elementary principle (Ohio) · Go Syfert
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elementary principle in Ohio

27 Ohio opinions name it 8 courts 1881–2020 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by Ohio courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (5)

CaseFollowedCited
David A. Lampe v. Xouth, Inc., Phillippe G. Wooggreen
ca3 · 1992 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2020–2020
1 sentence

2020Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-431 , 127 S.Ct. 1184 , 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007) (In the federal system, a court “generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the parties (personal jurisdiction)”); Lampe v. Xouth, Inc., 952 F.2d 697, 700 (3d Cir.1991) (“It is an elementary requirement that personal jurisdiction must be established in every case before a court has power to render any judgment”); Sutton v. Stolt-Nielsen Transp.

11
Motorists Mutual Insurance v. Columbus Finance, Inc.green
ohioctapp · 2006 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2019–2019
2 sentences

2019Co. v. Columbus Fin., Inc., 168 Ohio App.3d 691 , 2006- Ohio-5090, 861 N.E.2d 605, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.). {¶ 30} It is an elementary principle that any law relating to a contract which is in existence at the time of the execution of the contract becomes a part of the contract.

2019Co. v. Columbus Fin., Inc., 168 Ohio App.3d 691 , 2006- Ohio-5090, 861 N.E.2d 605, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.). {¶ 30} It is an elementary principle that any law relating to a contract which is in existence at the time of the execution of the contract becomes a part of the contract.

11
In Re HSM Kennewick, L.P.green
txnb · 2006 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014In re HSM Kennewick, L.P., 347 B.R. 569, 571 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2006) (“[i]t is an elementary principle of corporate law that a corporation and its stockholders are separate entities and that title to corporate property is vested in the corporation and not in the owners of the corporate stock”); In re Lindermann, 20 B.R. 826, 828 (Bankr.W.D.Wash.1982) (“[a]n individual shareholder has no property interest in its physical corporate assets”). {¶60} In the present case, the trial court found that Duane Burdick purchased six motor vehicles personally and paid for them during the course of the marriage

11
In Re Lindermangreen
wawb · 1982 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2014–2014
1 sentence

2014In re HSM Kennewick, L.P., 347 B.R. 569, 571 (Bankr.N.D.Tex.2006) (“[i]t is an elementary principle of corporate law that a corporation and its stockholders are separate entities and that title to corporate property is vested in the corporation and not in the owners of the corporate stock”); In re Lindermann, 20 B.R. 826, 828 (Bankr.W.D.Wash.1982) (“[a]n individual shareholder has no property interest in its physical corporate assets”). {¶60} In the present case, the trial court found that Duane Burdick purchased six motor vehicles personally and paid for them during the course of the marriage

11
Meyer v. Chieffogreen
ohioctapp · 2011 · cited in 1 Ohio opinions naming this issue, 2012–2012
2 sentences

2012The trial court properly followed our mandate, and would not have been authorized to consider issues regarding the water problem, particularly since that matter had been resolved through an award of damages. {¶ 50} “It has been cited as an elementary rule of contracts that when a material breach occurs, the nonbreaching party ‘may, at his option, elect to rescind the contract, or continue it in force and sue for damages for the breach.’ ” Meyer v. Chieffo, 193 Ohio App.3d 51 , 2011-Ohio-1670 , 950 N.E.2d 1027, ¶ 32 (10th Dist.).

2012The trial court properly followed our mandate, and would not have been authorized to consider issues regarding the water problem, particularly since that matter had been resolved through an award of damages. {¶ 50} “It has been cited as an elementary rule of contracts that when a material breach occurs, the nonbreaching party ‘may, at his option, elect to rescind the contract, or continue it in force and sue for damages for the breach.’ ” Meyer v. Chieffo, 193 Ohio App.3d 51 , 2011-Ohio-1670 , 950 N.E.2d 1027, ¶ 32 (10th Dist.).

11

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

CaseNegativeCited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Ohio. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (27)

CaseCitedYears
State v. Eley green
ohio · 1978
2 sentences

2002"It is also an elementary principle of law that when reviewing a criminal conviction, `* * * [t]his court's examination of the record at trial is limited to a determination of whether there was evidence presented, "which, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." * * * Our review is thus confined to a determination of whether there was substantial evidence. * * *'" Id . at 263, 574 N.E.2d at 496 , quoting State v. Eley (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 169 , 172 , 10 O.O.3d 340, 341 , 383 N.E.2d 132 , 134 .

