63 Kentucky opinions name it 3 courts 1891–2026 5 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Kentucky courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Merrick v. Smithgreen2 sentences2021We first ask if Nichols has alleged an injury in fact.16 In order to confer standing, an injury cannot be speculative but instead must be direct and imminent.17 In Merrick v. Smith, our predecessor court held “[i]t is an elementary principle that constitutionality of a law or its application is not open to challenge by a person or persons whose rights are not injured or jeopardized thereby.”18 Thus, for Nichols to have standing to claim that KRS 341.470(3) violates the separation-of-powers doctrine, he must show that his 14 Id. 15 Id. at 192 (“We hold that all Kentucky courts have the constitu 2021We first ask if Nichols has alleged an injury in fact.16 In order to confer standing, an injury cannot be speculative but instead must be direct and imminent.17 In Merrick v. Smith, our predecessor court held “[i]t is an elementary principle that constitutionality of a law or its application is not open to challenge by a person or persons whose rights are not injured or jeopardized thereby.”18 Thus, for Nichols to have standing to claim that KRS 341.470(3) violates the separation-of-powers doctrine, he must show that his 14 Id. 15 Id. at 192 (“We hold that all Kentucky courts have the constitu | 4 | 4 |
Second Street Properties, Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson Countygreen2 sentences2008Properties, Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 445 S.W.2d 709, 716 (Ky.1969); Merrick v. Smith, 347 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Ky.1961)(“It is an elementary principle that constitutionality of a law or its application is not open to challenge by a person or persons whose rights are not injured or jeopardized thereby”) The judgment of the Barren Circuit Court is affirmed. 2008Properties, Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 445 S.W.2d 709, 716 (Ky. 1969); Merrick v. Smith, 347 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Ky.1961)("It is an elementary principle that constitutionality of a law or its application is not open to challenge by a person or persons whose rights are not injured or jeopardized thereby.") The judgment of the Barren Circuit Court is affirmed. | 3 | 3 |
Warren v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1958See Ramsey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 267 S.W.2d 730 ; Warren v. Commonwealth, Ky., 256 S.W.2d 368 . 1956See Ramsey v. Commonwealth (Guinan v. Commonwealth), Ky., 267 S.W.2d 730 ; Warren v. Commonwealth, Ky., 256 S.W.2d 368 . | 2 | 4 |
Hampton v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2022In beginning our analysis of the safe-harbor language contained in KRS 372.005, we note that “[i]t is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word . . . of a statute.” Hampton v. -8- Commonwealth, 257 Ky. 626, 630 , 78 S.W.2d 748, 750 (1934) (citations omitted). 2022In beginning our analysis of the safe-harbor language contained in KRS 372.005, we note that “[i]t is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word . . . of a statute.” Hampton v. -8- Commonwealth, 257 Ky. 626, 630 , 78 S.W.2d 748, 750 (1934) (citations omitted). | 2 | 3 |
Griffith v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2017Griffith v. Commonwealth, 250 Ky. 506 , 63 S.W.2d 594, 596 (1933). 4 Like many common law rules of evidence that have been included in modern codes of evidence, KRE 801A(b)(2) derives its wisdom from an elementary rule of human nature that was long ago woven into the fabric of the common law. 2017Griffith v. Commonwealth, 250 Ky. 506 , 63 S.W.2d 594, 596 (1933). 4 Like many common law rules of evidence that have been included in modern codes of evidence, KRE 801A(b)(2) derives its wisdom from an elementary rule of human nature that was long ago woven into the fabric of the common law. | 2 | 2 |
Tipton v. Brown, Director of Game and Fishgreen2 sentences2015Tipton v. Brown, 277 Ky. 625 , 126 S.W.2d 1067, 1071 (1939). 2015Tipton v. Brown, 277 Ky. 625 , 126 S.W.2d 1067, 1071 (1939). | 2 | 2 |
Stein v. Kentucky State Tax Commissiongreen2 sentences2005Prop., Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 445 S.W.2d 709, 716 (Ky.1969) (“Before one seeks to strike down a state statute he must show that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures him.”); Merrick v. Smith, 347 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Ky.1961) (“It is an elementary principle that constitutionality of a law or its application is not open to challenge by a person or persons whose rights are not injured or jeopardized thereby.”); Steel v. Meek, 312 Ky. 87 , 226 S.W.2d 542, 543 (1950) (constitutional challenge to statute governing absentee voting procedures on grounds that it made no provision 2005Prop., Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 445 S.W.2d 709, 716 (Ky.1969) (“Before one seeks to strike down a state statute he must show that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures him.”); Merrick v. Smith, 347 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Ky.1961) (“It is an elementary principle that constitutionality of a law or its application is not open to challenge by a person or persons whose rights are not injured or jeopardized thereby.”); Steel v. Meek, 312 Ky. 87 , 226 S.W.2d 542, 543 (1950) (constitutional challenge to statute governing absentee voting procedures on grounds that it made no provision | 2 | 2 |
