 Pac. (2d) 238 ; 12 Am.

1939Codes; see, also, section 7542, Id.; Backer v. Parker-Morelli-Barclay Motor Co., 87 Mont. 595 , 289 Pac. 571 ; New Home Sewing Machine Co. v. Songer, 91 Mont. 127 , 7 Pac. (2d) 238 ; 12 Am.

1939Codes; see, also, section 7542, Id.; Backer v. Parker-Morelli-Barclay Motor Co., 87 Mont. 595 , 289 Pac. 571 ; New Home Sewing Machine Co. v. Songer, 91 Mont. 127 , 7 Pac. (2d) 238 ; 12 Am.

1939Codes; see, also, section 7542, Id.; Backer v. Parker-Morelli-Barclay Motor Co., 87 Mont. 595 , 289 Pac. 571 ; New Home Sewing Machine Co. v. Songer, 91 Mont. 127 , 7 Pac. (2d) 238 ; 12 Am.

1938Dist., 63 Mont. *299 293, 207 Pac. 121, 122 , see, also, State ex rel.