2002"It is also an elementary principle of law that when reviewing a criminal conviction, `* * * [t]his court's examination of the record at trial is limited to a determination of whether there was evidence presented, "which, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." * * * Our review is thus confined to a determination of whether there was substantial evidence. * * *'" Id . at 263, 574 N.E.2d at 496 , quoting State v. Eley (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 169 , 172 , 10 O.O.3d 340, 341 , 383 N.E.2d 132 , 134 .

21991–2002
Hartman v. Berry neutral
mo · 1874
2 sentences

1896Norton v. Clark, 85 Me., 357; 2 Jones Liens, section 1304; 11 Allen, 152 ; 56 Mo., 487 ; 54 Md., 71 .

1896Norton v. Clark, 85 Me. 357 ; 2 Jones’ Liens, sec. 1304; 11 Allen, 152 ; 56 Mo. 487 ; 54 Md. 71 .

21896–1896
McLaughlin v. Reinhart neutral
md · 1880
2 sentences

1896Norton v. Clark, 85 Me., 357; 2 Jones Liens, section 1304; 11 Allen, 152 ; 56 Mo., 487 ; 54 Md., 71 .

1896Norton v. Clark, 85 Me. 357 ; 2 Jones’ Liens, sec. 1304; 11 Allen, 152 ; 56 Mo. 487 ; 54 Md. 71 .

21896–1896
Sinochem International Co. v. Malaysia International Shipping Corp. green
scotus · 2007
2 sentences

2020Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-431 , 127 S.Ct. 1184 , 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007) (In the federal system, a court “generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the parties (personal jurisdiction)”); Lampe v. Xouth, Inc., 952 F.2d 697, 700 (3d Cir.1991) (“It is an elementary requirement that personal jurisdiction must be established in every case before a court has power to render any judgment”); Sutton v. Stolt-Nielsen Transp.

2020Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-431 , 127 S.Ct. 1184 , 167 L.Ed.2d 15 (2007) (In the federal system, a court “generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the parties (personal jurisdiction)”); Lampe v. Xouth, Inc., 952 F.2d 697, 700 (3d Cir.1991) (“It is an elementary requirement that personal jurisdiction must be established in every case before a court has power to render any judgment”); Sutton v. Stolt-Nielsen Transp.

12020–2020
State ex rel. Henderson v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation & Correction green
ohio · 1998
2 sentences

2017Henderson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab & Corr., 81 Ohio St.3d 267, 268 , 690 N.E.2d 887 (1998).

2017Henderson v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab & Corr., 81 Ohio St.3d 267, 268 , 690 N.E.2d 887 (1998).

12017–2017
Bryan Publishing Co. v. Kuser, 7-07-17 (6-2-2008) neutral
ohioctapp · 2008
1 sentence

2011No. 7-07-17, 2008-Ohio-2610 , 2008 WL 2230074 , ¶ 18, citing Dickson v. Wolin (Nov. 27, 1934), 9th Dist.

12011–2011
Haskins v. Alcott & Horton green
ohio · 1862
1 sentence

2010Accordingly, it is an elementary principle in pleading, that “where a statute, upon certain conditions, confers a right or gives a remedy unknown to the common law, the party asserting the right or availing himself of the remedy must in his pleading bring himself clearly within the statute.” Stipanovich v. Applin (1991), 74 Ohio App.3d 506, 510 , 599 N.E.2d 711 , citing Haskins v. Alcott & Horton (1862), 13 Ohio St. 210 . {¶ 29} The taxpayers’ allegations in the complaint fail to bring them clearly within R.C. 309.13.

12010–2010
Stipanovich v. Applin green
ohioctapp · 1991
2 sentences

2010Accordingly, it is an elementary principle in pleading, that “where a statute, upon certain conditions, confers a right or gives a remedy unknown to the common law, the party asserting the right or availing himself of the remedy must in his pleading bring himself clearly within the statute.” Stipanovich v. Applin (1991), 74 Ohio App.3d 506, 510 , 599 N.E.2d 711 , citing Haskins v. Alcott & Horton (1862), 13 Ohio St. 210 . {¶ 29} The taxpayers’ allegations in the complaint fail to bring them clearly within R.C. 309.13.