Steel v. Meekgreen2 sentences2005Prop., Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 445 S.W.2d 709, 716 (Ky.1969) (“Before one seeks to strike down a state statute he must show that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures him.”); Merrick v. Smith, 347 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Ky.1961) (“It is an elementary principle that constitutionality of a law or its application is not open to challenge by a person or persons whose rights are not injured or jeopardized thereby.”); Steel v. Meek, 312 Ky. 87 , 226 S.W.2d 542, 543 (1950) (constitutional challenge to statute governing absentee voting procedures on grounds that it made no provision 2005Prop., Inc. v. Fiscal Court of Jefferson County, 445 S.W.2d 709, 716 (Ky.1969) (“Before one seeks to strike down a state statute he must show that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures him.”); Merrick v. Smith, 347 S.W.2d 537, 538 (Ky.1961) (“It is an elementary principle that constitutionality of a law or its application is not open to challenge by a person or persons whose rights are not injured or jeopardized thereby.”); Steel v. Meek, 312 Ky. 87 , 226 S.W.2d 542, 543 (1950) (constitutional challenge to statute governing absentee voting procedures on grounds that it made no provision | 2 | 2 |
Ramsey v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences1958See Ramsey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 267 S.W.2d 730 ; Warren v. Commonwealth, Ky., 256 S.W.2d 368 . 1956See Ramsey v. Commonwealth (Guinan v. Commonwealth), Ky., 267 S.W.2d 730 ; Warren v. Commonwealth, Ky., 256 S.W.2d 368 . | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Standard Brewery, Inc.green2 sentences2020We have long held, “[i]t is an elementary rule of construction that effect must be given, if possible, to every word . . . of a statute.” Hampton v. Commonwealth, 78 S.W.2d 748, 750 (1934) (citing United States v. Standard Brewery, 251 U.S. 210, 40 (1920)). 1934United States v. Standard Brewery, 251 U. S. 210 , 40 S. Ct. 139 , 64 L. | 1 | 2 |
Entwistle v. Carrier Conveyor Corporationgreen1 sentence2026Corp., 284 S.W.2d 820, 822-23 (Ky. 1955). | 1 | 1 |
Mid-Continent Petroleum Corp. v. Barrettgreen1 sentence2024It is deemed his own fault if he does not expressly provide against contingencies and exempt himself from responsibility in -7- certain events.” Id. at 818-19 (quoting Mid-Continent Petroleum Company v. Barrett, 181 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Ky. 1944)). | 1 | 1 |
McCall v. Courier-Journal & Louisville Times Co.green1 sentence2024“It is an elementary principle of the law of libel that the defamatory matter complained of should be construed as a whole.” McCall v. Courier-Journal and Louisville Times Co., 623 S.W.2d 882, 884 (Ky. 1981) (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Sextongreen2 sentences2021We first ask if Nichols has alleged an injury in fact.16 In order to confer standing, an injury cannot be speculative but instead must be direct and imminent.17 In Merrick v. Smith, our predecessor court held “[i]t is an elementary principle that constitutionality of a law or its application is not open to challenge by a person or persons whose rights are not injured or jeopardized thereby.”18 Thus, for Nichols to have standing to claim that KRS 341.470(3) violates the separation-of-powers doctrine, he must show that his 14 Id. 15 Id. at 192 (“We hold that all Kentucky courts have the constitu 2021We first ask if Nichols has alleged an injury in fact.16 In order to confer standing, an injury cannot be speculative but instead must be direct and imminent.17 In Merrick v. Smith, our predecessor court held “[i]t is an elementary principle that constitutionality of a law or its application is not open to challenge by a person or persons whose rights are not injured or jeopardized thereby.”18 Thus, for Nichols to have standing to claim that KRS 341.470(3) violates the separation-of-powers doctrine, he must show that his 14 Id. 15 Id. at 192 (“We hold that all Kentucky courts have the constitu | 1 | 1 |