2010Accordingly, it is an elementary principle in pleading, that “where a statute, upon certain conditions, confers a right or gives a remedy unknown to the common law, the party asserting the right or availing himself of the remedy must in his pleading bring himself clearly within the statute.” Stipanovich v. Applin (1991), 74 Ohio App.3d 506, 510 , 599 N.E.2d 711 , citing Haskins v. Alcott & Horton (1862), 13 Ohio St. 210 . {¶ 29} The taxpayers’ allegations in the complaint fail to bring them clearly within R.C. 309.13.

12010–2010
Rice v. CertainTeed Corp. green
ohio · 1999
2 sentences

2007Rice v. CertainTeed Corp. (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 417, 419 , 704 N.E.2d 1217 . {¶ 24} Not only does the majority insert words into and delete words from R.C. 4905.61, it also misconstrues the context in which “treble the amount of damages” is used.

2007Rice v. CertainTeed Corp. (1999), 84 Ohio St.3d 417, 419 , 704 N.E.2d 1217 . {¶ 24} Not only does the majority insert words into and delete words from R.C. 4905.61, it also misconstrues the context in which “treble the amount of damages” is used.

12007–2007
Harvey v. Slacum green
md · 1942
2 sentences

2005“It is an elementary principle that no valid proceeding can be had against a person until he has been notified of the proceeding by proper summons, unless he voluntarily waives such constitutional right.” Harvey v. Slacum (1942), 181 Md. 206, 210 , 29 A.2d 276 . {¶ 15} Maryland Rule of Civil Procedure 2-121 sets forth the procedures for service of process in the circuit court.

2005“It is an elementary principle that no valid proceeding can be had against a person until he has been notified of the proceeding by proper summons, unless he voluntarily waives such constitutional right.” Harvey v. Slacum (1942), 181 Md. 206, 210 , 29 A.2d 276 . {¶ 15} Maryland Rule of Civil Procedure 2-121 sets forth the procedures for service of process in the circuit court.

12005–2005
State v. Jenks red
ohio · 1991
1 sentence

2002"It is also an elementary principle of law that when reviewing a criminal conviction, `* * * [t]his court's examination of the record at trial is limited to a determination of whether there was evidence presented, "which, if believed, would convince the average mind of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." * * * Our review is thus confined to a determination of whether there was substantial evidence. * * *'" Id . at 263, 574 N.E.2d at 496 , quoting State v. Eley (1978), 56 Ohio St.2d 169 , 172 , 10 O.O.3d 340, 341 , 383 N.E.2d 132 , 134 .

12002–2002
Quality Ready Mix, Inc. v. Mamone green
ohio · 1988
1 sentence

1999Quality Ready Mix, Inc. v. Mamone (1988), 35 Ohio St.3d 224 , 226-227 .

11999–1999
Akron-Canton Regional Airport Authority v. Swinehart green
ohio · 1980
1 sentence

1998An elementary requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Id.; Regional Airport Auth. v. Swinehart (1980), 62 Ohio St.2d 403 , 406 . "[I]n order for notice to be effective, it `must be granted at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.'" State ex rel.

11998–1998
Lee v. State green
kan · 1961
1 sentence

1970In one of these cases, Lee v. State, 187 Kan. 566 , the Supreme Court of Kansas said: “It is an elementary rule of law that the right to operate a motor vehicle upon a public street or highway is not a natural or unrestrained right, but a privilege which is subject to reasonable regulation under the police power of the state in the interest of public safety and welfare.” (Emphasis added.) “The use of the public highways by motor vehicles, with its consequent dangers, renders the necessity of regulation apparent.

11970–1970
Shaker Corlett Land Co. v. City of Cleveland green
ohio · 1942
2 sentences

1967Shaker Corlett Land Co. v. Cleveland (1942), 139 Ohio St. 536 , 41 N. E. 2d 243 , paragraph three of the syllabus; 55 American Jurisprudence 1048 and 1050, Vendor and Purchaser, Sections 655 and 657.

1967Shaker Corlett Land Co. v. Cleveland (1942), 139 Ohio St. 536 , 41 N. E. 2d 243 , paragraph three of the syllabus; 55 American Jurisprudence 1048 and 1050, Vendor and Purchaser, Sections 655 and 657.

11967–1967
City of Columbus v. Jackson neutral
ohioctapp · 1952
1 sentence

1965City of Columbus v. Jackson (1952), 93 Ohio App. 516 ; State v. Zdovc (1958), 106 Ohio App. 481 .