First Baptist Church of Ft. Worth v. Baptist Bible Sem.green1 sentence2013As this Court recently noted in Tax Ease Lien Investments 1, LLC v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust, 384 S.W.3d 141, 143 (Ky.2012), for a party to have standing to bring an action it is imperative that the party have a “present or substantial” interest in the matter litigated and not simply a “mere expectancy.” In the realm of constitutional challenges, the rule was most concisely stated in Merrick v. Smith, 347 S.W.2d 587, 538 (Ky.1961): “It is an elementary principle that [the] constitutionality of a law or its application is not open to challenge by a person or persons whose rights are not injure | 1 | 1 |
Tax Ease Lien Investments 1, LLC v. Commonwealth Bank & Trustgreen1 sentence2013As this Court recently noted in Tax Ease Lien Investments 1, LLC v. Commonwealth Bank & Trust, 384 S.W.3d 141, 143 (Ky.2012), for a party to have standing to bring an action it is imperative that the party have a “present or substantial” interest in the matter litigated and not simply a “mere expectancy.” In the realm of constitutional challenges, the rule was most concisely stated in Merrick v. Smith, 347 S.W.2d 587, 538 (Ky.1961): “It is an elementary principle that [the] constitutionality of a law or its application is not open to challenge by a person or persons whose rights are not injure | 1 | 1 |
Butcher v. Adamsgreen2 sentences2010However, it is also, “an elementary rule of statutory interpretation that whenever in the statutes on any particular subject there are apparent conflicts which cannot be reconciled, the later statute controls.” Butcher v. Adams, 310 Ky. 205 , 220 S.W.2d 398, 400 (1949) (emphasis added). 2010However, it is also, “an elementary rule of statutory interpretation that whenever in the statutes on any particular subject there are apparent conflicts which cannot be reconciled, the later statute controls.” Butcher v. Adams, 310 Ky. 205 , 220 S.W.2d 398, 400 (1949) (emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Denham v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2006Baker v. Commonwealth, 307 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Ky. 1957) ("Indirect and circumstantial evidence may be the basis of establishing the necessary elements of an offense."); Denham v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 771 , 40 S.W.2d 384, 386 (1931) ("The corpus delicti may be established by circumstantial evidence as any other fact in the case." (Quotation omitted.)). 2006Baker v. Commonwealth, 307 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Ky. 1957) ("Indirect and circumstantial evidence may be the basis of establishing the necessary elements of an offense."); Denham v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 771 , 40 S.W.2d 384, 386 (1931) ("The corpus delicti may be established by circumstantial evidence as any other fact in the case." (Quotation omitted.)). | 1 | 1 |
Baker v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2006Baker v. Commonwealth, 307 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Ky. 1957) (“Indirect and circumstantial evidence may be the basis of establishing the necessary elements of an offense.”); Denham v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 771 , 40 S.W.2d 384, 386 (1931) (“The corpus delicti may be established by circumstantial evidence as any other fact in the case.” (Quotation omitted.)). 2006Baker v. Commonwealth, 307 S.W.2d 773, 775 (Ky. 1957) ("Indirect and circumstantial evidence may be the basis of establishing the necessary elements of an offense."); Denham v. Commonwealth, 239 Ky. 771 , 40 S.W.2d 384, 386 (1931) ("The corpus delicti may be established by circumstantial evidence as any other fact in the case." (Quotation omitted.)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C.green2 sentences2006If, in fact, the Member of this Court who has changed his mind about Kotila “was seduced by a metaphysical infatuation which led to an absurdity,” ante, at 603, then it was a self-seduction, because that very same Member (Justice Graves) was the author of Hayward . 1 Following Hayward and the first rule of statutory construction, i.e., “the language of the statute itself,” United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 338-39 (6th Cir.2000), Kotila then applied an elementary principle of English grammar: The word “the” is “[u]sed as a function word before a plural noun denoting a 2006If, in fact, the Member of this Court who has changed his mind about Kotila "was seduced by a metaphysical infatuation which led to an absurdity," ante, at 603, then it was a self-seduction, because that very same Member (Justice Graves) was the author of Hayward . [1] *612 Following Hayward and the first rule of statutory construction, i.e., "the language of the statute itself," United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 338-39 (6th Cir.2000), Kotila then applied an elementary principle of English grammar: The word "the" is "[u]sed as a function word before a plural noun den | 1 | 1 |
Gibson v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2003See *424 also Gibson v. Commonwealth, 209 Ky. 101 , 272 S.W. 43 (1925) (“It is an elementary principle that where ... there are two possible interpretations, by one of which the statute would be constitutional, and by the other it would not, it is the duty of the court to adopt that construction which would uphold it.”). 23 . 2003See *424 also Gibson v. Commonwealth, 209 Ky. 101 , 272 S.W. 43 (1925) (“It is an elementary principle that where ... there are two possible interpretations, by one of which the statute would be constitutional, and by the other it would not, it is the duty of the court to adopt that construction which would uphold it.”). 23 . | 1 | 1 |
| Overnite Transportation Co. v. Gaddisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Gilbert v. Greenegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Southern Railway Companygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Keyes v. Carrickgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Old Republic Insurance Company v. Begleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Kentucky. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
American Cas. Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Shely
green
2 sentences1971Kentucky Home Life Insurance Co. v. Kittinger, 262 Ky. 525 , 90 S.W.2d 673 , 103 A.L.R. 1361 ; American Casualty Co. of Reading Pa. v. Shely, 314 Ky. 80 , 234 S.W.2d 303 .” It was shown that plaintiff made inquiry of defendant concerning the possibility that the latter enjoyed a tax-free status. 1958Kentucky Home Life Insurance Co. v. Kittinger, 262 Ky. 525 , 90 S.W.2d 673 , 103 A.L.R. 1361 ; American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Shely, 314 Ky. 80 , 234 S.W.2d 303 . | 2 | 1958–1971 |
Kentucky Home Life Ins. Co. v. Kittinger
neutral
2 sentences1971Kentucky Home Life Insurance Co. v. Kittinger, 262 Ky. 525 , 90 S.W.2d 673 , 103 A.L.R. 1361 ; American Casualty Co. of Reading Pa. v. Shely, 314 Ky. 80 , 234 S.W.2d 303 .” It was shown that plaintiff made inquiry of defendant concerning the possibility that the latter enjoyed a tax-free status. 1971Kentucky Home Life Insurance Co. v. Kittinger, 262 Ky. 525 , 90 S.W.2d 673 , 103 A.L.R. 1361 ; American Casualty Co. of Reading Pa. v. Shely, 314 Ky. 80 , 234 S.W.2d 303 .” It was shown that plaintiff made inquiry of defendant concerning the possibility that the latter enjoyed a tax-free status. | 2 | 1958–1971 |
American Cas. Co. v. Shely
neutral
2 sentences1971Kentucky Home Life Insurance Co. v. Kittinger, 262 Ky. 525 , 90 S.W.2d 673 , 103 A.L.R. 1361 ; American Casualty Co. of Reading Pa. v. Shely, 314 Ky. 80 , 234 S.W.2d 303 .” It was shown that plaintiff made inquiry of defendant concerning the possibility that the latter enjoyed a tax-free status. 1958Kentucky Home Life Insurance Co. v. Kittinger, 262 Ky. 525 , 90 S.W.2d 673 , 103 A.L.R. 1361 ; American Casualty Co. of Reading, Pa. v. Shely, 314 Ky. 80 , 234 S.W.2d 303 . | 2 | 1958–1971 |
Fordson Coal Company v. Bowling
neutral
2 sentences1943Simpkins’ Adm’r v. Wells, 42 S. W. 348 , 19 Ky. Law Rep. 881 ; Fordson Coal Co. v. Bowling, 238 Ky. 221 , 37 S. W. (2d) 69 . 1943Simpkins’ Adm’r v. Wells, 42 S. W. 348 , 19 Ky. Law Rep. 881 ; Fordson Coal Co. v. Bowling, 238 Ky. 221 , 37 S. W. (2d) 69 . | 2 | 1942–1943 |
Bain v. Tye
green
2 sentences1928In the case of Bain et al. v. Tye et al., 160 Ky. 408 , 169 S. W. 843 , we said: “It is an elementary rule in the interpretation of deeds that the intention of the parties should be effectuated, and in doing this a liberal construction is given to deeds inartificially and untechnically drawn. 1928In the case of Bain et al. v. Tye et al., 160 Ky. 408 , 169 S. W. 843 , we said: “It is an elementary rule in the interpretation of deeds that the intention of the parties should be effectuated, and in doing this a liberal construction is given to deeds inartificially and untechnically drawn. | 2 | 1920–1928 |
Bowlin v. Archer
green
2 sentences1924Moreover, they must agree; and proof without a pleading to'support it no more warrant's a recovery, than a pleading without proof. ’ ’ Bowlin v. Archer, 157 Ky. 540 . 1915In the case of Bowlin v. Archer, 157 Ky., 540 , it was .said: “It is an elementary rule of practice, that instructions should .be confined to the issues presented by the pleadings and the evidence.” In L. & N. R. | 2 | 1915–1924 |
Frazier v. Collins
green
1 sentence2024It is deemed his own fault if he does not expressly provide against contingencies and exempt himself from responsibility in -7- certain events.” Id. at 818-19 (quoting Mid-Continent Petroleum Company v. Barrett, 181 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Ky. 1944)). | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Kotila v. Commonwealth
green