11965–1965
State v. Zdovc green
ohioctapp · 1958
1 sentence

1965City of Columbus v. Jackson (1952), 93 Ohio App. 516 ; State v. Zdovc (1958), 106 Ohio App. 481 .

11965–1965
Collacott Realty, Inc. v. Homuth neutral
ohmunictclevela · 1939
1 sentence

1962As an example, see Collacott Realty Company, Inc., v. Homuth (1939), 13 Ohio Opinions, 250, 28 Ohio Law Abs., 211 , 2 Ohio Supp., 118 , where realty company that had drawn a lease was denied judgment for its services in procuring the lease and the defendant was denied judgment for recovery of money he had paid as part payment for such services to the realty company.

11962–1962
Dickson v. Wolin green
ohioctapp · 1934
1 sentence

1959In Dickson v. Wolin, 18 Ohio Law Abs., 107 (1934), the Court of Appeals of Summit County states on page 108: “It is an elementary rule of contracts that, upon a material breach of a contract by one party thereto, the other contracting party may, at his option, elect to rescind the contract, or continue it in force and sue for damages for the breach.” The court further states on pages 108 and 109: “In other words, the conduct of the parties, as shown by the evidence, was such that, in our opinion, a mutual abandonment of the contract may be properly implied.

11959–1959
Tanzi v. New York Central R. Co. green
ohio · 1951
1 sentence

1957Co., 155 Ohio St., 149 , 98 N. E. (2d), 39, 24 A. L.

11957–1957
L. & M. Investment Co. v. Cutler green
· 1932
1 sentence

1956Investment Co. v. Cutler, et al., 125 Oh St 12, 180 N. E. 379 (cited in the Black-man case), is considered applicable here, in which case it is stated in the opinion, pp. 18 and 19: “It is an elementary principle of our jurisprudence that in determining whether a law or ordinance is constitutional, every reasonable presumption will be indulged in favor of its constitutional validity, and that it is only when there is a clear incompatibility between the legislative act and the Constitution that the judicial power will refuse to execute it.

11956–1956
Jacot v. Secrest green
· 1950
1 sentence

1954It is an elementary principle that any law relating to a contract which is in existence at the time of the execution of the contract becomes a part of such contract. 9 Ohio Jurisprudence, 416, Section 189; Palmer & Crawford v. Tingle, 55 Ohio St., 423 , 45 N. E., 313 ; Jacot v. Secrest et al., Bd. of Edn., 153 Ohio St., 553 , 93 N. E. (2d), 1.

11954–1954
Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Ives green
scotus · 1892
2 sentences

1948The rule upon the subject has been correctly stated to be that: ‘Where the surroundings are such as to render a crossing particularly dangerous, it is the duty of the company to exercise care commensurate with the danger, and especially, if the company has created unusual danger at or near a crossing, it must meet such peril with additional precautions.’ ” The case of Grand Trunk Railroad Company v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408 , 12 S. Ct. 679 , 36 L.

1948The rule upon the subject has been correctly stated to be that: ‘Where the surroundings are such as to render a crossing particularly dangerous, it is the duty of the company to exercise care commensurate with the danger, and especially, if the company has created unusual danger at or near a crossing, it must meet such peril with additional precautions.’ ” The case of Grand Trunk Railroad Company v. Ives, 144 U. S. 408 , 12 S. Ct. 679 , 36 L.

11948–1948
State Ex Rel. Harris v. Quigley neutral
ohio · 1938
1 sentence

1939Harris, v. Quigley, 134 Ohio St., 466 , 17 N. E. (2d), 912, it is stated by the Supreme Court that: “ ‘It is an elementary principle of code pleading that, in order to sustain a cause of action, all of the operative ultimate facts essential to the cause of action must be pleaded; * * V 31 Ohio Jurisprudence, 598, Section 58.

11939–1939
White's Adm'r v. Life Ass'n of America green
· 1879
1 sentence

1933We agree with the statement of the law contained in plaintiff in error’s brief, namely, that it is an elementary principle in the law of suretyship that: “the contract of a surety imports entire good faith between him and the creditor, which must be kept inviolate in all subsequent dealings between the creditor and the principal debtor.” White’s Admr., v Life Assn, of America, 63 Ala., 419 .

11933–1933
Norton v. Clark green
· 1893
11896–1896
Marsh v. Case neutral
wis · 1872
11881–1881

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Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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