2 sentences2006If, in fact, the Member of this Court who has changed his mind about Kotila “was seduced by a metaphysical infatuation which led to an absurdity,” ante, at 603, then it was a self-seduction, because that very same Member (Justice Graves) was the author of Hayward . 1 Following Hayward and the first rule of statutory construction, i.e., “the language of the statute itself,” United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 338-39 (6th Cir.2000), Kotila then applied an elementary principle of English grammar: The word “the” is “[u]sed as a function word before a plural noun denoting a 2006If, in fact, the Member of this Court who has changed his mind about Kotila "was seduced by a metaphysical infatuation which led to an absurdity," ante, at 603, then it was a self-seduction, because that very same Member (Justice Graves) was the author of Hayward . [1] *612 Following Hayward and the first rule of statutory construction, i.e., "the language of the statute itself," United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335, 338-39 (6th Cir.2000), Kotila then applied an elementary principle of English grammar: The word "the" is "[u]sed as a function word before a plural noun den | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| United States v. Jeffers green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| McDonald v. United States green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Bumper v. North Carolina
green
2 sentences2001Although the United States Supreme Court has, consistently and for over fifty years, placed the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of a warrantless search upon the government, see e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 , 69 S.Ct. 191 , 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 , 72 S.Ct. 93 , 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 , 88 S.Ct. 1788 , 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), today's majority appears, on three separate occasions, to reverse this burden by criticizing 2001Although the United States Supreme Court has, consistently and for over fifty years, placed the burden of demonstrating the reasonableness of a warrantless search upon the government, see e.g., McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451 , 69 S.Ct. 191 , 93 L.Ed. 153 (1948); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 , 72 S.Ct. 93 , 96 L.Ed. 59 (1951); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 , 88 S.Ct. 1788 , 20 L.Ed.2d 797 (1968); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 , 91 S.Ct. 2022 , 29 L.Ed.2d 564 (1971), today's majority appears, on three separate occasions, to reverse this burden by criticizing | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Coolidge v. New Hampshire green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
| Carr v. Cincinnati Bell, Inc. green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Kaplon v. Chase green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Pittsburg & Midway Coal Mining Co. v. Rushing green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Akers v. Floyd County Fiscal Court green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Duncan v. O'NAN green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Smith v. Pure Oil Co. green | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| Thomas v. Lyons green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Creech v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad neutral | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Collins v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Murphy v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Cornelius v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Powell v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1955–1955 |
| Newsom v. Damron neutral | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Barrett v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Shell v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 1953–1953 |
| Sumpter v. Burchett, as Commonwealth's Atty. green | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Dowdy v. McGuire neutral | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Consolidated Coach Corporation v. Hopkins green | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Sasseen v. Farmer green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| County Bd. of Ed. of Bath Co., Ky. v. Goodpaster green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Ramsey's v. Ramsey green | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Craig v. Hawkins's heirs neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Schultz, Superintendent v. Ohio County green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Monmouth Street Merchants' Bus Ass'n v. Ryan green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Alexander v. de Kermel green | 1 | 1938–1938 |
| Wilson v. Commonwealth neutral | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Equitable Life Assurance Society of United States v. Morgan neutral | 1 | 1934–1934 |
| Reid v. Lyttle neutral | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.